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Introduction
In the 1980s the Canadian philosopher of science Ian Hacking outlined what he 
later called the project of scientific styles of thinking and doing, for short the 'styles 
project'. His main objective was to investigate the philosophical significance of the 
thesis that there exist distinct scientific ways of reasoning which have emerged 
and stabilized at different points of the history of the sciences. Although over the 
last forty years Hacking has added to his original nucleus of ideas several 
constructive suggestions, his original thesis has never been fully developed into a 
comprehensive theory. This dissertation can be placed between an assessment of 
Hacking's claims and an attempt to develop, correct and present in a more 
systematic way the styles project so to make of it something coherent and 
complete, what might be called the 'theory of scientific styles of thinking and 
doing'. Since to infer philosophical implications from Hacking's project and 
analyse them in order to pursue these two aims has been central to my 
methodology, my dissertation is also an analytical account of the styles project and 
its philosophical implications.
A few papers have captured my attention during the early stages of this 
dissertation. The first ones were Hacking's papers 'Language, Truth and Reason' 
and '"Style" for historians and philosophers', respectively published in 1982 and 
1992. In those writings, Hacking discussed the key expression 'style of reasoning', 
which he later abandoned in favour of the expression 'style of thinking and doing' 
to underline that in order to find out we do not only think but we also act. The
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original label 'style of reasoning' came from the book Styles of Scientific Thinking in
the European Tradition by the historian of science Alistair Cameron Crombie (1915-
1996). In that work, the latter listed six major styles of argumentation or, as he
conceived them, six methods of scientific enquiry and demonstration central in the
formative period of Western scientific thought:
a) The method of postulation exemplified by the Greek geometry, which 
consists of proof by deduction on the basis of explicit axioms;
b) The method of experiment and measurement both to control postulation 
and explore by observation;
c) The hypothetical construction of analogical models in order to explain 
unknown properties of phenomena;
d) The ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy;
e) The statistical analysis of regularities of populations and the calculus of 
probabilities.
f) The historical derivation of genetic development, a way of explaining the 
present as a development of the past regulated by certain laws.
In Hacking's hands the notion of style acquired a richer physiognomy with 
philosophical traits. He did not feel compelled to accept all the styles in Crombie's 
list, or their sequence and specific trajectory in time, and suggested that there have 
also been other styles.
When I started to reflect on these ideas I realised that, in order to 
understand whether the notion of style is useful for building up a picture of 
scientific reasoning, it was crucial to describe it more accurately. In particular, at a 
certain stage of my analysis of Hacking's notion it became important to make
STYLES OF TH IN K IN G : A SSESSIN G A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN HA CKING 'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
clearer which modes of thinking really deserve the label 'style of thinking and
doing'. These issues will be addressed in the second and in the third chapter of my
dissertation, after the literature review (chapter one). In those chapters, I shall
argue that it is possible to identify a set of features characterizing a style of
thinking and doing. Then I shall show that at least six ways of scientific thinking
satisfy those features and deserve the label 'style of thinking and doing', for short
'SoT'. Some of them belong to Crombie's list; others have been introduced by
Hacking or only mentioned by him. My analysis of these six SoTs will show that,
even though they share common properties, they also are very different in scope,
in their object of study and historical trajectory. Finally, in the fourth chapter I
shall argue that other ways of reasoning, which some scholars have presented as
SoTs, actually do not satisfy all the characterizing properties of the SoTs and
therefore should be considered as 'spurious SoTs'. In sum, the result I shall
achieve in chapter two, three and four is that it is possible to characterize what a
SoT is and use this notion for providing a description of modern scientific
thinking and doing.
In his papers of 1982 and 1992 Hacking put forward the claim that SoTs are 
modes of reasoning that emerge in particular historical periods and determine 
what counts as rational or irrational. In particular, according to him, SoTs bring 
about new sentences as candidates for being true-or-false: whether or not a 
proposition possesses a truth-value depends on whether we have ways to reason 
about it. For instance, in Renaissance medical textbooks we may find statements 
that are unclear to us; Hacking maintains that this does not happen because they 
are false when judged from our current mode of reasoning, but rather because
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what settles their truth-value is only the style of reasoning of the Renaissance
thinkers itself.
I took Hacking's claims above as a particular philosophical position within 
a line of thought that emerged at least back in the 1930s. In those years several 
philosophers and historians, including Ludwig Fleck and Gaston Bachelard, 
mentioned by Hacking on several occasions, claimed that the analysis of history of 
thought reveals ways of reasoning very different from one another. Indeed, their 
models, although different, share a common nucleus: intellectual history is to be 
regarded as made of several disparate worldviews. This view may well be 
considered as a reaction to the logical positivists who, impressed by the exciting 
scientific advances of their time, considered science as a model of rationality and 
its growth as cumulative.
The 'outside time and history' investigation of scientific activities 
conducted by analytic philosophers of science had also been called into question 
in the 1960s and 1970s by philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, Thomas 
Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. They rejected the idea that science simply grows by 
accumulation and proposed that earlier results may be rejected, replaced, or 
reinterpreted by new theories or worldviews. Nevertheless, these philosophers 
disagreed about how to* interpret history of science. For instance, Popper believed 
that progress is achieved when one and the same episode displays both 
incorporation and overthrow; for Kuhn, on the other hand, periods of 'norm al 
science', in which progress is achieved by incorporation, are followed by 
revolutionary overthrows that might accomplish discontinuous elevations of the 
level of scientific practice.
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Given this diversity of positions within the debate on the evolution of 
scientific thought I considered it important to identify the specific line of thought 
to which the styles project belongs. This issue will be addressed in chapter five: I 
shall argue that the SoTs project can be better understood as the development of 
'classical historical epistemology', a philosophical tradition bom  in France in the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when different thinkers started to reconstruct 
the historically situated conditions of scientific concepts.
In the rest of chapter five I shall compare and contrast the notion of SoT 
with the conclusions of other scholars. This comparative analysis will allow me to 
examine the concept of SoT from different perspectives so as to reveal its 
philosophical richness. The many-sided nature of the notion of SoT that will 
emerge explains why it is applied in many different areas of research. Ever since 
Hacking introduced this notion, many scholars have used it for investigating the 
history of concepts and of the sciences, the epistemic differences between distinct 
approaches to scientific research, the relationship between history and philosophy 
and even issues of learning and teaching science.
Another paper, 'Hacking's historical epistemology: a critique of styles of 
reasoning' by the philosopher Martin Kusch, prompted me to look into a question 
(discussed in chapter six) that became of crucial importance in the context of my 
research: does the notion of SoT imply a form of relativism? The conclusion I shall 
reach in chapter seven is that there are cases in which a scientific claim is justified 
for a community that adopts a certain SoT and unjustified for a community that 
adopts another SoT. This fact implies a form of epistemic incommensurability 
between different SoTs. The specific case that I shall examine refers to Hacking's
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claim that several theoretical entities of physics exist. I shall argue not only that 
this claim is justified only for a community that adopts a given SoT but also that it 
engenders a problem of consistency within Hacking's philosophy. Indeed, the 
styles project - I shall argue - is at odds with Hacking's anti-relativistic stance and 
in particular with his realism about theoretical entities. To corroborate my 
findings, in chapter eight I shall compare Hacking's claims concerning SoTs with 
some other claims of Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations and On 
Certainty. This parallel will help me to reveal the anti-foundationalism and the 
epistemic relativism inherent to the SoTs project. Further questions concern the 
role of contingency in the history of science and whether science approaches 
toward the truth in the long run. In chapter nine I shall discuss to which extent the 
emergence of SoTs is a contingent circumstance, why they are long-lasting, 
whether science is bound to converge on a single answer to a given question and, 
finally, whether science converges on truth in the long run.
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Chapter One: Plan of the Work and 
Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
The structure of this dissertation, which I have outlined in the previous 
pages, mirrors the different topic areas intersected by my research. Before focusing 
on each of these areas, I shall briefly restate their main focus. My research will 
mainly consist of four steps corresponding to four research issues:
• The first research issue is summarized by the following questions: what is 
meant by the label 'styles of thinking and doing'? Which common properties do 
styles possess? How can styles be distinguished from other ways of reasoning? I 
shall argue that there is a set of styles of thinking and doing that share all the 
properties mentioned by Hacking over the years: I will refer to them with the 
acronym SoT.
• My successive step will be a philosophical analysis of the notion of SoT. 
Some relevant questions in this connection will be: what is the philosophical 
background of the notion of SoT? How does it fit into the area of research of 
historical epistemology? What does a comparison between the SoTs project and 
other similar projects suggest?
• The third research issue will be my core research question: does the styles 
project imply epistemic relativism? Are SoTs incommensurable? Do certain
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implications of the notion of SoT gybe with Hacking's realism about theoretical 
entities?
• Finally, the answers to the previous questions will produce further crucial 
questions: why do SoTs emerge? Why are they long lasting? Is scientific process 
bound to converge to a single answer to a given question? Does the evolution of 
the sciences converge on a true, coherent description of the world?
Below I shall devote a section to each of the four research issues outlined 
above. The aim of each section is to explain better and justify my research 
purposes in the light of the literature in my field of research.
1.2 Characterising Styles of Thinking and Doing
As I have mentioned, Crombie suggested that in the history of the sciences it is 
possible to distinguish six styles of scientific reasoning still practised in the 
m odem  sciences, whose development has been continuous from the epoch of the 
ancient Greece until now: the style of geometry, the experimental style, the style of 
hypothetical modelling, the taxonomic, the statistical and the historico-genetic 
style (Crombie 1978,1988,1992,1994). His aim was to use his notion of style for 
describing how conceptions of nature and science, methods of inquiry and moral 
commitments have characterized Western natural science. Hacking modified 
Crombie's list in some respects (Hacking 1982,1992d): he introduced the 
laboratory SoT and considered Leviathan and the A ir Pump (Shapin and Schaffer 
1989 [1985]-b) as a book about its origins; he also spoke of the now extinct
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hermetic style of Paracelsus (Hacking 1982,1983b, 1992d). In addition, he just
mentioned the Indo-Arabic style of applied mathematics, interested in finding
algorithms and distinct from the style of geometry (Hacking 1992a), and hinted at
the possibility of other SoTs (Hacking 1982) (Lakoff 2012).
Beside these suggestions he made precise claims about the features of SoTs 
(Hacking 1982,1983a, 1992d, 1992c, 2002-2003,2007a, 2009): for instance, he 
claimed that a style introduces new types of objects, evidence, laws, possibilities 
and new true-or-false sentences, i.e. sentences whose truth-value hinges on the 
SoT itself ( for this reason they are called style-dependent sentences). Moreover, in 
striking contrast with Crombie's continuism, he suggested that SoTs have sharp 
beginnings and that some of them (e.g. the statistical and the laboratory style) 
have recent origin (Hacking 1983a, 1991a, 2006d, 2006 [1975], 2007a, 2009, 2012). 
For him SoTs are 'self-authenticating' (Hacking 1982,1983a, 1988a, 1991a, 1992b, 
1992d, 1992c, 2007a, 2009, 2012), a term that refers to the circularity induced by the 
following double claim: the truth of certain sentences is what we find by using a 
SoT; in turn, a SoT is a standard of objectivity because it gets at the truth. 
Hacking's views about SoTs evolved over the years: in recent papers, he put 
emphasis on the idea that a style is a way of thinking and a way of doing, i.e. a way 
of intervening in the world in order to know (Hacking 2012); furthermore, he 
added that a style is rooted in hum an innate capacities and that it is a way of 
finding out (Hacking 2009, 2012).
1.2.1 The Identify of Styles of Thinking: Unsolved Issues
Hacking's account of styles left several issues unsolved. First of all, it is not clear 
whether or not all the SoTs he mentioned actually possess all the properties he 
added over the years. For example, he did not put forward any argument for 
showing that styles such as the historico-genetic and the taxonomic one do 
introduce new types of objects, evidence, laws, possibilities and new candidates 
for truth or falsehood. If anything, in the literature there is no account of the 
reasons for considering them as SoTs of the same genus as styles such as the 
laboratory SoT. Strictly speaking, from Hacking's works it does not emerge why 
the postulational SoT introduces new evidence, why it is a way of doing and 
whether its birth is to be considered a discontinuous event in the history of 
thought. Still less clear is which properties other styles such as Paracelsus' one 
share with the styles in the Crombie's list; or whether the algorithmic style 
deserves the label 'SoT'. Another problem with Hacking's claims is that he does 
not say whether and why being self-authenticating is a feature of all the styles he 
mentioned. Is self-authentication a feature that should characterize each SoT? Or 
does it characterize only some of the most important scientific styles of thinking 
and doing? There is no clear answer to these questions: he maintained that self­
authentication marks a SoT out as scientific and enable it to be stable over time 
(Hacking 1996); however, in previous papers (e.g. (Hacking 1992d) he had noted 
that every style has its own techniques of self-authentication without specifying 
which ones they are. Still less clear is whether a SoT is to be understood as a long- 
lasting way of thinking: on the one hand Hacking seems to consider endurance as 
a feature of SoTs, on the other hand he gives examples of extinct styles.
What makes things worse is the fact that it is unclear whether a SoT can be 
identified by necessary and sufficient conditions. Although he has often been
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unwilling to state general characteristics of SoTs, his attitude towards this issue
has been wavering: in 1992 he described certain features as necessary conditions
(1992d, p. 14); in his lectures at the College de France he went further by speaking
of necessary and sufficient criteria (Hacking, 2006-a); then, in 2012 he took a step
backwards by denying the possibility of providing any identity conditions
(Hacking 2012).
1.2.2 The Identity of Styles of Thinking: Unsolved Issues in The 
Literature
Of the many who have directed their attention to the notion of style, no scholar 
has really fully investigated these questions. Indeed, the secondary literature 
concerning the issue of identifying SoTs can be divided into two categories. On the 
one hand, there are scholars who have been mainly concerned with presenting 
new ways of reasoning as candidates for being SoTs; on the other hand, there are 
scholars who have focused on the criteria for establishing what a SoT is or who 
have modified the characterization of what a style is according to their views.
Among the scholars in the first group, Barry Allen has argued that, from the 
mid-fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries, theologians and inquisitors who 
were committed to demonology shared a way of thinking that possessed some of 
the features illustrated by Hacking (Allen 1993). Forrester proposed to include, 
alongside Crombie's list, another style dominant in psychoanalysis and other 
disciplines: reasoning in cases (Forrester 1996). Schweber and Watcher claimed 
that mathematical modelling and simulation on computer constitute a new style of
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reasoning (Schweber and Watcher 2000). In a different research context also A.I. 
Davidson employed Hacking's notion of SoT as a tool for examining under which 
conditions we can comprehend various types of statements as true or false 
(Davidson 2001), and argued that around 1870 a new style of thinking emerged 
making possible new true-or-false statements about sexual perversions. Elwick 
used the label 'style of reasoning' to refer to two different sets of self-reinforcing 
norms in the pre-Darwinian research in biology (Elwick 2007). He noted that, in 
order to find out about questions concerning the development of embryos, some 
researchers adopted the style of analysis/synthesis, according to which the 
development proceeded through the fusion of parts, other researchers adopted the 
style ofpalaetiology, according to which development proceeded through a 
progressive specialization of the organism. Bensaude-Vincent argued that 
chemistry is a style of thinking by showing that it possesses all the features that 
Hacking attributed to his notion, including the existence of techniques of self­
stabilization (Bensaude-Vincent 2009). Kusch noted that, following Hacking, the 
Christian-Catholic style should be included among the scientific styles (Kusch
2010). Finally, Belfer introduced an 'Information Laden scientific style of 
reasoning': according to him the impact of Information Theory on science 
produced a way of reasoning that satisfies Hacking's characterization (Belfer
2011).
A point to be noted is that none of the authors of these studies has included 
among their criteria of identity all the features added by Hacking over the years. 
For example, both Allen and Kusch have not insisted on the point that a style in 
Hacking's sense must be a way of doing and a way of finding out about
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phenomena. This circumstance has led to a proliferation of the number of styles, a
consequence that Hacking has always struggled to avoid by trying to stick closely
to Crombie's list (see Hacking 2012). In this sense, what the studies above make
evident is the necessity of a better characterization of Hacking's styles.
As to the second group of studies, Gayon has focused on the uses of the 
term 'style' in history and philosophy of science (Gayon 1996). His analysis 
explained how Hacking's use of the term differs from other uses in literature but 
did not clarify which forms of reasoning can be considered as SoTs. Gayon 
pointed out that previous uses of the term expressed the idea of the singularity and 
the locality of the ways of knowing; in the hands of Hacking the meaning of the 
term 'style' acquired the idea of universality. Indeed, the category of style is a 
collective and historical product that, as we shall see, constitutes the base of 
objectivity.
Kusch moved his attention from the use and the meaning of the term 'style' 
to the issue of characterizing styles, which I consider relevant (Kusch 2010). He 
rightly maintained that the criteria of identity put forward by Hacking do not 
avoid the proliferation of styles: for instance, according to Kusch, Hacking cannot 
exclude Christian-Catholic reasoning. However, he did not undertake the task of 
offering convincing criteria for identifying SoTs.
More recently, the workshop on SoTs held at the University of Cape Town 
in 2011 left aside the problem of the number of styles posed by Kusch and 
returned to focusing mainly on the meaning of the notion of style. For example 
Winther analysed the relation between styles, paradigms a la Kuhn and scientific 
models (Winther 2012); Kwa looked at the origins of Crombie's concept of style,
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which for him can be found in art history (Kwa Unpublished). Other scholars 
drew on Hacking's works to put forward a different notion of style of thinking.
For example, Bueno considered a different understanding of Hacking's concept of 
style: his notion of 'narrow style of reasoning' made room for the diversity of 
scientific practices within Hacking's styles (Bueno 2011). Characterizations such as 
Bueno's twist Hacking's original intuitions and determine a proliferation of styles. 
As I want to characterize the notion of style by being faithful to Hacking's 
understanding, I shall disregard them.
1.2.3 What a Style of Thinking is: Filling the Gaps
Ultimately, notwithstanding the considerable amount of interest in Hacking's 
notion of SoT, there is still a gap in the literature: there are no studies that identify 
unambiguously what is meant by the label 'style of thinking'. To fill this gap I 
shall argue that there are six ways of thinking that share a few precise features. I 
shall name these particular ways of thinking and doing with the acronym 'SoT' to 
distinguish them from other ways of thinking that do not possess the same 
features and somehow are spurious -- species of a different taxonomic category. I 
shall provide a description of these SoTs in order to show that they share certain 
properties, which I have called the SoTs' characterizing properties (e.g. the property 
of introducing new true-or-false sentences and new evidence).
The first SoT I have described is the statistical one. Although Hacking never 
mentioned the notion of SoT in The Emergence of Probability (Hacking 2006 [1975]) I 
shall interpret his book as an account of the birth of this SoT. In particular, I shall 
explain how the coming to the fore of a new form of evidence in the seventeenth
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century, described in that book, made possible the emergence of the statistical SoT.
By doing so I shall put in connection different ideas of Hacking in different papers
(e.g. Hacking 1992c), so to provide a complete account of the statistical SoT.
Another way of thinking and doing that satisfies the SoTs characterizing
properties - 1 shall argue - is the Laboratory SoT, of which Hacking has written
extensively but unsystematically in different works, e.g. (Hacking 1988a, 1991a,
2006d, 2007a, 2009). Leviathan and the Air Pump (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 [1985]-b)
will be crucial to the construction of my systematic account: I shall reinterpret
their book in the light of the SoTs project.
I shall also claim that another way of thinking, the algorithmic one, 
dedicated to finding algorithms in applied mathematics, which is not in Crombie's 
list and has only been barely mentioned by Hacking (Hacking 1992d) (Hacking, 
2006-c) (Hacking 2009), is a SoT. My argument for the thesis that this SoT satisfies 
the SoTs' characterizing properties is illustrated by historical examples.
The fourth SoT I shall deal with is the postulational SoT. Netz reconstructed 
the missing diagrams in the Greek texts and provided an account of the 
emergence of demonstrative proofs in mathematics (Netz 1999). Although 
Hacking claimed that Netz's work can be considered as an account of the 
crystallization of the postulational SoT (Hacking 2009), he did not provide a 
systematic account. I shall use Netz as a primary source for a comprehensive 
description of the postulational SoT but I shall also rely on other sources such as 
Hoyrup (Hoyrup 1990b, 1990a; Hoyrup 2010, 2012), which will be crucial for 
supporting Hacking's view that the emergence of the postulational SoT represents 
a discontinuity in history of mathematics. Finally, Lloyd's writings will help me to
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identify the contingent factors that allowed its coming to the fore (Lloyd 2000; 
Lloyd 2004).
Finally, Hacking explicitly wrote that he has yet to provide a 
characterization of the historico-genetic and the taxonomic ways of thinking 
(Hacking 2012). I shall take on this task: my conclusion will be that they satisfy the 
SoTs' characterizing properties. As for the historico-genetic SoT, Mayr and 
Cleland made important points that help to distinguish the kind of explanations 
provided in laboratory research from that provided in the historical sciences 
(Mayr 2004) (Cleland 2002). I shall develop their points as well as those of other 
scholars by using examples drawn from the history of different historical sciences 
in order to provide a full characterization of the historico-genetic SoT. Similarly, 
scholars such as Atran, Mayr and Gould will be important sources for identifying 
the mental actions that characterize taxonomic reasoning (Atran 1990; Mayr and 
Bock 2002) (Gould 2000a); I shall also develop some ideas of Foucault in order to 
show that the taxonomic SoT introduces true-or-false sentences, as Hacking 
claims, and marks a discontinuity in the history of thought (Foucault 1994 [1966]).
To summarize, the first research issue of this dissertation concerns the 
possibility of identifying clearly the features of what Hacking calls 'a  scientific 
way of thinking and doing'. My study will help to shed light on different 
unsolved issues: in literature there is no systematic characterization of the SoTs 
mentioned by Hacking; nor is it clear what can be considered a SoT and what 
cannot. Furthermore, it is unclear why, as Hacking recently claimed (Hacking 
2012), we should stick to Crombie's SoTs and why each of them is self- 
authenticating.
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1.3 Hacking's Historical Epistemology
Ever since his first papers on SoTs (Hacking 1982,1992d), Hacking has maintained 
that his aim is to continue Kant's project of explaining how objectivity is possible. 
Indeed for Hacking SoTs represent the a priori conditions that make certain 
propositions objective, i.e. a candidate for truth or falsehood. In as much as for 
Hacking objectivity is made possible by SoTs that emerge at different points in 
time, it is possible to say that his aim is to historicize Kant. In chapter five, I shall 
ask: how can this project be better understood? I shall argue that it falls into an 
area of research called 'historical epistemology' (henceforth HE), of which Ian 
Hacking, Lorraine Daston, Peter Galison and Arnold Davidson are some of the 
most known practitioners. My analysis will shed light on the philosophical import 
of the notion of SoT.
The point that the SoTs project falls into the field of HE is not as obvious as 
it may appear. Hacking maintained that his project is different from those 
undertaken by other historical epistemologists (Hacking 1999a) and can be viewed 
as part of 'cognitive history' (Hacking 2009, 2012) (term borrowed from Netz 
(Netz 1999)), i.e. a study of how humans learned to use their cognitive resources. 
In contrast with Hacking, I shall maintain that the SoTs project is a work of HE 
because the latter asks what made certain propositions objective: in as much as 
SoTs may represent the answer to this question his project can be considered as 
part of HE. Although Kusch supports my thesis (Kusch 2010), his argument relies 
on a conception of HE as a program of historicization of epistemology, while I
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shall insist on the fact that the SoTs project fulfils the aims of HE in that it asks 
questions about the preconditions required for the existence of certain ideas.
My next step will be to provide a broader framework to the theory of SoTs by 
tracing out its connections with a tradition of thought bom  in France in the 
beginning of twentieth-century, when in different periods thinkers such as Lucien 
Levy-Bruhl (1857-1939), Leon Brunschvicg (1869-1944), Gaston Bachelard(1884- 
1962), Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984), started 
to reflect on the historical conditions of knowledge (see for example (Levy-Bruhl, 
1992 [1910]) (Brunschvicg, 1912) (Brunschvicg, 1934) (Bachelard, 1984 [1934]) 
(Canguilhem, 1968) (Foucault, 1969 [1972]) (Foucault, 1994 [1966])). By relying on 
studies that reconstruct these thinkers' research projects or discuss their 
contributions, e.g. (Chimisso 2003,2008,2010) (Gutting 2005) (Brenner 2006)) 
(Gingras 2010) (Castelao 2010) (Rheinberger 2010) as well as by examining 
primary sources, e.g. (Foucault 1969 [1972], 1994 [1966]), I shall trace the lineage of 
some ideas of the SoTs project back to the French scholars above and thinkers such 
as Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) (Fleck, 1969). Although Castelao (Castelao 2010) and 
Rheinberger (Rheinberger 2010) include Hacking in their discussions, mainly 
focusing on his reflections about the interventional character of m odem  science, 
the literature lacks a discussion of the philosophical influences on Hacking as far 
as his SoTs project is concerned.
In the second part of chapter five I shall offer different perspectives on the 
concept of SoT by comparing Hacking's ideas with those of thinkers such as 
Daston and Galison (Daston and Galison 2007). Their historical analysis is 
important for testing Hacking's claims. Kusch claimed that there is enough
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resemblance between Hacking's investigations into SoTs and Daston's historical
studies of epistemic virtues to justify the label 'historical epistemology' for both
projects (Kusch 2011c). However, he did not address my question: whether or not
their conclusions are consistent.
Another work that helps to shed light onthe philosophical meaning of the 
notion of SoT is the book Truth and Truthfulness by the philosopher Bernard 
Williams (1929-2003). By drawing on Williams' book Hacking suggested a new 
perspective from which the concept of SoT can be looked at (Hacking 2004,2005d, 
2009). Williams showed that in different historical periods there have been 
different commitments to truthfulness; Hacking generalized Williams' analysis to 
the domain of scientific knowledge and interpreted the emergence of a new SoT as 
a change in conception of what it is to tell the truth about different aspects of the 
world (Hacking 2004,2005d, 2009). Among the scholars who have discussed the 
SoTs project only Kusch (Kusch 2010) and Wanderer (Wanderer 2012) paid 
attention to Williams in their discussions. However, Kusch limited himself to 
presenting Williams as Hacking's ally; while Wanderer took into account
Hacking's thoughts on Williams only in order to discuss the self- 
authenticating character of SoTs. For my part, I shall further elaborate the idea of 
SoTs as different ways of being truthful that Hacking drew on the work of 
Williams. By doing so I shall highlight another reading of the notion of SoT, which 
has not clearly emerged in all the writings about SoTs, including Hacking's. 
Indeed, as I shall argue, SoTs select and exclude aspects of their objects of study 
and therefore can be viewed as different perspectives on them, i.e. as different 
ways of looking at the world.
1.4 The incommensurability of styles of thinking
For Hacking the truths discovered by reasoning in a certain way are independent 
of how we have found them, i.e. truth is external to history. In other words, 
although only if we reason in a particular SoT can we attribute a truth-value to 
certain sentences, their being true or false has nothing to do with the fact that we 
reason in a particular SoT. Regarding this point, I think there are two important 
issues to look into. The first one is to examine the SoTs project in order to confirm 
Hacking's point that his characterization of SoTs is consistent with the claim that 
truth is external to history. Strictly speaking, this issue amounts to asking whether 
the SoTs project implies alethic relativism: can a claim be true in a SoT and false in 
another? Is Hacking's characterization coherent with a negative response to this 
question?
The second issue concerns epistemic relativism. In particular, the possibility 
of having an atemporal and independent criterion for justifying those sentences 
whose sense hinges on a given SoT. My question amounts to the doubt that a 
claim expressed by certain sentences (whose sense hinges on a certain SoT) could 
be justified only within their SoT, i.e. by using the standards of evidence, methods 
and the way of thinking and doing of that very SoT. As I shall explain in chapter 
six it can also be said that my question concerns the incommensurability of SoTs: 
the claim that there might not be common standards of evaluation external to the 
SoTs.
1.4.1 Why the Relativism Issue is Important
The importance of the question I have posed lies on the fact that, as I shall explain 
below, no univocal answer has emerged from the discussions on this issue in 
literature. Its importance arises from the further fact that whether or not the SoTs 
project invites relativism can be considered a subproblem of a wider issue hotly 
debated: is relativism a philosophical consequence of the historicization of 
epistemology? For example, Chimisso pointed out that the historicization of 
epistemological concepts carried out by the French thinkers such as Brunschvicg 
opened the door to relativism (Chimisso 2008, p. 70). More in general, Kusch 
reminded his readers that the relationship between historicism and relativism 
represented a problem for discussion already a century ago (Kusch 2010, p. 168). 
Nor can it be forgotten that another continental thinker, Fleck, who introduced the 
notion of 'thought style' and influenced Kuhn and Hacking, explicitly spoke of 
incommensurability of concepts and ideas. Although he did not put forward a 
systematic argument for the thesis of incommensurability between thought styles, 
in his writings it is possible to find many passages that suggest this thesis. Indeed, 
in Fleck incommensurability directly follows from the fact that he historicizes a 
great deal of elements involved in the knowledge of the world. From a thought 
style to another everything changes: the way we perceive reality, the language 
used to communicate, the research problems, the standards of truth and the reality 
created by the thought style itself (Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 100).
The relativism issue continues to be relevant today in relation to historical 
epistemology. In Objectivity Daston and Galison took care of remarking that 
relativism has nothing to do with their account of objectivity. I interpret this 
excusatio non petita as the symptom of the general worry, among historical 
epistemologists, about the relativistic implications of their conclusions. Whether or
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not truth has a history -  Daston and Galison wrote - cannot be concluded from the 
fact that the means devised to attain it vary over time (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 
377). Maybe so, but this does not provide an answer to the tricky question of 
establishing how far we can go with our theses about what varies without ending 
up stating that there is no universal and atemporal justification for our epistemic 
claims. Hacking has been trying to allay any suspicion of relativism ever since he 
wrote his first papers on SoTs. For example, he insisted on the idea already 
mentioned that a style is characterized by a set of propositions that are true or 
false, not a set of true propositions, i.e. the actual truth-value of style-dependent 
sentences is external to the SoT. He distinguished form from content of science and 
remarked that, although the question of science are historically variable, the 
answers are not (Hacking 1999b, 2000a). That is: in a given historical context, once 
a question is fixed, there is only one correct answer to that question; no relativism 
about answers. By putting forward these ideas Hacking also distanced himself 
from those social contructionists such as Shapin and Schaeffer who spoke of the 
social construction of the actual answers to well asked questions (Hacking 2000a). 
As I shall show, Hacking's defence is not sufficient to escape the accusation of 
epistemic relativism, although the SoTs project does not imply alethic relativism.
1.4.2 Solutions to the Relativism Issue in the Literature
Before illustrating which resources have been important for arguing for these 
theses, I shall examine the different contributions in literature regarding the 
relation between the SoTs project and relativism. Some of these contributions
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propose a different thesis from mine, others present arguments that, in my view,
do not really hit their target.
Newton-Smith claimed that the point in (Hacking 2002 [1982] -a) that a 
proposition can be determined as true by a SoT for which there is no external 
justification implies relativism (Newton-Smith 1982). Although Newton-Smith 
added that whether or not Hacking thinks that there are external justifications is 
not really clear to him, he suggested that one should describe Hacking's ideas as a 
form of relativism, which he called 'm uted relativism'. However, this point did 
not prevent Newton-Smith from saying that it would possible to find a way out of 
the relativism issue by formulating an independent criterion to justify SoTs in 
terms of style-independent sentences ('observational statements' whose sense does 
not hinge on their SoT). However, Newton-Smith did not exhibit this criterion nor 
did he discuss how it could be found — one can suspect that this criterion does not 
exist.
Jardine mooted the possibility that one could show the superiority of the 
methods of a given SoT M against those of a past one M ' (Jardine 1991). He 
imagined the case in which M ' is ancestral to M and the local methods and the 
practice of M ' have gone through successive stages of modifications in the body of 
local practices: the outcome of these successive refinements, displacements and 
replacements of methods is M. Under these circumstances, Jardine concluded, it is 
possible to consider M to be more reliable than M ' because derived from M ' by a 
sequence of reliability enhancing steps (Jardine 1991, p. 167). It will be clear later 
that Jardine's point cannot be accepted in the light of Hacking's insistence that the 
evolution of methods and criteria of evidence is discontinuous. A case in point is
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that of Laboratory SoT. According to Hacking, SoTs may be characterized by 
methods that have not been calibrated against previous ones. He follows Shapin 
and Schaeffer in thinking that the air pum p is the emblem of a new way of 
providing evidence: to create effects that did not exist in isolation. There is no 
possibility of considering this new way of doing as derived from that of another 
SoT through successive refinements.
Baghramian, as Newton-Smith did, pointed out that Hacking does not 
propose a form of alethic relativism: what varies from culture to culture is the 
availability of propositions, not their truth-value (Baghramian 2004). For her, 
Hacking's account is an example of relativism because for him what counts as 
evidence is internal to a given SoT. However, even without an independent 
criterion and by using only the norms internal to one's SoT, she suggested, it is 
possible to become convinced that certain questions are better addressed by the 
methods of an alternative style of reasoning. I consider this suggestion 
unjustifiably optimistic, as it will be clear.
As Kusch stated, epistemic relativism is the claim that the properties picked 
out by the predicates 'rational' and 'justified' are relative to different epistemic 
systems (Kusch 2010). For him this definition fits the case of SoTs: a style- 
dependent sentence can be justified in its own SoT but is meaningless outside of it; 
therefore its justification is relative to its SoT. The problem is that this point only 
countenances a possibility: the relativism issue in the context of the SoTs project 
remains unsolved until it is found an example of a scientific claim that is justified 
in a SoT and unjustified in another. Kusch said that an example that involves two 
scientific SoTs in the Crombie's list would not do the job because 'familiar forms of
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epistemological relativism do not assume that one and the same individual
possesses more than one epistemic system' (Kusch 2010, p. 167). Therefore he
brought in Christian theology and argued that it is a SoT; then he concluded that
the sentence 'God told me that I should do his will from day to day, in humility
and poverty' is rational and justified for a Christian but not rational and justified
for him (Kusch 2010, p. 168). Indeed, he considers the Christian style incompatible
with his commitment to other scientific styles.
I see at least two problems with this argument. First of all, Kusch did not 
provide any example of a scientific claim that is justified in a SoT and unjustified 
outside it, rather an example of a claim that, he thinks, is incompatible with one's 
commitment to science. Consequently, Kusch left a doubt: in absence of an 
example of scientific claim one does not know whether, within science, there is 
incommensurability or not. Indeed, think of two different communities A and B 
that at different times adopt different SoTs; could B justify all the scientific claims 
made by A? This question remains unanswered. In sum, the lack of an 
investigation on the relation between relativism and the SoTs project, viewed as it 
is meant to be, that is a project on scientific ways of knowing, seems to me a serious 
gap in the literature.
Furthermore, Kusch noted that the same individual can adopt different 
scientific SoTs but added that for him the Christian style is incompatible with 
them. So there is compatibility between two scientific SoTs and there might be 
incompatibility between a non-scientific SoT and a scientific SoT. Kusch did not 
provide any argument to account for this asymmetry. In absence of arguments one 
is led to thinking that the incompatibility between the Christian style and a
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scientific SoT lies on the fact that what is considered true in the Christian style is 
not true in a scientific style. If this were the case one could push further his 
argument by saying that the SoTs project does not only imply epistemic relativism 
but also alethic relativism, a conclusion that, as I shall argue, is untenable.
Otavio Bueno disagreed with Kusch by claiming that Hacking has resources to 
avoid relativism (Bueno 2012). For him, statistical analysis could provide the 
relevant common standard to assess certain propositions of the laboratory SoT. In 
personal conversation he clarified his point by maintaining that the laboratory and 
the statistical SoTs have common standards. I disagree with this conclusion and 
the reason will be clear in chapter seven.
To summarize, from the SoTs project emerges the question whether or not 
Hacking's ideas imply epistemic relativism. Despite Hacking's dissent, most of the 
commentators claimed that the SoTs project does imply a moderate form of 
relativism. However, a few maintained that within Hacking's project there is room 
for a universal criterion for comparing different SoTs. Unfortunately, none of them 
has put forward such a criterion. Consequently, the literature lacks a thorough 
investigation about its existence. Inter alia, my thesis will show that this criterion 
cannot exist within the framework of Hacking's characterization of SoTs.
Finally, of those who claimed that the SoTs project implies epistemic 
relativism none has provided examples of scientific claims that are justified only 
within a certain SoT. Still worse, Hacking has been elusive on the core topics of 
justification. Notably, an in-depth analysis of how scientific claims are justified 
should have a role in any theory that claims the existence of different ways of 
finding out. This is for me another good reason to undertake this task.
1.4.3 My Solution to the Relativism Issue
I shall reformulate the incommensurability problem from the perspective of 
Edward Craig's approach to the concept of knowledge, known as State-of-Nature 
Epistemology. In 2011 Kusch critically related Craig's (and Williams') approach to 
Daston's historical epistemology (Kusch 2011a), but so far nobody has connected it 
to the SoTs project. Besides providing a clearer formulation of the 
incommensurability issue, the critical dialogue between Craig and Hacking that I 
shall conduct will help me to confirm the correctness of the claim that the SoTs 
project does not imply alethic relativism.
My next step will be to argue that the SoTs project implies that the existence 
of unobservables such as, say, electrons and muons, is justified in the laboratory 
SoT and unjustified for a community that does not adopt it. As I shall explain, 
Hacking justifies his belief that unobservable entities exist on the ground that they 
can be regularly manipulated by experimenters in order to find out and produce 
various phenomena (entity realism); he also maintains that no belief that our 
theories are true is required in order to be realist about unobservable entities 
(theory anti-realism). I shall argue that his justification about the existence of 
particles is relative to the laboratory SoT.
One of the outcomes of my general argument is that Hacking's entity 
realism (i.e. the claim that we know about unobservable entities) is at odds with the 
relativistic implications of the SoTs project. Both realism and the concept of SoT 
are relevant topics of Hacking's Representing and Intervening. It is surprising that, 
despite of the fact that this book is one of the widest read introductions to 
philosophy of science, and that several scholars analysed Hacking's realism 
(Morrison 1990; Shapere 1993; Resnik 1994; Reiner and Pierson 1995; Vallor 2009), 
none has asked whether the latter jibe with the concept of SoT.
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I shall also provide a more general argument (not focused on the laboratory 
SoT) for the claim that the SoTs project implies epistemic relativism. It consists of a 
critical comparison between Hacking's SoTs project and W ittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1997 [1953]) and On Certainty 
(Wittgenstein 1995 [1969]). Such an analysis is lacking in the literature, although 
Wittgenstein and Foucault are the tools used by Hacking for doing philosophy. In 
particular, the origins of anti-foundationalism in the SoTs project as well as of the 
concept of self-authentication have not been discussed so far. My analysis will 
show that they can be connected to some of Wittgenstein's ideas.
1.5 Styles of Thinking, Contingency and the 
Evolution of Science
Besides the incommensurability problem there is another aspect of the SoTs 
project that has important implications: since the emergence of SoTs is contingent, 
and SoTs are tools for finding out, the achievement of certain scientific results 
might not be an inevitable fact. In literature this issue is framed in many other 
different forms: for example, often it is asked whether a particular field of science 
could have taken a different route from the actual one or whether the achievement 
of certain scientific results has been contingent. Apart from the problem of 
framing it, the contingence issue includes many sub-problems since different 
items can be contingent: questions, methods, theories, laws of physics, form of 
equations, constants of physics, experiments. Moreover, each of these items
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requires a specific analysis and its being 'contingent' is always relative to
something to be specified. The immense importance of the contingency issue can
be grasped by recognizing its bearing on the question of convergence: if
contingency is a relevant feature of the evolution of the sciences, we might never
achieve a complete description of a part of the world.
1.5.1 The Contingency Issue in the Literature
The contingency issue can be found in embryonic form in Fleck (Fleck 1979 
[1935]): his doctrine that scientific facts exist only within thought styles raised the 
doubt that they are not inevitable at all, rather determined by contingent social 
forces. Although the idea of contingency was central to the work of many French 
philosophers such as Foucault, it did not play any fundamental role in the debates 
on the growth of knowledge that raged soon after the World War two in the 
Anglophone philosophy of science. With the advent of social constructionism the 
idea of contingency gained momentum. Shapin's conclusion that reality is capable 
of sustaining different accounts given of it suggested that our theories might have 
been different from the actual ones. Pickering's book Constructing Quarks 
(Pickering 1984) encouraged the thought that the quarky physics was not inevitable 
at all: the theories about quarks, the experiments performed to test them and that 
convinced the scientist of their existence represent the product of an historical 
process. The theme of contingence also played a role in some discussions on the 
interpretation of Quantum Theory. Cushing made a case for thinking that a 
plausible temporal reordering of certain scientific achievements could have 
engendered a deterministic world-view instead than an indeterministic one
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(Cushing 1992) (Cushing 1994). His point raised the important question as to 
whether or not science is bound to converge on a single answer to a given well- 
posed question or can take alternative routes at certain critical junctures.
Hacking, reflecting on these thinkers, brought the contingency issue to the 
fore in its full-fledged form. He framed the issue in (Hacking 1999b) and 
developed it with some variations in (Hacking 2000a, 2014) on the basis of ideas 
expressed also in (Hacking 1988b, 1992b, 1996) and later in (Hacking 2005b, 
2005a). In particular, he prompted the following formulation of the contingency
issue:
If the results R of a scientific investigation are correct, would any 
investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least 
implicitly contain or imply the same results? (Hacking 2000a, p. S70)
This formulation generalizes the question posed by Pickering's point as to 
whether a non-quarky physics, as trium phant as the high-energy physics that 
evolved after World War II, could have developed and become our current 
physics. In March 2006 the philosopher Lena Soler organized a conference on the 
contingency issue (Soler 2008a, 2008b) (Trizio 2008) (Sankey 2008) (Franklin 
2008b), and a second one in 2009 with the participation of Hacking and Pickering.
One of the upshots of those discussions was that Hacking's formulation of 
the contingency issue is only one of the many possible ways of framing the issue 
(Soler 2008a, p. 222-227). Those conferences made it evident how vast is the range 
of philosophical sub-problems of the contingency issue (Soler 2006, note 3 p. 364). 
For example, Soler showed how Hacking's formulation of the contingency issue
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above is ambiguous (Soler 2008b). Hacking substantially defined contingentism as
the claim that a science radically different from the actual one, but as successful and
progressive, would be possible. He also asked whether such a science, although
different, should imply or reach, at least in the long run, the same results as the
current science. The problem with this formulation is that, terms such as 'results',
'successful science' and 'correct' need clarification. Soler reformulated
contingentism in terms of two successful physics that have developed in complete
isolation from each other (Soler 2008b). Then, by means of a thought experiment,
she focused on what 'different' should mean, that is what kind of differences these
two physics should present for giving rise to a form of contingentism. However
she left out the problem of clarifying what a 'successful' physics really is and did
not focus on the adjective 'correct' as I have done in chapter seven and nine in
criticizing Hacking. Trizio investigated the connection between inevitability and
success by examining three conceptions of scientific success: truth, empirical
adequacy and robust fit (Trizio 2008). One of the implicit results of his analysis has
been to show how Hacking's formulation of the contingency issue above is not
neutral. Indeed, of course, an attribute such as 'successful' depends on
philosophical commitments -  e-g. a conception of success as truth implies
inevitabilism - and Trizio clarified how. Very recently Hacking showed more
awareness of the fact that the inevitability question is inextricably connected with
the question of success although he did not provide any in-depth analysis
(Hacking 2014, p. 117).
Sankey understood Hacking's formulation in terms of convergence on a 
single unified theory of the word: for him a contingentist would hold that science,
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properly conducted, might well have led to a completely different theory of the 
world from that of contemporary science (Sankey 2008). So he ended up 
discussing contingency in relation to realism. His conclusion was that, although 
realism does not entail inevitabilism (in the sense of convergence on a whole 
description of the world), the employment of reliable methods would in fact 
guarantee that science continues to move closer to the truth about a portion of the 
world but non-necessarily on the whole truth. On the other hand, Franklin 
discussed historical case studies in order to show that experiment provides 
constraints to the evolution of science (Franklin 2008a, 2008b). He concluded that 
in many cases there is no room for reasonable alternative options.
1.5.2 The Contingency Issue: a Gap in the Literature
I think it is unfortunate that so far the discussions above about the contingency 
issue have not involved the notion of SoT. Indeed, it is important to note that the 
account of SoTs given by Hacking and developed in the first two chapters 
represents a picture of the development of scientific thought: precise claims are 
made about when and why certain SoTs have emerged and developed so to allow 
the achievement of certain results. Therefore, that account can provide the 
framework in which the contingency issue can be more easily studied. Think for 
example that, as the theory of evolution provides the framework for a hypothesis 
of evolutionary relationships of species through time, so the SoTs theory 
presupposes a precise order in which certain SoTs have evolved. The same mental 
experiment, described by Gould in Wonderful Life (Gould 2000b, chapter one), of 
replaying the 'life's tape' to see if the repetition would lead to the actual
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phylogenetic tree could be conducted in the case of the evolution of SoTs. One
could imagine pressing the rewind button and going back to the origins of the first
SoT, the algorithmic SoT, in order to see if a replay of the tape would lead to a
science different from the actual one.
1.5.3 My Take on The Contingency Issue and the Question about 
why Styles of Thinking Endure
My brief discussion of the works on the contingency issue in literature shows that 
no progress has been made as far as a formulation of contingentism is concerned. I 
prefer to discuss single questions by referring to concrete examples rather than 
discussing contingentism in general. In chapter nine I shall examine the 
contingency issue in the light of the SoTs theory by addressing four fundamental 
questions. First of all, I shall discuss to which extent the emergence of the SoTs at a 
certain point of history is a contingent circumstance. In the following section I 
shall ask whether the endurance of SoTs is inevitable by tackling the connected 
question as to why the SoTs are long-lasting. Afterwards, I shall focus on the 
growth of knowledge within a community that adopts one or more SoTs by 
dealing with questions such as: if a certain SoT continues to be employed and if Q 
is a 'live question', is science bound to converge on a single answer to Q? Finally, 
on the basis of my previous reflections I shall look into the question of the 
convergence of science in the long run.
As to the first question, my answer will be that the emergence of each SoT is 
the result of both contingent and inevitable factors, although there is no contingence 
in the order in which SoTs have appeared. As for the second question I shall put
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forward the thesis that one of the causes of endurance of each of the six SoTs I 
shall present is, together with their self-authenticating character, the fact that they 
all are grounded in objective features of that portion of the world they study. No 
scholar, Hacking included (for reasons that will be evident later), has ever turned 
his attention to the possibility that a SoT endures because it is appropriate for 
dealing with particular objective structures of our world.
As for the third question, I shall agree with Hacking, although for different 
reasons, that the convergence of science on correct answers to single questions is 
inevitable; and that it is contingent that a given question has been asked. Finally, 
in relation to the fourth question, I shall argue that the idea of convergence of 
science on a single true, coherent and complete description in the long run is at 
odds with the following implication of the SoTs project: the growth of many 
different epistemological items is open-ended and never final and complete.
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Chapter Two: The Styles Project
2.1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the term 'style of thinking' has become widespread in the 
literature of the history and philosophy of science1. In spite of this, its meaning 
cannot be defined univocally because the scholars who have used it belong to 
different areas of study. The focus of this chapter will be the concept of 'style of 
thinking' as intended by Hacking (SoT). I shall illustrate the SoTs project: a set of 
ideas and suggestions, put forward in various papers of Hacking, which should be 
understood as a programme of research (Hacking 2012).
In order to lay bare the content of the concept of SoT, I will have to deal 
with a difficulty: Hacking has never given a definition of SoT as he maintains that 
its characterization should be based on examples drawn from the study of past 
and present scientific practice (Hacking 1983a, p. 456)( Lakoff 2012, p. 227)). This 
being the case, it seems appropriate to set out the concept of SoT going from usage
1 In the last four decades many scholars have used the term 'style' in diverse contexts 
with different meanings. For example: Winifred Wisan (Wisan 1978) speaking of Galileo's 
new style in the study of motion; Stephen Weinberg (Weinberg 1976) and Noam 
Chomsky (Chomskyl980) mentioning Galileo's style for making abstract models 
(Husserll970); Jan Lacki distinguishing physical from mathematical thinking (Lacki 2003); 
with different meanings. For example: Winifred Wisan (Wisan 1978) speaking of Galileo's 
new style in the study of motion; Stephen Weinberg (Weinberg 1976) and Noam 
Chomsky (Chomskyl980) mentioning Galileo's style for making abstract models 
(Husserll970); Jan Lacki distinguishing physical from mathematical thinking (Lacki 2003); 
Jonathan Harwood arguing that there are national research traditions rather than an 
unitary scientific method (Harwood 1993); Boon in relation to experimental and 
mathematical traditions (Boon 2011). The term 'style' has also been used in mathematics 
since the early twentieth century (see Mancosu 2010).
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to abstract characterization: to grasp the features of SoTs as well as to assess the 
SoTs project in the next chapters will be easier by referring to concrete examples.
In particular, I shall not start by presenting Hacking's general remarks on the 
features of the SoTs: without an example, his characterization would remain 
vague. On the contrary, in the next section I shall show the features that make the 
SoTs distinctive by discussing the genesis of a specific SoT, the statistical SoT.
Only later, on the basis of this example, will I present the main claims of Hacking's 
SoTs project.
With the purpose of providing insight into the statistical SoT, in the next 
section I shall mainly base my analysis on Hacking's The Emergence of Probability 
(Hacking 2006 [1975]). There is no mention of the concept of SoT in that book: it 
appears in Hacking's later studies on probability (Hacking 2008 [1990], 1992c). 
However, as will be clear in the next section, although Hacking got the idea of SoT 
from Crombie in 1978 (Hacking 2009, p. 6), three years later the publication of The 
Emergence of Probability, his inquiry into the concept of probability contained in 
that book can be read, with hindsight, as an account of the birth of a particular 
SoT, namely the statistical SoT. Only in the third section shall I turn to Crombie's 
notion of style of reasoning, the starting point of Hacking's reflections on the 
concept of SoT, and discuss the further development of the latter's ideas. Finally, 
in the fourth section I shall examine Hacking's thoughts concerning the laboratory 
SoT.
The aim of this chapter is to connect different suggestions of Hacking about 
SoTs so to present them in a systematic way. I just want to explain and highlight 
what deserves to be studied or developed in the next chapters. It is for this reason
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that I shall restrict my analysis to the statistical and the laboratory SoT, leaving
aside other SoTs: Hacking has mainly offered suggestions about these two SoTs
and has only mentioned or discussed other SoTs en passant Conversely, in the next
chapter, I shall develop his SoTs project by outlining a 'theory of SoTs'. My claim
will be that there are at least four other SoTs that share a set of features with the
statistical and the laboratory SoT. The conclusion will be that it is possible to give
substance to Hacking's notion of SoT by exhibiting six SoTs that share a set of
common features, i.e. those features of SoTs suggested by Hacking over the years.
It can be said that this chapter presents the SoTs project and the next one develops
it into a theory.
2.2 The Roots of the Styles Project: The Emergence of 
Probability as a Study on the Statistical Style of 
Thinking and Doing
In the late Sixties, when he was an associate professor in Uganda interested in 
logical questions about statistical inference, Hacking read the first abridged 
edition of Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization (Foucault 2006 [1961]) and 
The Order of Things (Foucault 1994 [1966]). It was under Foucault's influence that in 
the following years he wrote The Emergence of Probability (Hacking 2006 [1975]) and 
The Taming of Chance (Hacking 2008 [1990]), which examined the transformations
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in scientific understanding of probability2. The Emergence of Probability, in 
particular, applied that kind of analysis that Foucault called archaeology (Hacking 
2006b, p. 2): Hacking dug into the past in order to understand what made it 
possible for our world to be dominated by probabilities. By offering an historical 
account, he argued that the concept of probability was absent before the time of 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) ~  what made the concept of probability possible was the 
coming to the fore of a new form of evidence. This is a point relevant to 
understanding the concept of SoT. In order to explain it carefully I shall now 
summarize Hacking's account.
To start with, Hacking reminds us that, in medieval thought, scientia 
represented the knowledge of universal truths that is obtained by demonstration; 
conversely, opinio was associated with beliefs, resulting from argument or 
disputation, which could not be demonstrated. The word probabilis did not suggest 
the idea that a hypothesis was better supported by evidence than others but meant 
'worthy of approbation', i.e. approval by 'intelligent people' (Hacking 2006 [1975], 
p. 22-23).
In Renaissance medical textbooks, an opinio was supported by signs such as 
planets in conjunction, comets and other natural phenomena. While physicists 
were dedicated to demonstrative science, physicians had to predict the likely 
course of a medical condition on the basis of signs. In the case of an ill person, the 
causes had to do with efficient causes of the illness and signs were anything by 
which a doctor could make a prognosis (Hacking 2006 [1975], p. 28). Ultimately, in 
the Middle Ages an opinio was probable when supported by 'intelligent people',
2 Hacking revealed this autobiographical detail in an interview (Lakoff 2012).
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authoritative people, or ancient books. Later on, in the writings of Renaissance
physicians, opinions were probable when supported by signs of Nature, rather
than the written word. There was no antithesis between these two epistemological
attitudes: since for the Renaissance authors Nature was the writ of God, its signs
represented approval by the ultimate authority.
Beside approbation, there was no other concept of evidence related to 
opinion. What was lacking was the evidence provided by things, not to be 
confused with that provided by the data of senses. To use the example given by J. 
L. Austin (1911-1960) and quoted by Hacking (2006 [1975], p. 32), pig-like marks 
and buckets of food outside a sty represent the evidence of things for the statement 
that in the sty there is a pig; the coming into view of the pig represents the evidence 
of the senses - 1 can see what animal it is. Obviously, in the Renaissance people did 
use the evidence of things, but for Hacking the concept was absent: 'dogs and 
boars can tell there is a pig, and do not thereby have a concept of evidence' 
(Hacking 2006 [1975], p. 34). For us books and testimony represent indirect 
evidence reported by other people. The Renaissance had the order reversed: 
testimony and authority were primary, things counted as evidence only insofar as 
they resembled the authority of testimony and books.
The concept of sign underwent several changes -  for instance, Paracelsus 
(1493-1541) ignored the fact that the names of stars were conventions and thought 
that the 'true names' of celestial bodies were signs; but later on, the distinction 
between conventional signs and natural ones was clearly made. The physician 
Girolamo Fracastoro (1483-1553) wrote that, among the signs in the sky, air, soil or 
water that are premonitory
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some are almost always, others are often, to be trusted. Therefore one 
ought not to consider them all as prognostications, but only as signs of 
probability (Hacking 2006 [1975], p. 28).
These changes opened the way for the evidence of signs to turn into the evidence 
of things. In the passage above, we may note that, since not all signs are to be 
trusted with certainty, the idea of probability is connected with frequency, that is, 
with what happens 'almost always1. Here, we already recognize some of the 
features of our statistical concept of probability. According to Hacking, in a text 
published in 1650 by Thomas Hobbes, the concept of evidence of things conjoined 
with that of frequency had already taken full shape and probability had emerged 
in all but name (Hacking 2006 [1975], p. 48). In 1662 also the Port Royal logic, 
published by members of the Jansenist movement, distinguished arbitrary and 
conventional signs — the concept of sign as evidence had become endemic; stable 
and law-like regularities became worthy of observation. Later on, the studies of 
the Jacques Bernoulli (1654-1705) culminated in the central limit theorem; in 1756 
Thomas Simpson (1710-1761) applied the theory of errors to the discussion of 
uncertainty; finally, in 1820s the first public statistics were published (Hacking 
2008 [1990], p. 133) and some years later the statistical laws were used to explain 
phenomena.
The coming to the fore of the evidence of things produced a new way of 
reasoning whose features I am going to illustrate. Among the sentences 
formulated by the alchemists and astrologists of the Renaissance, Hacking takes 
the following sentence (henceforth called SI) of Paracelsus as an example:
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(SI) Mercury salve is good for syphilis because mercury is signed by 
the planet Mercury, which signs the marketplace where syphilis is 
contracted (Hacking 1983b, p. 71).
He claims that for us SI is not a candidate for truth or falsehood (Hacking 2002 
[1982]-a, p. 171). How can this claim be justified? The point is that, for Hacking, 
Paracelsus's reasoning was based on a kind of evidence that died out in the 
seventeenth century and became unknown afterwards: 'the way propositions are 
proposed and defended' (Hacking 2002 [1982]-a, p. 170) by Paracelsus is alien to 
us. In order to make sense of SI it is not sufficient to know the meaning and the 
connotations of all the words. In short, it is Paracelsus's way of reasoning that we 
need to reconstruct. Only when we have done so can we talk as Paracelsus talked. 
To make Hacking's point clear, let us examine Paracelsus's way of reasoning 
behind the sentence SI. The starting point is that diseases must be cured by 
similarity. Bearing that in mind, this is the logic chain of Paracelsus's reasoning: 
syphilis is contracted in the market place; the planet Mercury has signed the 
marketplace; this is evidence that the metal mercury, which has the same name, 
can treat syphilis, given that diseases are cured by similarities. Ultimately, for 
syphilis, the name 'mercury' of the metal mercury is the sign that a good physician 
m ust know. It is a sign that provides evidence for the proposition 'Mercury treats 
syphilis'. This way of reasoning is not ours: propositions are defended on the basis 
of a system of evidence (signs), rules (e.g. similarities) and practices now fallen in
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disuse. Because of that, Hacking maintains that they do not have truth-value for
us.
Following Hacking, one could say that, just as some propositions are 
candidates for truth or falsehood only in the Renaissance way of reasoning, so 
certain propositions acquire a truth-value only as consequence of the emergence of 
probability (or, better, of the evidence of things). For example, the sentence:
(s2) The adult height for one sex in an ethnic group follows a normal 
distribution
did not have any truth-value in the Renaissance not only because the term 'norm al 
distribution' was not defined but because the truth-value of the sentence s2 hinges 
on the evidence of things. This is a kind of evidence that, as I have said, according 
to Hacking was not yet conceptualized before the mid-seventeenth century3. 
Moreover, to reason about this sentence means to take all the steps of a complex 
process -  selecting a sample, measuring, classifying, dealing with errors or 
assessing the difference between the experimental distribution and the theoretical 
one. Ultimately, to prove the sentence above involves, for all the means and 
purposes, not only a way of thinking but also a way of doing.
Hacking's point is that certain sentences may be meaningful only in a given 
epoch not because some terms are not defined but because their having a truth- 
value hinges on different ways of thinking and doing. To appreciate his point, let
3 Hacking's own example is 'the gross national product of Wiirttemberg in 1817 was 76.3 
million adjusted to 1820 crowns'. For him, this sentence did not have a truth-value before 
1821 'because there was no procedure of reasoning about the relevant idea' (Hacking 
1992c, p. 143).
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us compare SI and S2 with this passage from The Merchant's Tale, a bawdy story
from The Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer (1343-1400):
l
'Allas', quod he, 'that I ne had heer a knave 
That koude clymbe! Allas, alias', quod he;
'For I am blynd!' 'Ye sire, no fors', quod she;
'But wolde ye vouche sauf, for Goddes sake,
The pyrie inwith youre armes for to take,
For wel I woot that ye mystruste me,
Thanne sholde I clymbe well ynogh', quod she,
'So I my foot myghte sette upon youre bak' (in Gooden 2009, p. 66).
In his The Story of English (Gooden 2009), Gooden says that in the passage there are 
several challenges for the modern reader. One has to know what certain words 
stand for, e.g. quod, past tense of queten -  'to say'; pyrie -  'pear tree'; knave -  
'servant'; no fors -  'no matter' (Gooden 2009, p. 66). However, although the 
passage is full of double-entendre, once the archaic forms are defined, its literal 
sense becomes clear - it becomes meaningful. It refers to what happens when the 
servant Damyan climbs up a pear tree in the garden of January, the main 
character, and waits for the arrival of the young May and her husband. Not so for 
Paracelsus's sentence -  understanding it is for us an entirely different exercise that 
requires an effort beyond that of expressing the sentence in modern English. Not 
so for the sentence s2 either: for Hacking a Renaissance thinker would not have 
been able to assert or deny it, even if expressed in her language.
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Taking a cue from these comparisons, another important point can be 
noted. The sense of both SI and S2 rests on two different kinds of evidence, each 
of them peculiar to the respective ways of thinking. On the other hand, another 
passage of The Merchant's Tale, which precedes the passage just quoted, reads:
(s3) She taketh hym by the hand
(i.e.: 'She takes him by the hand'). Hacking would say that the sense is 
straightforwardly clear because it hinges on the evidence of senses, which of 
course does not belong exclusively to a given way of thinking. In any epoch, once 
the terms are defined, it can be asserted or denied -  come and look. Indeed 
Hacking stresses that, beside sentences whose truth-value rests upon a style of 
reasoning, there are 'observation statements' (Hacking 1992c, p. 133), or in other 
words 'factual statements' (Hacking 1983b, p. 173). Hacking is adam ant that these 
sentences do not require any reasoning to be assessed as true or false: they rely on 
the evidence of senses, which is foundational, ahistorical.
The idea of 'observational statements', or 'protocol statements' in the 
original terminology of the Vienna Circle, has been much criticised in the last 
decades. For example, Norwood Hanson (1924-1967) and Paul Feyerabend (1924- 
1994) maintained that observation statements are theory-laden (Hanson 1958, 
chapter 1) (Feyerabend 1988 [1975], chapter 3). Hacking agrees w ith them only to a 
certain extent:
The core objection to a correspondence theory is that there is no way in 
which to identify the facts to which a statement corresponds,
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independently of the statement itself. That is true in general, but not of
a lot of the run-of-the-mill sentences of the sort beloved by logicians
(Hacking 1992c, p. 134).
For sentences that make sense only against the background of the 'accepted' way 
of reasoning, Hacking thinks that 'Moritz Schlick's motto, "the meaning of a 
sentence is its method of verification", points in the right direction' (Hacking 1992c, 
p. 135). In other words, he does not think that 'there is one theory of truth, or one 
semantics, that applies to all contingent empirical sentences investigated in the 
sciences' (Hacking 1992c, p. 135). On the one hand correspondence theories of 
truth apply to style-independent sentences (e.g. s3), i.e. sentences whose truth- 
conditions are not determined by the way we reason. On the other hand, the 
methods of verification, which may change over time, apply to style-dependent 
sentences (e.g.s2), making them candidates for truth or falsity.
The verificationist account of meaning is particularly important for the 
styles project, and especially for establishing whether or not certain propositions 
are style-dependent, that is candidates for truth or falsehood. Hacking's concern is 
chiefly with the fact that Schlick put forward 'a  test for marking off the meaningful 
utterances' (Hacking, 1975 p. 97): as we shall see, within the styles project whether 
or not a community that adopts a certain SoT possesses methods for assessing a 
proposition as true or false can be crucial for establishing whether or not that 
proposition is meaningful for that community. Indeed, by saying that certain 
sentences are not meaningful Hacking often assumes the verificationist principle. 
As an example one can consider the sentence s2 above: for him whether or not it is 
meaningful for a certain community, that is, a candidate for truth or falsehood,
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depends on whether or not that community possesses the methods of the 
statistical SoT or its kind of evidence.
This leads to another important point. The verification methods that make 
statistical sentences meaningful are refined versions of the procedures for testing 
errors and making estimations that have emerged since the eighteenth century. 
Hacking notes that these methods of verification are themselves couched in terms 
of probability:
the conditions of assertibility of statistical hypotheses are themselves to 
be determined [...] in terms of yet a new layer of sentences that 
themselves are statistical (Hacking 1992c, p. 151).
This remark can be explained by considering once again S2 (i.e. 'The adult height 
for one sex in an ethnic group follows a normal distribution'). What makes S2 true 
or false is the existence of criteria for assessing whether the normal distribution 
fits the observed statistical distribution of the adult height. Typically, these criteria 
are measures of goodness of fit such as the chi-squared tests, which evaluate how 
well the observed frequencies follow a Gaussian distribution. However, the chi- 
squared tests are themselves statistical -  for example, to 'verify' S2 one has firstly 
to use the differences between the theoretical and empirical frequencies for 
calculating a value called chi-square; then, on the basis of this value and a 
statistical distribution (chi-square distribution), one works out a probability. If this 
probability is lower than a certain number, it is considered very unlikely that S2 is
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true4. In conclusion we use a statistical distribution and other probabilistic
methods to assess a statistical sentence.
Hacking maintains that there is some circularity in the process:
There is an odd way in which a style of reasoning and truth-conditions 
of some sentences are mutually self-authenticating. The truth is what 
we find out in such and such way. We recognize it as truth because of 
how we find it out. And how do we know that the method is good?
Because it gets at the truth (Hacking 1992c, p. 135).
In terms of my example, Hacking's claim is that the truth conditions of S2 are 
determined by a process of reasoning that includes the use of statistical 
procedures such as the chi-square test; on the other hand, this way of reasoning 
has become 'the correct standard' of assessing s2 because it has, to use a phrase 
cited of C.S. Peirce (1839-1914) by Hacking, the 'tru th  producing virtue' (Hacking 
1992c, p. 135) i.e. it is able to identify whether or not a proposition is true. It is to 
this circularity that Hacking alludes to when he says that a way of thinking is self- 
authenticating.
So far I have illustrated by examples the following points of Hacking. In the 
Renaissance the evidence of things was lacking and the world testified by its signs. 
Certain sentences of the Renaissance thinkers (e.g. SI) are not among our 
candidates for truth-or-falsehood because their sense hinges on a kind of evidence 
and a way of reasoning different from ours. Later on different scholars maintained
4 An introduction to the use of the chi-squared test can be found in (Taylor 1982, chapter 
12).
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that signs can be imperfect: for example, in 1650, in Hobbes's Human Nature, signs 
are considered imperfect and only 'very often' right. Credibility and frequency 
were thus linked. Then conventional signs were distinguished from natural signs 
and the concept of the evidence of things emerged. In the seventeenth century the 
new evidence of things opened a space for a new way of reasoning and, in 
particular, for new candidates for truth-or-falsehood. Hacking thinks of this 
transformation as a discontinuity in the history of human thought:
there was hardly any history of probability to record before Pascal, 
while after Laplace [...] a page-by-page account of published work on 
the subject became almost impossible (Hacking 2006 [1975], p. 1).
He even gives a date for the birth of probability: the decade around 1660 (Hacking 
1992c, p. 141).
Incidentally, the coming to the fore of probability was not only followed by the 
emergence of new style-dependent sentences (e.g. S2) but also by new criteria (e.g. 
best fit), types of explanation (e.g. statistical distributions), laws (e.g. the law of 
large numbers), classifications (e.g. society is divided into genres of people 
(Hacking 2008 [1990], p. 134)) and new objects (e.g. the population characterized 
by a mean and standard deviation).
All these points of Hacking can be summarized by saying that there exists a 
mode of thinking and doing, which we may call the statistical style of thinking and 
doing, w ith the following characterizing properties:
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The statistical style of thinking and doing relies on a new kind of evidence for
finding out; it is self-authenticating and introduces new candidates for truth-
or-falsehood, criteria, types of explanation, laws, classifications and objects.
The emergence of the statistical style of thinking and doing represents a sharp
break in the history of Western thought.
Hacking introduced the term 'style' in his paper of 1982 'Language, Truth and 
Reason' (Hacking 1982). By the term 'style' or, more precisely, by the expression 
'style of thinking and doing', he means a way of thinking and doing with the 
features discussed above, as I shall explain in section 2.4. For my part, as I have 
said, I shall use the acronym SoT. That is: a SoT is a way of thinking and doing in 
the sense of Hacking — it possesses all the features listed just above (which I shall 
call 'the characterizing properties of SoTs').
Although Hacking introduced the concept of 'style of thinking and doing' 
seven years later the publication of The Emergence of Probability, the latter already 
illustrated the concept of style of thinking and doing that he later on elaborated, as 
my discussion above shows. For his concept of style Hacking acknowledged his 
debt to the Australian historian of science Alistair Cameron Crombie (1915-1996) 
of whom I will say more in the next section.
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2.3. From Crombie's Styles of Thinking to Hacking's 
Styles Project
In 1978, three years after the publication of The Emergence of Probability, Hacking 
was invited to a conference in Pisa in which Crombie (1915-1996) lectured on what 
he called 'styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition' (Crombie 1978). 
Crombie spoke of exactly six styles of scientific thinking still practised in the 
m odem  sciences, each of which emerged at a specific time in history and evolved 
in its own time frame. That lecture suggested to Hacking the 'idea of a small 
manifold of SoTs' (Hacking 2009, p. 6), as he revealed later (Hacking 2012, p. 1). In 
order to explain how he turned Crombie's ideas into his own philosophical project 
I shall first summarize the latter's account of styles.
The point that six styles can be distinguished in the history of Western 
science is a recurrent view in many of Crombie's writings (Crombie 1978,1988, 
1992,1994). Since the mid-seventies, his aim had been to write an encyclopaedic 
history of their growth, but it was only in 1994 that his ideas finally appeared in an 
ambitious three-volume book, entitled Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European 
Tradition (Crombie 1994).
In that book, Crombie maintained that a 'postulational style of thinking' 
was adopted by the ancient Greeks in mathematics, Aristotle's works on natural 
sciences, Hippocratic medicine, ethics, law and metaphysics (Crombie 1994, p. 74). 
He conceived this style, the first he described, as a method that consisted of a two- 
step process: search for the simplest and fewest premises and deduction of their 
implications by 'proof', a Greek invention (Crombie 1994, p. 20). For example, the
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demonstrative power of geometry was used by Claudius Ptolemy (90,168) to
calculate celestial motions and to build a theory of the process of vision in optics.
In their scientific works, the Greeks set up a rational scientific system in which 'the
sequence of theoretical reasoning from premise to conclusion matched the
sequence in nature from cause to effect' (Crombie 1994, p. 20). In other words, the
phenomena were reproduced by an abstract deductive formal system, which
embodied postulated principles and offered causes of regularities. The world
came to be thought as rational, entirely deducible by first principles.
Crombie also spoke of an experimental style that came about in ancient 
Greece because observation and measurement were necessary either to control the 
explanations obtained by the method of postulation or to explore the possible 
causes of phenomena. For Crombie, the use of experiments became the more and 
more sophisticated from 13th to the 17th century through the strong relation 
between the postulational style in the natural sciences and engineering (Crombie 
1994, pp. 311-423). Then, the habit of measurement and observation fully 
developed in the seventeenth century beside the growth of mathematics.
By 'the hypothetical style of modelling' Crombie meant 'the method of 
elucidating the unknown properties of a natural phenomenon by simulating the 
phenomenon with the known properties of a theoretical physical artefact' (1994, p.
74). For him, the style of hypothetical modelling had its origin in ancient Greece, 
in particular in ancient theology and astronomy. He illustrated in detail this thesis 
by examining thinkers who lived from 400 AD onwards (i.e. from Augustine to 
Kant) (Crombie 1994, pp. 1081-1231). For example, the armillary sphere (astrolabe) 
was a model of celestial sphere invented by Eratosthenes of Cyrene (276 -195 B.C)
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in order to describe the movements of stars and to map the constellations. 
Hypothetical modelling fully developed in application to early m odem  
perspective, painting and engineering; then, from these fields of study it was 
transferred to m odem  science.
Furthermore, Crombie maintained that the fourth style, the taxonomic one, 
is 'the method of ordering variety in any subject matter by comparison and 
difference' (Crombie 1988, p. 11). In the first volume of his 1994 work he pointed 
out that this style emerged as an explicit logic of classification in Plato and 
Aristotle and 'in  many ways it is the foundation of all natural science, establishing 
fundamental similarities and difference' (Crombie 1994, p. 75). Then, in the fifth 
part of the second volume, Crombie illustrated the search of a natural system 
throughout history from Andrea Cesalpino, who proposed a classification based 
on the reproductive parts, to Linnaeus, who funded his natural system on the 
fixity of genera.
The fifth style described by Crombie is the statistical one. He proposed for 
this style an origin alternative to that suggested by Hacking. Indeed, Crombie's 
story of probable reasoning begins in ancient Greece and leads to Laplace w ithout 
any sharp transition in systems of thought such as that emphasized by Hacking 
(Crombie 1994, p. 75). On his part, Hacking stressed the fact that his account of the 
emergence of probability is alternative to Crombie's continuist one (Hacking 2006 
[1975], p. X).
Finally, for Crombie the style of historical derivation, originated in ancient 
Greece, aimed at explaining the present as a development of the past regulated by 
certain laws and at deducing the past from present regularities (Crombie 1994, p.
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75). Again, Crombie conceived the development of the style of historical
derivation as continuous from Greeks to Darwin; however, these methods were
developed in application first to the history of languages, then to the geological
history of the Earth and the evolution of living organisms (Crombie 1994, vol. Ill
chapter seven).
In his seminars at the College de France, Hacking referred to Crombie's 
styles above by using the following aides-memoire:
a) The postulational style (in Hacking's writings the terms 'geometrical style' 
and 'style of mathematics' are also found (Hacking 2005c, p. 543) (Hacking 
2012))
b) The experimental style
c) The style of hypothetical modelling
d) The taxonomic style
e) The statistical style
f) The historico-genetic style
Henceforth, I shall refer to this list of styles of thinking as 'Crombie's list'.
Crombie introduced his concept of style to organize his history of western 
sciences. Sometimes, he used interchangeably the terms 'method' and 'style' (e.g. 
Crombie 1988, p. 10); in other occasions he added the specification that 'styles of 
scientific thinking are distinguished by their objects and their methods of 
reasoning' (Crombie 1994, quoted in Hacking 2009, p.90). It is in a book published 
only in Italian that he provided a more precise definition of what a style is:
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We can define what I call a 'scientific style' in terms of three features: 1) 
its form of argumentation (its methods of discovery and 
demonstration); 2) its conception of nature (beliefs about what exists 
and is to be discovered); 3) the mental habits (especially the 
expectations and the answers concerning innovation and change; the 
dispositions of a society and individuals within it) (Crombie 1992, p.
103 my translation).
Feature one concerns the model of discovery that scientists in distinct periods use 
(Crombie 1988, p. 2): for example, in certain circumstances, the geometrical model 
in which the laws of phenomena are derived from first principles might be 
preferred to an analogical model, in which phenomena are understood and 
explained by building their mechanical representations.
Feature two concerns the conception of nature associated to every style. For 
example, the statistical style opened the way to quantum theory (see Hacking 2006 
[1975], p. 174), whose formalism cannot be interpreted as if probabilities reflected 
our ignorance5. As a consequence, statistical laws have become an irreducible fact 
of the world and classical physics' deterministic conception of nature has given 
way to an indeterministic one. In this sense, the advocates of statistical style are 
committed to an indeterministic conception of nature.
Feature three concerns the fact that distinct societies have been more or less ready 
to accept change because of their beliefs: for example, as we shall see, according to
5 The works of the physicists John Von Neumann (von Neumann 1955), John Bell (Bell
1966), Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker (Kochen and Specker 1967) show that it is
impossible to provide a 'classical7 reformulation of the formalism of quantum theory.
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G.E.R. Lloyd it was precisely because Greek society was so polemical and open to
debate that an axiomatic-deductive mathematics came about in the ancient Greece
and was put into general practice (Lloyd 2004).
A point to note is that all of Crombie's styles emerge in ancient Greece and 
develop continuously. Both Kerry Magruder and Robert Iliffe pointed out that 
Crombie's continuity thesis about the development of styles is to be linked to his 
continuism concerning the Scientific Revolution (Magruder 1995, p. 408) (Iliffe 
1998, p. 20). In Crombie's view, the experimental methodology of Galileo and 
Newton was first developed and practised by medieval natural philosophers. 
Crombie accepted that the crucial steps in the emergence of modern science took 
place during the Scientific Revolution, but he thought that the essence of history of 
science was a continuous development of scientific thought from Greek thinkers 
onwards. As Kusch noted, 'the tool-box of Crombie-inspired styles contains no 
ingredients to understand historical change' (Kusch 2010, p. 166). Indeed, 
Crombie's notion has been conceived from a historical perspective different from 
that of SoT:
Crombie's vision of the history of the European sciences favours 
continuity. My instinct is exactly the opposite. I like to tell the history 
of each style as having at least one sharp moment of crystallization, a 
fixing of how to go in the future [...]. I acquired this habit early, in The 
Emergence o f Probability, some years before I had ever heard of Crombie 
(Hacking 2009, p. 14)
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In this passage Hacking reveals that it was his study on probability that made him 
sceptical about continuism. So much so that he supposes that other ways of 
reasoning possess the same feature. Consequently, what he wants is a notion that 
describes ways of reasoning whose beginnings mark a discontinuity point in the 
trajectory of Western thought.
In 1982, four years after his encounter with Crombie's ideas, Hacking published 
his first paper ever on SoTs, 'Language, Truth and Reason' (Hacking 1982), which 
was included by the English philosopher Martin Hollis (1938-1998) in a collection 
of essays entitled Rationality and Relativism (Hollis and Lukes [Eds.] 1982). A clear 
point emerged from that paper: despite Hacking's admission that Crombie had 
been the starting point of his SoTs project, their enterprises m ust be regarded as 
entirely different. Indeed, Hacking launched his own philosophical project by 
making a distinctive use of the latter's notion of style. I am going to illustrate this 
project in the next section.
2.4. The Styles Project
'The Style Project' is the label used by Hacking in his "'Language, Truth 
and Reason" thirty years later' (Hacking 2012) to describe the programme 
sketched in his earlier papers on SoTs, namely 'Language, Truth and Reason' 
(Hacking 1982) and '"Style" for historians and philosophers' (Hacking 1992d). 
However, later thoughts expressed in works such as Scientific Reason (Hacking 
2009) might be included in this project. In this section I shall present those points
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of the SoTs project made by Hacking that mainly concern his characterization of
SoTs and I shall leave for later discussion other philosophical questions touched
on by him. My point will be that the SoTs project contains ideas that need to be
developed or better clarified.
2.4.1 Objectivity and Meaning
Ever since his 1982 paper Hacking's reflection on SoTs has centred around 
the point that 'whether or not a proposition is as it were up for grabs, as a 
candidate for being true-or-false, depends on whether we have a way to reason 
about it' (Hacking 2002 [1982]-a, p. 160). For him SoTs fix the sense of certain 
sentences by making them candidates for truth or falsehood. The sentence S2 ('The 
adult height for one sex in an ethnic group follows a normal distribution') in the 
previous section illustrates well this point: its sense hinges on the SoT appropriate 
to it, i.e. the statistical SoT. Indeed -  Hacking would argue - what determines its 
truth-value is the statistical SoT: its methods, its way of thinking and doing and its 
kind of evidence.
Hacking distinguishes positive propositions, i.e. propositions that are true-or-false, 
from bivalent propositions, i.e. propositions that have a definite truth-value, true or 
false (Hacking 2002 [1982]-a, p. 166). 'Positive' is a less strong feature than 
'bivalent' because a positive proposition is a proposition potentially susceptible of 
being true or false, given the existence of a SoT; on the other hand a bivalent 
proposition is a proposition that is actually true or false. Hacking gives this 
example: once J.C. Maxwell (1831-1879) said that some propositions about the
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relative velocity of light were intrinsically incapable of determination; but few 
years later A.A. Michelson (1852-1931) invented a technology to give a precise 
answer to Maxwell's questions (Hacking 2002 [1982]-a, p. 167). Maxwell's 
sentences were only positive; but after Michelson's experiments they became 
bivalent. The point is that for Hacking a proposition is positive if it makes sense, 
even if the correct way of assessing it by the standards of truth and methods of its 
SoT has not yet been found. SoTs have to do with positive sentences rather than 
bivalent sentences.
The fact that Hacking essentially thinks of SoTs as structured classes of 
propositions that are capable of being true or false marks a profound difference 
between Crombie's notion of style and Hacking's notion of SoT. What for the 
historian Crombie is a device for describing the Western scientific tradition, in the 
hands of Hacking becomes the tool 'we need to understand what we mean by 
objectivity'(Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 181). What Hacking means can be explained 
by noting that he often uses statements such as 'the proposition has a truth-value' 
or 'has a sense' or 'is positive' or 'is meaningful' or 'is objective' interchangeably. 
In particular, the expression 'becoming objective' is used in reference to 
propositions that become candidates for truth or falsehood; or in reference to 
concepts, questions, conjectures, solutions that come to be uttered, shared, 
discussed, i.e. become 'possible', as when the emergence of the evidence of things 
made possible the sentences of the statistical SoT. So what Hacking means by 
saying that the notion of SoT is 'w hat we need to understand objectivity' can be 
grasped by looking at his study on probability: he thinks that the idea of a 
statistical SoT is a useful tool for understanding how certain sentences became
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candidates for truth or falsehood and how the concept of probability itself became
objective. More generally, Hacking wants to use the notion of a SoT to capture the
way in which the past has determined our present scientific conceptions. To adopt
Foucault's phrase, Hacking wants to do a 'history of the present' (Hacking 2009, p.
4), i.e. to dig into the past to reveal the conditions of possibility of our present
knowledge. This point will be relevant to tracing the philosophical lineage that has
shaped the SoTs project.
2.4.2 Hacking's Styles of Thinking
Over the years Hacking has mentioned as SoTs different ways of reasoning. 
Although in 1992 he declared that Crombie's three-volume work provides a 
historical account useful for characterizing his SoTs (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 186), 
he did not accept as SoTs all the styles in Crombie's list. For example, he observed 
that Crombie's styles b) and c) (the experimental style and the style of modelling) 
on their own cannot account for the considerable sophistication undergone by the 
experimental method over the centuries. Hacking did not deny that both 
experimenting and modelling can be in play in particular areas of research 
(Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 186), but he claimed that the concept that captures the 
genesis and development of experimental thinking is, as he called it, the laboratory 
style of thinking and doing. I shall characterize it better in the next section. For the 
time being, I want to outline the evolution of Hacking's thought as regards this 
SoT.
For a start he has always been convinced that the salient feature of this SoT 
is that, ever since the time of the Scientific Revolution, humans have build
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experimental apparatuses to elicit new phenomena, phenomena that had never 
been observed before (Hacking 2009, p. 43). The emblem of this new way of doing 
is Robert Boyle (1627-1691), who made the air pump in order to investigate the 
capacity of the air to exert pressure; this is a thesis that Hacking drew from Steven 
Shapin and Simon Schaffer's book Leviathan and the Air Pump (Shapin and Schaffer 
1989 [1985]-a), as I shall show. Ultimately, one way to think of this SoT is to regard 
it as a particular deployment of Crombie's styles b) and c) plus the creation of 
phenomena by man-made machines (Hacking 2007a, p. 3).
Furthermore, in the paper The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences 
(Hacking 1992b), Hacking argued that laboratory sciences tend to produce a sort of 
self-vindicating structure in that background theories, hypotheses, modelling of 
apparatus, data analyses and other items of knowledge are mutually adjusted to 
each other. He referred to this particular internal dialectic between different items 
of knowledge as a self-stabilizing technique (or self-vindicating technique), the process 
peculiar to the experimental thinking that, as I shall explain, makes the laboratory 
SoT self-authenticating.
Hacking has entertained the idea of a 'laboratory SoT' at least until 2007, 
when he gave a talk in Taiwan with the telling title 'The Laboratory of Thinking 
and Doing' (Hacking 2007a). Yet in 2012 he corrected his claim. He said that 
Occam's Razor should move us to regard the emergence of the laboratory SoT as a 
phenomenon internal to the life of Crombie's experimental style (this time 
considered a SoT) rather than a SoT to be added to Crombie's list (Hacking 2012, 
p. 5). Incidentally this last suggestion is difficult to put into practice. Boyle's new 
way of thinking cannot be fitted into Crombie's experimental style: Boyle
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represents a radical change whereas the development of Crombie's style is
continuous.
Concerning Crombie's postulational style, Hacking has always insisted that 
it can be considered a SoT with this proviso: the real novelty brought into being by 
Greek thought is 'proof' rather than, as Crombie believed, postulation. In 1992 he 
had made it clear that a comprehensive account of the postulational SoT, which he 
never offered, should explain why 'mathematics has the astonishing power to 
establish truths about the world independently of experience'(Hacking 2002 
[1992], p. 183). Some years later, in Scientific Reason (Hacking 2009), he declared 
that the Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics (Netz 1999) by the historian of 
ancient mathematics Reviel Netz is the study he wanted (Hacking 2009, p. 67): an 
investigation on the cognitive and social factors which shaped the emergence of 
proof.
With regard to the remaining styles in Crombie's list, the taxonomic style 
and the historico-genetic, the styles project says almost nothing, as Hacking 
explicitly admits (Hacking 2012, p. 10). On the other hand, in his 1992 paper he 
mentioned new SoTs that could be added to Crombie's list. For instance, he 
suggested that 'the Indo-Arabic style of applied mathematics, little interested in 
postulation but dedicated to finding algorithms' (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 185) 
might represent a distinct style, which he called 'algorismic' SoT (Hacking 2002 
[1992], p. 185). Later, in his lectures at the College de France (Hacking 2006c, p. 7) 
and in Scientific Reason (Hacking 2009) he brought up this idea again. Finally, he 
made no mention of it in his 2012 paper, in which he rejected some proposals of 
other SoTs in literature.
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It should not be forgotten that in 'Language Truth and Reason' (Hacking 
1982) as well as in Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983b), Hacking 
mentioned another style of thinking, that of Paracelsus (section 2.2), and in his 
2012 paper he also explicitly referred to it as a SoT (Hacking 2012, p. 9). However, 
in a note of his paper, Robert Kowalenko (Kowalenko 2011)6 wrote that Hacking, 
in personal communication, told him that Paracelsus' style is not 'scientific', a 
point that Hacking has never clarified.
Hacking's last word about the number of SoTs was that 'it is better not to 
multiply six [the number of styles in Crombie's list] beyond necessity' (Hacking 
2012, p.6). Even so, it remains unclear why certain styles he mentioned or others 
that have been proposed by other scholars should be excluded. Is there a deeper 
reason than the simple observance of lex parsimoniae?
6 Kowalenko's paper was presented at the third Bi-annual Conference of the European 
Philosophy of Science Association in Cape Town and has not been published so far.
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2.4.3 The Characterizing Properties of Styles of Thinking
A way of reframing this issue is that of asking whether there are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for being a SoT. As I am going to explain, Hacking has been 
undecided about the answer to this question. In section 2 .21 have introduced the 
'characterizing properties of SoTs', exemplified by the features of the statistical 
SoT. Indeed, over the years Hacking has mentioned each of those properties in his 
general discussions about SoTs. For example, I have already pointed out that for 
Hacking the statistical and the laboratory SoT had clear beginnings. Might there 
exist other ways of reasoning with this property? The SoT project contains no 
answer to this question. On the other hand, in the second section of this chapter I 
have also explained that the statistical SoT introduces new objects, new candidates 
for truth or falsehood, criteria and laws, relies on the evidence of things and is self- 
authenticating. This is exactly what Hacking says in general about SoTs:
Every style of reasoning [SoT] introduces a great many novelties 
including new types of:
Objects
Evidence
Sentences, new ways of being a candidate for truth or falsehood
Laws, or at any rate modalities
Possibilities
One will also notice, on occasion, new types of classifications and 
explanations (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 189) (see also Hacking 1995, p.
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Further on in the text he added that:
Styles become standards of objectivity because they get at the truth. But 
a sentence of that kind is a candidate for truth or falsehood only in the 
context of the style. Thus styles are in a certain sense 'self- 
authenticating' (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 191).
Although the sense of these quotations appears clear if one refers to the statistical 
SoT, some points are still ambiguous. It is unclear whether all the potential 
candidates for being identified as SoTs mentioned by Hacking are self- 
authenticating and why. This is not a trivial matter. In 1996, in respect of the 
question 'how  do the sciences differ from the humanities?' Hacking suggested that 
only the sciences exhibit ways of reasoning that have developed self-stabilizing 
techniques (Hacking 1996, p. 74). If so, establishing which ways of reasoning are 
self-authenticating is relevant to characterizing science itself.
Incidentally, I object to Hacking's use of the verb 'to introduce' in relation 
to evidence. Considering as an example the statistical SoT, it is not that it 
'introduced' new evidence; if anything, the order is reversed: only w hen the new 
evidence of things was conceptualized did a 'space' for the birth of the statistical 
SoT open. So I think this verb does not really do the trick, at least when we w ant to 
describe the statistical SoT's internal mechanisms. One should simply say that to 
adopt a new SoT involves the use of a new type of evidence.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the features I have mentioned above by 
Hacking are necessary and sufficient conditions for being a SoT. In 1992 he wrote 
that there is 'a  necessary condition for being a style of reasoning: each style should
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introduce novelties of most or all of the listed types [above]'(Hacking 2002 [1992],
p. 189). Later, in his lectures at the College de France he went further by claiming
that the existence of the features above is a necessary and sufficient criterion for a SoT
(Hacking 2006a, p. 3 my emphasis). But then, in 2012, interviewed by Andrew
Lakoff, he said:
It is not surprising that one can't give a definition, a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, for being in the Crombie's list. You can't 
define science: a fortiori you cannot define styles of scientific reasoning.
[...] There are general things that one can say, but they tend to be too 
general (Lakoff 2012, p. 227).
2.4.4 Doing
In his later writings (e.g. Hacking 2009) about SoTs he insisted on another point 
that I have already touched on: SoTs also are ways of doing. Crombie focused on 
'knowing by doing' inthe style of hypothetical modelling and the experimental 
style: for example, perspective was a new way of seeing, depicting and 
manipulating (Crombie 1994, pp. 444 - 60) and imitation of nature was a new way 
of knowing. In Hacking this inextricable combination of knowing and doing is 
much more developed: he is often keen to remark that humans are embodied 
creatures that use both their minds and bodies to think and act in the world 
(Hacking 2012, p. 2). For example, he stressed that there is a strong link between 
thinking and doing in mathematical proofs (Hacking 2011). In order to underline 
this point in his earlier writings he had favoured the locution 'style of reasoning' 
because he thought that 'thinking is too much in the head' (Hacking 2002 [1992], p.
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189), whereas he wanted to stress that assessing the truth of a style-dependent 
sentence has to do with 'doing' as well as 'thinking'. In his latest writings, to be 
more explicit, he preferred the label 'style of thinking and doing' to 'style of 
reasoning' (Hacking 2012, p. 2).
I have remarked in the second section of chapter one that some of 
Hacking's critics have passed over this remark. I am with James Elwick, who said:
[There is] a tendency of many scholars to transform 'styles of 
reasoning' into 'styles of thinking' despite Hacking's insistence that 
hand-work [sic] is just as important as head-work [sic] (Elwick 2012, p.
i) .
This tendency might be ascribed to the fact that Hacking has not clarified why all 
the SoTs he mentioned can also be viewed as ways of doing. This is another 
suggestion that I want to develop.
Finally in 2012 Hacking made it clear that SoTs should be understood as scientific 
ways of finding out
Another available moniker [for SoTs] is: [...] ways of finding out in the 
sciences. Not only finding out 'that' so and so, but also, finding 'how 
to'. Finding out what's true, and finding out how to change things 
(Hacking 2012, p. 3).
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In this sense, to develop the SoTs project means to explain how we have found out
about our world and altered it. This leads us to viewing the SoTs project from
another perspective.
2.4.5 The Styles Project as a Study in Cognitive History
Ever since his lectures at the College de France (Hacking 2006a), Hacking flirted 
with the idea that every SoT is grounded in one or more modules, sorts of separate 
structures of the mind, which are the product of evolution by natural selection and 
can be studied from the point of view of cognitive science and neuroscience 
(Hacking 2009, p. 48). For example, he conjectured that there might be a module 
for geometrical reasoning and one for numerical and combinatorial reasoning 
(Hacking 2011) (see also Spelke 1994).
In addiction to that, Hacking also regarded the SoTs project as an 
'ecological' study (Hacking 2012) (see also Crombie 1994, p. 6). The term 'ecology' 
comes from the Greek 'oikos' - 'house', and indicates the branch of biology that 
studies the relations of organisms to their surroundings, their 'house1, so to speak. 
So Hacking means that the SoTs project is not only about human beings and their 
capacities but also about the relations to their intellectual, moral and physical 
environment (Hacking 2012, p. 9). Finally, Hacking also used the term 'cognitive 
history' to describe the SoTs project, borrowing the term from Netz (Netz 1999, p.
6). Hacking thinks of his theory of SoTs as a further exploration of how certain 
cognitive capacities, within certain historical contexts, led to certain ways of 
acquiring knowledge (see also Netz 1999, Introduction).
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In 2012 Hacking tried to put an end to the issue of defining what a style is 
by saying that the word SoT is a word that describes and that SoTs 'are what we 
use' (Hacking 2012, p. 3). I do not think that this minimal definition is helpful. It 
does not chime in with some of his remarks about the necessity of certain features 
for being a SoT, which suggest that one must say more about what a SoT is. Firstly, 
Hacking insists that SoTs also are ways of doing; but not all the ways of thinking 
we use are ways of doing as well. For example, as John Forrester reminds us 
(Forrester 1996), the basic pattern of common law thinking consists of going from 
case to case: a proposition that describes a given case is transformed into a law 
that applies to other similar situations. There is no kind of handwork that plays a 
significant role in reasoning in cases. Therefore it is necessary to establish whether 
(some of) the ways of reasoning we use in the sciences are also ways of doing. A 
notion of SoT that captures this practical aspect of scientific knowledge would 
help us to better characterize and order our ways of thinking about the world.
Secondly, a commitment to discontinuity for the statistical SoT and the 
laboratory SoT suggests that the 'sudden' emergence of new standards of evidence 
could be a feature of our scientific ways of thinking and doing. If so, the notion of 
SoT could account for their punctuated trajectories. Thirdly, Hacking has given 
over the years too much emphasis to certain features of SoTs, implicitly suggesting 
that they are necessary in the discussion of certain ways of thinking. Therefore, 
they should inform the content of the notion of SoT, if it has to be a useful tool for 
understanding the present.
In addition to that, if a notion such as that of SoT has to be central to a 
project that deserves names such as 'cognitive history', it should shed light on the
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features exemplified by the statistical SoT. Indeed, a cognitive history should look
into our ways of finding out, the new forms of explanation 'invented' by the
hum an species and the relations between finding out and doing in different
contexts. Ultimately, Hacking has brought up features of scientific ways of
thinking that cannot be left out from the kind of inquiry he has in mind. In the
next chapter I shall argue that there is a set of styles of thinking and doing that,
although different one from another in their histories and in their historical
trajectories, share all the features suggested by Hacking over the years and
presented in this section. I wish to list all these features (the characterizing
features of SoTs) below:
1) A SoT is a way of thinking and doing. In particular, a way of intervening in 
the world and 'finding out "that" so and so, but also, finding "how to". Finding 
out what's true, and finding out how to change things' (Hacking 2012, p. 3).
2) A SoT relies on a new kind of evidence for 'finding out in the sciences' 
(Hacking, 2012 p.3)
3) A SoT introduces new candidates for truth-or-falsehood, new types of 
explanations and /o r new criteria, laws, classifications
4) A SoT is self-authenticating
5) A SoT represents a sharp break in the history of Western thought
In section 2 .21 had pointed out that the statistical SoT possesses the characterizing 
features 1)... 5). I had also made it clear that 'SoT' is the label I use for this 
particular set of ways of thinking and doing that have the features 1).. .5). In this
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section I have explained that Hacking has never listed together all the 
characterizing features of SoTs 1).. .5): first he listed features 2), 3) and 4) (see pp. 
67-68); in his more recent writings he added and stressed that when he uses the 
label 'style of thinking' he alludes to ways of thinking that should be thought of as 
characterized by features 1) and 5) (see p. 60 and subsection 2.4.4).
It is important to note that the set of SoTs is not empty: not only does the statistical 
SoT belong to it, as I have illustrated, but also does the laboratory SoT, as I am 
going to show. In the next chapter I shall argue that other ways of thinking have 
the characterizing features of SoTs (1).. .5)) and can be called SoTs. It is my 
contention that by this move it is possible to provide a better characterization of 
scientific thinking: there will be a set of ways of thinking that will be called SoTs 
while other ways of thinking will satisfy only some of the characterizing features 
of SoTs.
2.5. The Laboratory Style of Thinking
In this section I shall show how some of Hacking's ideas can be connected with 
one another and used to argue that there is a way of thinking that satisfies the 
characterizing properties of SoTs: the laboratory SoT. Crombie placed the 
emergence of the experimental style in ancient Greece; Hacking retorted that 
experimental thinking has no real beginning because hum an beings have always 
measured and explored (Hacking 2009, p. 42). Furthermore, Crombie was 
disinclined to see any sharp break, any discovery of a new hum an potential in the 
long development of experimental thinking (Hacking 2009, p. 95); on the contrary,
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Hacking asserted that the programme of experimentation developed in the
seventeenth century introduced a novelty in the way humans used experimenting
and modelling to know: the invention of a place, the laboratory, in which
instruments are built in order to elicit phenomena that do not exist in isolation.
This point deserves an explanation.
In his Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983b), Hacking had 
highlighted certain features of laboratory research. For instance he had 
distinguished between effects and phenomena. Substantially, Hacking separated 
phenomena that can be recognized and observed without a direct intervention in 
the world from phenomena that do not exist in isolation but require special 
devices to be elicited (i.e. effects). He gave the example of the Hall effect, that is, 
the voltage difference induced by a magnetic field perpendicular to an electrical 
current. The Hall effect occurs at any time and anywhere in nature once there is a 
particular arrangement of conductors and magnetic fields: for Hacking, it is a kind 
of regularity different from, say, the rise and fall in sea level produced by the 
attraction of the moon and the sun. The Hall effect requires a piece of equipment 
to be 'noted', whereas the phenomena connected with the tidal force are 'given in 
nature' and only need to be observed. Hacking often uses the verb 'to create': by 
saying that certain phenomena are 'created' in laboratory or are 'artificial' he just 
wants to say that nowhere in nature is there an arrangement such as the apparatus 
that produces the Hall effect. More importantly, '[an effect] can be seen as a 
regularity only against the further background of theory' (Hacking 1983b, p. 225), 
that is, as I interpret him, only against a further theory of the working of the 
apparatuses that produce it.
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The concept of the laboratory SoT is meant to account for this feature of 
scientific research: the production of effects. When did it start? As I have said, 
Hacking mooted that the production of effects settled into routine in scientific 
research in the seventeenth century. He drew his answer from Shapin and 
Schaffer's Leviathan and the air pump, which he considers a book about the origin of 
the laboratory SoT, as I am going to explain. This book presents the thesis that in 
the late 1650s Boyle and the English experimental community, still in its infancy, 
established new rules of discourse by which matters of fact had to be both 
generated and defended. They maintained a certain form of discourse by agreeing 
upon what should be considered a fact or a hypothesis, how disputes had to be 
settled, how matters of facts had to be explained.
Beside the air pump, the other protagonist of Leviathan and the air-pump is 
the philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who takes the role of Boyle's 
opponent: he did not accept the conventional basis of the latter's way of producing 
knowledge. Hobbes was an opponent of the social setting and the practice of 
acquiring knowledge, with its conventions and standards of truth, which was 
about to be widely adopted in scientific research.
Shapin and Schaffer tell that Boyle instructed Robert Hooke (1635-1703) to 
build for him an air-pump, a closed vessel (receiver) from which air could be 
extracted by using a pump-mechanism. Boyle produced an approximate vacuum 
in the receiver so to be able to perform a series of experiments to investigate the 
composition and compressibility of air (e.g. he repeated Torricelli's barometric 
experiment enclosing a Torricellian apparatus in the receiver). These experiments 
were carried out in what Shapin and Schaffer call the new place, the laboratory,
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namely a site for finding out by making: for example, finding out that the air is 
necessary for a candle flame by 'creating' the phenomenon of vacuum in a vessel.
The nascent laboratory was a 'public' space: to be public meant that the 
validation and the constitution of a piece of knowledge was obtained when all the 
individuals who attended the performance of an experiment agreed about what 
they saw. An aspect that Shapin and Schaffer contrast with 'the private work of 
the alchemists [...], who produced their knowledge claims in a private and 
undisciplined space' and with 'radical individualism -  the state in which each 
individual set himself up as the ultimate judge of knowledge' (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1989 [1985]-a, p. 78). However, the new place was also 'private': only the 
opinion of those who were able to understand how an instrument works and 
followed certain conventions could contribute to the validation of knowledge.
Shapin and Schaffer's book is considered one of the most influential 
approaches to social constructivism. For instance, Jan Golinski wrote that '[for 
Shapin and Schaffer both the laboratory] and the wider realm beyond its walls can 
be viewed as an arena in which knowledge is constructed'(Golinski 2005 [1998], p. 
37). Indeed Shapin and Schaffer argued th a t,' Boyle's technologies [of persuasion] 
contributed to a common strategy for the constitution of the matter of fact [...] 
That is to say, each technology functioned as an objectifying resource' (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1989 [1985], -a p. 77). In this sense, Hobbes against Boyle, as conceived by 
Shapin and Schaffer, is a quarrel about what should count as evidence: is evidence 
w hat we find among us, as Hobbes thought, or is it what apparatuses produce, as 
Boyle suggested? Both Hobbes and Boyle, argue Shapin and Schaffer, had justified 
and rational arguments, but those of Hobbes had no force: had the social context
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been different, Hobbes' objections would have found a different reception. For 
Shapin the social world of seventeenth-century England with its values of civility, 
honour and integrity formed the basis in which knowledge was established 
(Shapin 1994). These ideas fit the constructivist standpoint according to which 
truth is the product of contingent historical or social forces.
2.5.1 New Evidence and Discontinuity
Hacking wrote that '[Hobbes] saw that [Boyle's] was a new and threatening style 
of reasoning' (Hacking 1991a, p. 240). 'Hobbes saw' because he was aware of the 
conventions by which knowledge was acquired and validated in the new place 
that developed into the laboratory. Put differently, Hobbes was able 'to  see from 
outside' the features of the new emerging style and did not accept them. The first 
of these features is represented by a new type of evidence: for Boyle 'evidence' was 
not only what can be found as 'given' in nature but also what can be made by man. 
Hobbes, for his part, refused to accept that the result of an experiment could 
represent the evidence on which to base our claims of knowledge. His point was 
that all the experiments conceal theoretical assumptions, e.g. about the functioning 
of the apparatus and the set up of the experiment, whose validity could always be 
disputed. For him, whatever explanation was made to account for an artificial 
phenomenon, there is always a superior explanation that proceeds from different 
assumptions about the experiment.
The emergence of a community of people that used as a new type of 
evidence phenomena produced by devices such as the air pum p, which did not 
previously exist in isolation, is a punctuated event in the history of science. To
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illustrate this point, let us look at the social context in which Galileo worked.
Although just a handful of years separates Galileo and Boyle (Boyle was sixteen
years old when Galileo died) their milieus could not have been more different.
Mario Biagioli has argued that 'Galileo and his readers did not belong to a
professional community that could provide the kind of credit and rewards he
sought' and that in his field there was a Tack of consensus about style of
argumentation and standards of evidence as well as [a] scant interdependence
among the members' (Biagioli 2006, p. 97). Biagioli shows that Galileo discoveries
were discussed in an intellectual milieu radically different from that of Boyle. The
former's social setting included scholars dispersed over different universities and
courts linked through correspondence networks; the latter included a tiny elite of
people in London, who explored the 'secrets of nature' in the same public place.
Galileo's milieu could do little to favour the establishment of new standards of
truth; the mutual trust of the gentlemen of London's scientific societies was crucial
for the coming into being of a new form of evidence.
How radical was the metamorphosis brought about by Boyle's community 
appears even more evident when one considers that until the first decades of the 
seventeenth century it was impossible to trace a demarcation line between 
'magicians' and 'scientists', i.e. between the hermetic tradition and the emergent 
laboratory style. Many scholars, included Boyle, accepted various hermetic 
doctrines (see Trenchard More 1941) and were committed to the laboratory style. 
But in the span of Boyle's life, 'secrecy for science became a disvalue' (Rossi 2000, p. 
34) ~  making one's knowledge public became a value whereas keeping one's 
opinions secret came to be considered akin to treason.
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Did the creation of phenomena mark out the beginning of a new style of thinking 
and doing? I shall answer this question in the next subsection.
2.5.2 A New Way of Thinking
Once a question about the world is asked, e.g. whether or not the flame of a candle 
needs air to bum , finding out the answer in the style of laboratory means, one can 
imagine, to perform three types of mental and physical actions. The first type 
comprises actions such as to design and calibrate a machine that, as Shapin and 
Schaffer say, 'stands between the perceptual competences of a hum an being and 
natural reality itself'(Shapin and Schaffer 1989 [1985], -a p. 77). These actions 
involve not only the brain but also the body:
Doing is more important for the laboratory than for 
mathematics [...] In the hypothetical-deductive reasoning of 
laboratory science I include the making and the calibrating as well as 
the designing and the deducing (Hacking 1991a).
The second kind of mental actions is illustrated by this passage:
The final 'working1 of air pump technology is a matter of using a lot of 
different plastic resources — the material apparatus, the background 
theory, ideas about what the machine does, and how things in it 
behave - each of which is adapted to the other (Hacking 1991a, p. 237).
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In brief, the actions of the second type are represented by choices that make
different epistemological elements of the experiments cohere: what is considered a
fact, theories about nature, the set up of the apparatus and the pieces that
constitute it, the interpretation of data. For example, the actions of the second type
include: to distinguish matters of fact from speculative hypotheses and to establish
how theory and interpretation of the results of the experiment are connected.
Finally, the previous two types of mental and manual actions are made 
visible to everybody so that the knowledge produced becomes the result of a 
collective enterprise. This is the aim of the third type of actions. Particular rules of 
discourse and conventions of social relations are followed, e.g. what is to be 
considered as 'the experimental fact' is isolated and described in detail so to 
facilitate its replication by as many people as possible.
In Shapin's account, the third type of actions evolved out of the early 
program of Boyle and the Royal Society, who wanted to 'build a solid factual 
foundation for a reformed natural philosophy by soliciting more and more 
testimony and extending networks of justified trust further and further' (Shapin 
1994, p. 205) -- by the third type of actions the fact becomes objective.
2.5.3 Techniques of self-vindication
The actions of the second type are relevant for grasping Hacking's thesis that the 
laboratory SoT is self-authenticating7. Shapin and Schaffer explained that Boyle, in 
his Two Essays Concerning the Unsuccessfulness of Experiments, offered a repertoire 
of reasons why an experiment might not produce the expected outcome: from the 
construction defects of the materials to their composition, from the context of the 
experiment to the background theories involved (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 [1985], 
-a p. 185). However, they noted, he never considered any of these reasons to reject 
the idea of air's pressure: for example, when two cohered thin discs placed in the 
bulb of the air pum p did not separate as expected for the absence of air, Boyle 
blamed the leakage and continued to refuse his opponents' idea of horror vacui. 
Shapin and Schaffer concluded:
Any physical hypothesis could be saved from an admitted 
experimental failure either by pointing to a range of subsidiary 
hypotheses or by modifying the key hypothesis so that this could be 
seen as unaltered for all practical purposes (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 
[1985], -a p. 186).
In 1992, in the paper 'The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences' 
(Hacking 1992b), Hacking made a point that can be put in relation to Shapin and 
Schaffer's: laboratory sciences tend to produce a sort of self-vindicating structure 
in that background theories, hypotheses, modelling of apparatus and data 
analyses are mutually adjusted to each other.
n
I should make it clear that Hacking has never distinguished different types of actions 
within a SoT.
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To start with, the concept Shapin and Schaffer express in the passage above
could be reformulated in terms of the Duhem thesis: in the modus tollens if p entails
the evidence e then -e  implies -  p; however, Duhem observed that it is always p
plus a, where a is the whole of auxiliary hypotheses and background knowledge,
rather than only p, which implies e. Therefore, if -  e, one can only conclude that
either p an d / or one of the auxiliary hypotheses included in a a re /is false. Going
by the logical point made by Duhem, Hacking pointed out fifteen different 'plastic
resources', included in a, which can be modified in order 'to  keep p alive'. Here is
his full list of the plastic resources:
1) questions about theories or the subject matter of the experiment;
2) background knowledge, that is those beliefs that are taken for granted;
3) systematic theory, namely general theories of high level about the subject matter 
of the experiment (e.g. quantum theory can be taken as the systematic theory for 
the Stern-Gerlach experiment);
4) topical hypotheses, that is rules that connect theoretical concepts or symbols with 
observational terms (e.g. how the concept of speed vector is connected with the 
observed values of the motion of a body);
5) modelling of the apparatus, theories or background lore about how the apparatus 
works;
6) target, which indicates a part of the experimental material, such as a population 
of bacteria to be studied;
7) source of modification, it is that part of the experimental apparatus that interferes 
with the target, e.g. a beam of light;
8) detectors to measure the modification of the target;
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9) tools, which are the objects on which an experimenter m ust count, such as a 
chemical substance or a ruler;
10) data generators, which are particular tools such as a camera or anything that 
counts events;
11) data such as graphs, tables, photographs, measurements of physical 
magnitudes and so on;
12) data assessment such as statistical or not statistical estimations of errors;
13) data reduction such as theory neutral mathematical methods to transform types 
of data into other kind of data, e.g. Fourier transforms;
14) data analysis, a kind of data reduction that is not theory neutral;
15) interpretation of the data, which is always made by using a theory (Hacking 
1992b) (Hacking 1988a).
Hacking thinks that in laboratory research there is an interplay not only 
between theory and observation, as certain scholars had suggested before him 
(Pickering 1984, p. 8), but also among all the fifteen elements listed above:
We can 1) change questions; more commonly we modify them in mid­
experiment. Data 11) can be abandoned or selected without fraud; we 
consider data secure when we can interpret them in the light of, among 
other things, systematic theory 3) [...] Data processing is 
embarrassingly plastic [...] in the case of data assessment and 
reduction, 12) and 13) [...]. Data analysis is plastic in itself; in addiction, 
any change in topical hypotheses 4) or modelling of the apparatus 5) 
will lead to the introduction of new programs of data analysis 
(Hacking 1992b, p. 54).
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Hacking's conclusion is that 'our preserved theories and the world fit together so 
snugly less because we have found out how the world is than because we have 
tailored each to the other'(Hacking 1992b, p. 31). For him theories are not refuted 
or confirmed by a direct comparison with the world but by making all the other 
fourteen items in the list above cohere. If anything, he thinks, we should limit 
ourselves to saying that the sciences of laboratory are true to the phenomena 
elicited by man-made machines. This feature makes the laboratory science a sort 
of self-vindicating and stable structure. Turning to the terminology of the SoTs, I 
express his point by saying that there is a circularity in the way of thinking and 
doing of the laboratory style: in order to confirm theories, experimental 
apparatuses that provide data are made; and how do we know that the 
experimental apparatus has been designed properly and the data are correct? By 
checking whether or not the data fit our theories. That is to say, the laboratory 
style possesses a technique of stabilization that consists of the iterative back and 
forth, whereby the fifteen elements above are compared and discussed. In a 
nutshell, the symmetrical exchanges between theories and data that go on in 
laboratory research make its style self-authenticating8.
The practice of climate science is a case in point. It would be wrong to say 
simply that empirical data validate climate models, as it is shown by a study of
g
It is important to note a point that will be clearer later: Hacking does not draw 
constructionist conclusions from the plasticity of the fifteen items. He only notes that this 
plasticity makes SoTs self-authenticating and therefore science stable (see Hacking 1988a). 
For him only a little number of the possible combinations of the fifteen items above can 
endure. As he says, 'Not all the descriptions [of a phenomenon] can be accepted but there 
is no reason for thinking that there is only one possible description' (Hacking 2005b, p. 5). 
His metaphysics is anti-constructivist and pluralist.
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Helene Guillemot (Guillemot 2010). She explained that the simulations in climate 
science are confronted with data provided by three types of sources: networks of 
meteorological stations; instruments on satellites; data collected during field 
experiments. These sources do not provide 'raw  data': at least three models that 
combine the initial data with other factors are necessary to acquire the surface 
temperature from a signal captured by a satellite; and computer models are 
employed to harmonize all the data coming from the surface stations (Guillemot 
2010, p. 245). Among the different kinds of validation of models, Guillemot 
outlines the features of the so-called 'bottom-up validation' used for example for 
the parametrization of clouds in the global climate model. In that case, the model 
equipped with the parametrization is tested by comparing it with another model 
validated by observation (Guillemot 2010, p. 247). In other cases models are used 
to complete the data or to test the methods of their interpretation (Guillemot 2010, 
p. 249). Therefore, the practice of climate studies reveals that there are symmetrical 
exchanges between many elements mentioned by Hacking.
2.5.4 New candidates for truth or falsehood
Up to now, I have described some features of the laboratory style. It is a new way 
of thinking and doing that involves three types of mental and physical actions 
originally practised within a small community of thinkers in the seventeenth 
century. These thinkers brought to the fore a new type of evidence -  the evidence 
produced by man-made phenomena -  by which the knowledge produced was 
validated. Hobbes refused to embrace this new criterion of validation of
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knowledge and did not accept the rationale of the three types of mental and
physical action^. He maintained that the philosopher's model for knowing
consequences and causes was provided by geometry9. Since the postulational SoT
adopted in geometry is a SoT, as I shall show, it is possible to say that Hobbes
adopted a SoT, the postulational one, different from that adopted by Boyle, the
laboratory one. Notice that Boyle opened a new space of discourse in which new
questions were admissible, a feature that, as I shall explain, belongs to all the SoTs.
In Shapin and Schaffer's words:
Was the Torricellian space a vacuum? Did the exhausted receiver 
constitute a vacuum? The platform from which Boyle elected to 
address these questions was experimental: the way of talking 
appropriate to experimental philosophy was different in kind to 
existing natural philosophical discourse (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 
[1985]-a, p. 45)
The last feature of the laboratory style I shall deal with concerns the point 
that the birth of the laboratory style brought into being new candidates for truth 
or falsehood. Hacking provided examples of both observational statements whose 
truth-value is independent of the laboratory style and theoretical statements 
whose truth-value is determined by that style itself (style-dependent statements). 
He noted that the sentence 'm y skin is warmed', which is used by William 
Herschel (1738-1822) in his theory of heat to describe the effect of filters of some
9 Shapin and Schaffer cite Hobbes' Leviathan: 'As when we know, that, if the figure shown 
be a circle, then any straight line through the centre shall divide into two equal parts [...] 
And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher' (Shapin and Schaffer, 1989 [1985]).
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colours on his skin, is of the former class and referred to it as a 'sense-datum 
sentence'(Hacking 2002 [1982] -a, p. 173). Conversely, Hacking cited another 
sentence formulated by Herschel:
The heat which has the refrangibility of the red rays is occasioned by 
the light of those rays.
According to Hacking this sentence is style-dependent:
If another culture has acquired the styles of reasoning enumerated by 
Crombie, it can perfectly well learn Herschel's physics from the ground 
up -  that is just what I do in making sense of Herschel's text. The 
problem is that the sufficiently foreign person will not have Herschel's 
kind of sentence as the sort of thing that can be true-or-false, because 
the ways of reasoning that bear on it are unknown [...] [Archimedes] 
would not be able to effect a translation until he had caught up on 
some scientific method (Hacking 2002 [1982]-a, p. 173).
In 1800 Herschel proved that the different colours of the spectrum are of different 
temperatures and discovered the infrared radiation of sunlight (Herschel 1800b). 
He used prisms or filters (i.e. 'man-made devices') in his telescopes to create a 
'new  effect': the separation of the rays of light; then he measured the tem perature 
of each of them by a thermometer. In some cases he even tried to feel the rays 
from different filters as heat on the skin.
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Hacking argues that Archimedes did not possess the SoT of Herschel and
therefore he could not make sense of Herschel's sentence. To interpret Hacking
one can focus on the fact that the important novelty introduced by the laboratory
style -  that phenomena elicited by apparatuses constitute the evidence for certain
propositions -  is also an essential element of what, since the seventeenth century,
is considered the scientific method. Bearing this in mind, Hacking's point would
amount to say that Archimedes could not make sense of a sentence such as 'the
heat which has the refrangibility of the red rays is occasioned by the light of those
rays' because its sense hinges on a new kind of evidence which emerged only at
Boyle's time.
Although it is clear enough that Archimedes did not possess the methods 
that bear on Herschel's sentence, I do not think that Hacking's is the best example 
that can be given. Herschel's effect was not really a phenomenon that 'd id  not 
exist in isolation': it is well known that a spectrum of light is naturally produced in 
the sky by reflection and refraction of sunlight by rain droplets in the atmosphere. 
A better example might concern the early experiments on the scattering of alfa- 
particles in Rutherford's laboratory. These experiments elicited a phenomenon 
never seen before: we need a particular arrangement of experimental apparatuses 
to see the effects of the scattering of a beam of charged particles. So, an example of 
style-dependent (theoretical) sentence in the laboratory SoT is:
The scattering has cylindrical symmetry about the beam axis and therefore the 
cross section is independent of the azimuthal angle.
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Among the style-independent sentences, there is a particular class that I 
want to bring to the fore for my purposes in chapter seven. In his book 
Representing and Intervening (Herschel 1800a, 1800c), Hacking defended a 
particular form of realism according to which the word 'real' refers to the 
possibility for a class of entities of affecting macroscopic objects. He is a realist 
about entities such as electrons because we can use them to intervene in the 
world affecting other objects. For example, he says that what convinced him of 
realism was the fact that in some experiments scientists succeed in spraying 
positrons to increase the charge of a niobium ball:
If you can spray them then they are real (Hacking 1983b, p. 22).
The point I want to mention here and explain in detail later is that for Hacking 
the causal effects produced by particles are described by observational 
propositions, i.e. propositions that are not 'theory-loaded', a catchword used by 
Hacking to say that they do not carry a 'load of theory'. For him propositions 
such as:
The gauge indicates that the niobium ball is altered
must be considered observational and consequently style-independent because 
their sense, Hacking claims, hinges on a kind of evidence -  the 'evidence of 
senses' -  which is ahistorical.
To sum up, in this section I have connected some ideas of Hacking 
scattered in different writings in order to make this point: around the time of
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Boyle a new style of thinking and doing, which satisfies all the characterizing
properties satisfied by the statistical SoT, emerged. From now on, I shall refer to
it as the laboratory SoT. It is a corollary of my argument that Shapin and
Schaffer's account in Leviathan and the Air Pump can well be reread as a quarrel
between two men that adopted different SoTs.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I have presented Hacking's SoTs project, a set of suggestions 
concerning the thesis that in history of science it is possible to recognize the 
emergence and the development of a few styles of thinking and doing. In order 
to explain this project, of which I have still to say a lot more, I have started by 
giving the example of the statistical SoT: I have reread the book The Emergence of 
Probability in terms of the notion of SoT. In the following sections I have used this 
example to explain better how Hacking characterizes the notion of SoT. Then I 
have explained that Leviathan and the A ir Pump can well be reread as a quarrel 
between two men that adopted different SoTs. My analysis in this chapter has 
shown that many points of the styles project need to be developed in order to 
make Hacking's suggestions into a full-fledged theory. Such a theory could help 
to characterize scientific thinking by exhibiting the SoTs that compose it.
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Chapter Three: Developing the 
Styles Project: Towards a Theory of 
Styles of Thinking
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shall be engaged in turning the SoTs project into a more 
comprehensive analysis of scientific thinking. One of the points implied by 
Hacking's thoughts is that two ways of thinking, the statistical and the laboratory 
SoT, share a set of features ('the characterizing properties of SoTs' presented in 
section 2.2). The label 'SoT' wants to suggests that, despite their differences, these 
ways of thinking are species of the same genus.
Still at issue is how we can further characterize scientific thinking: can we 
identify other SoTs so to provide a more accurate description of it? It is a safe 
guess to say that the spectrum of our ways of finding out about the world is quite 
broad: there might be other ways of finding out that possess all the characterizing 
properties of SoTs in addition to ways of thinking that do not satisfy them. 
Actually, I shall put forward two related theses. My first thesis is that, beside the 
statistical and the laboratory SoT, there are at least four other SoTs. My second 
thesis, which I shall discuss in the next chapter, is that the spectrum of scientific
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ways of finding out also includes 'spurious SoTs', as I shall call all those ways of
thinking that fail to satisfy one or more characterizing properties of SoTs. To prove
the first thesis, in the following four sections I shall argue that the algorithmic, the
postulational, the historico-genetic and the taxonomic way of thinking possess the
characterizing properties of SoTs. My argument for the second thesis is contained
in section 4.2:1 shall consider most of the candidates for being SoTs presented in
the literature and explain why they do not possess all the characterizing properties
of SoTs.
The brief comments on each of these four SoTs provided by Hacking are not 
sufficient to give a full account of their properties and in some cases I shall object 
to them. However, in his discussions Hacking has drawn the reader's attention to 
certain historical works that provide profound insights into the nature of these 
SoTs. I shall rely on these works, although they have not been written within the 
framework of the idea of SoT. Nevertheless, other sources will receive my 
attention for their connections with my claims.
In the following chapters, when it will be necessary to address 
philosophical questions related to the SoTs project, I shall often refer to the SoTs 
discussed in this chapter and in the previous in order to make my points clearer. 
However, the conclusions I will draw will be independent from my own 
characterization of scientific thinking. They will follow from Hacking's 
characterization of what a SoT is, i.e. from its characterizing properties.
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3.2 The Algorithmic Style of Thinking
When in 1992 Hacking hinted that there is a SoT of applied mathematics distinct 
from the postulational, he called it 'algorismic'10 (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 185).
This term stems from 'Algoritmi', the transliteration of the name of the Persian 
mathematician al-Khwarizml (780-850) whose works, translated into Latin in the 
twelfth century, introduced to Europe several algorithms. As the historian of 
mathematics Carl Boyer put i t , ' [al-Khwarizml’s work] is to algebra what Euclid's 
Elements is to geometry' (Boyer 1968, p. 258): for Hacking it was with the 
introduction of algebra that the algorithmic way of thinking flourished in Europe 
(Hacking 2002-2003, p. 543).
The use of the term 'algorismic' instead of 'algorithmic' reminds us that this 
way of thinking has to do with following step-by-step procedures in calculations 
rather than in more general problems that do not involve numbers. Indeed, while 
in the Middle Ages the Latin name 'algorismus' denoted a genre of works on 
methods of calculations (such as Carmen de Algorismo by Alexander de Villa Dei 
(1175-1240) or Algorismus Vulgaris by John of Sacrobosco (1195-1256)) (Karpinski 
and Waters 1928, p. 45), the term algorithm emerged much later from 'algorismus' 
and took on the generalized meaning of a set of rules to be followed in problem­
solving operations. At any rate, Hacking regarded the algorithmic way of thinking 
as a mathematical SoT that, together with the postulational one, forms the 'style of 
mathematics' (Hacking 2002-2003, p. 543): to adopt the algorithmic way of
10 To my knowledge, Hacking has never used the term 'algorithmic' in English. Though, 
in French he has used the term 'algorithmique' rather than 'algorismique'. As I shall 
explain below I prefer to call it 'algorithmic'(Hacking 2006c, p. 7).
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thinking means to follow methods of calculation, i.e. step-by-step list of rules that
might be represented by a formula.
In his latest overview of the SoTs project (Hacking 2012) Hacking did not 
even mention the algorithmic way of thinking. By contrast, I believe that this way 
of thinking cannot be left out from any account of scientific thinking since it 
occupies a vital role in all the branches of scientific knowledge. Beside the intimate 
connection of knowing and doing, a theory of scientific thinking should also 
highlight the fact that the sciences combine qualitative and quantitative methods of 
analysis. Mathematics does not only give a formal expression to disciplines such 
as physics or economics but also provides a way of seizing the measure of certain 
magnitudes. According to Michel Paty, from nineteenth century science, 
'measurable quantities [...] have meant uniquely, and perhaps restrictively, 
quantities taking numerical values, as it was most usually the case in classical 
physics' (Paty 2003, p. 126)11. The magnitudes to be calculated are not only those 
that already exist in the physical corpus, they are also introduced by scientists 
(and expressed by functions or constants): entropy in physics, affinity in 
chemistry, volatility in economics are some examples (Lacki 2003, p. 274). The use 
of the algorithmic way of thinking is therefore ubiquitous in scientific research. 
Incidentally, in order to know the value of a physical constant it might be 
necessary to perform a measurement that consists of step-by-step procedures. As I 
intend to account for this aspect of scientific research too, I prefer to use the term 
'algorithmic' rather than 'algorismic': I want to describe a SoT that accounts not 
only for the use of standard procedures in calculations but also for the use of
11 Paty provides a review of the conceptions of quantity or magnitude over the centuries 
and investigates how these conceptions have legitimated the mathematization of physics.
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standard procedures to be followed in more general problem solving operations 
that may involve numbers. So to call this SoT 'algorithmic' seems to me more 
appropriate. In the following lines I shall describe the 'algorithmic style of 
thinking' and argue that it is a SoT. Let us start by giving an example.
3.2.1 Algorithmic Thinking: an Example
The first known algorithms in history go back to civilizations more ancient than 
Greece12. In particular, they can be found in one of the Egyptian papyri that have 
survived the ravages of time, known as 'Rhind Mathematical Papyrus' or 'Ahmes 
Papyrus' in honour of Ahmes, the scribe who copied it down in around 1650 BC13. 
One of the sentences in the papyrus states:
There are 7 houses, 49 cats, 343 mice, 2401 ears of grain
The scribe was providing an answer to this problem14:
In each of seven houses
there are seven cats
each of which eats seven mice,
each of which would have eaten seven ears of grain.
Adding up houses, cats, mice, ears of grain, how many objects are there in total?
12 I shall focus my discussion on the Babylonian and the Egyptian civilizations. However, 
my arguments could also be tested against examples drawn from the mathematics of 
Mayan people between the third and ninth centuries (see for example Magli 2009 [2005]).
13 The Egyptian history is usually divided into three large periods that cover a period 
from 3100 to 332 BC: the Old Kingdom , the M iddle Kingdom  and the N ew  Kingdom. The 
Ahmes papyrus belongs to the Middle Kingdom, between about 2050 and 1600 BC.
14 The Ahmes papyrus presents several arithmetical, algebraic and geometrical problems. 
For a review of the mathematics in the Ahmes papyrus see: (Boyer 1968, pp. 12-23)
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This riddle can be iterated adding as many objects as one wants, e.g. one can 
imagine that each of the seven ears of grain had seven seeds and each seed was 
made of seven items and every item contained seven objects and so on.
The simple answer to the riddle is that there are
7 +7x7+7x7x7+7x7x7x7= 7+49+343+2401 objects
Today, a mathematician would recognize at first glance that these numbers 
represent the first four terms of a geometric series of ratio 7 whose sum of the first 
n terms is given by a standard formula. By performing a standard procedure 
consisting of successive steps, the Egyptians were able to solve the riddle 
whatever the total number of the objects added by iteration was. For example, if 
the iteration stopped at n, the first step to take would have been to consider n 
terms of which the generic rath term of the series was 7 multiplied by itself ra 
times. The other steps would have been to work out each of the n terms of the sum 
by performing the multiplications. According to Boyer (1968, p. 15), in Ahmes' day 
multiplication were performed by a method of successive doubling. Indeed, by 
using an abacus it is easy to add up, multiply and divide by 2. Suppose they 
would have to calculate the fourth term of the sum, which is 
7x7x7x7=7x343=240115. Since 7=4+2+l, they would have doubled 343 and got 686, 
then doubled 686 and obtained 1372, i.e. four times 343. Afterwards, they would 
have add up 1372+686+343 obtaining 2401. By using the abacus this is an easy task
15 Of course the Egyptians did not denote numbers as we do. They had a system of 
numeration derived from base ten and did not possess a placed-valued system. When 
operations were performed they grouped together the symbols in no particular order.
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because to double requires a smallnumber of operations. The Egyptians also had 
another very similar method to work out multiplications: it is today known as the 
Russian farmer's method and involves divisions and multiplications by two. Thus, 
in principle, they were able to 'check' a result by using different methods of 
calculation. To sum up, in order to provide the answer to the riddle, whatever the 
number n  of iterations, the Egyptians used the algorithmic way of thinking: they 
followed a procedure expressed by a list of well-defined instructions, which 
involved the use of the abacus.
The Egyptians used algorithms to solve many arithmetical problems, such 
as that of finding solutions of linear equations (Boyer 1968, p. 16) or that of 
calculating areas and volumes (Boyer 1968, p. 19-23). On the other hand, the 
Babylonians were able to calculate the correct values of many astronomical 
phenomena even though their geometry was not as developed as in the ancient 
Greece: for example, by measuring and implementing algebraic algorithms they 
managed to make predictions of the phenomenon of lunar eclipses every eighteen 
years, the so called Saronic cycle (Mason 1962, p. 19). The ancient Greeks made use 
of algorithms too: the Euclidean one for finding the greatest common divisor of 
two integers and the numerical solutions of algebraic equations in Diophantus's 
Arithmetica, which was read by the Arab mathematicians of the ninth century, are 
the examples that stand out.
In all the historical examples I have given above, to reason in the 
algorithmic SoT meant to follow a set of elementary rules in order to reach a 
certain objective. This way of reasoning is fundamentally distinct from that used
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in proving a theorem. I interpret Hacking in the passage below as making just this 
point:
There is nothing perspicuous about calculation. There is no feeling of 
compulsion. There is no sense of understanding (Hacking 2000b, p.
101).
Applying an algorithm to solve Ahmes' riddle is different from thinking in order 
to demonstrate that an angle inscribed in a semi-circle is a right angle. In the 
former case there is no feeling of understanding; in the latter, there is a strong 
feeling that the conclusion must follow from two facts: the base angles of isosceles 
triangles are equals and the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to 180 degrees. 
Whereas the steps to be taken in order to solve Ahmes' riddle iterated n times 
are fixed, within a line of reasoning from hypotheses to thesis every statement 
m ust be deduced from the previous one.
Algorithm and demonstration are the two faces of mathematical thinking. 
A mathematician has to switch from the way of thinking of demonstration (the 
postulational SoT described in the next section), which allows her to prove a 
theorem, to the algorithmic way of thinking, which for example allows her to 
determine the result of an operation, a number.
3.2.2 Techniques of self-vindication
As I have pointed out, the Egyptians were able to use different algorithms for 
solving the same problem; therefore, one of these algorithms could serve as a 
means for checking the result obtained. Examples are: the already mentioned
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method of successive doubling and the 'Russian farmer's m ethod' for performing 
multiplications; the 'm ethod of false positions' and the 'm ethod of factorization' 
for solving linear algebraic equations (see Boyer 1968, p. 17).
In other words, the algorithmic way of thinking does not answer to any 
criterion except its own: the criterion to prove whether or not what has been found 
out is correct still relies on another algorithm. In this sense the algorithmic SoT 
possesses what Hacking would call a technique of self-vindication: 'the solution of 
the riddle iterated n is x' is what we conclude by using the algorithm A; and how 
do we know that we are correct? We know that because by using another 
algorithm, the algorithm B, we find x. That is: the algorithmic way of thinking is 
self-authenticating.
3.2.3 Mathematical Ways of Thinking in Egypt, Babylonia and 
Greece
Many of the 110 problems in the Rhind and Moscow papyri, from which we 
derive our knowledge of Egyptian mathematics, have a practical origin. Similarly, 
Babylonian cuneiform tablets do not present general formulations in geometry but 
deal either with specific practical problems or with more 'theoretical exercises' for 
the joy of pure mathematics, to be worked out according to a certain algorithm 
(Hoyrup 1990b, p. 65)16. Referring to the contrast between Greek and Babylonian 
(or Egyptian) mathematics Jens Hoyrup defined the former 'scientific knowledge' 
and the latter 'sub-scientific knowledge': while the ancient Greeks pursued 
scientific knowledge systematically and for its own sake, the Babylonians and the
16 The Babylonian texts to which Hoyrup refers belong to the Old Babylonian period, 
from 2000 to 1600 BC.
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Egyptians acquired and transmitted only sub-scientific knowledge, that is, a 
specialist knowledge pursued only in view of its applicability (Hoyrup 1990b, p. 64 
and p. 71). The Egyptian and the Babylonian mathematicians did introduce 
problems with no practical application such as Ahmes' riddle but they were 
determined by methods already at hand. On the contrary, 'Greek mathematics 
[was] determined by problems for the solution of which new methods would have 
to be developed' (Hoyrup 1990b, p. 65).
The Babylonian mathematicians did not have an algebraic notation as 
transparent as ours. They represented their algebra by using a geometry of 
measurable segments, squares and rectangles and: '[their] prescriptions 
describe[d] what is done in the geometric representation, just as we may describe 
in words what we are doing to the equation' (Hoyrup 2010, p. 34). According to 
Donald Knuth, Babylonian algebra consisted of step-by-step lists of rules, i.e. of 
algorithms for representing algebraic equations and, ultimately, computing them 
(Knuth 1972, p. 672). In brief, in Knuth's understanding the use of algorithms is 
the only relevant insight to read Babylonian mathematical texts. Hoyrup 
stigmatized this view as a mistake built on the translations current at the time (e.g. 
Neugebauer and Sachs 1945) and gave his own interpretation (Hoyrup 2010): as 
we do, the Babylonian mathematicians presupposed the existence and the 
properties of the objects they were looking for and operated on geometric 
representation in order to find them. Not only the algorithmic thinking but also 
decision-making was involved: '[Babylonian texts] describe a particular type of 
geometrical manipulation, which like m odem  equation algebra is analytical in
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character, and which displays the correctness of its procedures without being 
explicitly demonstrative' (Hoyrup 2010, p. 1 my emphasis).
These points lead to the conclusion that the algorithmic way of thinking 
had already settled down into a routine in the Egyptian and Babylonian 
civilizations. Importantly, by no means can we conclude that Babylonians did not 
have a 'reasoned' mathematics, as Hoyrup explains:
Procedures were described in a way which [...] turns out to be as 
transparent as the self-evident transformations of modern equation 
algebra and in no need of further explicit arguing [...] (Hoyrup 2012, p.
17).
Nevertheless,
No surviving text suggests that all this was ever part of an explicitly 
formulated programme, nor do the texts we know point to any 
thinking about demonstration as a particular activity  (Hoyrup 2012, p. 17)
This passage suggests we should think of the Babylonian mathematicians as 
possessing an algorithmic way of thinking but not a demonstrative way of thinking: 
as I shall explain in the next section, only as a consequence of a different historical 
and social environment did a style of demonstration (postulational SoT) emerge in 
the ancient Greece.
3.2.4 Doing
By saying that 'mathematics is embodied' and that 'it is in the hands and in the 
arms that move around' (Hacking 2011) Hacking reminded us that the first men 
who counted needed to perform precise acts with their hands. For example, to 
solve Ahmes' riddle meant to carry out automatically multiplications by 
manipulating pebbles from one side to another of a tablet. Similarly, as I have 
already said, the Babylonian algebra had a geometrical representation; and some 
operations that we might call 'addition' and 'subtraction' consisted of specific 
actions: they were concrete operations. To make few examples: 'to append' meant to 
join an entity to another one, which conserves its identity; 'to tear out' meant to 
remove an entity from another quantity of which it is part; 'to compare' meant to 
observe that a length or an area exceeds or fall short of another (Hoyrup 2010, p. 6- 
7)17. The above-mentioned concrete operations upon objects, which were involved 
in the implementation of Egyptian and Babylonian algorithms, show that the 
algorithmic SoT is a way of doing.
3.2.5 The Emergence of the Algorithmic style of Thinking
Research shows that basic numerical competences are rooted in biological built-in 
resources that can be explored in animals and humans (for a review of this 
research see Nieder 2005). Different species of animals have the sense of the 
cardinality of a set, although they have distinct upper-numerosity discrimination 
limits (Kohler 1957) (see also Davis and Perusse 1988). On the other hand, pre­
verbal hum an infants possess a sense of the numerosity of a set of objects and can 
engage in basic additions and subtraction operations with objects (Wynn 1992)
17 Interestingly, the Babylonian way of doing mathematics has gone extinct. This shows 
that, even if a SoT is long-lasting, the ways of implementing it can die out.
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(Feigenson, Dehaene, and Spelke 2004); Amazonian populations that lack words 
for numbers beyond five can compare large sets of items (Pica et al. 2004).
Furthermore, it seems that humans have an innate ability to follow 
recursive rules: procedures for finding the number of elements in finite sets such 
as finger counting were in use in hum an societies before the invention of writing. 
For example, according to the researchers who found it, a bone of a baboon 
marked with 29 notches and dated to approximately 35 000 B.C was used as a 
calendar stick (Bogoshi, Naidoo, and Webb 1987). To record the passage of days it 
was sufficient to follow a simple rule: for each sunset a notch had to be etched into 
the bone.
However, although our capacity for number as well as the faculty of 
language relies on recursive rules (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002), neither the 
existence of fixed procedures for counting nor the sense of numerosity implies the 
existence of an abstract concept of number. To acquire this concept it is necessary a 
step forward: to represent a particular value by a symbol or a word, i.e. to 
represent a feature of sets of objects that is independent from the characteristics of 
the objects themselves -  this feature is the cardinality of a given grouping. In as 
much as the concept of number implies the idea of a magnitude to be represented, 
it requires the existence of a language that makes it possible to process numerical 
information with precision. When did this concept emerge? Certainly, when the 
first hum an societies started to make use of commodity money a concept of 
number had to come about: money is a measurement of value (as well as a m edium  
of exchange and a store of value). Therefore, I maintain that the algorithmic SoT 
came to the fore when the concept of number came about, in turn a consequence
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of the emergence of complex social structures. We may think of the birth of the 
algorithmic SoT as a discontinuity in human history by considering that small 
groups of hunter-gatherers possessed only the ability of finger counting and had 
no symbolic representation of number (Rudman 2007, chapter one). It was only 
with the Neolithic transition from a life-style of hunting and gathering to one of 
settlement and agriculture (about 10 thousands of years ago) that an abstract 
concept of number emerged. According to Peter Rudman, the concept of division 
and of prime number came to the fore after 10,000 BC (Rudman 2007, chapter one).
The Neolithic transition, also called 'the Agricultural Revolution', was very 
rapid, as archaeological and demographical studies have documented (Bocquet- 
Appel 2011). It is plausible to say that it produced a sharp break between the way 
of thinking and doing of the hunter-gatherers and that of the first complex 
communities who computed land areas or granary volumes by using algorithms.
3.2.6 New Sentences, Evidence
My last point is that there has been a time in which a sentence such as
The number of objects in Ahmes' riddle is given by multiplying the following three terms: 
7x7, 7x49, 7x343 and adding up them to 7
had no truth-value. It was a time in which, in order to make sense of that sentence, 
people would have had to possess an abstract concept of number and share the 
algorithmic way of thinking and doing. Humans may well have an innate ability 
to follow step-by-step procedures, but only when the first complex societies came
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about did they use algorithms as evidence of the truth of certain (style-dependent) 
propositions. In order to make sense of the sentence above, those humans who 
lived before the Agricultural Revolution would have had to possess certain 
concepts, standards of truth, methods, in brief, a way of thinking and doing. For 
them it would not have been so important whether the sentence was written by 
using the Egyptian numeral system or our placed-value system: how to use a 
numeral system can be learned. The point is that only for someone who is part of a 
community that shares the algorithmic way of thinking and doing does the 
sentence above acquire a truth-value.
In chapter eight, I shall connect some Wittgenstein's thoughts with my 
considerations about the self-authenticating character of the algorithmic way of 
thinking. For the time being, my conclusion is that the algorithmic way of thinking 
and doing satisfies all the characterizing properties of SoTs and, therefore, 
deserves the label of 'algorithmic SoT'.
3.3 The Postulational Style of Thinking
This section contains a broad characterization of the deductive way of thinking 
involved in the demonstrative proofs of geometry. As I have explained, according 
to Hoyrup the deductive method emerged in ancient Greece and was not a 
Babylonian practice. Another scholar, the already mentioned Reviel Netz, in his 
book The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics (Netz 2000) advanced the same 
thesis. Actually, Netz's reconstruction of the missing diagrams (i.e. geometrical
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figures composed of lines) in the Greek texts provides deep insights into Greek 
mathematics that I shall use to argue that the deductive way of thinking possesses 
the characterizing features of SoTs.
Greek mathematical texts consist of lettered diagrams and words. The 
deployment of these two elements is what makes Greek mathematics a 
recognisable genre. As we shall see, Netz maintains that, on a logical plane, 
lettered diagrams and words combine in necessity-preserving ways to form 
deductive chains and to yield knowledge of general validity: not knowledge of a 
particular triangle but of all the triangles (Netz 1999, chapters 5 and 7). On a 
historical plane, while lettered diagrams are the mark of a literate society, 
deductive proofs are idealised versions of oral arguments, the mark of a polemical 
society (Netz 1999, chapter 7 especially p. 312). On a cognitive plane, Greek 
demonstrations are the result of an interplay between visual resources and indices 
(letters that signify a point by standing next to it) (Netz 1999, p. 47).
The logical, historical and cognitive analysis offered by Netz provides 
fertile ground for my arguments. Indeed, first of all Netz gives sound reasons for 
claiming that the diagram is a necessary element in the reading of the text (Netz 
1999, pp. 26-27): for example, some assertions of Greek proofs must be deduced 
from the diagram (Netz 1999, p. 47). This is a point that will be important for my 
argument that the postulational style can be viewed as a way of doing: as I shall 
show, assertions are mediated via specific actions.
Furthermore, in the last chapter of The Shaping of Deduction in Greek 
Mathematics Netz makes another point that, as I shall point out, is germane to the 
question as to whether the early development of the postulational style was
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gradual. For Netz, the practice of the Greek mathematicians would not have come 
about without a culture of agonistic debate, the existence of an intellectual 
network, a tradition of oral and literate culture. Finally, it is possible to make it 
clearer what Hacking meant when he maintained that the SoTs project is a study 
in 'cognitive history'. As I have said, 'cognitive history' is an expression that Netz 
used in the introduction to The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics. He 
reminded the reader that the foundations of the theory according to which some 
functions of mind are modules, i.e. task specific capacities, were laid by the 
cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor (Fodor 1983) (Netz 2000, p. 5). For example, 
according to the latter, syntax is a module: a biological capacity hard-wired in the 
brain that allow hum an beings to perform syntactic computation without even 
relying on other knowledge. However,
central processes such as the fixation of belief are not modular [...] we 
can never have a neat universal model of such functions as the fixation 
of belief. [...] For the historian, study starts where universality ends. It 
is clear why cognitive history is possible. While there are no general, 
universal rules concerning, for example, reasoning, such rules do exist 
historically, in specific contexts (Netz 1999, p. 5).
In other words, processes such as vision and language are modular and single 
modules can be analysed by the methods of cognitive sciences. On the contrary, 
more complex cognitive processes, such as ways of thinking and doing, cannot be 
reduced to general rules: instead of a cognitive science we need a 'cognitive
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history' that searches for rules in specific contexts. 'Cognitive' because it is a study 
of the practices of knowledge and the way human cognitive structures come to 
interact; 'history' because the only rules that exist concerning the reasoning are not 
universal but historical.
Hacking generalized this point by conjecturing that, if the research program 
of innate cognitive modules will develop, then 'no single module will correspond 
to exactly one style of thinking. Each demands many and modules of different 
types' (Hacking 2009, p. 39). So, each SoT represents a particular way in which 
different modules interact with each other. In the case of the deductive thinking,
diagrams [...] are the Greek mathematical way of tapping human 
visual cognitive resources. Greek mathematical language is a way of 
tapping human linguistic resources (Netz 1999, p. 6)
In his book Netz made no mention of Hacking's concept of SoT, although he did 
use the term 'style' a couple of times (e.g. Netz 1999, p. 9) in its common-sense 
usage to hint at a Greek 'style' of mathematics. Hacking on his part wrote that 'the 
styles project does not engage in historical research but it is delighted by new 
historiographical ideas that it can exploit. Netz provides one such' (Hacking 2012, 
p. 5). In Hacking's mind, just as Leviathan and the A ir Pump represents an analysis 
of the emergence of the Laboratory SoT, so The Shaping of Deduction in Greek 
Mathematics represents a history of emergence of the postulational SoT (Hacking 
2012, p. 5). Though, these two books belong to different philosophical 
perspectives. Indeed, Netz plays with the word 'shaping' in the title of his book in 
order to distance himself from constructivist stances:
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This book should not be read as if it were 'The Shapin of Deduction', an 
attempt to do for mathematics what has been so impressively done for 
the natural sciences. [...] I do not see 'deduction' as a sociological 
construct. I see it as an objectively valid form, whose discovery was a 
positive achievement (Netz 1999, p. 3).
Yet this caveat did not prevent Bruno Latour, who was recommended to read the 
book by Hacking (Hacking 2009, p. 67), from considering The Shaping as belonging 
to the field of science studies:
Netz's book does exactly what he says he does not want to do: it
offers for the origin of formalism what Shapin and Schaffer have
\
done for the origin of experimental science (Latour 2008,442).
On the other hand, Hacking did not share Shapin and Schaffer's constructivism:
In the case of Netz, my reading is closer to the author's intentions than 
is Latour's. In the case of Shapin and Schaffer, Latour's reading is 
certainly closer to the intentions of the authors than mine. Latour very 
much plays down the aspect of Netz indicated in the subtitle, cognitive 
history [...] For me, it is also the first account of the discovery of a 
fundamental human cognitive capacity, the ability to make 
demonstrative proofs (Hacking 2009, p. 71).
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In the following lines I shall show that Netz's book can be interpreted as a study 
on the emergence and development of what Hacking has called the postulational 
SoT.
3.3.1 Postulational Thinking
Euclid's Elements, which contain the concepts that constitute the foundation of 
Greek mathematics, were written in Alexandria in about 300 B.C. The treatise 
consists of thirteen books that collect definitions, axioms, postulates, propositions 
and mathematical proofs. As T.L Heath explained, 1) an axiom asserts a self- 
evident truth that is taken for granted; 2) a postulate assumes the truth of a 
statement without proof but, unlike an axiom, is not self-evident and may assume 
that something exists; 3) a proposition may be a theorem or a problem. A theorem is a 
conditional statement; a problem, once solved, proves the existence of a 
geometrical entity (Heath 1908 p. 117-119).
Consider the problem represented by Proposition 1 Book 1:
On a given finite line to construct an equilateral triangle (Heath 1908 p. 241)
For a start Euclid states:
Let AB  be the given finite straight line (Heath 1908 p. 241)
Then he provides the directive to construct the equilateral triangle on the straight 
line AB: consider the circle with centre A and radius AB; and the circle with centre
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B and radius AB. The circles intersect one another in two points on opposite sides 
of the line AB. Call C one of them and join with a straight line B and C and with 
another straight line A and C. AC =AB because they are radii of the same circle 
with centre A; and BC =AB because they are radii of the same circle w ith centre B. 
It follows that AC=BC=AB 
Euclid's proof follows this schema:
(1) AC=AB and (2) BC=AB so (3) AC=BC
The assertions (1) and (2) follow from Definition 15 Book I that defines w hat a 
circle is:
A circle is a plane figure contained by one line such that all the straight 
lines falling upon it from one point among those lying within the figure 
equal one another (Heath 1908 p. 153).
The implication (3) follows from Axiom 1 Book I according to which things that 
equal the same thing also equal one another (Heath 1908 p. 155).
Netz maintains that the building-blocks of proof, which he calls the 'atom s' 
of necessity, are the starting points, i.e. all the assertions which are not subject to 
argument in the text, and the arguments (Netz 1999, p. 168). To think in a 
postulational way means to combine in necessity-preserving ways these two 
atoms. For example, the proof above combines a definition and an axiom (starting 
points) with an argument (e.g. steps (l)-(3) constitute a single argument). We could 
add another atom of necessity, e.g. that (4) AB>DE, where DE is another straight 
line and conclude that (5) B O D E and A O D E . That is:
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(1) AC=AB and (2) BC=BA so (3) AC=BC, (4) AB>DE so (5) B O D E and 
A O D E
According to Netz's terminology, (l)-(3) and (4)-(5) are different arguments of the 
same proof. Step (4) could be a starting point or the conclusion of another 
argument, which is introduced at the required moment. In this case the proof would 
involve two arguments ((l)-(3) and (4)~(5) plus three starting points.
Notice that the postulational way of thinking requires not only to do deductions, 
such as in the steps (3) and (5), but also postulations, such as when the existence of 
a line AB is postulated. In this sense proofs involve a way of thinking that is both 
postulational and deductive.
The Greeks' proofs can be much more complicated than my example: they 
can form long almost linear chains, i.e. chains that include asides and breaks such 
as when a mathematician sets aside the point and switches to another argument. 
Furthermore, the Greeks' proofs prove results that are both necessary and general: 
for example, proposition 1 above is true for all the straight lines AB. Netz 
maintains that '[necessity is explained] in terms of atomic necessity producing 
elements, which are then combined in necessity-preserving ways' (Netz 1999, p. 
240). On the other hand 'generality is the repeatability of necessity' (Netz 1999, p. 
270): generality derives from the possibility of repeating for any other case a proof 
about specific objects in specific diagrams.
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3.3.2 Doing
In order to realise that a proof involves not only a way of thinking but also 
a way of doing we need to take note of the fact that the diagram is a necessary 
element in producing and reading a proof. Let us re-examine the proof of 
Proposition I above. First of all, consider the first opening sentence 'Let AB be the 
given finite straight line'. This is not an assertion but a sentence that invites an 
action: to individuate the letters and the line in the diagram. Consider next the 
point that two circles with centres A and B meet: this is an implicit assumption 
based on the diagram (Netz 1999, p. 27). Besides, in the course of the proof, the line 
AB must be examined within its context: is it the radius of a circle? Does it 
intersect another line? Is it also the radius of another circle? Thinking and doing, 
mental and visual resources, interact in order to construct the equilateral triangle: 
the proof consists of drawing a line and two circles with a ruler and a compass 
(action); of individuating a point C and drawing the lines AC and BC (action); 
finally, of deducting (3) from (1) and (2). In Latin, the acronym used to indicate 
that the task set in propositions such as Proposition 2 Book 1 has been 
accomplished is Q.E.F., i.e. Quod Erat Faciendum -'W hich Was To Be Done'.
Once the assertion is proved, proposition 1 can be inserted in a chain of 
deduction so to prove another proposition. To sum up, the text points to objects 
via letters and leaves to the 'eyes' or the visual imagination the task of identifying 
them; the arguments are mediated through visual actions.
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3.3.3 Techniques of self-vindication, new evidence, new objects
Hacking made the point that the postulational way of thinking is self- 
authenticating because the result of a proof is always confirmed by other proofs:
There is no standard of what is correct proof, than proof itself. Proofs 
are self-authenticating. Many a proposed proof has proven to be 
fallacious, but the standard of validity or fallacy is proof itself (Hacking 
2009, p. 40).
This is a claim that can be better understood by noticing that the structure of 
mathematical proofs is completely autonomous: 'the necessity of assertions is 
either self evident (as in starting-points) or dependent on nothing beyond the 
immediate background' (Netz 1999, p. 215). The immediate background is 
constituted, in Hacking's terminology, by the new objects 'introduced' by the 
postulational way of thinking, e.g. straight points, lines and planes. When doing 
proofs a mathematician refers visually to these representations, which is to say 
that the diagram supplies the evidence to which the propositions refer — the 
diagram is the standard of evidence within the postulational style. To say that 
there is no other standard of what is correct proof amounts to saying that there is 
no way to establish that the diagram is a valuable standard of evidence. That is: 
the diagram represents the inescapable universe in which knowledge is produced. 
It is the postulational way of thinking that has 'introduced' the diagram and it is 
the diagram that supplies its universe of discourse.
3.3.4 New Sentences
According to Hacking,
those very sentences used to express the geometrical a priori 
propositions could not have that sense unless they were embedded in 
the practice of geometrical demonstration (Hacking 1983a, p. 457).
Let us consider three examples of sentences:
Straight lines which are parallel to the same straight line and are not in the same plane 
with it are also parallel to one another (Heath 1908 Elements IX,9 p. 290).
Similar polygons inscribed in circles are to one another as the squares on the diameters 
(Heath 1908 Elements XII,1 p. 369).
Any prism which has a triangular base is divided into three pyramids equal to one 
another with triangular bases (Heath 1908 Elements XII,7 p. 394).
For Hacking the sense of these sentences is determined by the way in which we 
can reason for their truth or falsehood. To see why consider the first two 
propositions listed above. They could not have been thought or understood by, 
say, the Babylonian mathematicians, even if a definition of infinite planes, straight 
lines and similarity of triangles had been given to them. Indeed, terms such as 
'point' and 'straight line' in those sentences are embedded in ways of doing 
unknown to Babylonian mathematicians. The Babylonian and the Greek texts
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reveal different ways of doing: the former refer to objects that were actually moved, 
the latter refer to diagrams; the former are dependent from the context, the latter 
are abstractions. A Babylonian would have had to learn to act as a Greek and to 
think independently from the context in order to make sense of those sentences 
above.
On the other hand, in the last sentence listed above, there are no terms that, 
once translated, would have had no sense for an Egyptian; but the sentence is not 
a candidate for truth or falsehood for the presence of the quantifier 'any', which 
gives generality to the proposition. Indeed, 'Babylonian mathematics is limited, 
compared to Greek mathematics, by being tied to the particular operation upon 
the particular case' (Netz 1999, note 154): the quantifier 'any' would have made no 
sense for a Babylonian because generality was a 'historical novelty'(Hoyrup 2005, 
p. 143) brought into being by the Greek mathematical thinking.
Finally, it is worthy of note that in the few lines that precede Hacking's 
passage above, Hacking reminds the reader that:
empirical propositions, to be established from case to case by 
measurement are to be distinguished from a priori and demonstrable 
propositions of geometry.
In the language of the SoTs project, we can say that my examples of style-dependent 
propositions above must be distinguished from style-independent propositions such 
as:
The side of this pyramid is one meter long
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or
Two sides of this trapezoid are parallel
Indeed, for Hacking these sentences above have a truth-value that is independent 
from any way of thinking and doing.
3.3.5 Discontinuity
As Netz declared, his vision of Greek intellectual life has been shaped by G.E.R. 
Lloyd (Netz 1999, p. 292). According to the latter, while in Mesopotamia the 
investigation of the heavens was a matter of state importance (Lloyd 2004, p. 17), 
in Greece there were no intellectual institutions. Greek society was very 
argumentative because Tacking state institutions that gave stable employment, 
they [the Greeks] were in open and more or less continuous competition with one 
another'(Lloyd 2000, p. 3). As Jean-Pierre Vernant had already stressed 'speech 
became the instrument of the city's political life' (Vernant 1982 [1962], p. 52). So, 
argued Netz, the development of rigorous arguments in philosophy and 
mathematics must be seen against the background of rhetoric: the fact that the 
latter failed to meet certain standards of incontrovertibility led to a form argum ent 
that goes beyond mere persuasion. It was in Greece, thanks to this particular 
historical setting that proof emerged and came to be considered as the paradigm  
of what it means to settle an argument. Before the late fifth century there were no 
conditions for the emergence of proof.
Netz concluded that the origin of Greek mathematics has been a 'sudden 
explosion of knowledge': it is impossible to imagine that the early history of Greek
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mathematics was gradual and that there has been a rudimentary form of pre- 
Euclideanism:
Whoever was capable of proving one Euclidean result was capable of 
proving most of them. I therefore suggest that the origin of Greek 
mathematics could have been a sudden explosion of knowledge [...].
No more than a generation would be required to find most of the 
elementary results of Euclid [...] (Netz 1999, p. 273).
This is exactly Hacking's point that the discovery of the possibility of 
demonstrative proof represents a sharp break in the development of mathematical 
reasoning. To conclude, the Greek style of mathematics possesses all the 
characterizing properties of SoTs and therefore can be called 'the postulational 
SoT'.
3.4 The Historico-genetic Style of Thinking
'Historico-genetic' is the locution by which Hacking referred to the last style of 
thinking in Crombie's list. The few comments he made on Crombie's account of 
the historico-genetic style are insufficient to reconstruct the physiognomy of this 
SoT. First of all, we gather that while the postulational SoT systematically employs 
deductive logic, '[the historico-genetic SoT] employs one branch of logic, namely 
abduction or inference to the best explanation'(Hacking 2012, p. 5). Hacking's 
description of the historico-genetic thinking can be summarized by these steps: 1)
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assuming that things stand in a certain way in some domain of interest; 2) 
devising an explanation of how things got to be that way; 3) inferring from the 
power of the explanation, and its superiority to any other available candidate, that 
it tells how things are (Hacking 2012, p. 5). 'Darwin's long argument', mentioned 
by Hacking in passing, can be taken as an example of historico-genetic thinking. 
Indeed, the explanation of adaption of living beings is considered the primary fact 
to be explained by the theory of evolution (Gould 2002, p. 119) (step 1). The Tong 
argument', as Darwin calls his argument in The Origin of Species (1985 [1859]), 
provided an explanation of this problem (step 2); William Paley (1743-1805) had 
proposed a different explanation according to which adaptation must have been 
'designed' by God. As there are several facts that are not explained by Paley's 
argument (see Darwin 1985 [1859], chapter XIV) but are explained by the Tong 
argument', one can conclude that Darwin proposed the best explanation (step 3). 
In the next subsection I shall provide a more detailed characterization of the 
historico-genetic thinking.
Hacking has not been very clear as to when the historico-genetic SoT 
emerged. Indeed, although he pointed out that '[the historico-genetic] genre of 
reasoning began long before what we call the sciences' (Hacking 2012, p. 5), he 
also noted:
Probability crystallizes in the time of Pascal. Then there is historico- 
genetic explanation, whose triumph is Darwin's explanation of the 
species by natural selection (Hacking 2012, p. 5).
In this passage he seems to suggest that Darwin's time represents the point in
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which the historico-genetic explanation became the standard method of scientific 
disciplines such as the life sciences. For my part, I shall argue that the historico- 
genetic SoT, a way of tapping abduction, a hum an form of reasoning, emerged in 
the eighteenth century.
3.4.1 Historico-genetic Thinking versus Laboratory Thinking
After this brief presentation of Hacking's claims, I am going to better characterize 
the historico-genetic thinking. The best way to do this is to compare and contrast it 
with laboratory thinking.18
In his book What Makes Biology Unique? (Mayr 2004) Ernst Mayr explains that 
'biology consists of rather two different fields, mechanistic functional biology and 
historical biology' (Mayr 2004, p. 24). The former deals with the physiology of 
living organisms '[which] can be explained mechanistically by chemistry and 
physics' and does not need any historical analysis. The latter deals with 'all 
aspects of the living world that involve the dimension of historical time' (Mayr 
2004, p. 24). Whereas in functional biology the most frequently asked question is 
'how?', in historical biology scientists ask 'why?' most of the time (Mayr 2004, p. 
25).
This distinction can be extended to disciplines such as geology, cosmology 
and palaeontology: these disciplines are 'historical', although they can ask 'how- 
questions' like in chemistry and physics. For instance, geology has provided 
insights into the structure of the Earth by applying physics methods to the study
18 In my analysis I shall only deal with the general features of the historical and the experimental 
sciences. For a review of the methods deployed by Darwin see (Gould 2002, pp. 103-116). A 
compendium of the methods of geology can be found in (Laudan 1987, pp. 7-16).
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of seismic waves, i.e. by asking questions about how waves propagate ('how- 
questions'); on the other hand, thanks to Alfred Wegener (1880-1930), geology has 
offered a historical explanation of continental drift, explaining a large number of 
features of the surface of the Earth, e.g. why continents' shapes fit together like a 
jigsaw ('why-questions').
In subsection 2.5.2,1 have explained that one of the cognitive steps involved 
in laboratory thinking consists of establishing what is a matter of fact and what is 
a speculative hypothesis, which theory has to be embraced and which has to be 
rejected. Laboratory sciences postulate statistical or causal regularities among 
types of events; from the laws supposed to describe these regularities, predictions 
are inferred and tested in laboratory; and, importantly, often in the face of a failed 
prediction ad hoc hypotheses are added and separately tested in order to protect 
the hypothesized laws from false negatives (see also Cleland 2002, pp. 476-480). 
Furthermore, the essence of explanations in physics is to show that a phenomenon 
'has to be so' given certain physical laws and a few additional facts. This is what 
Isaac Newton (1642-1727) did when he proved that Kepler's three laws of 
planetary motion could be deduced from his laws of motion and universal 
gravitation.
Conversely, as Mayr notes, laws have a non-essential role in historical 
biology (Mayr 2004, p. 27) given the contingent character of many phenomena. In 
biology a result R we expect could fail to come about simply because our 
hypothesis K admits exceptions. Indeed, what really characterizes historical 
sciences is the postulation of a common cause for explaining different puzzling 
effects of past events. Often this common cause must be connected w ith its effects
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through a long chain of events, some of which are contingent: for example, on 
Gould's model of history of life the Cambrian explosion produced a wide range of 
phyla, of which many disappeared rapidly; for him, it was a matter of luck, and 
not of being 'fitter', if a worm-like organism called Pikaia gracilens, from which we 
probably descend, did not go extinct (Gould 2000b). This example shows the 
absence of regularities in biology: according to Gould, if one could somehow turn 
the clock back and allow life to evolve again, very likely our species would not 
exist. It is for this reason that historical explanations have the character of a story 
that cannot be tested in a laboratory: there is no way to test experimentally a thesis 
about hum an origins.
Historical scientists try to find 'the best explanation', i.e. the particular story 
that unifies under a single explanation the largest number of facts to be explained. 
As often many explanations compete, scientists must hunt for what Carol Cleland 
called a 'smoking gun' (Cleland 2002, p. 480), namely a trace or a body of traces 
that establish whether an explanation is more unifying than another. The search 
for a smoking gun plays a key role in historico-genetic research, as Cleland 
explained. A case in point is the hunting for a smoking gun that discriminates 
between the different explanations of the extinction of the dinosaurs. According to 
some of the first explanatory stories offered before the 1980s, dinosaurs went 
extinct about 65 millions of years ago because of the lack of immunity to a very 
infectious disease or because of a rapid change of climate. Then, following the 
discovery of unusual high concentrations of iridium in a layer of Earth's crust in 
1980 (iridium is rare on our planet and abundant in meteorites) another 
explanation gained support: an asteroid impact determined a mass extinction.
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Finally, during the late 1980s, geologists found the Chicxulub Crater underneath 
the Yucatan peninsula: the smoking gun, as it were.
It is a fact that since the beginnings of the modern historical sciences there 
has always been a clear awareness of the distinction between how-questions and 
why-questions. So much so that when M.J.S. Rudwick outlined the historical 
setting that lies behind the Great Devonian controversy (about the dating of 
certain puzzling rock strata) in the 1830s, he wrote:
Causal analysis was central to dynamical geology, whereas for 
stratigraphical geology it was peripheral [...] Most geologists in the 
1830s were not centrally concerned with causal questions at all [...].
The problems of geological dynamics were perceived as neither more 
nor less fundamental than those of stratigraphical geology: they were 
just different [...] [G]eologists [...] treated them as essentially separate 
realms (Rudwick 1985, p. 45).
In sum, my points so far provide an illustration, although idealized, of two 
distinct ways of acquiring knowledge: laboratory scientists infer predictions from 
laws, test them and control auxiliary hypotheses; historico-genetic scientists 
suggest explanations of puzzling traces of the past searching for smoking guns 
that rule out alternative explanations. We can say that the historico-genetic way of 
thinking is well portrayed by the following three mental operations. The first one 
consists of focusing on the historical aspect of the world. It is a change of 
perspective that is well described by Darwin:
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When we regard every production of nature as one which has had a
history; [...] when we thus view each organic being, how far more
interesting, I speak from experience, will the study of natural history
become! (Darwin 1985 [1859], p. 456)
Darwin's perspective is radically different from that in which the world is 
investigated as it is: compare a question about the orbit of a planet with that 
concerning its history from its formation to its orbital capture. The second mental 
operation consists of postulating causal histories to explain the effect of long-past 
events. Finally, the third mental operation is the search for the smoking gun, the 
evidence that discriminates between two or more historical explanations.
3.4.2 Doing
It must be added that, by hunting high and low for the traces of past-events, 
historical scientists do not only support their conjectures or discriminate between 
conflicting explanations. They also build their stories just as if they pieced together 
a jigsaw: sometimes they have no clear vision of how the puzzle image will look 
like; their final product is often unexpected and results from an interchange of 
fieldwork and theoretical research. A case in point is the reconstruction of the 
evolutionary history between Homo sapiens and the ancestral species we share with 
chimpanzees and bonobos. The hypothesis of a new species, now gone extinct, 
Homo rudolfensis, was put forward in the 1970s on the basis of a collection of early 
Homo fossils from Koobi Fora (Kenya). However, this hypothesis remained 
controversial because of the incomplete preservation of the remains. Only with the 
discovery of other fossils in 2012 by the paleoanthropologist Meave Leakey did it
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gain support (Leakey et al. .2012). Another example comes from geology: the 
Scottish geologist James Hutton (1726-1797), searching for a proof of the idea that 
internal and external forces of Earth mould rocks and mountains, went by boat to 
Siccar Point, a Scottish promontory in which he found overlapping strata of 
different geological eras. That was the evidence that the Earth was considerably 
older than previously thought and the beginning of modern geology19. As a final 
example, by removing ice cores from the polar ice, climate scientists have been 
able to examine the air trapped inside. The data revealed information about the 
atmosphere over the millennia and helped the reconstruction of the history of the 
climate of our planet.
Fossil hunting, geological digging, ice cores removing represent examples 
of fieldwork in historical sciences. M.J.S. Rudwick pointed out that, in early 
nineteenth-century, working on foot, wearing outdoor clothing, being frequently 
soaked to the skin was not thought unusual by the geologists. This was the 
indispensable part of their activity that Deborah Cadbury has recently recreated in 
her scientific novel The Dinosaurs Hunters, a story of the rivalry between the 
palaeontologists Gideon Mantell (1790-1852) and Richard Owen (1804-1892). A 
hammer for collecting samples of rock and finding fossils, a magnetic compass for 
measuring the tilt of strata and other few items were 'all that the most eminent 
geologist required in the field' (Rudwick 1985, p. 40). Fieldwork was an activity 
fundamentally distinct from the activity in laboratory. As Rudwick pu t it
[the] major issues in early nineteenth-century geology,
19 More details on this example can be found in (Eldredge 1998, chapter II)
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w[ere] argued over in such public arenas as the Geological
Society and the British Association. But all parties [...]
acknowledged publicly that fieldwork was the primary locus of
encounter between the geologist and the phenomena of his
science (Rudwick 1985, p. 37).
Fieldwork marks the way of doing that is peculiar to historico-genetic 
sciences: without this activity no stories can be told about the portion of world 
under study. The primacy of fieldwork in the historical sciences parallels the 
primacy of laboratory in the experimental sciences or the primacy of the use of 
diagrams in geometry: if a practitioner of geology did not have acted 'in  the field' 
she would not have been accepted as part of the community of the earliest 
members of the first geological societies.
3.4.3 Discontinuity
The historian of science Paolo Rossi wrote that
In the one hundred of years that separate in time the Discourse on 
Earthquakes (1668) of Hooke from the Universal Natural H istory and 
Theory of Heaven (1755) of Kant, the discussions about the history of the 
Earth and of cosmos radically change[d] (Rossi 2000, p. 256 my 
translation).
In the seventeenth century the minds of the natural philosophers were still 
impregnated with the origin myths of Genesis and the alleged brief history  of our
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planet. A century later the dichotomy between a prescriptive science of the 
unchangeable laws of the universe and a descriptive science of the evolution of 
phenomena had already emerged. Historical sciences such as cosmology, biology, 
palaeontology and geology constituted themselves around a set of practices that 
shared the historico-genetic way of thinking. As Antonello La Vergata pointed 
out, 'only in the second half of the eighteenth century did the geological practice 
consolidate and did a consensus about terms, concepts and data emerge' (La 
Vergata 1988, p. 165 my translation). The first geological societies were founded at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century: in the case of the Geological Society,' [its] 
membership more than doubled between 1825 and 1845' (Rudwick 1985, p. 22). 
When the legitimacy of a 'historical' consideration about nature was established, 
several alternative theories as well as various models of history of Earth and 
universe emerged.
The more [...] naturalists looked at the earth's structure, the more 
complex it seemed [...]. Soon theories based on extensive 
transformations of the earth's surface became to appear [...] [and] 
geology and palaeontology would eventually emerge (Bowler 2003 p.
28).
On the basis of these considerations, it is possible to say that the emergence of the 
historico-genetic way of thinking and doing I have described so far was not 
gradual. In their book Cartographies of Time (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010) the 
historians Daniel Rosenberg and Anthony Grafton looked into how hum ans have 
drawn time in the course of history. I think that their conclusions corroborate my
1 3 0 STYLES OF T H IN K IN G : A SSESSING A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN H ACKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
point. Today the timeline with a single axis is a ubiquitous figure in the 
representation of time and one of the most inescapable metaphors for representing 
history by a drawing. Yet, Rosenberg and Grafton showed that the timeline is not 
even 250 years old. It is difficult to imagine a sort of rudimentary idea of the 
timeline that grows by micro-accumulation as if the first forms of such line had 
continuously developed into our timeline. Rosenberg and Grafton's account of 
'the birth of m odem  historical thinking traces a path from the enumerated but not 
yet narrated medieval date lists called annals, through the narrated but not 
narrative accounts called chronicles to fully narrative forms of historiography that 
emerge with modernity itself' (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010, p. 11). In their 
research they have not observed such a micro-accumulation. Until the mid­
eighteenth century, what Rosenberg and Grafton call the Eusebian model - a 
simple matrix with kingdoms listed across the top of the page and years listed 
down the left or right hand columns - was dominant. Only in the middle of the 
eighteenth century did scholars start to communicate the idea of historical 
development. For Rosenberg and Grafton, the crucial event was the publication in 
1765 of the Chart of Biography and in 1769 The New Chart of History by the scientist 
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). The reader could carry her eye vertically and see the 
contemporary state of all the empires subsisting in the world, at any particular 
time; or, she could carry her eye horizontally and note empires rise, flourishing 
and decline as time goes by.
Priestley's chart [...] provided an intuitive visual analogue for concepts
/
of historical progress that were becoming popular [...]. In Priestley 
chart, historical thought and new forms of graphic expression came
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into dialogue [...] (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010, p. 19-20).
Priestley's charts became an essential part of a gentleman's library: for example 
Rosenberg and Grafton say that the novelist Maria Edgeworth (1768-1849) and the 
physician Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) recommended the new ways of visualizing 
history as aids in the education of children. In his book The Life and the Opinions of 
Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, the novelist Laurence Sterne (1713-1768) drew lines to 
represent the narrative patterns and the digressions from the main story. In 
conclusion, just when the historico-genetic thinking became central in the history 
of thought the timeline emerged. Its sudden coming to the fore suggests that the 
historico-genetic way of thinking and doing, with the features I am going to 
describe, had sharp beginnings.
3.4.4 A New Kind of Evidence
Thinking in the historico-genetic way involved a 'new  kind of evidence'. This 
expression must be understood in two senses, as I am going to explain. First of all, 
let us compare and contrast how the experimental and the historical sciences 
provide pieces of evidence and how they use them. Experimental scientists test a 
target hypothesis not so much in order to reject it on the basis of a failed 
prediction (as Popper thought) but to save it from misleading confirmations. For 
example, the astronomers Urbain Le Verrier (1811-1877) and John Couch Adams 
(1819-1892) 'saved' the gravitational law. When it was found that the orbit of 
Uranus differed from that predicted by the gravitational law, they suggested the 
existence of another planet (Neptune) whose position was theoretically calculated
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and confirmed by telescopic observation. Two points must be noted: firstly, 
experimental sciences' use of evidence is limited to a single hypothesis (Cleland 
2001, p. 988); secondly, the analysis of the hypothesis is often carried out by man- 
made machines such as Boyle's air pum p that bring about the test conditions 
specified by the hypothesis.
Conversely, as Cleland pointed out, in the historical sciences most of times 
evidence plays a different role since it is used to discriminate multiple competing 
hypotheses about past events (Cleland 2001, p. 989). The new kind of evidence 
that comes about with the emergence of the historical thinking is the 'smoking 
gun'. The 'smoking gun' is a kind of evidence entirely distinct from the 'man- 
made evidence' of the laboratory SoT: the former discriminates between different 
historical accounts, the latter concerns a single hypothesis that must be falsified or 
'saved' and it is, most of the time, elicited by apparatuses. For example, the 
Chicxulub Crater represents the evidence that an asteroid impact determined a 
mass extinction. So, it discriminates between different historical accounts of the 
evolution of dinosaurs. On the other hand the death of a bird in the air-pump is a 
piece of evidence produced by a man-made machine in order to test the single 
hypothesis of the existence of void.
I am not claiming that there are no examples in which historical scientists 
use apparatuses in order to sharp a particular trace or to reveal a smoking gun. 
Nor am I claiming that 'the smoking gun' is a kind of evidence that was not in use 
before the emergence of the historical sciences. My point is that when the 
Geological Society invited its members to display on a table set the relevant 
specimens after a paper was read (Rudwick 1985, p. 23), those pieces of evidence
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were being used in a way of which the entire community had become aware -  they 
were used to discriminate between different historical accounts. The existence of a 
'smoking gun' had become the new standard of truth within a new way of 
thinking and doing.
There is a more obvious sense by which it is possible to say that a new kind 
of evidence emerged: historico-genetic scientists turned their eyes to a previously 
unnoticed portion of the world, to objects such as fossils, minerals, rocks and 
geological layers. Before the emergence of the historico-genetic way of thinking 
this portion of the world had no role as evidence. In his book I segni del tempo 
(Rossi, 2002 [1979], p. 21-45), Paolo Rossi explained that, until the seventeenth 
century and with the exception of Leonardo Da Vinci (1452-1519)20 and Bernard 
Palissy (1510-1590), Platonic and Aristotelian interpretations of the origins of 
fossils were prevalent: Platonic thinkers thought that fossils grew inside the earth 
like organisms thanks to particular virtues (virtus plastica, lapidifica, vegetabilis)’, 
Aristotelian thinkers ascribed the existence of fossils to the action of solar heat and 
winds that blew in the bowels of the earth. Only when fossils were thought of in 
terms of their origin could thinkers interpret those puzzling objects as remains of 
old organisms: nature became the reign of history, of which fossils represented the 
documents (Rossi 2000, p. 258). Consequently, the emergence of the historical 
vision of nature is closely tied to the coming to the fore of a new portion of the 
world, which for the first time came to play the role of evidence.
20 An account of Leonardo’s theories about fossils can be found in (Gould 1998)
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3.4.5 Techniques of Self-Vindication
The evidence on which historico-genetic scientists rely in order to infer the best 
explanation may not be determined independently from the historico-genetic way 
of thinking itself. For example, the evidence for the extinction of the dinosaurs is 
provided by the claim that the Chicxulub Crater was caused by an asteroid-impact 
dating from the end of the Cretaceous period, when the dinosaurs went extinct. In 
turn, this claim is an inference to the best explanation of different traces of past 
events such as: clay with quantities of iridium much higher than normal and 
concentration of iridium in asteroids. In other words, the very evidence that 
supports the historical account of how dinosaurs went extinct is still another 
historical account obtained by using the historico-genetic way of thinking and 
doing.
Consider these questions and answers: why is the historico-genetic way of 
thinking and doing reliable? The reason is that it provides the best explanation. 
And why is what it provides the best explanation? The reason is that there is a 
smoking gun. And why is just that a smoking gun? Because it follows from an 
inference to the best explanation obtained by using the historico-genetic way of 
thinking. These questions and answers form a circulus in probando: the historico- 
genetic way of thinking is self-authenticating.
This point can be viewed from a different perspective:
science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to 
derive descriptions of many phenomena using the same patterns of 
derivation again and again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us 
how to reduce the number of types of facts we have to accept as
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ultimate (Kitcher 1989, p. 432).
That is: humans apply the abductive method again and again in order to build up 
a unifying picture of all the disparate phenomena. For example, the extinction of 
dinosaurs and the crater in the Yucatan peninsula were 'brute facts' until they 
were put in relation by applying twice the inference to the best explanation: an 
inference to the claim that the crater was caused by an asteroid-impact and an 
inference to the hypothesis of the extinction of the dinosaurs. By doing so those 
two brute facts are fitted together. In this sense to be self-authenticating for the 
historico-genetic thinking corresponds to the fact that we apply again and again 
the abductive method in order to provide a coherent historical account of our 
world; and we cannot 'escape' from abduction.
3.4.6 New Sentences
In their book Rosenberg and Grafton reproduce a section of a famous mediaeval 
manuscript called the Annals of S t  Gall, which records events in the Frank 
kingdoms during the eight, ninth and tenth century:
709. Hard winter. Duke Gottfried died.
710. Hard year and deficient in crops.
711.
712. Flood everywhere
713.
714. Pippin, mayor of the palace died
715.
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716.
717.
718. Charles devastated the Saxon with great destruction
719.
720. Charles fought against the Saxons
721. Theudo drove the Saracens out of Aquitaine.
722. Great crops
Rosenberg and Grafton say that although 'these annals breathe with the life of 
Middle Ages' they appear 'strange and antic to a modern eye, beginning and 
ending seemingly without reason, mashing up categories helter-skelter like the 
famous Chinese encyclopaedia conjured by Borges' (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010, 
p. 11). Indeed, the Annals of St. Gall
make no distinction between natural occurrences and human acts; they 
give no indication of cause and effect; no entry is given more priority 
than another. [...] there is no distinction among periods, and lists begin 
and end as nameless chroniclers pick up and put down their pens.
(Rosenberg and Grafton 2010, p. 12).
Let us focus on a single sentence of Annals of St. Gall:
712. Flood everywhere
There is no history behind that sentence, no real sense of a cause such as an 
alleged cyclone that brought about the flood. The sentence could be contrasted
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with sentences such as:
The flood was a consequence of a warming of ocean waters and the formation of a cyclone 
that rotated counterclockwise and reached France in 712.
The meaning of the latter sentence hinges on scientific practices unknown in 712: 
no sense can be attributed to it until one comes to consider floods has having a 
history and grasps how different explanations are selected and how and where the 
evidence can be found and used. What is necessary to make sense of the latter 
sentence is a way of thinking and doing that was absent during those centuries. 
The same arguments could be applied to sentences such as:
Modifications to the lower parts of the limbs of the horse shows that evolution proceeds 
in the direction of increasing specialization
The order of formation of rocks can be read from the observed sequence
For us these sentences could be true or false, but in the ancient times no truth- 
value could be attributed to them. Myriads of sentences such as these two above, 
i.e. sentences that are candidates for truth or falsehood only within the historico- 
genetic way of thinking, have appeared after the eighteenth century.
To conclude, although humans have always used the abductive method, it was 
only in the seventeenth century that a way of thinking with all the features 
described in this section emerged. These features characterize this way of thinking 
as a SoT, 'the historico-genetic SoT'.
3.5 The Taxonomic Style of Thinking and Doing
By 'taxonomy' it is generally meant a branch of science concerned with the 
classification of organisms. As Ernst W. Mayr and Walter J. Bock explained, 
classifications are attempts to arrange a diversity of entities into sets of classes 
according to a criterion of similarity (Mayr and Bock 2002, p. 170): each class is 
constituted by individual entities that are considered similar. Classifications are a 
subset of 'ordering systems', a term that alludes to any attempt to arrange objects 
into particular categorizations. For example, the 'cladistic method', introduced by 
Willi Hennig (1913-1976) in the late twentieth century, is not considered a 
classification but an ordering system in that it groups species not according to 
their morphological similarity but according to their degree of evolutionary 
relatedness. 'The entities ordered in a cladification are not classes, but clades' 
(Mayr and Bock 2002, p. 182), which may be so heterogeneous to include, e.g., 
mammalians and primitive reptiles.
Rather than depicting our ancestral ability to perform the dullest forms of 
cataloguing, I want to characterize the way scientists think when they classify the 
living world. Hacking explicitly said that Crombie's taxonomic style has to be 
counted as a SoT, but he never provided his own characterization. However, it is 
possible to say that he pointed out the possibilities that this way of thinking opens 
up for hum an action and described the way it affects the people classified (e.g. see 
Hacking 2002, chapter six) (Hacking 1999b, chapters four and five). For example, 
Hacking reflected on the fact that, although certain perversions may have always 
existed, the 'pervert, as a diseased person, [was] created in the late nineteenth
STYLES O F TH IN K IN G : ASSESSIN G A N D  DEVELOPIN G
IAN H A CKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
1 3 9
century' by classifications based on a new functional understanding of disease 
(Hacking 2002, p. 100)(Hacking 1999). This is only one of the ways explored by 
Hacking in which human beings and their perceptions of themselves are affected 
by our classifications. The way of framing these issues, which are beyond the 
purpose of this work, was influenced by Foucault, as Hacking acknowledged 
(Hacking 2002, p. 100).
Another fact to be noted is that Hacking has been attracted by a thesis pu t 
forward by the American anthropologist Scott Atran in the book Cognitive 
Foundations of Natural History (Atran 1990). The latter argued that there are 
universal principles of biological classification and nomenclature employed by 
peoples everywhere. In particular, Atran maintained that the beginnings of 
m odem  biosystematics are to be traced to folk classifications of living beings: the 
classification of plants and animals made by Aristotle exhibit the same constraints 
as the classification of other coeval peoples in different ecosystems.
According to Atran plants and animals may change from a geographical 
region to another but every people recognizes the same classes in its environment 
and eventually comes to use the same taxonomic structure. For example, peoples 
who live in two different ecosystems will give to the same plant or to two distinct 
varieties of the same plant the same place in their classification21.
21 There is no consensus about Atran's theses. Developmental psychology does not offer 
much support to them: for example, Spelke maintains that young infants appear to have 
initial domain-specific knowledge only in four domains: physics, psychology, number 
and geometry (Spelke 1994, p. 433) (see also Carey 1985). Lloyd pointed out some 
difficulties with Atran's studies (Lloyd 2007, p. 47-53). Also, by comparing the taxonomies 
of animals in ancient China with Aristotle's, Lloyd argued that there is no universal 
common sense by which to compare and contrast the solutions to some questions about 
the classification of animals (Lloyd 2007, p. 54) (Lloyd 2004).
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What attracted Hacking in Atran's work was the fact that it provides a basis for 
claiming that the taxonomic SoT is grounded in the humans' innate dispositions: 
in fact Atran proposed the existence of a module for the naive classification of 
living beings. However, for Hacking, Atran's theses only represent the first step 
towards an understanding of the taxonomic SoT. What he would like to see is a 
theory of the contingent social and institutional conditions that have made this 
SoT possible (Hacking 1991b, p. 18).
3.5.1 Taxonomic Thinking
It is a fact that in the extant literature before Aristotle there is no comprehensive 
explicit classification of animals and plants. Aristotle introduced a major 
distinction between blooded and bloodless animals that roughly corresponds to 
our division between vertebrates and invertebrates. He subdivided the former 
class into live-bearing and egg-laying animals (and a third categories of animals 
that share properties with both groups); then, he subdivided the latter into four 
groups. Aristotle's aim was not to carry out a taxonomic project in the real sense of 
the word (Lovejoy 1960 [1936], p. 56) (Louis 1986, p. 7-8) (Gohau and Duris 1997, 
p. 8): he did not invoke a single principle to classify animals and switched from 
anatomical to physiological or behavioural criteria (see Lloyd 1961). In spite of 
that, it was Aristotle who suggested to later thinkers the idea of a graded scala 
naturae in which the animals are arranged according to their degree of 'perfection' 
(see Lovejoy 1960 [1936]) (Bynum 1975). This suggestion was based on a criterion 
of rank: the grade of development reached by the offspring. On the basis of this 
criterion he conceived eleven grades, with man, the ens perfectissimum at the top
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and at the bottom the zoophytes, those animals that look like plants. For example, 
'bloodless' animals were ranked below animals that possessed blood; animals 
such as birds were ranked over fish; and animals were ranked over plants for their 
ability to move and sense.
Grouping (forming taxa) and ranking (placement of those taxa in a hierarchy) 
represent two distinct mental actions that can be recognized in Aristotle's way of 
thinking about the natural sciences (Winther 2012, p. 634) (Stevens 1994, p. 10). For 
example, when Aristotle divided animals into two classes by using as a criterion 
the presence of blood in the body he was grouping, an action that remains at an 
organizational level and is distinct from that of ranking. On the other hand, when 
he suggested a criterion of rank to arrange all the classes in a single ladder he was 
ranking.
The taxonomist Graham Griffiths distinguished 'classification' from 
'systematization': to classify means to order into classes, which in turn are 
constructed from similarities', to systematize means to arrange classes according to 
certain relations (Griffiths 1974, p. 85) such as developmental or philogenetic. 
Griffiths' concept of systematization implies something more than just ranking: to 
put forward an explanation in order to interpret the ranking (Winther 2012, p. 7). 
Systematizing makes the work of a taxonomist distinct from that of stamp- 
collector. To make the concept clearer let us come back to Aristotle. When he 
applied the categories 'high' and 'low ' throughout the animal kingdom he just 
ranked different classes of living beings, e.g. according to his classification dogs are 
more advanced creatures than fishes, and fishes are more advanced than any 
invertebrate. This mental action is to be considered distinct from that of
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systematizing, i.e. interpreting the classification. For example, Aristotle claimed 
that the latter shows the static plan of nature: each species has always existed and 
will never become extinct. This was a systematization of the classification.
Later on, from the Middle Ages until the late eighteenth century, the result of 
Aristotle's interpretation was a conception of the universe as a 'Great Chain of 
Being', which was made, for the principle of continuity, of an infinite number of 
links in hierarchical order. The naturalist Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) took 
seriously this classification and put forward an anti-evolutionist systematization, 
i.e. an explanation according to which 'each species was an eternal element in the 
divine plan' (Bowler 2003 p. 64). In fact, Bonnet provided a causal explanation to 
interpret a classification whose basic principles had been introduced by Aristotle. 
He did not group, nor did he ranked, he just systematized, i.e. he provided an 
explanation of the classification by denying evolution. On the other hand Lamarck 
reinterpreted the chain of being by 'temporalizing' it, to use Lovejoy's term, i.e by 
abandoning the fixity of species and proposing the theory of a linear evolution.
To suggest a causal explanation of the classification is often an action strongly 
interconnected with those of ranking and systematizing.
Whether with Linnaeus we attend to form [...] [or] function, whether 
[...] we arrange the taxa by counting similarities, or whether we 
construct a taxonomy that is homomorphic to an evolutionary tree, we 
are in every case invoking a conception of living beings (Hacking 
1993a, p. 288).
Yet my point is that it is theoretically possible to disentangle these three mental
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actions, which are peculiar to the taxonomic thinking.
When from Aristotle we turn to the modern taxonomists, the mental actions 
of grouping, ranking and systematizing are even more clearly distinguishable. In 
order to group plants, the naturalist John Ray (1627-1705) focused on the 
distinguishing features that perpetuate themselves in propagation from seed and 
established as a principle that 'a  species never springs from the seed of another' 
(quoted in Gribbin and Gribbin 2008, p. 24); in so doing he provided a first version 
of the definition of species. By taking into account every visible character of every 
species Ray tried to introduce a ranking: he grouped species infimae (our species) 
into species subalternae (our genera) and the latter into genera (our orders). 
Eventually he concluded that there is no way of knowing which is the most 
relevant character for a classification. Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) opposed Ray's 
conclusion and focused on the reproductive organs of plants. He determined 
classes and orders by counting stamens and pistils of every flower; then he 
determined the species by a closer inspection of the structures of these plants. By 
doing so he introduced taxonomic ranks into the living world: species were 
grouped into a higher category called genus and the genera were grouped into 
classes of more basic resemblances. Linnaeus thought that his scheme of m apping 
biological relationships as smaller classes within successive large classes mirrored 
the God's permanent order, which ought to be discernible by the hum an mind. 
This can be viewed as a systematization, that is an interpretation of his 
classification, but also as an assumption that guided his research of a 
comprehensive classification of the living world -  at any rate, Linnaeus' creationist 
account is to be distinguished from his mental actions of grouping and ranking.
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The interpretation in creationist terms given by Linnaeus was not the only 
possible. Linnaeus' classification is open to another systematization in terms of 
evolutionary theory, as Stephen Jay Gould explained: 'Linnaeus's scheme happens 
to be compatible with the interpretation that the interrelationships among 
organisms derive from a genealogical hierarchy built by evolutionary branching 
(Gould 2000a, p. 22). Ultimately, like Aristotle, Linnaeus carried out three 
independent mental actions: grouping, ranking and systematizing. His 
systematization was only one of the possible ones.
To sum up, the way of thinking of taxonomists from Aristotle to the modern 
taxonomists is characterized by three mental actions: grouping, ranking and 
systematizing. Grouping and ranking require criteria such as those based on 
similarities in Aristotle's and Linnaeus' classifications. Systematizing consists of a 
causal explanation to interpret the classification: for example, the fixity of species 
for the great chain of being or the evolutionary theory for the Linnean 
classification.
Another point to note is that taxonomists themselves consider their 
methods as ways of finding out. This is evident not only in Aristotle, for example, 
who wanted to explain the nature of kinds by identifying their place in Nature 
(Hacking 1991b, p. 18), but also in the thought of later students of classification. In 
the mid-seventeenth, 'to  name means to know' was the idee fixe of taxonomists 
(Rossi 2000, p. 280): for Linnaeus denominatio was one of the aims of botanic and 
classifying constituted a way for finding out the structure of the divine thought. In 
the mid-eighteenth century the idea that a classification should mirror the 
principle of common descent caught on. Classification helped to find out about the
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history of life: for example, to distinguish, within vertebrates, morphological types 
such as fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals suggested that each of 
them descended from a common ancestor which possessed the same body plan.
3.5.2 Emergence and Discontinuity
For Hacking Linnaeus represents the point in time in which the taxonomic 
thinking suddenly came to dominate the scientific milieu. Perhaps it is not by 
coincidence that a similar thesis can be drawn from Foucault's The Order of Things. 
In The Order of Things (Foucault 1994 [1966]) Foucault told of three major epochs in 
Western thought: the Renaissance, the Classical Age (from 1650 to 1800), and 
Modernity. Each epoch was marked by an epistemic system, i.e. by particular 
conditions of possibility of knowledge and its discourse that Foucault tried to 
describe. In particular, until the mid-seventeenth century 'the historian's task was 
to establish the great compilation of documents and signs -  of everything, 
throughout the world, that might form a mark' (Foucault 1994 [1966], p. 130). It 
was only in the Classical Age that 'the sciences carr[ied] within themselves the 
project [...] of an exhaustive ordering of the world' (Foucault 1994 [1966], p. 74). 
This entirely new way of connecting things is for Foucault 'the hidden network' 
(Foucault 1994 [1966], p. XX) that determines, inter alia, how we deal w ith the 
things classified. For Foucault, the episteme of the Renaissance is the period in 
which 'the naturalist [becomes] the man concerned with the structure of the 
visible world and its denomination according to characters' (Foucault 1994 [1966], 
p. 161). As I am going to show, Foucault's account not only supports the claim that 
the taxonomic style of thinking crystallized in Linnaeus' time but also that it
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suddenly opened up a conceptual space for new candidates for truth and 
falsehood.
To start with, as Lloyd noted, no thinker in pagan Greek antiquity 
attempted a zoological classification on the scale of Aristotle (Lloyd 2007, p. 54). 
Theophrastus, Aristotle's disciple, focused only on plants and rocks and Roman 
naturalists such as Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD) did not really add anything 
scientifically important to Aristotle's achievements (Gohau and Duris 1997, p. 9). 
The important naturalistic works of Albertus Magnus (1193/1206-1280) faded 
soon into oblivion and in the Renaissance animals were not studied as such but for 
the signs that could be read in them (Foucault 1994 [1966], chapter 5).
Furthermore, no new systematizations were proposed until the end of the 
seventeenth century when the idea of chain of being finally lost support.
It is a fact that, between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth century 
the amount of data increased exponentially: as Paolo Rossi reports, in the 
Herbarum Vivae Eicones, written by the botanist Otto Brunfels (1439-1534) and 
illustrated by Hans Weiditz (1495-1537), we find a list of 258 species of plants. Less 
than one hundred of years later, in 1623, the naturalist Gaspar Bahuin, in the Pinax 
theatre botanici, listed six thousands of species. In 1686, Ray published the first 
volume of his Historia plantarum in which he described 18,000 species (Rossi, 2000).
An interesting point made by Atran is that Aristotle dealt with a local fauna 
of just six hundred or so local species, a number that does not strain our innate 
capacities to sort; by the time of Linnaeus and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) the 
complexity of the known world of nature increased so much that our built-in 
capacity to sort plants became insufficient. Linnaeus is therefore the point of
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history -  argues Atran - in which a 'scientific breakaway' took place, i.e. a sort of 
gradual disengagement of science from common sense. What triggered this 
explosion of discoveries? Why did people become obsessed with classification?
Foucault's analysis suggests the following answer to these questions: for 
the taxonomic thinking to crystallize in Linnaeus' time it was necessary for the 
students of 'History' (Foucault's terminology) to become observers of the natural 
world. This has not always been the case:
[...] though it is true that the historian, for the Greeks, was indeed the 
individual who sees and who recounts from the starting-point of his 
sight, it has not been so in our culture. Indeed, it was at relatively late 
date, on the threshold of the Classical age, that he assumed -  or 
resumed -  this role (Foucault 1994 [1966], p. 130).
The year 1657, date in which the naturalist John Jonston (1603-1675) published a 
Natural history of quadrupeds, is considered by Foucault the threshold of the 
Classical Age. For him, until that moment all that existed was ju st histories: a 
History of the nature of birds by Pierre Belon (1517-1564) an Admirable history of 
plants by Claude Duret (1570-1611), a History of serpents and dragons by Ulisse 
Aldrovandi (1522-1605). In their works, these authors gave room to allegoric 
interpretations, myths and legends about a given animal or a plant. Their 
classifications included mythological animals, literary considerations, possible 
uses of a certain animal and its edibility. Rather than coming from a direct 
observation of nature, Renaissance scholars usually depended for their reference 
material on information obtained from previous Classical authors. The naturalist
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Conrad Gesner (1516-1565), whose Historiae animalium was widely read in the 
Renaissance, is another case in point: in that work he showed the animals' places 
in history, literature and art and included mythical creatures and imaginary 
beasts, intermixed with animals brought back from the New World. Foucault 
explained his attitude with these words:
Until the time of Aldobrandi, History was the inextricable and 
completely unitary fabric of all that was visible of things and of the 
signs that had been discovered and lodged in them [...] (Foucault 1994 
[1966], p. 129).
The reason why, as I have just said, Foucault considers Jonston as the 
threshold of the classical age is that in his Natural history of quadrupeds the latter 
eliminated almost completely the literary considerations still present in 
Aldobrandi. For Foucault, in the Classical Age naturalists eliminated fables and 
documents, began to take close examinations of the living beings and reported 
what they see in the most neutralized way. The ancient texts ceased to be the 
documents of history, replaced by herbariums, collections and gardens. The 
taxonomic thinking as we know it, described above by the mental actions of 
grouping, ranking and systematizing on the basis of the characters of animals and 
plants, was fully emerged.
When Rossi (Rossi 2000) says that in the Classical age scholars got rid of the 
superfluous, he must be interpreted as saying not only that they eliminated 
legends, hearsay and literary considerations from their classifications but also that 
they focused their attention on a particular portion of the world: certain aspects of
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plants and animals up to that moment 'u n k n o w n '. The stamens and pistils of 
flowers began to be enumerated, the sizes of corollas measured, the shapes of the 
flowers recorded. It was at that point that to group on the basis of the many 
emerging differences and similarities between animals and plants, to rank the 
many species just discovered in order to arrange them and, finally to systematize, 
became crucial.
3.5.3 A New Kind of Evidence
Foucault points out a sentence of Linnaeus that established w hat should be taken 
into account as fundamental in the study of a living being.
As Linnaeus said [...] 'every note should be a product of number, of 
form, of proportion, of situation'. For example when one studies the 
reproductive organs of a plant it is sufficient but indispensable to 
enumerate the stamens and pistils [...], to define the form they assume, 
according to what geometrical figure they are distributed in the flower 
[...] and what their size is in relations to organs (Foucault 1994 [1966], 
p. 134).
As a matter of fact, number, form, proportion and situations were the standards of 
evidence shared by the new community of naturalist historians in the Classical 
Age. This is a standard of evidence entirely new: as we have seen in section 2.2 in 
the Renaissance an opinio was supported by signs. Different scholars could well 
disagree on which characters to consider in order to group and rank different 
classes of living beings: Joseph Pitton de Toumefort (1656-1708) looked at corollas
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and the features of fruits whereas Linnaeus focused on sexual characters of plants. 
But they all agreed that number, form, of proportion and situation must represent 
the features necessary for reconstructing the place of a natural object in the natural 
world; they all agreed on trusting only their eyes and disregarding other organs of 
sense. In other words, they all agreed on certain standards of evidence for justifying 
w hat can be considered a sound classification. In doing so they established that to 
classify means to group and rank on the basis of visible similarities. The emergence 
of this way of thinking with these standards of evidence is a fact that characterizes 
Linnaeus' epoch.
Botanic gardens and zoological collections represented the institutions that 
reinforced the 'rules' shared by the naturalist historians. What came into being 
was a community of people that shared common standards for describing the 
living world. In order to classify the members of this community had to perform 
measurements and make comparisons, to carry out experiments and observe the 
capacity of interbreeding of animals and plants. More recently, measures and 
comparisons involve genetic sequencing. These physical actions necessary for 
comparing and contrasting characterize the taxonomic way of thinking.
3.5.4 Meaningful and Meaningless Classifications
The change between the way of thinking of the Renaissance scholars and 
that of the seventeenth century taxonomists was so radical that the classifications 
made by the former appear alien to us. To give an example, Gesner grouped 
unicorns with rhinoceroses; Aldovrandi described snakes under headings such as: 
various meanings of the word 'serpent', synonyms and etymologies, differences,
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form and description, nature and habits, temperament as well as prodigies and 
presages, monsters, mythology, fables, allegories and mysteries, hieroglyphics, 
emblems and symbols, proverbs, heraldic signs (Foucault 1994 [1966]). The 
juxtaposition of monsters and snakes, mythical creatures and rhinoceroses as well 
as that of habits of animals and proverbs and hieroglyphic is impossible for us to 
make sense of — it is a way of classifying and describing living creatures that 
seems to cross the boundaries of our rationality.
Indeed, Aldovrandi's and Gesner's lists are reminiscent of the essay The 
analytical language of John Wilkins by Jorge Borges cited by Foucault in a well 
known passage of the preface to The Order of Things. Borges described a Chinese 
encyclopaedia in which it is written that animals are divided into:
1. Those that belong to the Emperor,
2. Embalmed ones,
3. Those that are trained,
4. Suckling pigs,
5. Mermaids,
6. Fabulous ones,
7. Stray dogs,
8. Those included in the present classification,
9. Those that tremble as if they were mad,
10. Innumerable ones,
11. Those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
12. Others,
13. Those that have just broken a flower vase,
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14. Those that from a long way off look like flies.
Foucault commented:
It is not the 'fabulous' animals that are impossible, since they are 
designated as such, but the narrowness of the distance separating them 
(and juxtaposing them to) the stray dogs, or the animals that from a 
long way off look like flies. What transgresses the boundaries of all 
imagination, of all possible thoughts, is simply that alphabetic series 
(a,b,c,d) which links each of those categories to all the others (Foucault 
1994 [1966], p. XVI).
For the same reasons, the juxtapositions of Aldovrandi and Gesner live in a space 
that is unthinkable for the student of classifications who lived some dozens of 
years later: the mode in which animals and plants are grouped make their 
writings fantastic, irrational, meaningless.
3.5.5 Techniques of Self-Vindication
Hacking followed William James (1842-1910) in considering classification as 'the 
fourth' branch of logic together with deduction, induction and abduction (Hacking 
2006a, p. 8-9). Hacking's point can be developed in order to explain in which sense 
the taxonomic way of thinking is self-authenticating. When a classification does 
not satisfy us (e.g. because it does not happen to mirror our current theories) we 
have still to rely on taxonomic thinking in order to provide more and more 
suitable classifications. It is never the case that the taxonomic way of thinking and
STYLES O F T H IN K IN G : ASSESSING A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN HA CK IN G 'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
1 5 3
doing is dismissed as inadequate or conducive to falsehood. What might be 
refused is the systematization of a classification, that is, the theory we use to 
interpret the classification. But whether or not we keep on using the same 
classification or we provide a more suitable one it is taxonomic thinking that we 
use. In other words, the taxonomic way of thinking and doing itself is immune to 
refutation, as deduction, induction and abduction are.
This point can be illustrated by historical considerations. As I have 
explained, Aristotle suggested that zoological forms could be arranged on a 
hierarchical scale, which reflected the grades of perfection of living beings. The 
organizing schema of a single linear chain remained substantially identical in the 
following centuries although it was enriched of always new forms of living beings. 
When the evidence that the world is forever changing became overwhelming, it 
was thought that the static linear chain could be converted into a sort of biological 
escalator, leading from the lowest organisms to man. Lamarck thought that, due to 
the pressures of adaptation to changing environment, the scala naturae had to 
make room for a certain number of branches. In other words: he kept on using the 
taxonomic way of thinking although he changed his theories. Eventually, the 
theories that interpreted the schema of a single linear chain were refused and 
Darwin's theory triumphed. It was the hierarchical order based on continuous 
branching and no subsequent joining of branches erected by Linnaeus that was 
compatible with the theory of evolution. Linnaeus, as it were, had changed the 
organizing device behind the classification but, again, he had still relied on the 
taxonomic way of thinking. He proposed not a linear chain but a logical tree in 
which we can reach a species by making successive twofold divisions (vertebrate
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and invertebrate, mammals and non-mammals within the vertebrates, carnivores 
and non-carnivores within the mammals and so forth). This type of logical tree 
that represented Linneaus' new classification was not a novelty: it was familiar at 
least since Plato and Aristotle and Ray had already used it before Linnaeus (Gould 
2000a, p. 23). However Linnaeus had interpreted his classification in creationist 
terms. His way of grouping and ranking was neither true or false: it just happened 
to mirror the topology of evolutionary systems (Gould 2000a). It was his 
systematization that was wrong. Ultimately, while our systematizations can be 
refused, taxonomic thinking is inescapable: we have still to rely on it again and 
again when we want to know about the living world. It is in this sense that one 
can consider taxonomic thinking self-authenticating.
To summarize, to define the taxonomic way of thinking as a 'SoT' is 
appropriate because it satisfies all the characterizing properties of SoTs. The 
taxonomic style of thinking and doing has followed a specific trajectory: it 
'surfaced' in the writings of Western thinkers since Aristotle but it flourished only 
in Linnaeus' epoch, when a community of people that relied on certain standards 
of evidence came about.
3.6 Conclusions
There exist six ways of thinking and doing (SoTs) that share a set of common 
characterizing features. I have described two of them in the previous chapter, 
following some of Hacking's suggestions. In this chapter I have argued for the 
existence of other four SoTs by outlining their features. All the differences 
notwithstanding, striking parallels can be drawn between different SoTs: they
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emerged suddenly at certain points in time, crystallized around communities that 
shared certain standards of evidence and represent basic and inescapable forms of 
reasoning in the sense I have discussed above.
Chapter Four: The Theory of Styles of 
Thinking: Further Developments
4.1 Introduction
For the theory I am developing to be complete it is necessary to address three 
more issues. First of all, the characterization of scientific thought is still partial: in 
the next section I shall examine a few ways of thinking and explain that they differ 
from the SoTs I have presented. One of the upshots of my discussion will be that 
SoTs possess particular techniques of self-vindication that make them unique in 
the variety of ways of thinking. Secondly, up to now I have isolated single SoTs in 
scientific research in order to describe and analyse them. However, very rarely do 
SoTs operate in isolation: in section 4.3 I shall explain how they intertwine with 
one another in scientific research. Finally, in the last section I shall spell out the 
claim that a style-dependent sentence has no truth-value for a community that 
adopts a different SoT.
4.2 Spurious Styles of Thinking
According to my account in the previous sections, there is a set of ways of 
thinking and doing that share a few precise features, although they differ in 
questions, methods and trajectories of development. I have reserved the
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expression 'style of thinking', abbreviated to 'SoT', for these particular ways of 
thinking. I make no claim that they exhaust the set of all the SoTs, the actual ones 
or those that might come about in the future. I only claim that, should we exclude 
one of the SoTs I have presented, we would inevitably end up with a partial 
understanding of scientific thinking.
SoTs are distinct from other ways of thinking that do not possess all the 
characterizing properties and that, therefore, are spurious SoTs, as I shall call them 
— species of a different taxonomic category. Ever since Hacking introduced his 
notion, some scholars have argued that some particular ways of thinking should 
be counted as SoTs. I shall show that their conclusions are fallacious for reasons 
that differ case by case. However, the fact that those ways of thinking are spurious 
SoTs does not prevent some of them from having played a crucial role in the 
history of scientific thought.
4.2.1 Are Religions Styles of Thinking?
In the course of his argument for the thesis that 'Hacking has failed to make 
progress as far as criteria are concerned' (Kusch 2010, p. 170) Martin Kusch made 
the point that Christian-Catholic reasoning satisfies the characterizing properties 
of SoTs. For him this way of thinking introduces:
new types of objects (God and angels that I can directly experience), 
evidence (that God appears to me is prima facie evidence of his 
existence), sentences ('God told me that I should do his will from day 
to day in humility and poverty') modalities and possibilities (it is 
possible for God to be perceived by me) (Kusch 2010, p. 170).
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Furthermore, according to Kusch, Christian-Catholic thinking is self-vindicating 
for two different kinds of reasons. Firstly,
Theorists of mystical perception have developed techniques of self­
stabilisation. That God seems to talk to us is not good enough; for the 
experience to pass muster it must cause 'interior peace' rather than 
perturbation, trust in God rather than despair, or calm rather than 
impatience (Kusch 2010, p. 170).
Secondly,
The authority principle and the principle of infallibility of the Pope in 
fundamental theological questions are further stabilization techniques 
(Kusch 2010, p. 170).
Now, notice that in principle his argument could be extended to any 
religion. One could say that, in general, religious thinking 'introduces' a variety of 
'objects' (ghouls, ghosts, spirits), new truth-candidates ('God made the angels 
endowed with one, two, three and also four wings' (Koran 35:1)), new evidence 
(miracles, signs, states of mind), possibilities (it is possible for spirits to inhabit a 
wood); and possesses techniques of stabilization (e.g. the Koran proves the 
prophethood of Mahomet, then the Koran is the revelation of a prophet). 
However, that religions can be counted as SoTs is a result difficult to accept: the 
notion of SoT has been conceived to describe scientific ways of thinking and one
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would expect that not all the characterizing properties of SoTs are satisfied by 
non-scientific ways of thinking.
Hacking has never considered the problem of marking a difference between 
SoTs and ways of reasoning that are non-scientific. Before 2012, the only claim 
germane to this point he made is that what distinguishes scientific from non- 
scientific discourse is that there are no self-authenticating techniques for the larger 
part of morality and humanistic thought (Hacking 1996, p. 74). However he never 
substantiated this claim, which is unfounded in the case of religions in the light of 
Kusch's example: Christian-Catholic thought -  argues Kusch - does not belong to 
the scientific discourse and is self-authenticating. As I shall argue in the next 
subsection it is necessary to spell out what a self-authenticating technique is in 
order to highlight the difference between certain ways of thinking and the SoTs I 
have presented.
However, in 2012, two years after the publication of Kusch's paper Hacking 
made another claim (the characterizing feature 1) already mentioned) that, this 
time, does help to identify a difference between religious ways of thinking and 
genuine SoTs, as I am going to argue. He clarified that SoTs are 'w ays of finding 
out in the sciences', that is : ' finding out that "so and so'" and 'finding out w hat's 
true, and how to change things' (Hacking 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, by claiming 
that the emergence of SoTs is to be understood in an 'ecological w ay' he left no 
doubt about the fact that a SoT should not only be understood as a way of finding 
out but also as a way of altering our physical world in order to make it our 'hom e', 
in the Greek sense of the word 'ecological'. These suggestions can be summarized 
by saying that to adopt a certain SoT involves the use of our bodies for fulfilling
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one or more of these aims: to know why a given fact happens; to predict certain 
events; to find out how to elicit or describe a phenomenon; to reveal how facts, 
entities or phenomena are connected with one another.
Now, my point is that religious ways of thinking may well involve ways of doing 
but never for fulfilling the aims just mentioned. Indeed, compare the ways of 
doing of religions with those of the SoTs I have described. The monastic life 
certainly involves particular activities such as praying or introspecting. However, 
whether or not these activities can cause effects on our world, it is never the case 
that believers systematically act and intervene 'hands-on' in the world in order to 
reveal patterns of relations between facts or entities that appear prima facie 
unrelated or I order to predict certain facts. On the other hand, to think and act in 
the algorithmic SoT allows us to discriminate, compare or associate objects and 
events on the basis of their numerosity. Physicists use the visual resources 
involved in the postulational SoT in order to reveal the relations between different 
phenomena, e.g they use geometry to study the phenomena of light. Laboratory 
scientists build machines that induce certain effects in order to find out about the 
existence of theoretical entities, connect their properties with one another and 
predict their behaviour. Statisticians perform several actions, such as selecting 
random  samples of voters, in order to find out how the probability of the election 
of certain candidates are related to certain events. The taxonomists of the 
seventeenth century conducted field research in order to find out about the 
structure of divine thought: do different morphological types descend from a 
common ancestor? Finally, by hunting high and low for the traces of past-events,
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historical scientists build patterns of relations between different facts, as when they 
reconstruct the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens.
In brief, by thinking and doing, scientists reveal patterns of relations and give 
explanations of how and why natural phenomena occur. On the contrary, 
religions do not systematically intervene in the world in order to put in relation 
different physical phenomena; they are rather concerned about questions of 
ultimate meaning and moral value. My conclusion is that Kusch's paper does not 
take into due consideration a property of SoTs: that they are ways of doing in 
order to find out about phenomena. The wrong conclusion that, according to the 
claims of the SoTs project, religions should be counted as SoTs follows from 
having disregarded this fundamental property of SoTs deeply rooted in Hacking's 
philosophy of science.
4.2.2 Internal and External Techniques of Self-vindication
Hacking wrote that
[Ejach style has its own self-stabilizing techniques, but [...] some are 
more effective than others. [...] in the case of statistics there is an 
almost too-evident version of self-authentication (the use of 
probabilities to assess probabilities). But that is only part of the story, 
for I emphasize the material, institutional requirements for the stability 
of statistical reasoning (Hacking 1996, pp. 73-74).
This passage implies that there are different self-stabilizing techniques and that, 
for example, in the case of the statistical SoT, material and institutional factors
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contribute to the stability of a SoT. So Hacking seems to treat these very factors 
and the use of probabilities to assess probabilities alike: he counts both of them as 
'techniques of stabilization'. It seems to me that the two things (social factors and 
use of probabilities to assess probability) must be kept distinct. To take as an 
example the postulational SoT, one thing is to attribute its stability to the 
argumentative character of the Greek society and other historical and social 
circumstances, another thing is to explain its stability by noting that there is no 
way of assessing the demonstration of a theorem apart from that of using another 
demonstration (the use of proof to assess proof). In the first case, what provides 
stability to the postulational SoT is something external to its cognitive methods: 
social factors. In the second case, as for other SoTs I have described so far, to be 
self-authenticating means that the postulational SoT does not answer to any 
external canon of truth independent of itself: the truth of a proposition whose 
sense hinges on the postulational SoT can only be assessed by using that very SoT. 
This very fact makes the postulational SoT immune to refutation and therefore 
stable, as Hacking says. Ultimately, in the first case the techniques are external to 
the SoT, in the second they are intrinsic to the SoT.
I shall distinguish 'internal techniques of self-vindication' from 'external 
techniques of self-vindication'. An internal technique refers to cases in which 
stability is provided by the characteristics of the way of thinking itself, which is 
self-reinforcing: in order to assess what has been found out by using a certain form 
of reasoning (e.g. abduction for the historico-genetic SoT, deduction for the 
postulational SoT, computation for the algorithmic SoT) one has to use that very 
form of reasoning. SoTs are inescapable, e.g., it is not possible to say that counting
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is a 'w rong' method of thinking and doing on which the algorithmic SoT relies: we 
can only assess a calculation by using another kind of calculation. On the other 
hand, an external technique refers to cases in which social, cultural and historical 
factors make a SoT stable. As I have argued in the previous chapter, all the SoTs I 
have described possess internal self-vindication techniques in addition to external: 
both internal and external techniques concur to giving stability to a given SoT. 
Hacking wrote:
The apparent circularity in the self-authenticating styles [SoTs] is to be 
welcomed. It helps explain why, although styles may evolve or be 
abandoned, they are curiously immune to anything akin to refutation 
(Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 192).
I would correct this passage by making it more precise: as SoTs possess internal 
techniques of self-vindication they are immune to refutation; its style-dependent 
sentences cannot be refuted, neither in principle nor in fact. Of course, SoTs might 
be abandoned should we find better ways of knowing or should we stop craving for 
knowledge, a circumstance impossible to imagine. Conversely, if a way of 
thinking possesses only external techniques of self-stabilization in principle it could 
be refuted, e.g. when the social context changes. I am not saying that this has to 
happen; I am saying that whereas a given SoT cannot be assessed by other SoTs, in 
principle it would be possible to use one or more SoTs to assess a way of thinking 
that does not possess internal techniques of self-vindication. For example, it w ould 
be possible to use the SoTs I have presented to assess other ways of thinking, but it 
would be impossible to assess the postulational SoT by another SoT.
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The styles project as formulated by Hacking does not provide an answer to 
the question as to why SoTs have endured. I suggest that a possible answer is that 
as they rely on internal techniques of self-vindication they can never be refuted (I 
will say more about this issue in section 9.3). The examples I am going to give in 
the next subsections will clarify the points of this subsection (see also my parallel 
between Wittgenstein and Hacking in chapter eight).
4.2.3 A Scholastic-inquisitorial Style of Thinking?
Barry Allen argued that the reasoning of the inquisitors of the early modern 
period (1490-1690) possesses the features of a SoT (Allen 1993). When examining 
cases of witchcraft, two works were often consulted: the Malleus Maleficarum by 
Heinrich Kramer (1430-1505) and James Sprenger (1436-1495), admired 
theologians and Dominican inquisitors, and the Daemonolatria by Nicolas Remy 
(1530-1616), a secular magistrate who condemned nine hundred witches. For 
Allen, both these works proposed a debate about the existence of witches (the 
'new  objects'), contain candidates for truth or falsehood ('children can be 
generated by incubi and succubi' or 'witches are more common than in the past') 
(Allen 1993, p. 115). Furthermore, according to Allen, the reasoning of 
demonologists is self-authenticating because of their attitude towards textual 
authority: 'each writer cited his predecessors and became an authority worthy of 
citation'(Allen 1993, p. 112). Lastly, inquisitorial reasoning involves a new kind of 
evidence: confessions under torture, special signs in the body, taciturnity, and 
incapacity to recite the Lord's Prayer (Allen 1993, p. 111). Allen concluded that the 
men who persecuted witches were not misogynistic monks with narrow minds
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but secular magistrates and highly educated lawyers who 'shared a style of 
reasoning [(SoT)] which was [...] productive of reasoned discourse and 
knowledge' (Allen 1993, p. 105). He called this way of thinking 'scholastic- 
inquisitorial'.
Notice that the attitude of appealing to the authority of predecessors, which 
provides stability of the scholastic-inquisitorial way of thinking, is an external 
technique of self-vindication. By no means can this technique of self-vindication be 
comparable to that of SoTs: whereas the propositions of Malleus Meleficarum could 
well be assessed now by, e.g., the laboratory SoT, which would reject its kind of 
evidence, SoTs are immune to refutation just because they possess an internal 
technique of self-vindication. Attributions of witchery might be mutually 
supporting but, as it is possible in principle to use another SoT, e.g. the laboratory 
SoT, to assess them, it cannot be said that the scholastic-inquisitorial way of 
thinking possesses internal techniques of self-authentication. As I have said, 
Hacking is reluctant to state rules. However, it is important to note that if  one 
requires that any SoT must possess internal self-stabilization techniques then 
Allen's candidate is not a SoT. For sure, its techniques of self-vindication make it 
dissimilar to the SoTs I have presented.
Another obvious difference between Allen's candidate and SoTs is that 
there is no relevant sense in which the former can be considered a way of finding 
out: demonologists used methods such as torture, interrogation and physical 
inspection in order to assess whether a person was a minion of Satan. These 
methods have a very narrow range of application: they only help to find out 
whether or not innocent human beings are witches.
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4.2.4 The Chemists' Way of Thinking
Bernardette Bensaude-Vincent argued that both Crombie and Hacking wrongly 
located the emergence of laboratory style in Boyle's air pum p (Bensaude-Vincent 
2009). Indeed, in their History of Chemistry (Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers 1996) 
Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers had explained that the laboratory as a physical 
place was invented by the alchemists and then was adopted first by the chemists 
and only afterwards by the physicists. Chemists had to fight to secure the identity 
of chemistry against other scientists, until it became an autonomous discipline. 
The conquest of this autonomy, they argue, was determined by the combined and 
changing action of three factors: professions, institutions and techniques of 
laboratory. For example, for Bensaude-Vincent the laboratory of chemistry must 
be conceived as distinct from the laboratory of physics (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, p. 
370).
In Bensaude-Vincent's view the chemists' way of thinking possesses all the 
characterizing properties of SoTs. For example, she noted that by altering materials 
chemists have been able to know the features of the substances. For her, chemistry 
is a way of knowing by making — only through technological processes are the 
features of the chemical elements revealed. She also considered the chemical 
atoms introduced by John Dalton (1766-1844) as the epitome of the 'new objects' 
introduced by chemists' style and the chemical formulas as a perfect example of 
'new  candidates for truth and falsehood'.
Hacking replied that 'the chemical laboratory is different from, and older 
than, the physical laboratory' and that it is better not to multiply the number of
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styles in Crombie's list beyond necessity, 'and instead to see the invention of the 
laboratory as making experimental exploration more 'systematic', to use Kant's 
word' (Hacking 2012, p. 6). That is: Hacking proposed to exclude Bensaude- 
Vincent's candidate on the ground that it was with the physical laboratory that 
experimental practice raised to the rank of science.
As I interpret Bensaude-Vincent, different reasons explain why, despite 'all 
sorts of enterprises of reduction or refutation throughout their history, chemistry 
remain[ed] nevertheless relatively stable'(Bensaude-Vincent 2009, p. 376). Firstly, 
there is what I have called external techniques of self-stability: the combined role of 
institution and professions. Secondly, Bensaude-Vincent maintained that 
'[chemists] do not claim to provide a causal explanation, and their theory is closer 
to being a narrative than a fundamental explanation' (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, p. 
372). For her chemists' practice is a sort of 'cookery' that does not involve theory 
books but recipes for manipulating substances in laboratory or mnemonic rules for 
dealing with chemical formulas (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, p. 371). Rather than 
representing the real world, chemical formulas are useful fictions to be 
manipulated in order to predict and characterize compounds. For Bensaude- 
Vincent there is no real effort for unveiling a deeper structure of the world: 
chemists mainly want to understand the principles behind particular classes of 
reactions, the changes undergone by matter under certain processes, the structure 
and the properties of certain compounds.
It is not clear whether by likening chemistry to cookery Bensaude-Vincent 
wanted to suggest that chemistry is self-authenticating. At any rate, on the basis of 
her claims it would be possible to argue for this thesis by noting that a chemical
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formula is correct because it follows certain rules, which are not really discussed 
and questioned by the chemists. For example, the reduction-oxidation reactions 
are worked out in reference to 'rules' imposed by the conservation of charge and 
mass. Chemists simply need to apply definite procedures in which only certain 
possible oxidation states of the elements are possible. And how can they double­
check the correctness of a reduction-oxidation reduction? By looking at other 
chemical reactions in which it is found that a given element does get the same 
oxidation state number as in the reaction under study. In other words, the 
conclusion of the argument would be that chemistry could be thought as a set of 
procedures that are self-reinforcing. That is, according to this argument, chemistry 
would possess an internal self-authenticating technique (and therefore it would be 
comparable to other SoTs).
If this is the essence of Bensaude-Vincent's point, it might be prone to the 
following objection. Suppose that a very large part of chemistry had been reduced 
to physics in the original sense of Ernst Nagel (1901-1985): a secondary science can 
be reduced to a primary science when the laws and theories of the secondary 
science are a logical consequence of those of the primary science (condition of 
derivability) and when the terms of the secondary science can be redefined in 
terms of the primary science (condition of connectability) (Nagel 1961, p. 336-397). 
Roughly speaking, that a science is reduced to another means that a set of 
propositions is derived from another set. In that case, there would be a sharp 
difference between the chemical way of thinking and the SoTs I have presented. 
Compare the postulational SoT with the chemical thinking. The former is 
somehow irreducible in the sense that the truth-value of the propositions of
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geometry hinges on the very postulational SoT: only demonstration can be used to 
check another demonstration. Conversely, in the hypotheses of reducibility, the 
propositions of chemistry would depend on those of physics and therefore the 
chemists' style would not be really autonomous from the Laboratory SoT. 
Otherwise stated, although chemistry is stable and autonomous as a discipline, its 
propositions would have an external justification -  and therefore the chemical way 
of thinking would not be self-authenticating. In parenthesis, notice the difference 
between the chemists' way of thinking and the historico-genetic SoT: as I have 
already argued, the latter has an internal self-stabilizing technique, and indeed 
biology, palaeontology and geology cannot be reduced to physics.
In conclusion, if chemistry can be reduced to physics it does not possess 
internal self-stabilizing techniques. Though, it must be said that it is still a res 
controversa whether or not chemistry can be reduced to physics. For different 
reasons Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend were critics of reduction, while Paul Dirac 
thought that the difficulty of reducing chemistry to physics was only technical 
(cited in Scerri 1994, p. 162). Today it is widely recognized that the valence of an 
element can be calculated and explained by putting it in relation with the number 
of electrons in the outer orbit of atoms. However, according to Roald Hoffmann 
there are still in chemistry concepts such as PH or reactivity that resist 
reductionism (Hoffmann 1995). More recently the philosopher of chemistry E.R. 
Scerri argued that the hope of any strict or exact reduction has been abandoned 
and that all that remains is the possibility of approximate reduction, a notion still 
vague because no criteria have been pu t forward (Scerri 1994, p. 168).
Ultimately, the chemical way of thinking has played a fundam ental role in
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the history of science and it is still crucial in many areas of scientific research. 
Since whether or not it is reducible to physics is a question for determination it is 
impossible to conclude that it satisfies all the characterizing properties: it might 
not possess internal techniques of self-vindication. We can only conjecture that if 
chemistry is in principle reducible to physics the chemists' mechanisms of 
reasoning are not so basic, fundamental, and inescapable as those of the SoTs I 
have presented.
4.2.5 The Astrological Way of Thinking
As we have seen in section 2.2, Hacking presented a sentence of Paracelsus as an 
example of style-dependent proposition. For him the way Paracelsus reasoned is 
entirely different from ours and exemplifies a 'Northern European Renaissance 
tradition of a bundle of hermetic interests: medicine, physiology, alchemy, herbals, 
astrology, divination' (Hacking 1983b, p. 70-71). I shall briefly discuss here only 
the astrological way of thinking, as similar points can be made about alchemy and 
divination.
Ancient peoples such as the Babylonians practised astrology and believed 
that many aspects of the skies had some importance in divination. However, it 
was with the conquests of Alexander the Great that astrology crystallized out of 
an amalgam of Babylonian, Greek and Egyptian elements. I shall focus on its 
elementary grammar, although astrology has greatly evolved beyond his apparent 
roots in Babylonian culture becoming a variegated group of doctrines.
To put it simply, astrological thinking is purely deductive: to think in the
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astrological way amounts to drawing some consequences from precise facts in the 
skies according to certain rules. For example:
When Venus appears in Dilgan (Virgo), rains in heaven, floods on [earth] the crops of 
Aharru will prosper.
a sentence from a collection Assyrian omens called 'Enuma Anu EnliT (Bobrick 
2005, p. 16).
However, the astrological way of thinking is more accurately described by 
three steps. The first step is an assumption: it is postulated that celestial bodies 
have an influence upon human affairs. To all intent and purposes, this is the 
postulate of astrology: 'astrology extrapolates factual influences by postulating that 
the positions of the Sun, Moon and 8 planets other than Earth with respect to the 
sky background, as well as with respect to each other, influence terrestrial events 
and hum an psychology and destiny' (Zarka 2011, p. 420). I shall call this postulate 
'the astrological correspondence principle' in that it is a principle that establishes a 
correspondence between mundane facts and cosmos. The second step consists of 
casting a horoscope, which is a map of the positions of Sun, Moon and 8 planets 
drawn for a particular moment of time and read according to established rules. In 
many traditions this map is round: the circle is divided in twelve sectors, which 
are called the 'houses'; in the outer portion are drawn the signs of Zodiac, that is, 
twelve stations or 'signs' along the ecliptic, the apparent path of the Sun around 
the earth. Once the astrologer knows the date of birth, time and place of someone, 
he can draw up a horoscope. First, he calculates the ascendant; the point where the 
ecliptic intersects the horizon in the east at the place of birth; from that point, he
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draws the twelve sectors (houses) of the circle. Then he writes the signs along the 
round and, consulting an ephemeris, marks the location of the sun, moon and 
planets and their relative angles for that particular date and time. The third step 
consists of interpreting the horoscope, that is of drawing certain conclusions 
according to the rules of a certain tradition of astrology.
'Houses', 'signs', 'zodiac', and other conventions and reference frames can 
be considered the 'new objects' introduced by the astrological way of thinking. 
The horoscope represents a form of evidence for the believers in astrology: an 
astrologer will consider each of the possible relative angles between pairs of 
planets (i.e. Conjunction (0°), Opposition (180°), Square (90°), Trine (120°)), or how 
much an angle made by two points differs from the exactness, as evidence of the 
truth of certain sentences.
I think that two different external techniques of self-vindication made the 
astrological way of thinking endure. First of all, institutions, authorities and mass 
media have always been consistently woven into the discourse of astrology and 
astrologers cite their predecessors as authorities: the Tetrabiblos, Ptolemy's treatise 
on astrology, was considered the most authoritative astrological work of antiquity 
not only in the Medieval Latin West but also in the Islamic world. Finally there is 
the astrological correspondence principle, which is never questioned. Its role can 
be likened to the infallibility of Pope in Christian-Catholic reasoning.
The astrological way of thinking does not belong to the same taxonomic 
category as the SoTs. Indeed, it does not possess internal techniques of self­
vindication because the astrological correspondence principle as well as sentences 
such as
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His condition quickly worsened because of the rapid motion of the moon (found in 
Bobrick 2005, p. 137),
(written by the mathematician Gerolamo Cardano (1501-1576) in 1553) are 
obviously not potentially immune to refutation. The astrological thinking is not 
inescapable: one can reason in a different way to show that it is not a valid form of 
reasoning. But one cannot reason in a different way from the algorithmic SoT to 
show that a calculation is wrong or in a different way from the historico-genetic 
SoT to show that there is a better explanation for the extinction of dinosaurs.
It is also possible to argue that the astrological way of thinking is not a SoT 
by noting that the evidence for any astrological claim is provided through the 
horoscope by the positions of planets. No further investigations are carried out in 
order to know whether or not the positions of the planets exert an influence upon 
terrestrial events. This point lies behind Kuhn complain that 'astrology has rules 
to apply but no puzzles to solve and therefore no science to practice' (Kuhn 1970, 
pp. 8-9) and Feyerabend's claim that '[astrology does not] attem pt to proceed into 
new domains and to enlarge our knowledge of extra-terrestrial influence' 
(Feyerabend 1978, p. 96). Therefore, the astrological way of thinking is a spurious 
SoT: it cannot be likened to the SoTs I have presented because it is much interested 
in making predictions and very little in finding out why and how.
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4.3 Styles of Thinking in Action
Let us now pu t aside the spurious SoTs. I now want to make it clear that 
sometimes the same scientific problem has been tackled in two distinct ways 
based on different SoTs. Consider this example. In the third century BCE, the Greek 
astronomer Aristarchus of Samos calculated the distances of the Sun and the 
Moon from the Earth in units of the Earth's radius. His style of thinking was 
postulational: Len Berggren and Nathan Sidoli liken his treatise On the Sizes and 
Distances of the Sun and the Moon to mathematical texts of the early Hellenistic 
period, such as Euclid's works (Berggren and Sidoli 2007). In fact, in order to work 
out the distance of the Moon and Sun, Aristarchus drew geometric diagrams of 
the Earth's, the Sun's and the Moon's respective positions during a half moon and 
a lunar eclipse, made few observations, formulated geometrical and 
computational hypotheses, used known geometrical theorems and finally derived 
the distance of these celestial bodies (Berggren and Sidoli 2007, p. 215). However, 
in principle, the distance to the Moon can also be determined by adopting the 
laboratory SoT through these steps: determination of acceleration g  by measuring 
the period of a simple pendulum; measurement of the sidereal period of the 
Moon; calculation of the Earth's radius by measuring the gravitational constant G 
and applying the law of universal gravitation; finally, by equating the force 
between the Moon and the Earth to the Moon's centripetal force, the distance to 
the Moon can be expressed and calculated in terms of the acceleration g, the 
sidereal period of the Moon and the Earth's radius. In the case of Aristarchus the 
result is obtained by thinking in a postulational way: no laboratory thinking is
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involved, although Aristarchus had to make a few astronomical observations. In 
the second case, the laboratory thinking is necessary to reason in terms of physical 
laws and experimental apparatuses.
4.3.1 The Accumulation of Styles of Thinking
Another point to note is that the project of SoTs implies that 'styles of scientific 
reasoning [SoTs] tend to accumulate' (Hacking 1983b, p. 56). Unlike Kuhn's 
paradigms, SoTs do not replace one another. As SoTs have emerged they have 
often been adopted together in order to solve single scientific problems: the 
algorithmic, the postulational, the statistical, the historico-genetic, the taxonomic, 
and the laboratory SoTs are not mutually exclusive. Today scientists switch from 
the ways of thinking and doing, the methods, the objects, the type of evidence of a 
SoT to another while they do scientific research. Algorithms, hypothetic deductive 
methods, distributions, inferences to the best explanation, taxonomies, analogical 
models and measurements as well as distinct ways of thinking and doing, take 
your pick: whatever scientific problem one considers, one can recognize the 
features of different SoTs.
The simplest example of simultaneous use of different SoTs that can be 
given has to do with the use of vectors to represent physical magnitudes such as 
forces and velocities. As vectors are often represented in the three-dimensional 
space as arrow-like objects, which can be multiplied by real numbers or added 
together, the simple rules that define their use rely on the postulational SoT. 
Therefore, we can expect that in many problems of physics both the postulational 
SoT and the laboratory SoT play a crucial role. Consider for example three positive
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charges Q l, Q2 and Q3 arranged in a right triangle ABC. Suppose that one has to 
determine the force on Q2 on the point B, the vertex of the right angle. The 
solution of this problem is worked out by summing up two vectors: that one that 
represents the Coulomb force exerted by Q l and that pushes Q2 away from it, and 
that one that represents the Coulomb force exerted by Q3 and that pushes Q2 
away from it. By applying Pythagoras' theorem to the triangle formed by the two 
force vectors on Q2 and by their sum it is possible to calculate the magnitude of 
the resultant force on Q2. In principle, three SoTs, the laboratory, the postulational 
and the algorithmic one, are necessary for working out the result. First of all, 
thinking and doing in the laboratory SoT is necessary to put forward and test the 
Coulomb law; secondly, thinking and doing in the postulational SoT is necessary 
to represent the forces in a plane and apply geometrical considerations: finally, the 
algorithmic SoT is necessary to perform multiplications and divisions and obtain a 
number, the magnitude of the force.
4.4 Truth-value, intelligibility, pure nonsense
In order to arrive at a complete theory of SoTs I want to address a last question 
concerning the semantics of sentences whose truth-value hinges on their SoT 
(style-dependent sentences). I shall elaborate on the claim that members of a 
community cannot make sense of a style-dependent sentence uttered by another 
community that adopts a different SoT. More precisely, I shall define and examine
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the type of intelligibility that can be achieved for different kinds of sentences by 
communities that adopt different SoTs.
True-or-false sentences are sentences that express true-or-false propositions. 
Henceforth, as I have done so far, I shall use the term 'sentence' rather than terms 
such as 'propositions', 'statements' or whatever the logicians use in order to 
designate assertive acts of thought: I want to call attention to the fact that I am 
referring to grammatically correct strings of words that come to be uttered by 
members of certain communities of people at specific points in time.
Suppose that a SoT crystallizes around a community of people. Its members 
will communicate to each other by expressing style-dependent and style- 
independent sentences. In that case, they will have three kinds of intentions: to 
utter those sentences, to confer meaning to them and to communicate them. The 
first intention is satisfied by using parts of the body to produce a sound; the 
second intention by expressing the sentences correctly and imposing truth- 
conditions on them. Once these two conditions are satisfied, a hearer could in 
principle recognize them and understand the sentence so to satisfy the third 
intention of the speaker. Ultimately, putting aside the intention of uttering the 
sentence, the hearer m ust recognize the speaker's intention of 1) formulating the 
sentence correctly, i.e. according to the rules of the language and of 2) providing 
truth-conditions for that sentence. Points 1) and 2) express two different concepts: 
point 1) concerns the correct syntactical arrangement of the words that, by their 
meaning, will determine the sentence meaning, that is, the conventional m eaning of 
the sentence; point 2) concerns the speaker meaning, that is, w hat the speaker means 
by expressing the sentence. This distinction between these two concepts has been
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brought to the fore by the philosopher Paul Grice (1913-1988): the notion of 
meaning involved when someone says that a sentence (or a word) means so-and-so is 
to be distinguished from the notion involved when someone says that by saying 
such-and-such she means so-and-so (Grice 1968).
To give an example, if the sentence were 'the dog is barking', the hearer 
could recognize the intention of expressing a sentence correctly in English so to 
attribute to it a conventional meaning. Then, recognized this intention, the hearer 
could also recognize the second intention of providing truth-conditions: the 
sentence is true if, as a matter of fact, the dog is barking. Such being the case, the 
hearer could grasp the meaning of the sentence and the speaker could succeed in 
communicating it.
Now, for the argument's sake, I shall imagine different cases in which 
speaker and hearer belong to different communities, even separated in time.
If the hearer does not belong to the community that adopts the same SoT of the 
speaker the message conveyed from the latter may not get through. Take for 
example, this sentence in Middle English:
I ne have heer a fruyte
If the hearer (or the reader) belonged to the community of the Renaissance 
alchemists, she might not be able to recognize some words of that sentence and 
their syntactical arrangement -  the conventional meaning of the sentence would 
be obscure. However, the hearer could investigate about the meanings of the 
words and the grammar rules employed by the modern scientists. She would find 
out that the translation is:
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I do not have here a fruit
This sentence would not only have a conventional meaning but also a truth-value 
straightforwardly recognizable by the hearer — its conditions of truth do not differ 
from the conditions of truth she employs in her SoT. In other words, after 
investigation, the hearer would be able to recognize that:
1) the sentence T ne have heer a fruyte' means 'I do not have a fruit (sentence 
meaning)
2) by saying 'I ne have heer a fruyte' the speaker means that her sentence is true if and 
only if the speaker does not have a fruit (speaker meaning).
In these examples above, once the hearer finds out the 'sentence meaning' 
by virtue of the correct translation of the sentence, she has a straightforward 
access to the speaker meaning. However this is not always the case. Take for 
example, this passage of Paracelsus:
The Adamant is a black crystal called Adamant or else Evax on account 
of the joy which it is effectual in impressing on those who carry it. It is 
of an obscure and transparent blackness, the colour of iron. It is the 
hardest of all; but is dissolved in the blood of a goat (Paracelsus 2007,
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Suppose that the hearer belongs to a community of the Eighteenth century that 
adopts the statistical SoT. She would not find it difficult to recognize the correct 
arrangement of the words and therefore the conventional meaning, but that would 
not be of much help -  the access to the speaker's meaning would not be 
straightforward anymore. To the hearer it would not be clear whether or not the 
speaker wants to attribute truth-conditions to that sentence and which ones they 
could be. The historical discontinuity between the way of thinking of the 
Renaissance thinkers and the statistical SoT has not really turned words such as 
'black, 'transparent', 'goat' into something else; but it has concealed from sight the 
conditions of truth given by the speaker. The hearer might want to ask how 
Paracelsus' sentences could be proven true or false; or, alternatively, she might 
decide that no condition of truth has been attributed to it and that the sentence has 
to be deemed nonsensical.
If the hearer opted for the former alternative she would need to investigate 
about the truth-value of the sentences in the passage. She could find out that 'the 
body of the Emerald is derived from a kind of petrine Mercury' and that 'it 
receives from the same its colour, coagulated with spirit of Salt' (Paracelsus 2007, 
p. 90), but still struggle to understand the passage above. She could then turn to a 
study of the system of relations of similarity or equivalence between things 
posited by the Renaissance thinkers and become aware of the existence of criteria 
that provide a justification for sentences such as Paracelsus'. She could also learn 
that metals have virtues and essences and that planets sign metals, understand 
why crystals can be black and dissolve in animals' blood, acquire skills in 
following the logic chain of Paracelsus' reasoning. But still she would need an
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awareness of the ways of doing that enable one to bring to light the signs and the 
virtues or an awareness of the laws that connect them with other signs and lead 
the speaker to certain conclusions.
All these circumstances, from the belief in analogies and sympathies 
between heavenly bodies and earthly things to Paracelsus' chain of reasoning, 
from his criteria of evidence to his way of doing constitute presuppositions that 
were unknown to the hearer. As it is against these presuppositions that 
Paracelsus' sentence acquires a truth-value for the Renaissance community of 
thinkers, the hearer would need to be aware of them in order to be able to 
attribute to the speaker the intention of conveying a message. In other words, only 
when the hearer has gained an insight into all those presuppositions can she 
recognize the intentions of the speaker, that is, can she recognize that the speaker 
has imposed conditions of truth on the sentence. When this is the case, the 
sentence becomes intelligible: by this term I mean that the hearer can recognize 
both the conventional meaning and the conditions of truth of the sentence — how 
it would be validated in a cognitive frame different from her own.
By the same token, one can consider the following style-dependent sentence 
in the postulational SoT:
In any triangle the sum of any two sides is greater than the remaining 
one (Euclid, Book I, prop. 20)
Suppose that this sentence were translated from the Greek spoken by Euclid in 
around 300 BC into Archaic Egyptian. Although, one can imagine, the translated 
sentence would have a conventional meaning because of the correct syntactical
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arrangement of the words, its truth-value, imposed by Euclid, would be concealed 
from a hypothetical ancient Egyptian/Indeed, according to the theory of SoTs, it 
was only with the abrupt emergence of the postulational style that the methods of 
reasoning and standards of evidence necessary for validating that sentence came 
about. An ancient Egyptian would find it impossible to examine any triangle and 
establish that the sum of two sides is greater than the remaining one. In order to 
recognize the intention of imposing a truth-value to that sentence an ancient 
Egyptian would need to come to see the presuppositions necessary to validate the 
sentence: among them, the existence of the postulational method and the different 
steps of the postulational way of thinking. This point is better expressed in terms 
of a verificationist account of meaning: whether or not Euclid's sentence above is a 
candidate for truth or falsehood for a community of people depends on whether 
or not that community possesses the methods necessary to assess the truth of the 
sentence. Since the ancient Egyptians did not know the methods of postulational 
SoT they could not assess Euclid's sentence. It is in this sense that this sentence 
would not have been meaningful for an ancient Egyptian. Notice that whereas we 
cannot understand what Paracelsus was saying, an Egyptian would arguably have 
understood Euclid's sentence, although she would not have had the tools to verify 
it. To conclude, only when the hearer comes to see the presuppositions of the 
postulational SoT, and in particular its methods, does Euclid's sentence above 
become intelligible to her. It is also important to note that the hearer would need 
to know the kind of questions at the root of the Greek inquiries. The questions 
asked by the Greeks were radically different from those asked by the ancient 
Egyptians: the latter asked questions about single geometrical figures; the former
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were interested in underlying principles beside practical problems. Ultimately, the 
hearer cannot recognize the speaker's meaning without being aware of another 
kind of presupposition: the kind of questions that were at the root of the 
postulational SoT.
4.4.1 Questions and Candidates for Truth or Falsehood
The points I have just made can be developed by considering what the 
philosopher Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943) wrote in the fifth and seventh 
chapters of his autobiography:
You cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken 
or written statements [...]. In order to find out his meaning you must 
also know what the question was [...] to which the thing he has said or 
written was meant as an answer (Collingwood 1979 [1939], p. 31)
According to Collingwood, truth and falsehood do not belong to sentences in their 
own right but to the sentences as answers to questions. In this sense, w hat the 
ancient Egyptian would lack is to have a bearing on the kinds of abstract questions 
that are asked in the community of Euclid.
Questions about the first principles were not 'real' for the ancient Egyptian 
society, to use a term introduced by the philosopher Nicholas Jardine in his book 
The Scenes of Inquiry (1991). For Jardine, a question is real in a community if there is 
a disposition to acknowledge the relevance of evidential considerations to that 
question. Evidential considerations are considerations that are potentially evident 
under appropriate circumstances: for example, they might be empirical but also
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theological, aesthetic or self-evident. A consideration is relevant just in case it is 
taken by the community to favour an answer to the question over the others 
(Jardine 1991, chapter 3). For example, for Jardine a question that is not real in any 
community is:
Why is there something rather than nothing? (Jardine 1991, p.56)
On the other hand, he gives examples of questions that were real only in a 
given community:
Is the organic the image of the planet? (Jardine 1991, p. 56)
This is a question that the naturalist Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) addressed himself 
when he set out on his classificatory enterprise. Oken's aim was to rethink the 
natural history by following the programme of Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854), 
who thought that nature realizes an 'original ideal' through the entire sequence of 
types of organization. There is no consideration that one can take in order to argue 
for a possible answer. By the same token, from Hacking's account it follows that 
Euclid's question about the entire class of prisms would be unreal for an ancient 
Egyptian: there is no consideration that she could have taken to answer questions 
about the properties of entire classes of geometrical figures.
In The Social Construction of What? (Hacking 1999b) Hacking espoused Jardine's 
ideas: '[Jardine] shows, by means of compelling historical examples, how 
questions that make sense in one scientific framework are unintelligible in 
another' (Hacking 1999b, p. 165). Moreover, Jardine gave examples of sentences to
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which the comments I have made in the case of Paracelsus' sentence apply. For 
example, he quoted Oken's sentences such as:
The nose is the thorax repeated in the head grown (Jardine 1991, p. 64)
The organic must be a vesicle because it is the image of the planet 
(Jardine 1991, p. 51)
Jardine explained that much of the rationale necessary to understand those 
sentences is not explicit in Oken's work. A m odern reader would need to put 
Oken in the context of Schelling's views and then learn how the latter explained 
the relations between different forms of living beings in the light of an interplay of 
natural forces. Only then would Oken's ways of defending his claims come to 
light and the sentences above become intelligible.
4.4.2 Intelligibility versus Understanding
Both Hacking and Jardine use the term 'intelligibility' rather than other terms such 
as understanding. I think that this choice deserves a close examination. When the 
hearer comes to see the presuppositions of another community that has a different 
SoT she can recognize the truth-values imposed by the speaker. However, those 
presuppositions are not shared by her community, are not her presuppositions. As 
a consequence, (in Hacking's terminology) the style-dependent sentences of a 
different SoT have no truth-value, although they are in principle intelligible. Or, 
alternatively, in Jardine's terminology, one may say that the questions of different
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cognitive standpoints can become intelligible, yet they remain unreal. So, what 
should we reserve the term 'understanding' for? Suppose that a speaker uttered 
Herschel's sentence
The heat which has the refrangibility of the red rays is occasioned by the light of those 
rays
Hacking claims that, if the hearer were Archimedes, he would not be able to 
assign a truth-value to this sentence, even if she had learned Herschel's physics 
from the ground up. However, not any hearer who belongs to a community that 
has the laboratory SoT would grasp the meaning of this sentence 
straightforwardly. Yet, any hearer in the SoT of the Laboratory, the same as 
Herschel's, could well understand the sentence, provided that she has learned some 
rudiments of physics. Indeed, she does not need to perform any hermeneutic work 
in order to come to see presuppositions such as questions, methods, and standards 
of truth: these presuppositions are peculiar of her community and are 'real' for 
her- and I have used the verb 'to understand' to underline this very circumstance. 
To be clearer, understanding does not require an effort for gaining an insight into 
the presuppositions of a different SoT. Whereas Archimedes can only achieve 
intelligibility, any member of the SoT of the Laboratory can achieve understanding 
of Herschel's sentence.
It is important to bear in mind that, for us, understanding is in principle 
possible for all the style-dependent sentences of the six SoTs that I have presented 
in chapter two and three. Indeed, as I have explained, they have emerged and still
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endure. That is to say that the presuppositions of those six SoTs, i.e. their criteria 
of evidence, methods, ways of reasoning and questions, are our presuppositions. 
In his Representing and Intervening, Hacking wrote:
There is no way to match what Paracelsus wanted to say against 
anything we want to say [...] we cannot assert or deny what is being 
said (Hacking 1983b, p. 71)
What Hacking means can be interpreted in the light of my discussion so far: 
Paracelsus' sentences only 'live' in his community, that is, only when there exist 
the presuppositions by which they can be validated. By virtue of a hermeneutic 
attitude Paracelsus' sentences do become intelligible in our community but, if we 
want to use them in order to argue, think and do we need to give up our own 
SoTs, i.e. our presuppositions: either we become members of Paracelsus' 
community or we cannot say what we w ant to say by using Paracelsus' sentences.
By the same token, it is not possible, for example, to defend a style- 
dependent sentence of the statistical SoT without relying on its presuppositions, 
e.g. the evidence of things and, say, the way of selecting a sample or dealing with 
errors. In other words, if a sentence such as
The adult height for one sex in an ethnic group follows a normal distribution (section 2.2)
has to be used to express claims of knowledge it cannot be separated from the 
presuppositions of the statistical SoT by which it can be validated. This claim 
implicitly relies on a verificationist thesis: the sentence is not meaningful for a
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community that has no methods to assess its truth. The methods and criteria of 
evidence of, say, the taxonomic SoT cannot validate the sentence above -  either we 
switch from the taxonomic SoT to the statistical SoT or we are not able to make use 
of the sentence in order to know and find out.
4.4.3 Projectibility
This point can be expressed in a different way. One of Kuhn's ideas was that after 
a change in paradigm scientists 'live' or 'work' -  he used both of these verbs -  in a 
different world. In his paper Working in a New World (1993) Hacking used the term 
'projectible' (introduced by the philosopher Nelson Goodman (1906-1998)) to 
restate Kuhn's thesis of untranslatability between different paradigms. He made it 
clear that the scientific terms of an earlier paradigm might well be intelligible to 
the members of the new paradigm, but the latter could no longer use these terms 
projectibly. By this term he means:
a class of terms is [projectible when it is] used by a community for 
making law-like statements, forming general conjectures, picking and 
making things with expectations about what they will do and how they 
will work (Hacking 1993b, p. 295).
For Hacking scientific names refer to scientific kinds in use by a paradigm and the 
notion of projectibility express their untranslatability into those of another 
paradigm. By analogy with Hacking's use of the term 'projectible' I say that style- 
dependent sentences are not projectible: they cannot be used to work and think in
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a different SoT. Very importantly, while scientific terms are not projectible because 
of an issue of untranslatability between paradigms that use different scientific 
kinds, style-dependent sentences are not projectible because of a difference in 
presuppositions between different SoTs. A style-dependent sentence is not 
projectible into a different SoT because it needs the presuppositions of its own SoT 
to be meaningful: it would be impossible to form conjectures, think and know. 
Although in the case of Kuhn, projectibility is referred to untranslatability, 
Hacking's use of the term 'projectible' for scientific terms is compatible with my 
extension to style-dependent sentences:
To call a term projectible is not to say that generalizations made with it 
[...] can be justified in the community. Projectibility defines the class of 
possibilities envisioned or capable of being taken seriously by a science 
at a time (Hacking 1993b, p. 296).
In other words, projectible terms are terms that can be used for forming 
statements that can be justified in a given community. Therefore, to study the 
projectibility of terms also includes the study of the possibility of justifying 
statements in a given community -  just the possibility I have been discussing.
To sum up, what Hacking maintains can be couched in these terms: there 
are a number of presuppositions that must be known by a hearer in order to come 
to see the intention of the speaker of attributing truth-values to certain style- 
dependent sentences. The concept of intelligibility concerns the circumstance in 
which the speaker and the hearer have different presuppositions. The 
presuppositions of style-dependent sentences in the SoT of the speaker are
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recognized only thanks to the hermeneutic attitude of the hearer, who has a 
different SoT. The concept of understanding relates to the situation in which the 
speaker and the hearer share the same presuppositions but the hearer needs to 
acquire some background knowledge in order to grasp the meaning of the style- 
dependent sentence. The society we live in adopts all the six SoTs I have presented 
so that style-dependent sentences in those SoTs are in principle understandable by 
us. The term presuppositions refers to criteria of evidence, methods, ways of 
reasoning, questions. In other words, the presuppositions that need to be known 
in order to attribute truth-values to a style-dependent sentences coincide with 
some of the features of the SoTs they belong to. Ultimately, understanding has to 
do with sentences that have truth-value in a given SoT; intelligibility has to do 
with style-dependent sentences that lack truth-value according to the 
presuppositions of a given community that has a certain SoT.
Hacking's SoTs' project also implies the impossibility of projecting style- 
dependent sentences into another SoT. For example, certain sentences of 
Paracelsus are not projectible into our SoTs: there is no way of justifying them 
according to our standards; there is no possibility of doing things as he does 
because that would be to hold Paracelsus' criteria of evidence. It would mean to 
drop out of our community.
On the other hand, the style-independent sentences have truth-value in any 
SoT. They are always meaningful because they rely on the evidence of senses, 
which is not a presupposition of only one given SoT. Suppose that the following 
declarative sentences were translated from Greek to ancient Egyptian or vice
versa:
STYLES OF T H IN K IN G : ASSESSING  A N D  DEVELOPING 1 9 1
IAN H A CK IN G 'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
Two sides of this trapezoid are parallel
Any hearer would recognize the truth-value that the speaker has imposed on 
these sentences straightforwardly: their being true-or-false depends on the 
evidence of senses.
4.4.4 Hypothetical Styles of Thinking and Doing
In section 3.5 we have seen that an essay of Borges is mentioned by 
Foucault as an example of transgression of the boundaries of our rationality.
The short stories of Borges present other sentences that are seemingly absurd. 
Take for example:
No book can be a ladder, although no doubt there are books which 
discuss and negate and demonstrate this possibility (Borges 1997 
[1941], p. 686).
This sentence appears in a note of the tale The Library of Babel in which Borges 
imagines a building composed of an indefinite number of hexagonal galleries. In 
each wall of each hexagon there are 32 books of identical size made of 410 pages; 
each page contains 40 lines composed of 80 letters. As each book is a possible 
combination of the 25 orthographic symbols, every conceivable book m ust exist in 
the Borges' library. For example, Borges writes that the detailed history of the 
future or the autobiographies of the archangels can be found in the library.
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Now, Borges' sentence just above suggests the existence of a book in which is 
argued the existence of another book that is a ladder. For example, the book might 
contain, beside a sentence such as 'a  book can be a ladder', the sentence:
Sometimes a ladder behaves like a book
How should we classify this sentence? It is natural to say that it is just non­
sense. Notice, however, that in the future there might emerge a SoT whose 
presuppositions give truth-value to it; or there might have existed an unknown 
SoT in which that sentence was understandable. We cannot put forward any 
hypothesis about the presuppositions that would attribute a sense to the sentence 
in an unknown way of thinking, that is, about the presuppositions that would 
make that sentence true-or-false. More importantly, it is difficult to imagine this 
hypothetical SoT as self-authenticating, i.e. to imagine that the sentence above is 
immune to refutation by our SoTs. However, in principle the theory of styles of 
thinking is open to this possibility. In other words, Hacking's account of SoTs 
implies that certain sentences that seem nonsense in our SoT can be in principle 
intelligible. The reason is that, for Hacking, when a SoT comes about it objectivizes 
new candidates for truth or falsehood. A new SoT might provide sense to some of 
all the possible sentences whose syntactical arrangement is correct.
In his fictional text Borges says that '[it was] possible for a librarian of 
genius to discover the fundamental law of the library' (Borges 1997 [1941], p. 682) 
so that it was possible to decipher every book. A possible suggestion of this idea is 
that it is possible to make sense of every possible combination of the
STYLES O F TH IN K IN G : A SSESSING A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN H A CKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
1 9 3
orthographical symbols written in correct grammatical form in the books of the 
Library. If so, as a metaphor, the suggestion would reminiscent of the Kantian idea 
of rules intrinsic to the mind that structure the entire reality. The possibility of a 
universal law that makes sense of all the possible sentences is compatible with 
Kant's philosophy. As a matter of fact he believed in 'transcendental conditions' 
that can be stated independently of history or other constraints imposed on us 
from outside. On the contrary, Hacking would reject Borges' metaphor: for him 
there is no universal rule; the sentences in the books of Borges' Library are 
affected by the arguments and the methods of inquiry that people have deployed 
in a certain historical context. This difference suggests that the project of SoTs 
consists of historicizing Kant, a point that I shall develop in the next chapter.
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4.4.5 Taxonomy of Declarative Sentences: a Summary
In this section I have deduced a classification of declarative sentences in correct 
grammatical form. The rules by which I have built this taxonomy are entirely 
derived by Hacking's claims in his SoTs project. From the point of view of a given SoT 
there are sentences that are understandable (in Hacking terminology: meaningful or 
sentences that have a truth-value), sentences that are intelligible and sentences that 
are nonsensical. Understandable sentences are either style-dependent sentences, 
that is, sentences that have a truth-value only within the SoT or style-independent 
sentences, which have a truth-value that does not hinge on a particular SoT. 
Intelligible sentences have a truth-value only by virtue of the presuppositions 
tacitly assumed by a community that has a different SoT. Nonsensical sentences 
are sentence that do not have truth-value in any SoTs — they are nonsense. Given a 
nonsensical sentence, we could well find out that a past SoT has made it objective.
By the term intelligible, I mean that, in principle, it is possible to come to see 
the presuppositions on which the truth-value of the style-dependent sentences is 
based on. Methods for finding out, standards of evidence, ways of thinking, 
questions constitute the presuppositions that need to be known in order to 
recognize the conditions of truth that have been imposed on the sentence. 
Presuppositions of a certain SoT are constituted by some of its features. In other 
words, an appreciation of the fundamental features of the SoT is necessary to 
obtain an insight into why a given style-dependent sentences is meaningful for a 
community of people. When this appreciation is gained, the style-dependent 
sentence become intelligible outside its SoT.
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Intelligible sentences are not projectible: even if certain style-dependent sentences 
have become intelligible, one cannot use them in one's own SoT in order to know 
-  they cannot appear as part of a body of sentences that express claims of 
knowledge, conjectures, hypotheses or law-like statements of another community 
that has another SoT. Style-dependent sentences receive their sense, their being 
true-or-false only in their own SoT by virtue of the presuppositions of that very 
SoT. To use them in order to know and find out in another SoT would mean to 
give up being part of one's own community and think, act and justify as the 
members of another community do. In my examples, this means that Laplace 
could have made Paracelsus' sentences intelligible by studying his thought but he 
could not have acted, thought or justified as Paracelsus did, and vice versa. 
Similarly, an ancient Egyptian could have learned about the postulational 
methods and the standards of truth of geometry but she could have not thought 
and acted as Euclid did when he proved the propositions in his Elements.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have completed my characterization of scientific thought: I have 
argued that there are ways of thinking that differ from SoTs. What I consider the 
most relevant difference is that only SoTs have strong techniques of self­
authentication, techniques that are intrinsic to their forms of reasoning. I have also 
discussed the claim that certain style-dependent sentences are not meaningful for 
a community that adopts a different SoT. The main upshot of this discussion has 
been that a style-dependent sentence is intelligible outside the SoT but it is not 
projectible.
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Chapter five: The Concept of Style of 
Thinking and Doing
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters provide a characterization of SoTs as well as examples of 
their use in different branches of scientific research. We are now ready to pursue 
the two main objectives of this chapter: to place the SoTs project in its 
philosophical perspective and to grasp fully the philosophical import of the 
concept of SoT. It will be a salient point of the first half of this chapter that the 
concept of SoT should be analysed within the context of an area of research called 
'historical epistemology', which studies epistemological concepts as objects that 
evolve.
Since its introduction in the 1980s, the concept of SoT has gone through a 
process of evolution as Hacking reacted to the ideas of coeval thinkers such as 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, who have been involved in similar projects in 
their careers, and Bernard Williams (1929-2003), who came from an entirely 
different area of philosophy. The ideas of these thinkers will be considered in the 
second part of this chapter, where I shall revisit the concept of SoT by considering 
different perspectives, suggesting analogies and drawing parallels.
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More in detail, in the next three sections I shall present historical 
epistemology as an attempt to historicize Kant: while the latter found the 
conditions of experience in the universal structures of mind, historical 
epistemologists find them in certain historical conditions for possible discourse. In 
the next section, in particular, I shall explain that while for Hacking there have 
been distinct SoTs at different times, for Kant there is a fixed universal rationality 
common to hum an beings at all times, to be understood in terms of pure concepts. 
I shall also present historical epistemology and argue that the SoTs project can be 
understood as belonging to this kind of study. In section 5 .41 shall draw an ideal 
line linking the SoTs project, the project of historical epistemology and a tradition 
of philosophy of science bom  in France at the beginning of the twentieth-century.
In section 5.5 I shall present Objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007) as a work 
in historical epistemology. As Daston and Galison's analysis is mainly historical, it 
will serve as a test against which Hacking's conclusions can be assessed. Finally, a 
point that will be clear in the last section is that, on the basis of some ideas of 
Williams, each SoT can be viewed as a way of representing a single aspect of a 
certain portion of the world.
5.2 Hacking's Historical Epistemology
Few passages of Hacking can be more illuminating than the following one for 
those who want to understand the philosophical perspective of the SoTs project:
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my study is a continuation of Kant's project of explaining why 
objectivity is possible. [...] Kant did not think of scientific reason as a 
historical and collective product. We do (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 
181).
In the first sentence of this passage Hacking espouses the Kantian idea that 
objectivity is made possible by certain a priori conditions, which he wants to 
identify and study, continuing Kant's project. In the second sentence, though, he 
makes a fundamental departure from Kantian philosophy by suggesting that what 
is objective is the result of historical and social circumstances.
In order to elaborate on this passage, I wish to remind the reader that the 
concept of objectivity occupies a pivotal role in the SoTs project: in Hacking's 
terminology, when in a community that adopts a given SoT certain sentences 
come to be 'up  for grabs as true or false'(Hacking 2002 [1982] -a, p. 160), they 
become objective; and when concepts, questions, conjectures, problems, solutions 
come to be shared and discussed, in short, when they become 'possible', they 
become objective. Indeed, in his styles project Hacking often uses interchangeably 
qualifiers such as 'meaningful', 'true-or-false', 'objective'.
One of Kant's problems was to understand how judgements become 
possible: to determine what he called the 'transcendental conditions', i.e. the 
'conditions of possibility' of our concepts. He believed he could state them 
independently of history or necessary constraints imposed on us from outside. 
Indeed, the Kantian transcendental conditions are related only to the structure of 
hum an thought - it is reason that imposes them on the raw sense data by making a 
set of sensations objective experience. In particular, the spatial and temporal
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forms of intuition represent the conditions within which we perceive objects as 
existing in space and time and within which the propositions describing these 
objects have a truth-value. Since transcendental conditions are prior to experience, 
Kant referred to them as a priori conditions.
For Hacking, Kant's solution cannot be satisfying because he thinks that the 
truth-value of a sentence is fixed by contingent historical circumstances. He rejects 
the picture according to which certain propositions are not affected by the 
methods of inquiry that we deploy in a certain historical context: although the 
statements of the theory of probability might be true at any time, for Hacking they 
could not be uttered until the mid-seventeenth century, when certain conditions 
for their emergence came into being, e.g. the new 'evidence of things', a new way 
of reading signs in things. Therefore, for Hacking, Kant's claim that the conditions 
of experience can be found in the structure of human mind is to be rejected 
because it jars with the results of historical analysis -- if anything, these conditions 
m ust be impermanent. It is the very existence of a SoT that provides the conditions 
for the objectivity of statements, theories and debates.
It must be emphasized that Kant was engaged in a particular stage of 
scientific process, Newtonian science22, which for him explained the world of 
appearances. In order to justify the kind of necessary universal laws proposed by 
Newton he defended the intellectual structures underlying Newtonian mechanics: 
Euclidean geometry, continuous classical time, absolute space and the concepts of 
causality and substance. By contrast, Hacking set out to solve the problem of why 
objectivity is possible in the aftermath of the upheavals of quantum  theory and the
22 For a comprehensive account of Kant's scientific sources see (Calinger 1979)
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theories of relativity, which had resulted in a non-Newtonian conception of space, 
time and motion23.
In the rest of this section, I shall argue that the context of the SoTs project is 
a field of research that Hacking has called 'historical meta-epistemology'. As many 
other scholars denote it as 'historical epistemology', without the prefix 'meta', 
henceforth I shall use the same label (or the acronym HE). In turn, in the next 
section I shall identify the philosophical roots of HE in a French approach to the 
history of the sciences that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The expression 'historical meta-epistemology' appeared in 1999 as title of a paper 
(Hacking 1999a) prepared for a conference in honour of the philosopher Lorenz 
Kruger. In that paper Hacking explained the meaning of that expression with 
these words:
[Historical meta-epistemology] is, first of all, 'meta' epistemology in 
that it talks about very general or organizing concepts that we use 
today, and which have to do with knowledge, belief, opinion, 
objectivity, detachment, proof, probability, argument, reason, 
rationality, evidence. It is not directly epistemology, in the sense of a 
theory o f knowledge (etc.), but a study of ideas about or uses of 
knowledge (Hacking 1999a, p. 53).
I am going to analyse this passage in order to explain what HE is. I shall start by 
clarifying w hat organising concepts are.
23 The first chapters of Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (Bohm 1984 [1957]) provide 
a clear exposition of why quantum mechanics brought about a renunciation of causality.
5.2.1 From Kantian Categories to Organising Concepts
A good start for a discussion about organizing concepts might be thinking of 
Kant's categories, as Hacking expressly said (Hacking 1999a, p. 66). Indeed, Kant's 
categories (and the two innate intuitions of space and time) lie at the top level of 
our conceptual organization. To such a degree that according to the Critique of Pure 
Reason (Kant 1996 [1781]), there could not be empirical concepts without organising 
concepts such as a priori categories: the former are forged from the raw material of 
experience by applying the categories to intuitions.
Like the Kantian categories, the organising concepts studied by HE (e.g. 
objectivity, knowledge and probability, mentioned in the passage above) 'govern 
and control ground level concepts' (Hacking 1999a, p. 65). For example, the 
concept of objectivity organizes a whole collection of other concepts, practices and 
values. Concepts such as standard of evidence, reliable method and valid 
argument, and the way in which they are related one to another, presuppose the 
meta-concept of objectivity. For example, in order to establish that a method is 
reliable it is necessary a standard of evidence, which in turn necessitates a 
cognition of what to be objective means. Ultimately, here objectivity plays a 
similar role to a Kantian pure concept: it is a priori because it is necessary for the 
existence and organization of other concepts. Similar considerations apply to other 
organising concepts, generally absent in traditional epistemology, e.g. the concept 
of child development. According to Hacking, in the last 150 years '[the concept of 
child development] has come to determine in the most minute details how we 
organise our thinking about children' (Hacking 1999a, p. 68). Notice that, as 
Kantian categories appear inescapable because timeless and universal, so 
organising concepts seem inescapable because, as Hacking says,
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they are [...] essential to the very functioning of our society. We are 
stuck with them, which is not to say [...] that they are not changing as I 
speak (Hacking 1999a, p. 65).
However, despite these analogies, Hacking points out a difference between 
organizing concepts and Kantian categories: the former are changeable, the latter 
are timeless. In particular:
Organising concepts [...] do not exist as a timeless built-in resource for 
all human beings. They are [...] situated. They change, evolve, undergo 
mutations, emerge out of new practices or radical transformations of 
old ones (Hacking 1999a)
For instance, the (organising) concept of probability emerged in the mid­
nineteenth century and has changed -  Hacking claims - in the way described in 
the central chapters of The Emergence of Probability. As an example of non­
organizing concept Hacking considers the concept of horse: it is a concept 'we can 
understand totally outside the history of any idea7 (Hacking 1999a, p. 59).
5.2.2 Historical Epistemology versus Traditional Epistemology
In the first passage of this section Hacking also says that HE is not a theory of 
knowledge. Indeed, traditional epistemology studies the conditions, the limits and 
the sources of knowledge and inquires into what makes knowledge scientific. It 
considers concepts such as proof, rationality, objectivity, evidence and the like as
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permanent and, to understand them, it analyses the timeless structure of logic and 
consults human understanding.
HE starts from an opposite presupposition: even though organizing 
concepts are necessary for our thinking, they get their meaning from the uses we 
make of them in a certain period of history and the way in which they are 
connected with other concepts. They are 'situated': they 'have no constitution 
other than tradition and use' (Hacking 1999a, p. 56). Furthermore, HE cannot be 
assimilated to history of ideas either: the latter is generally centred on the subject 
and tells how key concepts are transmitted from a thinker to another. Historical 
epistemology, on the other hand, is an inquiry into the very general structures in 
which hum an beings think. In conclusion, unlike traditional epistemology, HE 
does not formulate or defend theories of knowledge; rather, it reflects on the 
historical conditions under which we know, that is on organising concepts.
In nuce, historical epistemologists make a double claim: 1) at a particular 
stage of history there will be a set of organising concepts that play a role similar to 
Kantian pure concepts in that they allow us to make judgements; 2) organising 
concepts are not permanent. By bearing in mind these two points historical 
epistemology can be viewed as the historicization of Kant. In other words, the 
qualifier 'historical' in the expression 'historical epistemology' alludes to a radical 
departure from Kant, to the historicization of his 'pure concepts'.
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5.2.3 The Styles Project as a Study in Historical Epistemology
Another important conclusion concerns the question as to whether the SoTs 
project can be viewed as a specific study in HE 24. Surprisingly, Hacking's answer 
is in the negative:
Anyone who has come across some published sketches of ideas in 
progress [the SoTs project] might think this was an example of 
historical meta-epistemology: absolutely not! (Hacking 1999a, p. 72)
Rather, he interprets the SoTs project as 'a  way of saying something about 
language, truth and reason' (Hacking 1999a, p. 72). On his part, Kusch's answer is 
in the positive because 'Hacking's analysis historicises reason, historicises what 
counts as a scientific proposition, and historicises what passes for a scientific 
entity' (Kusch 2010, p. 158). My answer is in the positive too for the following 
reason: both methods and results of the SoTs project are part of the 
methodological and conceptual apparatus of HE. Indeed, to start with, I recall 
from the previous section that Hacking declared that his 'styles of reasoning [...] 
are part of what we need to understand what we mean by objectivity' (Hacking 
1992d, p. 181). In this sense, the scope of the theory of SoTs is identical to one of 
the objectives of HE -  to understand a concept, objectivity, which undergoes 
mutations and evolves along with the changes of our practices. However, as I have 
tried to highlight in the previous section, it is the mutation of a 'way of being 
objective', e.g. the evidence of signs, which can make it possible the emergence of
24 In general, Hacking combines the tradition of historical epistemology with the Anglo- 
American tradition of analytical philosophy (see for example Brenner 2006). However, the 
former is particularly relevant for the SoTs project as it will be clear in the next sections.
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a new SoT. Therefore, the reverse of Hacking's sentence is also true: what we 
mean by objectivity, its study, is necessary to explain what a style of reasoning is. 
But for Hacking objectivity is to be studied using the methods of HE, so the latter 
is necessary for elaborating the theory of SoTs.
5.2.4 Other Projects in Historical Epistemology
Over the past few years HE has been used as a label for a wide variety of 
programs (for an overview see Feest and Sturm 2011). Among them it should be 
mentioned the work of Daston and Galison, who characterized epistemological 
categories out of knowledge practices. Daston characterized HE as 'the history of 
the categories that structure our thought, pattern our arguments and proofs, and 
certify our standards of explanation' (Daston 1994, p. 282) and cited Hacking and 
Arnold Davidson as the leading practitioners of HE (Daston 1994, p. 283). The 
latter, conducted investigations into the conceptual formation of new disciplines 
and mentioned historical epistemology in relation to a kind of study that attempts 
to show how novel forms of experience are linked to the emergence of new 
structures of knowledge (Davidson 2001, p. XIII).
Today HE has expanded beyond the study of organizing concepts25. 
Historical epistemologists are also studying the objects of scientific practice and 
their history. Some of them are focused on the development and the dynamics of 
scientific knowledge. Another sub-area of research of HE aims to historicize 
epistemology by trying to answer to questions such as: 'does the historicity of
25 The introduction to the conference entitled "What (good) is historical epistemology?" 
and held at the Max Plank Institute for the History of Science in Berlin, provides further 
details about aims and programs of historical epistemology (Sturm 2008)
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some epistemic values force us to accept a relativistic outlook of science and 
history?' (see for instance Kusch 2011c) 'Are certain questions of traditional 
epistemology well posed?'.
5.3 The Roots of Hacking's Historical Epistemology
In the previous section I have argued that the SoTs project fits into an approach to 
the study of knowledge called historical epistemology (HE). When the label 
'historical epistemology' (Historische Epistemologie) appeared for the first time 
Hacking thought that it was inappropriate26. For him that label was too full of 
reminiscences of a book by Dominique Lecourt on Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) 
entitled L'Epistemologie historique de Gaston Bachelard (Lecourt 1969). He meant that 
the expression 'historical epistemology' already indicated a tradition in 
philosophy of science whose main protagonists were Gaston Bachelard and 
Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) (Hacking 1999a, p. 54). The prefix 'meta' he 
added wanted to mark a distinction with that prior use: 'for Bachelard objects are 
the sciences in their historical development [...] our objects of study are different, 
not knowledges, but ideas about knowledge' (Hacking 1999a, pp. 54-55).
However, other practitioners of HE did not follow Hacking in the use of the 
prefix 'm eta' and continued to use the label 'historical epistemology'. 
Consequently, today there is some ambiguity in its use. 'Historical epistemology' 
indicates both the variety of projects mentioned in the previous section and an
26 The label appeared in a correspondence about the establishment of the Max Planck- 
Institute in Berlin in the first years of 1990s (Hacking 1999a, p. 54).
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older tradition of thought in philosophy of science born in France in the beginning 
of twentieth-century, when different thinkers started to reflect on the historical 
conditions of knowledge. To avoid confusion, I shall follow Cristina Chimisso 
who called the latter 'classical historical epistemology' (henceforth CHE) in order 
to distinguish it from HE (Chimisso, unpublished).
In this section I w ant to show that the underlying assumptions of the SoTs 
project can be traced back to classical historical epistemology (CHE). It will be my 
contention that CHE, which represented a shift of interest in theory of knowledge 
previously focused on finding the correct method of science, continues until today 
under various forms.
5.3.1 Origins of Historicization of Epistemology
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1996 [1962]) is widely 
presented as the book that produced a decisive transformation in the predom inant 
image of science as exhibiting progress and methodological unity. However, 
already at the beginning of the twentieth century the attempt to identify the 
credentials of scientific knowledge was set aside and a space for a historicization 
of epistemology was opened up. It had become clear that the scientists' practices 
do not follow a timeless rule but are subject to a historical development and that 
the way in which hum an beings reason changes over history. Much later, fuelled 
by various scientific and philosophical developments, this philosophical attitude 
led to a historicization of all the categories associated with science.
Recently, several scholars have identified different pivotal points of history 
in which classical epistemology came to be under attack. Rheinberger emphasized 
the importance of Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896), working as an electro­
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physiologist in Berlin: by claiming that the science of mechanics could not account 
for its basic concepts -  matter, force and movement - he called into question the 
mechanistic conception of nature and therefore the unity itself of science 
(Rheinberger 2010, pp. 5-8). Gutting focused on the French philosophers Leon 
Brunschvicg and Gaston Bachelard and only mentioned en passant that the French 
philosopher August Comte, and later Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) and Henri 
Poincare (1854-1912), started a tradition that insisted on understanding science 
through its historical development (Gutting 2005). Chimisso, in her Writing the 
History of the Mind (Chimisso 2008) presented a set of projects whose common 
presupposition was that 'the mind could not be studied a priori, and that ways of 
thinking were different in different civilizations' (Chimisso 2008, p. 3). For her, 
Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem represent the acme of a French 
tradition of thought that had already started to historicize epistemology and of 
which the philosophers and professors at the Sorbonne Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1857- 
1939) and Leon Brunschvicg (1869-1944) and the historian Alexandre Koyre (1892- 
1964) were illustrious exponents (see for example (Levy-Bruhl, 1992 [1910]) 
(Brunschvicg, 1912) (Brunschvicg, 1934) (Koyre,1958 [1957])). Although this 
tradition did not ignore the lesson of previous positivist thinkers such as Comte, it 
'took history more seriously, in some cases extremely more seriously' than they 
did, as it is shown by Metzger's complain that for Comte 'historical events are 
chosen and interpreted to illustrate a theory, rather than being a basis for the 
theory' (Chimisso 2010, p.44). Moreover, Chimisso considered Levy-Bruhl and 
Brunschvicg the 'fathers' of CHE: the latter inherited their idea that human mind 
changes across different times or cultures (Chimisso, unpublished p. 3).
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Levy-Bruhl argued that certain traditional non-literate societies thought in a 
different way from modern people, e.g. they adopted a form of explanation based 
on supernatural causes, that is, on primary rather than secondary causes. 
Brunschvicg, on his part, struck by the philosophical implications of the Relativity 
Theory, argued that Kant had in fact presented a particular way of thinking, of 
which Newton's science was the product. In parenthesis, the belief that categories 
and certain laws and values are timeless and universal had already been the 
subject of Hegel's criticism. But Brunschvicg, like other French historians of 
philosophy at the Sorbonne, rejected the idea of laws of development in the 
history of thought (Chimisso 2008, p. 38-42).
We come to see that it was with Levy-Bruhl and Brunschvicg that that kind 
of historicization of Kant, of which Hacking presented his own version, started. 
Levy-Bruhl had argued that the categories of thought change in different cultures; 
Brunschvicg had historicized the Kantian categories; Hacking historicizes 
standards of evidence, way of reasoning and doing and spells out the conditions 
of possibility of certain sentences.
5.3.2 Origins of the Idea of Discontinuity
In the tradition of Brunschvicg, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) thought that 
scientific knowledge and common sense differ radically because they are 
produced by two distinct ways of thinking. In order scientific knowledge to 
emerge, it is necessary an 'epistemological break' with immediate experience that 
is rooted in imagination and emotions. Within scientific thought there have also 
been epistemological breaks, which have produced new ways of thinking: the
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lesson of Quantum Theory and Relativity, which had overthrown the old theories 
of classical physics, was strongly present to his mind.
With respect to discontinuity, Hacking took Bachelard's tack by arguing 
for sharp breaks in the history of science. He himself paid obeisance to Bachelard 
by saying:
I have a revolutionary temper, perhaps under the excessive influence of 
Bachelard, Kuhn and Foucault [...] I am interested in ruptures that 
radically transform our methods of reasoning (Hacking, 2006 -e p.9)
However, the reasons that underlie the two 'revolutionary' attitudes are different 
and not simply due to the distinctive character of Hacking's notion of SoT. While 
for Hacking SoTs accumulate, for Bachelard there is no monotonic increase of 
knowledge: at certain points of history radical revisions of the conceptual 
foundations of scientific knowledge can happen, although the past can be 
transformed rather than completely rejected. For example, in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the theory of relativity emerged with the consequent rejection 
of all the basic concepts of classical physics. For him, epistemological breaks like 
this were the consequence of a new 'scientific mind' that had emerged 
superseding the 'old Newtonian mind', which therefore was not eternal and 
universal.
In Bachelard's thought ancient ways of thinking now gone extinct such as 
the alchemic way of thinking are non-scientific -  he distinguishes three stages of 
historical development: prescientific, scientific and the phase of the new scientific 
mind, which started with the appearance of the Relativity theory. His
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philosophical attitude was normative: he used modern science as a standard in 
order to judge certain ways of thinking as 'non scientific'. Conversely, Hacking's 
historical epistemology is not normative -  Hacking is reluctant to saying that 
certain ways of thinking are non-scientific, e.g. he did not put forward any 
criterion to discard Paracelsus' way of thinking as non-scientific. As we shall see 
below, the kind of discontinuity proposed by Hacking shows a more direct lineage 
to Foucault.
5.3.3 Origins of the Historicization of Objectivity
In classical epistemology the knower had direct access to nature; Bachelard
complicated this subject-object relationship -  for him 'the production of 
knowledge is in a fundamental sense instrumentally mediated' (Rheinberger 2010, 
p. 24). Phenomena are not 'just there', waiting for being discovered, but m ust be 
isolated, purified and investigated through instruments, projected and calibrated 
by many people according to certain rules, which must be discussed and 
negotiated. As a consequence, for Bachelard objectivity becomes not something 
given once and for all but something that 'is produced in a process of 
objectification, the result of a double instruction -  of phenomena and of m inds' 
(Rheinberger 2010, p. 24). In other words, the phenomena are the result of the 
interaction between the world, a subject and a context; as a consequence, 
objectivity is established each time in relation to the growing precision of 
instruments and the negotiations between experts. By 'put[ting] the accent on the 
interface between science, technology, social structure of scientific community and 
the importance of scientific negotiable policies' (Castelao 2010, p. 53 my 
translation) Bachelard opened up the way for accepting the idea of a concept of
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objectivity that is variable in the course of history. Hacking developed his own 
way this aspect of Bachelard's philosophy: he put the accent on the instrumentally 
mediated production of knowledge through his idea that hum an ways of knowing 
must be understood as ways of thinking and doing. Besides, he argued that 
standards of evidence are not only the result of the development of technology but 
also of the emergence of new SoTs. In this respect, his theory of SoTs is a step 
further with the respect to Bachelard's view of objectivity: it is a theory that 
describes how and why it changes. Canguilhem, who succeeded Bachelard as 
Sorbonne professor, wrote: 'the object of historical discourse is, in effect, the 
historicity of scientific discourse' (Canguilhem 2005, p. 203) If Bachelard's view 
represents the first step for a theory of SoTs, Canguilhem's represents the second 
step: to identify particular scientific discourses, examine their criteria of evidence 
and methods so to draw a lesson about how they change.
5.3.4 Thought styles versus Styles of Thinking
In the 1930s the Polish microbiologist Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) put forward some 
ideas that showed a striking similarity to those that were emerging in the same 
period in France: in one of the first chapters of The Genesis and Development of a 
Scientific Fact (Fleck 1979 [1935]), he wrote that epistemology without historical 
investigations is an empty play on words27 (Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 21). His ideas 
sharply contrasted with the 'outside time and history' investigation of scientific 
activities conducted by the logical empiricist movement (see Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 
50). Perhaps for this reason he did not catch the attention of other scholars until
27 Fleck cited and discussed Levy-Bruhl in his Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 
(Fleck 1979 [1935], pp. 46-51)
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Kuhn rediscovered his work and mentioned it in the preface of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962 p. VIII-IX).
Fleck introduced the concept of thought collective (Denkkollektiv), a specific 
interactive community in which scientific knowledge is produced, and the concept 
of thought style (Denkstil), the distinctive mode of thinking of a certain thought 
collective. In the foreword of 1976 to Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 
Kuhn wrote that 'w hat the thought collective supplies its members is somehow 
like the Kantian categories' (Fleck 1979 [1935], p.XI): a thought style constrains, 
inhibits, influences the way of thinking and even the modes of perception. Kuhn's 
mention of Kant is another fact that suggests that Fleck's work could be viewed as 
another project in the current of ideas of CHE. Actually, besides important 
differences, there are many analogies between the notion of thought style and that 
of style of thinking, as I am going to show.
For Fleck,
[a thought style] is characterized by common features in the problem of 
interest to a thought collective, by the judgement which the thought 
collective considers evident, and by the methods which it applies as a 
means of cognition (Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 98).
In addition, thought styles are maintained by certain communities whose 
individuals share the same common knowledge and have the same 
communicative behaviour and literary style. The SoTs project proposes no 
equivalent of the notion of thought collective and the idea of a community is 
rarely explicit. Communicative behaviour and literary styles are im portant aspects
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of the notion of thought collective that have been inherited by social 
constructionism and are not present in Hacking: for example, Shapin and Schaffer 
describe the literary technologies of Boyle's community (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 
[1985]-a, chapter II). It is also to be noted that SoTs are ways of doing and finding 
out whereas practical aspects of cognition are less important in Fleck's thought. 
Furthermore, for Fleck
[there are] professional and semi-professional thought communities in 
commerce, military, sports, arts, politics, fashion, science and religion'
(Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 107).
On the contrary, for Hacking the notion of style m ust capture the idea of 
communities of people that share the same standard of evidence and adopt a 
method of reasoning that is self-authenticating. Ultimately, the comparison so far 
suggests that Fleck's notion is more sociological, Hacking's is more 
epistemological.
Another interesting contrast is that the formation of a thought style is 
ascribable to the change in meaning that emerges from a continuous 
communication between the members of a thought collective. This process of 
development is continuous28: 'In the development of ideas, primitive pre-ideas 
often lead continuously to modern scientific concepts' (Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 100). 
Contrary to this picture of continuity, Hacking emphasized sudden breaks in 
history of thought: rather than the slow and continuous transformations of 
thoughts that pass from an individual to another, what might causes the
28 Nicola Moaner supports my point (Mopner 2011, p. 7)
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emergence of a SoT is, for example, a rapid change in the kind of evidence that 
people use. In brief, Fleck's thought styles emerge from communicative 
interactions, mute continuously and die out in a brief span of time. Hacking's SoTs 
have clear beginnings and persist for a long period -- they are a matter of longue- 
duree. SoTs inherit from Crombie the function of organizing the history of science; 
thought styles have a sociological substance. One of the reasons why SoTs are 
more enduring than thought styles -  Hacking himself noted - is that 'they are built 
on fundamental cognitive capacities' (Hacking 2009, p. 27), although these 
capacities might have been tapped in different ways had the historical 
circumstances been different.
It is also worth noting that Fleck, before Hacking, had already used 
Paracelsus' way of reasoning as an example of thought style. Commenting on a 
passage of the latter he characterized Paracelsus' way of thinking in terms 
identical to Hacking (see Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 126). Compare:
[Paracelsus'] style of reasoning is alien (Hacking 1983b, p. 71)
Comprehending objects and phenomena in a way similar to our own 
was completely alien to [Paracelsus's] way of thinking (Fleck 1979 
[1935], p. 127).
The fact that Fleck considered Paracelsus's way of thinking a thought style should 
make us doubt that it can also be considered a SoT, given the differences between 
the two notions. Indeed, I had argued in section 4.2.5 that it differs substantially 
from the six SoTs I have presented.
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Fleck asserted that direct communication between the adherents of different 
thought styles is impossible (Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 36) and justified this point both 
in terms of impossibility of translating certain terms from a thought style into 
another and in these terms:
The statement 'Someone recognizes something' [...] is no more 
meaningful as it stands than the statements 'This book is larger' [...]. 
Something is still missing, namely the addition, 'than that book', to the 
statement. Analogously, the statement 'Someone recognizes 
something' demands some such supplements as 'on the basis of a 
certain fund of knowledge' or, better, [...] 'in a particular thought style' 
(Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 38).
I have made a similar point in section 4.4 when I have said that certain 
sentences are intelligible but not understandable for a member of a community 
that adopts a different SoT. In the theory of SoTs what we need to understand a 
sentence are the presuppositions of the SoT; for Fleck what we need is the 'fund of 
knowledge' of the thought style, the shared knowledge of the thought collective. 
However, Fleck made other strong claims that are absent in the theory of SoTs. He 
thinks that the perception of an individual changes when it is embedded in a 
certain thought style (or 'paradigm ' in Kuhn's version of the same claim). Even 
facts are created by thought styles; truth is a function of the particular thought 
style that has been accepted -  there is no objective truth. Not only does Hacking, 
as we shall see, reject these claims but also insist that sense-datum statements are 
represented by style-independent propositions.
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5.3.5 From Foucault's Archaeology to Hacking's Historical 
Epistemology
As I have explained, there are aspects of the notion of SoT that cannot be put in 
relation with the notion of thought style. One of the reasons of these differences is 
ascribable to the fact that Hacking's way of tackling the problem of identifying the 
a priori conditions of objectivity has a more direct link with the methods of 
analysis of Foucault. With the latter CHE reached a new stage of its reflection on 
the history of the sciences: Foucault's notion of a 'historical a p rio ri' can be 
viewed as another transient substitute of the timeless Kantian conditions of 
possible experience: it is constitutive with respect to new kinds of propositions 
coming into being as objective. In Foucault's words:
What I mean by the term [historical a priori] is an a priori that is not a 
condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for 
statements. It is not a question of rediscovering what might legitimize 
an assertion, but of freeing the conditions of emergence of statements 
(Foucault 1969 [1972], p. 127).
As I have already mentioned, in The Order of Things Foucault used the term 
episteme to mean the historical a priori as referred to scientific forms of knowledge. 
In a certain epoch, an episteme is a mode of thought whose system of rules 
operates under the surface of our consciousness and determines the boundaries of 
what can be thought and therefore made sense of. There is no continuity between
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an episteme and another and it is the task of 'archaeology' (Foucault' 
historiographic method) to dig into the thought of a certain epoch to identify and 
describe its episteme. In emphasizing discontinuity Foucault linked up with the 
studies of Bachelard and Canguilhem and their heterogeneous vision of history of 
the sciences.
I wish to set out three reasons why it is possible to say that Hacking 
developed the notion of SoT by adopting Foucault's perspective. First of all, 
Hacking considered the notion of SoT as a particular element of the episteme, the 
decisive element that is necessary to understand the emergence of new true-or-false 
sentences. As he put it:
I do not say that 'style of reasoning' means Foucaultian 'episteme' or 
whatever. On the contrary, if one could adequately define an episteme, 
one would surely have to include, as one of its elements, the styles of 
reason that bear on the positive propositions of that field of knowledge 
(Hacking 2002, p. 181).
In other words, for Hacking, of all the elements that characterize an episteme, e.g. 
assumptions, unspoken truths, institutions, knowledges, social activities, the 
material traces left behind by a particular epoch, what really counts in order to 
understand the emergence of new true-or-false statements is the style of thinking. 
Therefore, Hacking works in Foucault's perspective in that he aims to discover the 
conditions of validity of statements by using what might be considered an element 
of the episteme.
Secondly, for Foucault
STYLES O F  TH IN K IN G : ASSESSING  A N D  DEVELOPING 2 1 9
IAN HA CK IN G 'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
Archaeology does not seek to rediscover the continuous, insensible 
transition that relates discourses, on a gentle slope, to what precedes 
them, surrounds them, or follows them [...] On the contrary, its 
problem is to define discourses in their specificity; to show in what 
way the set of rules that they put into operation is irreducible to any 
another (Foucault 1969 [1972], p. 139)
In a similar way, the SoTs project is 'archaeological' in nature. It is not interested 
in those transitional zones between the phase that precedes the emergence of a 
SoT and its crystallization, for example in describing the continuous stages of 
refinements undergone by certain methods, instruments and practices. Rather, 
what counts is to discover the standards of truth, the questions, the criteria of 
evidence, the way of thinking and doing, i.e. the presuppositions that characterize 
the new SoT; and to do so it might be necessary to set up the presuppositions of a 
new SoT against those of others.
Finally, James Elwick highlighted the importance of possibility in the works 
of Hacking: 'Hacking's style of reasoning and Foucault's qpisteme are both 
conditions that make possible phenomena such as positive statements, new 
sciences and concepts' (Elwick 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, Elwick observed that 
certain sciences, new evidence, objects, sentences are made possible by SoTs and, 
in turn, SoTs are made possible by certain historical events. Therefore the model of 
layered conditions of possibility (stratigraphical model) can be applied not only to 
Foucault but also to Hacking. Following Elwick the SoTs project can be viewed as 
an analysis of different strata of possibilities: the first stratum made of contingent
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historical circumstances, the second stratum of SoTs, the third stratum of new 
objects, sentences and other epistemological items.
I want to conclude by highlighting a difference between the notion of SoT 
and that of episteme: epistemes come and go, while a SoT never nudges out 
another SoT. Hacking wrote that complains have been addressed to Foucault 
because he never explained why epistemes die out (Hacking 2002, p. 195). Unlike 
the notion of episteme, Hacking's notion is described, among other things, in 
terms of the concept of self-vindication. The existence of techniques of self­
vindication, especially when they are divided into internal and external, supply 
part of the answer to the question as to why SoTs do not vanish (see also section 
9.3). Why the Renaissance episteme of resemblance expired is a question that has 
no answer within Foucault's intellectual framework. On the contrary, why the 
Renaissance way of thinking of resemblance did not endure is a question that 
admits partial answers in terms of the absence of internal techniques of self­
vindication, as I have explained in subsection 4.2.2.
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5.4 Hacking's and Daston and Galison's Conceptions 
of Objectivity: a Comparison
My brief sketch of classical historical epistemology was intended to shed 
light on the concept of SoT. This is, however, only part of the analysis we need. It 
is also essential to examine further the connection between the notion of SoT and 
the concept of objectivity. I shall pursue this aim by comparing the SoTs project 
with Daston and Galison's study on objectivity. This choice is natural: on the one 
hand the SoTs project implies the existence of different 'objectivities', since every 
SoT generates its own sphere of objectivity, a space in which some sentences are 
candidates for truth or falsehood; on the other hand Daston and Galison's book 
Objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007) charts the history of nature of new 
conceptions of objectivity that emerged in the last three centuries. Are the 
conclusions of these two studies compatible? In order to address this question I 
shall start by outlining some conclusions of the book Objectivity interesting for my 
purposes.
5.4.1 Various Conceptions of Objectivity
Daston and Galison based their study on the analysis of scientific atlases 
from different fields of research. Atlases are 'those select collections of images that 
identify a discipline's most significant objects of inquiry' (Daston and Galison 
2007, p. 17). Daston and Galison think that their centrality comes from the fact that 
they 'set standards for how phenomena are to be seen and depicted' (Daston and
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Galison 2007, p. 19). They analysed atlases in order to gain insights into three 
conceptions of objectivity that came about -  they argue - in the last three centuries: 
truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, and trained judgement. Truth-to-nature 
emerged in the eighteenth century when scientists started to be afraid of being 
overwhelmed by the chaos of sensations and the intricacy of natural phenomena: 
too many non-essential details could hinder the knower from describing properly 
a phenomenon. Lisa Jardine described some technological factors that became 
catalysts for scientific advance in the seventeenth century: enhanced microscopic 
observation, chemical substance analysis, autopsy, camera obscura (Jardine 2000, 
chapter three). What her account reveals is how these new techniques produced a 
blinding intricacy of details that made it easy to fail to see the whole picture of a 
phenomenon. As a reaction to all that, Daston and Galison argue, scientists 
appealed to reason in order to find the hidden order behind the monstrosity of 
nature; they trained themselves to prune, shape, select and represent things in 
such a way that only what was typical of a certain class of objects could be 
recognizable. For example, eighteenth century atlases show images of ideal types 
that mean to illustrate the fully developed features of objects and be truer to 
nature than a specimen (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 56).
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, scientists started to criticize 
the artistic portrayals and praise the techniques of photography that were 
emerging. They ceased being concerned about being overwhelmed by nature and 
started to fear to project their theories into nature, deforming it. As a consequence, 
they tried to repress their predisposition to idealizing, pruning and perfecting. For 
example, Daston and Galison quoted the Berlin bacteriologist Carl Fraenkel as
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saying:
A drawing can only be the expression of a subjective perception and 
therefore must, from the beginning, renounce the possibility of an 
objection-free reliability. [...] The photographic plate, by contrast, 
reflects things with an inflexible objectivity as they really are (Daston 
and Galison 2007, p. 177).
Daston and Galison considered objectivity as a 'passionate commitment to 
suppress the will, a drive to let the visible world emerge on the page without 
intervention' (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 143) as the manifestation of another 
scientific ideal that they called mechanical objectivity.
In the twentieth century mechanical images became complex and needed to 
be interpreted and compared. According to Daston and Galison many scientists 
began to question the current way of representing (and knowing) nature: they 
regarded certain images as unreliable because of the abundance of incidental 
details and artefacts. As an example of the inadequacy of mechanical objectivity, 
as perceived by scientists, consider that the radiologist Rudolf Grashey (1876-1950) 
wanted to classify x-ray images of hum an organs and bones in order to 
distinguish the normal, with all its variations, from the pathological. The 
mechanical registration of images could not be the solution: he was forced to 
decide which of them represented deviations within normality and choose some 
of them as a boundary post of the normal (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 344). In 
short, the insistent drive to repress the wilful intervention of the scientist did not 
prove adequate to answering the need of interpreting, highlighting, comparing
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and handling images. In doing research, the images that any machine could 
produce were not sufficient to understand phenomena; in communicating and 
teaching science, some representations uncontaminated by hum an intervention 
were of no help to explain what was to be considered as pathological in a body or 
to distinguish a new particle among the tracks of myriads of decay particles. For 
example, in the Atlas of Electroencephalography (1941), the neurologists Frederic A. 
Gibbs and Ema L. Gibbs declared that their book had been written 'to train the 
[reader's] eye so that he can arrive at diagnoses from subjective criteria' (Daston 
and Galison 2007, p. 321). In many cases a subjective decision was a necessary 
supplement to mechanical images or the mathematical techniques. Daston and 
Galison called this supplement training judgement. The word judgement stands for 
the ability of the researcher to make decisions without following standard 
procedures; it is a training judgement because it is a kind of perception one can be 
trained for.
Lastly, in the twentieth century, fidelity to nature gave way to an 
engineering-inspired way of knowing in which making, manipulating or 
simulating, more than depicting, are considered the best method to gain insight 
into the phenomena. In Objectivity Daston and Galison also mentioned another 
form of objectivity, structural objectivity, which counters the hermetic privacy of 
the self: the visual was to be distrusted and only relationships and structures were 
to be relied upon (Daston and Galison 2007, pp. 253-307).
On her own Daston also introduced the concept of communitarian objectivity: 
it emerged in the nineteenth century and 'demanded the equally severe 
curtailment of individual an d /o r local autonomy in choice of instruments,
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methods, and even research topics, in the name of solidarity' (Daston 1999, p. 86). 
We can conjecture that there are also other forms of objectivity, which imply the 
restraint of emotions or the belief that underlying the probabilistic nature of the 
universe there is a deeper reality independent of the observer.
5.4.2 Styles of Thinking, Epistemic Virtues, Objectivity
A way of looking at the work of both Hacking and Daston and Galison is to 
note that, like other previous thinkers of classical historical epistemology, they 
address a particular question, i.e. the question as to what changes in the course of 
the history of the sciences. So, for them, what is it that changes? A partial answer 
would be that for all of them what changes are the concepts of objectivity that 
hum an beings possess, i.e. what to be objective means at a certain point in time. 
However, the question requires a less superficial answer. Addressing it will lead 
us to appreciate both the substantial differences and similarities between 
Hacking's and Daston and Galison's historical epistemologies. Let us focus on 
Hacking first. He maintains that SoTs are a priori conditions, i.e. they are 'prior to 
the concept of objectivity': each SoT defines its own norms and in so doing makes 
certain sentences objective. Therefore, the concept of objectivity Hacking has in 
mind concerns the meaningfulness of sentences, their being uttered and shared. In 
other words, in Hacking 'objectivity' refers to the fact that a community of people 
share the presuppositions of its SoTs (in particular, the standards of evidence). 
However, it is a consequence of the fact that there are diverse SoTs (and different
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communities of people that may not share the same SoTs) that there are also 
different ways of understanding objectivity: for a community being objective 
might mean to use the algorithmic method; for another using it in addition to the 
method of mathematical proof. In sum, in Hacking there are different 
'objectivities' because there are different SoTs, which are 'prior to them'.
Moreover, Hacking also maintains that objectivity is an organising concept. 
Therefore we can conclude that, once a certain community of people adopts one or 
more SoTs, a certain form of objectivity is in place, and this form of objectivity is a 
concept that organises the thinking and the system of values of the members of 
that very community. Now, since SoTs are 'prior to the concept of objectivity', can 
we say that the concept of SoT is an organizing concept too? I would refrain from 
using this qualifier. An organising concept -  in Hacking's characterization -  is an 
inescapable concept, a concept that is necessary for the functioning of our 
community and our life (Hacking 1999a, p. 65). In this sense the concept of SoT is 
not inescapable, although in chapter three and four I have used it to organise our 
scientific thinking and the different forms of objectivity that have emerged in the 
history of the sciences.
Let us now turn to Daston and Galison. At first it would seem that they 
prise the concept of objectivity away from any other notion. According to this 
misreading, they would limit themselves to identifying different ontological, 
epistemological, methodological or moral senses of objectivity and to tracing their 
genesis and development in scientific practices. Actually, as I am going to explain, 
each conception of objectivity is rooted in an epistemic virtue, as Daston and
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Galison call the scientific ideal to which scientists are committed in a particular 
period or circumstance. Indeed, consider first that for Daston and Galison
scientific objectivity always counters some aspect of the self, but not 
always the same one. This is why the genus objectivity embraces the 
species of both mechanical and structural objectivity—and no doubt 
potentially others as well. Because the subjectivity is multifarious, 
objectivity must be too (Dear et al. 2012, p. 31).
For example, mechanical objectivity is the expression of the fear of one's 
subjectivity (Daston and Galison 1992, p. 83): it opposes the post-Kantian unified 
self organized around the will (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 199). On the other 
hand, the enemies of truth-to-nature and trained judgment are external, Daston 
and Galison argue: the overwhelming wealth of irrelevant variations of nature for 
the former and the clutter of incidental details and artefacts introduced by 
mechanical objectivity for the latter. The battle is fought by what Daston and 
Galison depict as different prototypical knowers of nature, which in turn 
correspond to the different epistemic virtues: the 'insightful sage' (truth-to- 
nature), the 'diligent worker '(mechanical objectivity), the 'trained expert' (trained 
judgement) (Daston 1999, pp. 98-100) (Daston and Galison 2007, pp. 216-233). 
These scientific personas cultivate particular traits of the self and pursue different 
values at the expense of others. Epistemic virtue is therefore the term with ethical 
overtones that Daston and Galison use to describe the values pursued by scientists 
in the battle for knowledge against powerful enemies such as those just 
mentioned. In this sense truth to nature, mechanical objectivity, trained judgem ent
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can be seen either as epistemic virtues or as different forms of objectivity.
Although the epistemic virtues oppose different sorts of subjectivities, they 
all serve a common ideal, that of being faithful to nature. So, one can say that 
Daston and Galison present a history of the ways of being faithful to nature, a 
point that I will develop in the next section from a different perspective. In 
conclusion, there is a plurality of epistemic virtues or, alternatively, different 
forms of objectivity, which oppose different sorts of subjectivities and serve the 
common ideal of being faithful to nature.
I wish to insist on the fact that in Daston and Galison the concept of 
epistemic virtue is inseparable from the concept of objectivity: there is an 
epistemic virtue for each form of objectivity. It cannot be said that the concept of 
epistemic virtue is prior to the concept of objectivity, i.e. that it makes objectivity 
possible just as the concept of SoT makes objectivity possible. Indeed, the concept 
of epistemic virtue is simply the other side of the concept of objectivity or, rectius, 
each epistemic virtue represents the other side of a conception of objectivity: as 
Daston and Galison say each conception of objectivity is 'rooted' in an epistemic 
virtue or, equally, in an epistemic fear (Daston and Galison 2008, p. 671). 
Consequently, unlike the concept of SoT, the concept of epistemic virtue is an 
organizing concept: each epistemic virtue (i.e. each conception of objectivity) 
organises the thinking of scientists concerning their system of values in scientific 
research or how to perform experiments and interpret their result. In general, by 
creating relations of significance, epistemic values direct research into certain 
directions, as Martin Carrier illustrated (Carrier 2012).
It is unfortunate that Daston and Galison's study is limited to scientific
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atlases and the SoTs introduced by Hacking have not been examined in order to 
identify the epistemic virtues involved. Although Hacking, Daston and Galison 
agree on the existence of a plurality of 'objectivities', it is still an open question 
whether or not all the SoTs represent forms of objectivities that Daston and 
Galison would trace back to epistemic virtues.
5.4.3 Styles of Thinking and Epistemic Virtues: Some Substantial 
Convergences
As a further point, according to Daston and Galison, the discovery of 
photography was crucial for the emergence of truth-to-nature. Epistemic virtues, 
therefore, like SoTs, are made possible by contingent reasons; then they can 
conflict each other or intertwine, and, in principle, vanish; when a new epistemic 
virtue comes into being, the old ones do not necessarily pass away. Here, the 
resemblances between the notion of epistemic virtue and that of SoT are striking. 
Furthermore, Daston and Galison say that
the atlas is always - and fundamentally- an exemplary form of 
collective empiricism: [...] Atlas users become the people of a book, 
which teaches them how to make sense of their sliver-world and how  
to communicate with one another about it (Daston and Galison 2007, p.
27).
It is a sliver-world because, as matter of fact, atlases select what is im portant to ask, 
see, depict, teach and learn so that they exclude portions of the world, questions
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and perspectives. This may mean that for the members of a community who 
pursue certain epistemic virtues some aspects of phenomena (those that have been 
excluded) cannot play any role in the evidential considerations that bear on their 
knowledge. For example, the physicist Arthur Worthington (1852-1916), by relying 
only on his eyes, made symmetrical drawings of the impact of drops of liquids 
falling vertically on a surface of water (Daston and Galison 2007, pp. 11-16). In 
other words, Worthington discarded some features of the phenomenon in the 
name of the ideal of symmetry. Later on, after having succeeded in stopping a 
droplet's splash with a photograph, which showed that the phenomenon was 
anything but symmetrical, he converted to the 'objective view', i.e. to the epistemic 
virtue of mechanical objectivity. Arguably, under the new possibilities of a 
'mechanical objective vision', those variations that had been discarded under the 
'truth-to-nature vision', could have become the evidence for more accurate theories 
that describe the splash of a drop. Ultimately, epistemic virtues select end exclude 
portions of the world and shape what can and what cannot be considered as 
'evidence'. Similarly, SoTs select and exclude, opening a specific space of 
possibilities and relegating to the oblivion questions, concepts and kinds of 
evidence. A case in point is the historico-genetic SoT: the community of scientists 
that adopted it turned their eyes to a previously unnoticed portion of the world that 
became the evidence for their new theories: fossils, minerals, rocks and geological 
layers.
Nevertheless, the role played by scientific atlases is not only limited to 
selecting and excluding. By reminding her readers that Foucault described the 
museum in terms of the difference between objects and concepts, Beth Lord
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argued that museums do not only display objects but also systems of 
representations (Lord 2006). What is true of museums is much truer of atlases: 
they are representations of phenomena. More importantly, atlases reveal the 
contingences and the discontinuities of hum an conceptual schemes. As spaces of 
representations, atlases are the tangible historicization of Kant's idea of a fixed 
system of representations that applies to all phenomena. From the characterization 
of what has to be considered as the 'ideal image' in representing organic systems 
to the descriptions of manipulations of objects, what Daston and Galison do is a 
Foucaldian analysis of different 'orders of things'.
5.5 Reinterpreting the Concept of Style of Thinking: 
Williams and Hacking
Hacking's writings that date from after 2000 present a interesting rereading 
of the concept of SoT inspired by the philosopher Bernard Williams. In 2002, the 
latter published Truth and Truthfulness (Williams 2002) an essay that explores the 
value of truth and the meaning of truthfulness. For the benefit of his argument, 
Williams reflected on different commitments to truthfulness that originated in 
certain historical periods, took over one from another or coexisted. Hacking found 
this set of reflections on truth-telling very interesting (Hacking 2004, p. 137) and 
re-described his notion of SoT from Williams's perspective. In this and the next 
section, I shall compare Williams's account of truth and truthfulness w ith
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Hacking's views in order to explore the philosophical import of the notion of SoT.
I do not see this analysis as conceptually separated from the content of the 
previous section: once I shall have explained Hacking's point that SoTs are 
different 'ways of being truthful', SoTs and epistemic virtues will look much more 
tight related concepts.
In his book William points out that some philosophers, called 'deniers' 
(Williams 2002, p. 5) are suspicious of the fact that any historical account can aim 
at truth: the stories that are told about the past, e.g. that of European anti-Semitism 
or the French Revolution, are always biased or ideological. Therefore, they say, we 
should admit that the concept of 'pursuit of truth' is empty and truth or 
truthfulness cannot be considered as values. Williams defends the opposite thesis 
that any hum an society needs to possess truth and truthfulness as values. His 
move is to look at truthfulness from a historical perspective in order to provide a 
narrative that reveals the role of truthfulness in different societies, the way it came 
about and developed. Indeed, according to Williams, truthfulness has a history 
and telling it will show that all the societies need dispositions of truthfulness and 
the sense of the value of truth, otherwise they 'lose everything' (Williams 2002, p. 
7). I shall not examine the whole of Williams's reply to the deniers; instead, I shall 
focus on those parts of his argument that are interesting for my purposes. In 
particular, I shall make it clear that both Williams and Hacking start from a 
common premise; then, discussing an example of Williams about how 
truthfulness changes, I shall make some more points about the concept of SoT.
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5.5.1 Truth and Truthfulness
The premise of Williams's account of truthfulness and truth is that they are 
radically different categories - truthfulness has a history, truth does not. For him, 
truthfulness essentially means to tell stories respecting truth, i.e. to tell the truth 
about something. In turn this means to be accurate and sincere: accuracy implies 
doing one's best to acquire true beliefs and sincerity implies telling exactly these 
beliefs to other people. These two dispositions have a history because the way of 
being sincere or accurate has changed throughout different cultural situations and 
ways of thinking: for example, Williams argues th a t '[ . . .]  a set of ideas, which 
associate Sincerity with personal authenticity, [...] came into distinct existence in 
the eighteenth century' (Williams 2002, p. 172) and, as we shall see in the next 
subsection, Denis Diderot (1713-1784)) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) had 
two distinct ideas of sincerity and authenticity.
While sincerity and accuracy, and thus truthfulness, are historically 
changeable, the concept of truth has never changed. By saying this, Williams 
means that the idea of what truth is, the role that this idea plays in talking, 
thinking, arguing and so on has always been the same in history: the concept of 
truth for an Egyptian or a Greek is absolutely the same of that for a European in 
the Middle Ages or for us; even if, telling their stories, they all have been 
answering to different standards or values.
This view is entirely shared by Hacking. Although in his review of Truth 
and Truthfulness he points out that Williams's claim that truth is a hum an universal 
is 'more of an assertion than an argued statement' (Hacking 2004, p. 140) it 
remains the key premise of the SoTs project: 'I accept as a convention that truth is
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a formal concept, without content and history' (Hacking 2006f, p. 3) I invite the 
reader to bear this important claim in mind as my argument proceeds in the next 
two chapters. For the time being I just want to make it more precise: by saying that 
styles of reasoning settle what to be objective means, Hacking does not want to 
say that logic and the concept of truth change through time. Indeed, one's exercise 
of rationality involves logical argument and evidence (in different forms); it is 
only what is considered as amenable to public evidence, i.e. what is objective, 
which changes switching from a style into another, not the types of inferences 
(deduction, induction and abduction) used in arguments and the concept of what 
truth is.
5.5.2 Shifts in the Way of Telling the Truth
Having discussed Williams's premise, I shall now examine more closely what he 
means by saying that truthfulness can change. In Truth and Truthfulness he 
illustrates the different conceptions of the self associated with Rousseau and 
Diderot. Rousseau's project in his Confessions was to reveal himself to his readers. 
One of his main questions was to understand how to bring about a concord 
between what one is for oneself and what one is for others (Williams 2002, p. 175). 
A passage of Williams explains what Rousseau's answer was:
Sincere, spontaneous, non-deceitful declaration, the product of his 
presence to himself, will guarantee a true understanding of [one's] 
motives. Moreover, what is revealed and understood in this way will 
represent a character, a whole person, and this implies that it will be 
coherent, or, as one might say, steady (Williams 2002, p. 178)
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A precise conception of sincerity underlies this answer: sincerity means to declare 
what is immediately evident to oneself. In turn this conception implies an idea of 
the self as a set of constant unchanging features ('steadiness') that can be revealed 
once and for all.
Williams contrasts Rousseau with Diderot. The latter wrote Rameau's 
Nephew (published in 1805), an imaginary conversation between 'm oi', the 
narrator, and 'lui'. Diderot wanted to understand how the interaction with other 
people could stabilize the whimsical inconstant mental constitution of people. 
Indeed, Rameau is described as a person who does not know who he is, '[who] 
expresses different things at different times' (Williams 2002, p. 190). As Williams 
explains:
Diderot was always attracted to a picture of the self as something 
constantly shifting and reacting and altering [...] for him the 
declaration at a given instant of self can be only a declaration of self at 
that instant (Williams 2002, p. 190).
To conclude, while for Diderot sincerity meant uninhibited expression, for 
Rousseau it meant to report the finding of self-examination.
5.5.3 Style of Thinking as Ways of Telling The Truth
While Williams, given his aims, limited his analysis to truthfulness about domains 
such as the past or the self, Hacking tried to generalize it to other domains of 
knowledge: 'I interpret [Williams' account] as a genealogy of the possibility of
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telling the truth in a domain or another7 (Hacking 2006f, p. 5). He proposed this 
schema:
the emergence of a new SoT is represented by a change in 
conceptions of what it is to tell the truth about X (Hacking 2004, 
p. 142).
In the case of Williams's case studies, X was 'the self7 or 'the past7, but for Hacking 
X extends to many other domains of knowledge: e.g. the geometrical relations in 
the case of the geometrical style. For example, following Hacking suggestion we 
can say that the style of geometry represents a shift of the conception of what 
means to tell the truth about the geometrical relations: whereas the Egyptians used 
algorithmic methods, the Greeks introduced geometry, their new method for 
telling the truth. Ultimately, the schema above, rather than being a proper 
definition of SoT, represents a different perspective suggested by Williams from 
which SoTs are viewed as ways of telling the truth, distinct modes of being 
truthful.
Let us now consider Diderot's and Rousseau's ideas of the self: Diderot was 
committed to the uninhibited expression of himself, whereas Rousseau was 
committed to the non-deceitful declaration of feelings. By paraphrasing Daston 
and Galison it is possible to say that just as in telling the truth about the self 
Diderot and Rousseau were committed to two different 'non epistemic virtues', 
two different conceptions of both authenticity and sincerity, so in telling the truth
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about nature scientists are committed to different epistemic virtues. Williams's 
account in ethics parallels Daston and Galison's in epistemology.
Moreover, according to Williams' schema, just as Diderot's and Rousseau's 
conceptions of the self represent two different ways of being truthful to it so SoTs 
represent 'different ways of being truthful to nature'. Since there is no significant 
change of sense resulting from the substitution of the adjective 'truthful' with the 
adjective 'faithful' it is possible to say that according to Williams' schema SoTs are 
'ways of being faithful to nature '- and this is exactly one of the ways in which 
Daston and Galison have characterized the commitment to epistemic virtues. In 
short, SoTs as well as the commitments to epistemic virtues can be considered as 
different ways of telling the truth about nature or, likewise, as different ways of 
being objective.
5.5.4 Style of Thinking as Ways of Looking at the World
The comparison between SoTs, epistemic virtues and ways of being truthful can 
be pushed further. Let us reconsider Diderot's and Rousseau's pictures of the self 
instead than their conceptions of sincerity. For Diderot the self was 'disintegrated' 
(Williams 2002, p. 189), the result of spontaneity, its manifestation, it consisted of 
all that can be 'seen' and is 'external' in a given moment: e.g. jokes, lies and 
expressions. For Rousseau, it was an unchanging unity, all that is 'internal' and in 
need of being expressed: e.g. feeling, emotions and states of mind. In other words, 
both Diderot and Rousseau selected a particular aspect of the self and excluded 
others: the former directed his attention to the exterior product of spontaneity; the 
latter directed his attention to interior states of the self. In the previous section I
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had pointed out that also SoTs and epistemic virtues select and exclude: each SoT 
has its own questions and each epistemic virtue teaches how to make sense of a 
certain sliver-world. Ultimately, SoTs and epistemic virtues can be viewed not 
only as ways of being truthful but also as particular ways of looking at the portion 
of the world under study, which shed light on particular aspects of it and put 
others in the shade. This may well be the consequence of human inability of 
encompassing all the aspects of things.
5.6 Conclusions
I have argued that the SoTs project can be better understood within the context of 
historical epistemology, which I have described. A salient point of my analysis is 
that Hacking's is one of the projects of historical epistemology that historicize 
Kant. In this respect, a profound insight into the notion of SoT can be gained by an 
analysis of classical historical epistemology to which I have traced back many ideas 
of the SoTs project. There are also substantial convergences between the SoTs 
project and Daston and Galison's study on objectivity, although the notion of SoT, 
as a concept, is different from the notion of epistemic virtue. Finally, Williams' 
account of truth and truthfulness helps to show that SoTs are ways of telling the 
truth and ways of looking at the world.
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Chapter Six: Knowledge, Styles of 
Thinking and the Relativism Issue
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shall discuss a philosophical issue concerning the notion of SoT. 
This issue boils down to the question as to whether the SoTs project implies 
epistemic relativism. My aim is to bring it to the fore as well as examine and frame 
it. Only in the next chapter will I tackle this issue (henceforth 'relativism issue') by 
arguing that Hacking's claims do have relativistic implications.
The relativism issue is best described by comparing historical epistemology 
and Edward Craig's approach to epistemology, the so-called 'state-of-nature 
approach'. Craig explored the needs of cooperative human beings in an imaginary 
state-of-nature society in order to explain the role and the features of the concept 
of knowledge. The state-of-nature scenario provides a logical rather than a 
historical model that I shall apply to the SoTs project in order to elaborate a new 
view of it and clarify some points that are still unclear. The most important 
conclusion that I will reach is that the SoTs project does not imply alethic 
relativism although, as it will be clear, it is still an open question whether or not it 
implies epistemic relativism. I shall conclude that Hacking has not provided
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sufficient reasons to exorcise epistemic relativism, despite his insistence on anti­
relativism.
6.2 State-of-Nature Approach versus Historical 
Epistemology: the Concept of Knowledge
As I have explained in the previous chapter historical epistemologists think that 
organizing concepts can be historical. Specifically, if we focus on the (organizing) 
concept of knowledge we have every reason to think that Hacking considers it as 
historical and situated. Indeed, in 'Historical Meta-Epistemology' first he listed 
this concept among the organizing concepts:
Historical meta-epistemology [HE] is concerned with very general 
organizing concepts that we use today: knowledge, belief, evidence, 
good reason, objectivity, probability (Hacking 1999a, p. 58 my 
emphasis)
and then, in the following paragraph he stated that
'[historical epistemologists] begin with the common place that 
organizing concepts [...] change, evolve and undergo mutations 
(Hacking 1999a, p. 59).
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But, does the concept of knowledge really have a history? As it will be clear in the 
next section, there is nothing in the SoTs project that implies this conclusion. If 
anything, by relying on methods different from those of HE, the philosopher 
Edward Craig in the book Knowledge and the State of Nature (Craig 1990) provided 
an indirect answer to this question that contrasts with Hacking's claims above. 
And if we look at the notion of SoT from the perspective of Craig's approach to 
epistemology we are forced to conclude that the concept of knowledge does not 
change over history. In order to argue for these theses I shall start by comparing 
Craig's approach with HE.
6.2.1 State-of-Nature Approach versus Historical Epistemology:
Same Questions Different Methods
Central to Craig's reflection on epistemology is the question as to why, in addition 
to the concept of true belief, we have a concept of knowledge at all. In asking this 
question Craig distances himself from traditional epistemology that pays no 
attention to the social value and the function of knowledge. Like HE, Craig's 
approach to epistemology is not normative in that, rather than investigating the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, he wants to present an account 
of the reasons why, to paraphrase Hacking, the concept of knowledge became 
'ours, present and inescapable' (Hacking 1999a, p. 65). Craig's approach is similar 
to that of HE also in another respect: he actually asks why the organizing concept 
of knowledge came about just as Hacking asks how the organizing concept of 
probability emerged. However, Craig adopts a method of analysis that radically 
differs from that of HE: he tells a fictional story about an epistemic state of nature.
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This approach, called 'state-of-nature approach', takes as his model the 
tradition of naturalism in which philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu and Rousseau saw concepts, practices and institutions as the 
outcome of natural causes (Craig 1990, pp 8-9). Just as in Leviathan (1651) Hobbes 
looked at the human behaviour in a state of mere nature in order to establish the 
rational principles for the construction of a civil polity, so Craig gives a full 
account of the concept of knowledge by exploring the needs of cooperative human 
beings in an imaginary state-of-nature society.
6.2.2 The Concept of Trustworthy Informant
In presenting his fictional story Craig takes as a solid point to start from this
one:
Any community may be presumed to have an interest in evaluating 
sources of information [...]. [T]he concept of knowledge is used to flag 
approved sources of information (Craig 1990, p. 11)
Craig posits that the concept of knowledge came about in our early societies to 
satisfy fundamental epistemic needs: the need of acquiring true beliefs, of 
exploiting the information possessed by others and of signalling trustworthy 
informants. By saying that a teacher knows when Napoleon was bom  it is meant 
that the teacher is a good informant about Napoleon's date of birth. Here, the role 
of the term 'knows' is that of signalling that the teacher is a good informant.
Notice that Craig's claim strikingly contrasts with that of the historical 
epistemologists: for Craig, given our epistemic needs, it is inevitable that we have
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this concept whereas for the historical epistemologists organizing concepts emerge 
for contingent reasons, which are revealed by studying their history.
If knowledge is a concept that inquirers used to flag an approved informant 
K in the state of nature, there must be certain features possessed by K that make us 
think that she can be taken into account as a trustworthy informant As Craig puts 
it:
What I have in mind is that if the informant possesses any condition 
which correlates well - as we believe - with telling the truth about p, he 
will be regarded as a good source (Craig 1990, p. 13).
According to Craig, in the state-of-nature society for being trustworthy an 
informant had to: 1) hold a true belief p; 2) be honest and understandable towards 
the inquirer; 3) be able to make the inquirer believe that p; 4) be accessible to the 
inquirer; 5) possess indicator-properties XI. . .Xn  that correlated well w ith having 
all these features. For example, 'Fred, who is up a tree, is more likely to tell me the 
truth as to the whereabouts of the tiger than Mabel, who is in the cave' (Craig 
1990, p. 9). Features l)-5) are not necessary and sufficient conditions; in particular 
situations of the state of nature one or more of the elements above could well be 
lacking. Furthermore, the set of properties XI. . .Xn  has no precise identity: in 
certain circumstances a property could be that of having arrived at the belief by a 
reliable method; in other cases, even being willing to offer an opinion correlates 
with being right.
6.2.3 State-of-Nature Approach versus Historical Epistemology: 
Different Conclusions
Kusch calls 'proto-knowledge' the concept of knowledge that emerges in the state- 
of-nature in order to flag trustworthy informants. (Kusch unpublished 
manuscript) (Kusch 2011b). As historical epistemologists want to know how 
concepts have become present certainties so Craig wants to know how we got 
from the concept of proto-knowledge to the concept of knowledge. Again, 
although Craig shares with HE similar objectives, he adopts a different method. 
Instead of hypothesizing the existence of historical contexts that made it possible 
the crystallization of the concept of knowledge out of certain practices, he tries to 
imagine and describe the process, which he calls the process of 'objectification', 
which takes from the concept of proto-knowledge to that of knowledge. Craig 
illustrates the process of objectification with the imaginary example of the 
emergence of the concept of chair (Craig 1990, p. 84). In Craig's example, as I 
interpret it, the various stages of the process of objectification of the concept of 
chair parallel those concerning the process of objectification of the concept of 
knowledge (however, notice that the latter is an organizing concept whereas the 
former is not). One could be interested in 'something' which she can sit on here 
and now, says Craig; then, in other circumstances, in 'something' which one can 
sit on sometimes in the future and somewhere in the space. Similarly, we can 
suppose that in the state of nature inquirers started to look for an informant to be 
trusted in situations that could emerge in the future. One may also imagine, adds 
Craig, that other people, interested too in sitting at future times, ask to other 
people whether this sort of objects exists. This stage parallels that in which
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informants are recommended from inquirers to other inquirers: being 
recommended became a property that indicates knowledge. Then, continues 
Craig, one might wish that anyone should have something suitable to sit on if she 
wants to. Hence, the emergence of 'the concept of something which is, in 
abstraction from what any particular person wants at any particular time and 
place, or even from whether anyone ever wants to sit down, simply suitable for 
sitting on' (Craig 1990, p. 84). At this point, the concept of a chair is objectivized: it 
emerges to satisfy the need of this abstraction.
It is possible to assume that, in a way similar to the case of the concept of 
chair, hum an beings started to call someone a knower even though this very 
knower was not accessible to them. One does not need to think that truly things 
went on according to the process of objectification that takes from the concept of 
proto-knowledge to that of knowledge. But it makes sense that this kind of 
explanation applies to the transition from an imaginary state-of-nature society to a 
real human society in which the concept of knowledge crystallized. Indeed, some 
of the features 1) and 5) of a proto-knower disappear when we think of a knower: 
for example, an individual possesses knowledge even if we will never have access 
to it and we will never know that she possesses it. Ultimately:
What happens to the concept at the centre of our investigation, that of 
good informant, as objectification proceeds? The requirement of true 
belief remains, and so does that of a property correlating well with 
truth of belief on the issue in hand [...] (Craig 1990, p. 90).
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To sum up, for us a trustworthy informant should possess a true belief and a set of 
properties X that correlates well with having it. But, importantly, it remains true 
what I have stressed in the case of the proto-concept of knowledge: the set X 
cannot be fixed, that is, valid in all the situations.
In conclusion, by using methods different from HE Craig argues that the 
concept of knowledge cannot be historicized. For him, its role of flagging 
informants who possess a true belief and a property X, no matter which one, 
which correlates well with it, has not changed over history:
the core of the concept of knowledge is an outcome of certain very 
general facts about the human situations (Craig, 1990 p.10)
As these facts are so general 'that one cannot imagine their changing whilst 
anything we can still recognize as social life persists' (Craig, 1990 p.10), he 
concludes:
'there is not a reason to expect the concept of knowing to change as 
well' (Craig, 1990 p.10).
This conclusion is at odds with Hacking's general claim that organizing concepts 
are historical and situated.
6.3 From Craig's State-of-Nature Approach to the 
Styles Project
It must be emphasized that Hacking's claim that knowledge belongs to the kind of 
concepts that are historical is unsubstantiated. Indeed, there is nothing in the SoTs 
project (as well as in Daston and Galison's account of objectivity) that plays in 
favour of this claim; if anything, the core thesis of his project can be couched in 
terms of the concept of trustworthy informant discussed above.
In order to support this claim let us choose as a case study the emergence of 
the laboratory SoT. It is easy to see that its coming to the fore did not involve any 
change of the concept of trustworthy informant (knower), rather a change of who 
is to be considered a trustworthy informant. Indeed, as I have argued in section 
2.5, the story of Hobbes fighting Boyle (told by Shapin and Schaffer) can be 
interpreted as a dispute between two men who had two different SoTs 
(respectively, the postulational and the laboratory SoT). In his A  Social History of 
Truth Shapin argued that in the seventeenth century the decision of whether or not 
to believe in the interpretation of an experiment was largely a question of what 
kind of person to trust. Shapin claimed that in the community of the Royal Society 
it was the gentleman who was counted trustworthy because of his moral qualities:
Gentlemen were truth-tellers because nothing could work upon them
that would induce them to be otherwise (Shapin 1994, p. 84)
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therefore:
If one wished to make experimental knowledge, then here [in the 
laboratory] were the technical, social and discursive means with which 
it might be made (Shapin 1994, p. 127 my emphasis).
Conversely, for Hobbes:
The geometer [...] could do better than the experimentalist (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1989 [1985], p. 151)
in that:
when its methods [are] rightly followed, geometry yield[s] irrefutable 
and incontestable knowledge (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 [1985], p. 100)
These passages show that Hobbes and Boyle possessed the same concept of 
knower: it was someone who possessed a true belief and a property X, no matter 
which one, which correlated well with it. They only disagreed on which property X 
had to be attributed to the knower: for Boyle it was the property of possessing the 
methods of the laboratory SoT; for Hobbes it was the property of possessing the 
methods of the postulational SoT. In other words, they disagreed on the answer to 
the following question: who were the trustworthy informants? But for both of 
them 'knowledge' had the same meaning: it was a 'tag', so to speak, that could be 
attributed to the experimenter (for Boyle) or to the geometer (for Hobbes). It is in
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this sense that we can say that the concept of knowledge is invariant. What may 
change when a new SoT emerges is that the adherents of the new SoT are not 
viewed as trustworthy informants by the adherents of the old one, e.g. because 
they adopt certain ways of thinking and doing, methods and standards of 
evidence. For example, for the members of the Royal Society the private work of 
alchemists became a marker of bad informant.
It is to be noted that just as the SoTs project does not imply that the concept 
of knowledge varies (although Hacking includes it among the organizing concepts 
that can be historicized) so does not Daston and Galison's account of objectivity. 
An example may clarify this point. In Objectivity Daston and Galison mention the 
confrontation between embryologist Wilhelm His (1831-1904) and the colleague 
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) about the use of embryological evidence (Daston and 
Galison 2007, p. 191). It was an opposition between two ways of collecting 
evidence based respectively on drawing and photographing: Haeckel used his 
drawings, which show the essentials of embryological phases of mammals, to 
make his point that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. On the other hand, His 
proposed an elaborate mechanical method of making images and accused Haeckel 
of introducing subjective elements and prejudices into his drawings. Daston and 
Galison comment:
The His-Haeckel confrontation dramatizes the transformation of 
scientific ideals and practices [...] By the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, the epistemology and ethos of truth-to-nature had 
been supplemented [...] by [...] mechanical objectivity (Daston and 
Galison 2007, p. 195).
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Let us reframe Daston and Galison's point. In the nineteenth century, what in the 
eighteenth century community of scientists counted as a set of properties X I.. .Xn 
of the trustworthy informant was supplemented, and in some cases substituted, 
by new properties Yl...Yn. Obviously, both in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth 
century, for a certain part of the scientific world to possess a true belief and any 
property correlated with it was a necessary requirement for being a good 
informant. However, what counted as the set of properties that marked out the 
knower was different in the two cases: in the nineteenth century, to make use of 
illustrations that showed only the essentials of an object did not represent 
anymore a property that characterized a trustworthy informant. When this 
happened Haeckel came to be an untrustworthy informant for His. For a certain 
part of the thinkers in the nineteenth century drawing the essentials of an object 
did not correlate well with possessing a true belief, whereas in the previous 
century it did. Ultimately, from Daston and Galison's account does not emerge 
that the concept of knowledge changes, although the properties that identify the 
knower do. No wonder that in the case of Daston and Galison we have reached 
the same conclusions as for Hacking. When Daston and Galison claim that 'truth- 
to-nature, mechanical objectivity and trained judgement all combat genuine 
dangers to knowledge' (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 376) they are implicitly 
assuming that the concept of knowledge is unchanging. They discuss how 
epistemic virtues emerge in order to contrast the dangers to knowledge but they 
do not put forward any idea that implies that the concept of knowledge has 
changed over time. Finally, my analysis suggests that Daston and Galison's claim
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that epistemic virtues are 'a  plurality of visions of knowledge' (Daston and 
Galison 2007, p. 371) can be re-expressed by saying that epistemic virtues 
correspond to a variety of sets of properties that characterize the knower in 
different historical circumstances. These sets of properties, we might say, 
characterize the different 'scientific personas' (committed to different scientific 
virtues) described in Objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007, pp. 216-243) and 'The 
Moralized Objectivities of Science' (Daston 1999).
In the next subsection I shall elaborate on the points made here by reading the 
SoTs project in the light of Craig's concept of knowledge.
6.3.1 State-of-Nature Approach and the Styles of Thinking Project
We have seen how the concept of knowledge can be characterized in the 
state-of-nature approach. My question now is: how can SoTs be characterized in 
the same perspective? On the basis of my discussion in the previous subsection I 
propose the following characterization:
1) the exponents of distinct SoTs can be viewed as possible informants for a 
hypothetical inquirer.
2) the concept of knowledge, in particular its role of flagging informants who 
possess a true belief and a set of properties XI.. .Xn,  no matter which one, which 
correlates well with it, has not changed over history.
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3) at different times in the history of science, different sets of properties 
XI. . .Xn  have crystallized and have been claimed to be markers of a good 
informant.
It can be noted that the crucial factor that explains the existence of different SoTs is 
what I have called the set of properties XI . . .Xn that correlates well with holding a 
true belief. There is a close connection between properties XI. . .Xn  of a SoT and its 
presuppositions, which are, as I have explained, the methods, standards of 
evidence, questions, ways of thinking and doing that characterize a SoT. Indeed, 
we may expect that the presuppositions of a certain SoT identify certain properties 
of the informant that are recognizable by the inquirer: for example, to adopt the 
laboratory way of doing may well correspond to properties such as that of 
wearing a white coat. In certain situations a presupposition may coincide with a 
property Xi, that is, an inquirer can straightforwardly recognize a presupposition 
of the SoT of the informant, e.g. her way of doing or her methods of research, but 
this is not always the case. More often the inquirer will recognize a property Xi  
that signals the existence of a presupposition. As a simple example one may recall 
what Craig says:
the property of being a taxi-driver certainly cannot be identified with 
that of having discovered, by a reliable method, how to find one's way 
round the neighbourhood [...], although of course it is true of taxi 
drivers that they have found that out by a reliable method: driving 
round the place for hours and hours [...] so long as [the inquirer]
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believes that they do, and can recognize them, he can acquire the best 
information (Craig 1990, p. 26).
In this case, for an inquirer it is sufficient to recognize the property of driving a 
taxi since it is expected that in that case the informant has used a reliable method. 
Being a taxi driver is the property that signals the existence of a method. Similarly 
we may think that certain properties of the adherent of a certain SoT signal the 
existence of a method, the method of that very SoT. In conclusion SoTs identify 
certain presuppositions or, similarly, certain properties XI. . .Xn.  Presuppositions 
and properties XI. . .Xn  are isomorphic. Consequently, point 3) reduces to the 
already known claim that in the course of history of science certain 
SoTs/presuppositions/properties XI. . .Xn  have crystallized29.
Ultimately, over history it is possible to recognize the crystallization of 
several distinct sets of properties XI. . . .Xn  of what is considered the trustworthy 
informant. We may think of these properties XI. . .Xn  as related to the 
presuppositions of the new SoT of this informant. However, the role and the 
essential features of the concept of knowledge have remained intact: at any time an 
approved informant is someone who possesses a true belief and a set of properties 
XI. . .Xn  that make him distinguishable to any inquirer.
Moreover, we can now say that, although Hobbes and Boyle possessed the 
same concept of knowledge, they did not agree on what was the set XI. . .  Xn  
correlated with true beliefs of informants. When in the late 1650s the English
29 Before Hacking, Shapin and Schaffer had used the verb 'crystallize' in the Leviathan and 
A ir Pump, e.g. in (Shapin and Schaffer 1989 [1985]-a, p. 14), to refer to the formation of 
scientific communities. Following all of them I have used the same verb to refer to new  
SoTs or presuppositions or properties XI...Xn that come about and stabilize.
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experimental community started to use laboratory apparatuses in order to 
generate phenomena, a new way of providing evidence, the new kind of evidence 
provided by man-machines, crystallized. In turn, certain properties XI. . .Xn  
crystallized. To adhere to certain forms of discourse and certain modes of 
solidarity, to produce experimental knowledge in a public space, to provide 
evidence by using apparatuses were all part of the set of the properties that 
distinguished a good from a bad informant. Hobbes did not accept as a marker of 
a good informant these properties.
As a last point, I wish to explain that the state-of-nature approach can be 
used to address another question that Hacking's account of SoTs has left open. 
Suppose that a biochemist performs a blood test and presents the results to a non­
expert patient in a language appropriate for a lay audience. On the one hand, the 
biochemist has carried out the test by adopting the laboratory SoT and the 
statistical SoT; on the other hand, the non-expert patient has simply ascribed to the 
biochemist knowledge for what she asserted. Can we say that the non-expert 
patient is adopting a particular SoT? Or should we say that only the biochemist 
adopts the laboratory and the statistical SoT? Do SoTs concerns only groups of 
experts within a certain community? One way to answer these questions is that all 
the members of a given community share the same presuppositions and can 
understand and project (see subsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 for the use of these terms) 
the style-dependent sentences uttered by the experts of their community. But in 
the light of the state-of-nature approach we can say that the non-expert patient 
ascribes knowledge to the biochemist because she recognizes certain properties 
X I .. .Xn that distinguish the good from the bad informant. To wear a white coat
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and work in a hospital could well represent a property Xi  that the patient is 
looking for: so long as she believes that Xi  correlates well with acquiring the best 
information about her physical conditions, the patient does not need to know 
anything about the reliable method used by the biochemist. Therefore, the expert 
and the non-expert who belong to the same community share the belief that a set 
of properties XI. . .Xn  identifies a trustworthy informant. The expert may have a 
deeper understanding of why XI. . .Xn  is a marker of a true belief but both the 
expert and the non-expert agree on considering XI. . .Xn  the propriety that is 
required. This identity of views about XI. . .Xn,  i.e. about the physiognomy of the 
trustworthy informant, descends from the circumstance that both the expert and 
the non-expert share the same presuppositions, to which XI. . .Xn  point to. 
Ultimately, 'to adopt a certain SoT' means 'to belong to a community whose 
members agree about the properties that define a trustworthy informant' or, 
equally, 'to belong to a community whose members share the same 
presuppositions'.
6.4 The Relativism Issue
Let us return to the Boyle-Hobbes dispute. When the laboratory SoT emerged, it 
raised the question (to which Hobbes answered in the negative) as to whether to 
consider the gentlemen of Boyle's community as trustworthy informants. Since a 
similar question might have been asked, mutatis mutandis, when other SoTs 
emerged, it is better to give to it a general formulation: 'which informants should
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one accept?'. That is: 'which sets of properties X I ...Xn should one accept? Which 
presuppositions?
We come to see that an important issue underlies the SoTs project. This 
issue arises from a double claim, which in the light of my analysis can be couched 
in these terms: on the one hand the SoTs project does not imply that the concept of 
knowledge has a history; on the other hand it implies that the properties XI. . .Xn  
that help to recognize the knower do have a history. Then the question is: how 
then can we recognize knowledge? That is, which set XI. . .Xn  should we single 
out in order to be justified in choosing a certain informant? This is not an abstract 
dilemma that vanishes when we come to concrete examples. Suppose that a 
speaker that belongs to a given community that adopts a certain SoT utters a style- 
dependent sentence. A listener that belongs to a different community with a 
different SoT can come to see the presuppositions that make that sentence true-or- 
false in the speaker's SoT. The sentence would become intelligible to the listener 
but she could ask: are those presuppositions right or wrong? At that point, the 
listener would require independent presuppositions to provide an answer to this 
question. Do these independent presuppositions exist? Is what is true-or-false for a 
certain community true-or-false for any community? And if so, how are we to 
justify this claim? In this section I shall give a precise identity to the philosophical 
issue I am discussing. Then I shall argue that Hacking does not provide any clue 
about how to address it.
6.4.1 What Kind of Incommensurability?
At first glance, it seems that the issue I am discussing resembles those 
incommensurability problems in which it is asked whether there is a 'common 
measure', that is a universal standard for comparing the merits of competing 
paradigms or theories. In this subsection I shall argue that this intuition is correct, 
although the kind of incommensurability issue posed by the SoTs project is 
different in nature from that discussed by previous philosophers of science such as 
Feyerabend and Kuhn.
The term 'incommensurable' originated in the sixteenth century from 
Medieval Latin incommensurabilis ('not-measurable-together'). It was and it is still 
used in mathematics and physics to indicate the concept of two entities not 
measurable by the same standard. Typically, two lengths are commensurable if one 
can express their ratio as that of two integers m and n.
So far as I am aware, Fleck has been the first to use the word 
'incommensurable' in philosophy of science. In his papers in Polish he borrowed 
from mathematics the term niewspolmiernosc (Sady 2012), which is translated into 
the German term inkommensurabel in his Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. 
He wanted to express the idea that certain concepts, which are not replaced with 
adequate substitutes in an emerging thought style, cannot be brought into the 
usual logical relations of inclusion, exclusion, overlap with new concepts (see for 
example Fleck 1979 [1935], p. 62). The SoTs project does not investigate the 
compatibility of concepts within a given SoT. However, it would be correct to say 
that, as for Fleck there is no common measure that makes it possible to understand 
both old and new concepts, so for Hacking there is no common m easure that
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allows a given community to understand and use all the concepts that have come 
about and will come about over history. This common measure is to be 
understood as a common thought style in the case of Fleck and a common SoT in 
the case of Hacking.
It is a fact that only with Kuhn and Feyerabend did the term 
'incommensurable' catch on in philosophy of science. Kuhn matured the notion of 
incommensurability under the influence of philosophers such as Ludwik Fleck30 
and Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) and Gestalt psychologists such as Wolfgang 
Kohler (1887-1967). According to Eric Oberheim, Feyerabend developed it more 
than a decade earlier than Kuhn, drawing it from Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) who, 
in turn, had developed it already in 1906 (Oberheim 2005, p. 372). Feyerabend 
used for the first time the term 'incommensurable' to describe the relation between 
two non instantial-theories, i.e. theories that have ontological implications about the 
nature of the world. Feyerabend claimed that two such theories are 
incommensurable because the concepts of one theory can
neither be defined on the basis of the primitive descriptive terms of the 
other [theory], nor related to them via a correct empirical statement 
(Feyerabend 1962, p. 59)
Concepts do not 'keep intact' from a theory into another. Feyerabend illustrated 
this idea by comparing geometrical and wave optics or physics and relativity. For 
example, he maintained that the term 'mass', as used in classical physics, denotes
30 Kuhn read the Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact in 1949-50, as he says in his 
foreword of 1976 to the English edition of the book.
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a constant property of a body, while in theory of relativity it denotes the total 
quantity of energy divided by the speed of light squared.
To grasp the cause of meaning change it is necessary to consider that for 
Feyerabend the framework of a theory gives meaning to its theoretical and 
empirical terms. In turn, these meanings affect our ontology, our conception of 
what exists. For example our ontological concept of what light is made of has 
changed from the corpuscular theory to the wave theory; each of the theories 
proposed has given meaning to its theoretical terms and this, in turn, has 
determined a different ontological concept of what light is. Since the framework 
of a theory gives meaning to its empirical terms (as well as its theoretical ones) it is 
not possible to count on empirical facts in order to find a universal criterion to 
judge between different theories. Therefore theories are incommensurable: there is 
no common criterion, to decide which ontological consequences are correct31.
we no longer assume an objective world that remains unaffected by our 
epistemic activities (Feyerabend 1988 [1975], p. 19)
Like Feyerabend, Kuhn believed in the impossibility of defining the terms 
of one theory on the basis of the terms of the other. Moreover, under the influence 
of Fleck, he maintained that different paradigms use concepts that are 
incompatible. However, as he refined his ideas, Kuhn developed a concept of 
incommensurability not only limited to the idea of translation failure. He argued 
that incommensurability was not only caused by linguistic factors but also by
31 Beside conceptual inconsistence, Feyerabend also argued for the logical inconsistence 
between theories. I will ignore this point.
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differences in methods for setting up research and evaluating its results. 
Furthermore, under the influence of the Gestalt psychologists, he also spoke of 
differences of perceptions between adherents of different paradigms. It is from the 
collaboration of all these elements that incommensurability follows. For example, 
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he argued that in the seventeenth century 
different people might have viewed in a different way the same stone swinging 
from a string. An Aristotelian would have seen the stone as constrained in its 
downward motion; an adherent of the new Galilean physics would have seen a 
pendulum  that repeats the same motion forever. Kuhn claimed that these two 
conceptualizations are incommensurable because there is no neutral way to 
adjudicate between them:
[This is the] most fundamental aspect of the incommensurability [...]
The proponents of different paradigms practice their trades in different 
worlds. One contains constrained bodies that fall slowly, the other 
pendulums that repeat their motions again and again. [...] Before they 
can hope to communicate fully, one group or the other must experience 
the conversion that we have been calling a paradigm shift (Kuhn 1996 
[1962], p. 150)
As a consequence, paradigm change is like a Gestalt switch in perception.
To sum up, in both Kuhn's and Feyerabend's versions of 
incommensurability I have sketched out it can be recognized a semantic aspect: two 
paradigms or theories are incommensurable when there is no neutral language 
into which the content of both theories can be translated. In this sense by a lack of
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a 'common measure' it is meant a lack of a 'common language'. However, Kuhn's 
version of the concept of incommensurability also contains an epistemological and 
methodological aspect concerning how scientific claims have to be justified: there is 
not universal standard that serves to justify a paradigm against its rivals.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that Kuhn and Feyerabend believed 
that observational propositions are theory laden. This point is crucial for their 
claim of incommensurability: for example, in Kuhn the replacement process of 
paradigms cannot be a falsification process a la Popper in which certain 
observational data falsify a paradigm. The two kinds of incommensurability I 
have distinguished in the works of Kuhn and Feyerabend have been progressively 
recognized in the contemporary debates as different in principle. In 2004 Lena 
Soler distinguished two aspects of incommensurability (Soler 2011):
1) The semantic incommensurability, which concerns semantical or descriptive 
changes about what rival theories, paradigms, thought-styles.
2) The methodological incommensurability which concerns changes in the conceptions 
of how a scientific claim can be justified.
By comparing Hacking's claims with Feyerabend's and Kuhn's I am going to 
argue that the set of questions I have asked in the previous section can be 
identified, in Soler's terminology, with a methodological incommensurability issue 
or, better, with an 'epistemic incommensurability issue'.
First of all, nothing in the SoTs project leads to semantic 
incommensurability. It is true that by saying that certain style-dependent 
sentences have no meaning within another SoT Hacking often assumes 
verificationism, a thesis about meaning. But to assume that only statements about
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the world that are verifiable by a certain method are meaningful does not imply 
that the meaning of a sentence changes from a SoT to another. That is: within the 
SoTs project verificationism is a semantic thesis that does not imply semantic 
incommensurability as in the case of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Hacking's point is 
that there are sentences that are meaningful in certain SoTs (e.g. because there are 
methods to assess their truth) and meaningless in other SoTs -- the meaning of 
sentences does not change from a SoT to another.
Although style-dependent sentences are intelligible, i.e. their 
presuppositions can be identified and understood, they cannot be projected into a 
different SoT. Nor it is always possible to switch from a SoT to another as when, as 
Kuhn imagines, one switches from the Keplerian system to the Ptolemaic. For 
Hacking, a Renaissance scientist could well learn how Boyle justified his sentences 
but in order to use all his sentences she would have to reject the presuppositions 
of her community and espouse Boyle's. Intelligibility is not enough. The 
Renaissance scientist would have to think, do and justify her conjectures as Boyle 
did — and she would not be able to perform these mental and physical actions 
while preserving the presuppositions of her community. Of course it is true that, for 
example, today it is possible to switch from the probabilistic style to the taxonomic 
style: their presuppositions are our presuppositions. So, the suspicion of 
incommensurability of SoTs comes from the fact that there seems to be no 
common measure, i.e. no universal set of presuppositions, valid for all the 
theoretical sentences expressed by communities that have different SoTs.
Similarly, the SoTs project does not posit that advocates of different SoTs 
have different perceptions. According to Kuhn, the idea of incommensurability
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sprung to his mind in 1940 when, studying Aristotle's physics he found some 
passages unsound and senseless (Kuhn 1987). Kuhn realized that by changing his 
way of reading the text, by changing some concepts and the meaning of some 
words, he was able to understand what Aristotle said. Later he described it as a 
Gestalt switch (Kuhn 1996 [1962], p. 111-135). Conversely, in reference to earlier 
scientific conceptions such as Paracelsus', Hacking said:
[...] understanding is not enough. We cannot use, project, work in a 
former body of organized thought while we preserve our own 
(Hacking 1993b, p. 298).
So there is a crucial difference between Kuhn and Hacking: for the former a 
Gestalt switch leads to understanding an ancient system of thought, for the latter 
even if we understand its presuppositions we cannot project its sentences.
At this stage of my argument I cannot conclude that Hacking's 
characterization of SoTs implies epistemic incommensurability. Indeed, although 
some style-dependent sentences of different SoTs hinge on distinct 
presuppositions, it is also true that all the SoTs share a criterion for assessing the 
truth or the falsehood of style-independent sentences. This circumstance could 
make the scales tip in favour of the possibility of a universal criterion for assessing 
style-dependent sentences. Furthermore, Hacking could claim that certain 
scientific claims can be expressed in terms of style-independent sentences, which 
can be assessed by using the evidence of senses. To get convinced of the fact that 
we cannot conclude yet that the SoTs project implies incommensurability, one 
should look at the role of theory-ladeness in Kuhn's and Feyerabend's
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epistemologies. Whereas Hacking claims the existence of 'sense-datum 
statements', which are basic, foundational and out of history, and that do not 
require any reasoning to be assessed or false, Fleck, Kuhn and Feyerabend believe 
that all the observational propositions are theory laden. Thanks to this difference 
the latter thinkers are able to defend incommensurability. To sum up, the SoTs 
project leaves open what I have called the incommensurability issue.
6.4.2 What Kind of Relativism?
Is the incommensurability issue a relativism issue as well? Chris Swoyer has 
classified relativism by using the following schema:
Y is relative to X.
Each form of relativism is provided by: replacing Y by different concepts such as 
rationality, truth, standards of rationality, justification etc.; replacing X by what 
leads to the differences in the value of Y, e.g. cultures, paradigms, styles of 
thinking, languages etc.; and stating what 'relative' amounts to (Swoyer 2008).
In order to obtain an economical classification, Maria Baghramian has 
proposed to classify relativism by simply considering that Y can refer to cognitive, 
moral and aesthetic norms (Baghramian 2004, p. 6). For my purposes, I just want to 
point out that within the category of cognitive relativism it is possible to 
distinguish alethic relativism, which claims that the truth of statements is relative to 
an individual or social group and epistemic relativism, e.g. the claim that 
justification is relative to SoTs.
Epistemic incommensurability between SoTs implies epistemic relativism 
for, if there is no universal and independent justification, justifications con only be 
relative to different SoTs. In particular, a proposition might be justified in a SoT 
and meaningless in another SoT, which would amount to saying that facts about 
justification are not absolute. Obviously, epistemic relativism implies epistemic 
incommensurability so we can conclude that the incommensurability issue is a 
relativism issue.
Notice that an alethic relativist claim about SoTs would consist of this double 
claim:
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1) different SoTs lead to different claims, sometimes incompatible, about the world
2) the justification for each of these claims is relative to the style of thinking in 
which they are embedded.
The epistemic incommensurability of SoTs I am discussing has nothing to do with 
points 1) and 2). Indeed, think of two SoTs SI and S2. For Hacking, what might 
happen is: that there exists a proposition C such that C is claimed true in SI and is 
neither true nor false in S2; and that C is justified in SI. This is different from 
saying that C can be claimed true in SI and false in S2, which would entail alethic 
relativism.
6.4.3 What Hacking says
My contention in this section will be that Hacking has not offered any conclusive 
argument that helps to solve the incommensurability issue. Let us examine the 
passages relevant to this issue. In his first paper on SoTs he wrote:
Consider Hamlet's maxim, that nothing is either good or bad but 
thinking makes it so. If we transfer this to truth and falsehood, it is 
ambiguous between (a) nothing which is true is true, and nothing 
which is false is false, but thinking makes it so, and (b) nothing is either 
true-or-false but thinking makes it so. It is (b) that preoccupies me. My 
relativist worry is that the sense of a proposition p, the way in which it 
points to truth and falsehood, hinges on the style of reasoning 
appropriate to p  (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 180).
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In this passage Hacking highlights that the key distinction to bear in mind is the 
difference between truth-and-falsehood and truth: point b) would imply alethic 
relativism; point a) only states that the truth-or-falsehood of style-dependent 
sentences is relative to SoTs. I think that Hacking is correct when he says that the 
SoTs project does not imply alethic relativism. Indeed, if the SoTs project implied 
that truth has a history then the concept of knowledge would have a history too, 
in contrast with what I have concluded. Ultimately, Hacking only manages to 
dissociate himself from alethic relativism -  point b) is still compatible with 
epistemic relativism. The incommensurability issue remains open.
In his paper of 1992 Hacking touched on another important point: what is 
the reason of the disappearance of a SoT? Arguably if there were a universal and 
atemporal criterion to assess style-dependent sentences it might allow us to give 
up a SoT because it does not get at the truth. Hacking made no mention of such a 
criterion claiming that, although particular theories might be refuted a SoT, thanks 
to its self-authenticating techniques, endures. In his words:
It is our knowledges that are subject to revolutions, to mutation, and to 
several kinds of oblivion; it is the content of what we find out, not how 
we find out, that is refuted (Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 192).
In more recent writings Hacking distanced himself from constructionism 
(Hacking 1999b, 2000a). He distinguished form  from content of knowledge, a 
distinction that is relevant to the SoTs project. By form  of a branch of scientific 
knowledge Hacking means 'sentences that can be true or false, together with 
techniques for finding out which ones are true and which ones are false' (Hacking
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1999b, p. 170). In the terminology of the SoTs project: style-dependent sentences as 
well as methods and criteria of evidence, which are used to determine the truth- 
values of those very style-dependent sentences, constitute the form of a given SoT. 
The content of a SoT is what is found out, e.g. the Maxwell equations.
After having distinguished form from content, Hacking replied to 
constructionist thinkers:
the answer to a clear question about some aspects of the world is 
determined by how the world is. [...] when the question is a live one, 
and there is a context in which there are ways of addressing the 
question, or even methods of verification for possible answers, then 
aspects of the world determine what the answer is (Hacking 2000a, p. S 
69).
In the terminology of the SoTs project 'live questions' are the questions that a 
community that adopts certain SoTs asks in a certain historical period. Hacking's 
point is that once a SoT emerges, with its presuppositions and questions,
the answers to live questions about the natural world have nothing to 
do with us. (Hacking 2000a, p. S70).
I w ant to highlight two of Hacking's central claims: 1) there are correct answers to 
live questions 2) these correct answers are found when there are ways of addressing 
the question. Now, think of an answer expressed in terms of style-dependent 
sentences found by a community that adopts a certain SoT. The problem is that we
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might not be able to establish that this answer is correct until we find an atemporal 
and universal criterion to justify style-dependent sentences. If the ways of 
addressing the questions and the methods of verification are changeable how 
could one ever know whether the answers provided by a certain SoT are to be 
trusted? Hacking arguments can only oppose alethic relativism but are a blunt 
spear against epistemic relativism. I believe that, if Hacking wished to offer such a 
justification or, more in general, give an example of a 'correct answer' that can be 
expressed in terms of style-independent sentences and therefore justified 
independently of the SoTs in which is found, he could bring up his arguments in 
favour of realism about entities. In the next chapter I shall argue that there cannot 
be such an atemporal and independent justification.
6.5 Conclusions
I have compared and contrasted Craig's state-of-nature approach with historical 
epistemology. Despite historical epistemologists stress that organizing concepts 
are historical, the SoTs project does not imply that the concept of knowledge 
changes over history: the SoTs project and Daston and Galison's account of 
objectivity are consistent with the ahistoricity of the concept of knowledge.
By developing and applying the state-of-nature approach to the SoTs project I 
have brought to the fore a philosophical problem, which I have called 'the 
incommensurability issue' (or 'the relativism issue'). I have shown that this issue 
is still open because Hacking does not provide a coherent and convincing answer.
Chapter Seven: 
The Incommensurability of Styles of 
Thinking and Doing: the Case of the 
Existence of Theoretical Entities
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I have argued that an important issue underlies the SoTs 
project. I have called it 'the incommensurability issue': the question as to whether 
there exists a universal and atemporal justification for the claims made by a 
community that adopts a particular SoT. In this chapter, I shall present a case 
study in which a claim made in the laboratory SoT has no universal and atemporal 
justification. As I shall explain, Hacking justifies his belief that unobservable 
entities exist on the ground that they can be regularly manipulated by 
experimenters in order to find out and produce various phenomena (experimental 
realism); he also maintains that no belief that our theories are true is required in 
order to be realist about unobservable entities. I shall argue that his justification is 
relative to the laboratory SoT. In particular, my point will be that, if Hacking's 
characterization of SoTs is correct, his justification strategy based on experimental
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realism is no viable option for a member of a community that does not adopt the 
laboratory SoT — the existence of a particle would be justified in the laboratory 
SoT and unjustified outside it. Ultimately, from this case study I shall draw the 
important conclusion that the SoTs project implies epistemic relativism.
In the next section I shall present Hacking's entity realism and theory 
antirealism and put them in relation with the SoTs project. In the third section, I 
shall first discuss the consequences of theory antirealism for the possibility of 
comparing different SoTs. Afterwards I shall deploy my argument that Hacking's 
entity realism is not justified outside the laboratory SoT. The argument will be 
divided into two parts: whether or not we grant Hacking that experimentation is 
nearly theory-free the justification for the existence of unobservable entities is 
relative to the laboratory SoT.
7.2 Hacking's Experimental Realism
The greater part of Hacking's ideas about scientific realism is expounded in 
his book Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983b), published one year later 
than the first paper on SoTs. This book mentions the notion of SoT three times 
(Hacking 1983b, pp. 56, 71,127) but never refers to the notion of 'laboratory SoT' 
as the latter was introduced in the review of 1991 to Leviathan and the air pump 
(Hacking 1991a).
Hacking distinguishes between two types of realism: entity realism and 
theory realism (Hacking 1983b, p. 37). Generally speaking, entity realists deny
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some or all of the beliefs held by the theory realists (such as: theories aim at the 
truth; if a theory is true then the fundamental terms of the theory denote real 
entities). However, unlike entity anti-realists, entity realists do consider 
fundamental entities as real and as part of the causal structure of the world. 
Hacking describes himself as an entity realist: an anti-realist about theories and a 
realist about entities. To start with I shall explain his theory anti-realism, then I 
shall focus on entity realism.
7.2.1 Hacking's Entity Realism
In the paper 'Experimentation and Scientific Realism' Hacking acknowledged that 
'[his] own approach owes an enormous amount to Nancy Cartwright's parallel 
developments, which have often preceded [his] own' (Hacking 1984, note n. 3 p. 
171). For her part, the philosopher Nancy Cartwright wrote that her book How the 
laws of physics lie (1983) is a complement to Representing and Intervening 
(Cartwright 1983, p. 20).
Hacking has espoused Cartwright's distinction between phenomenological 
laws and fundamental laws, the former being laws that merely describe what 
happens in specific situations. In Cartwright's example, Airy's law of Faraday's 
magneto-optical effect is a characteristic phenomenological law: the physicist 
George Airy (1801-1892) added some ad hoc further terms (first or third 
derivatives) to the equations of light (which are to be interpreted as fundamental 
laws) in order to represent analytically the rotation of the plane of polarization of a 
beam of light sent parallel to the lines of a magnetic field inside a piece of material. 
W hat Airy obtained is, in Cartwright's terminology, a phenomenological law. The
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wave equations of the theory of light are fundamental laws that Airy modified in 
order to describe the particular situation under study: the passage of light through a 
definite piece of material. Ultimately, Cartwright argues, as compared with 
fundamental laws, phenomenological laws do not describe idealized situations. 
They are faithful representations of certain aspects of the phenomena as they 
appear, considering all the circumstances in which they occur.
Building on these ideas, Cartwright argues that, although the fundamental 
laws of physics provide us with great explanatory power, they do not describe 
reality but rather idealized situations; as the title of her book states, the laws of 
physics lie, i.e. they do not get the facts right. On the other hand, when they are 
amended to be true by transforming them into phenomenological laws, they lose 
their fundamental explanatory force. Indeed, for her fundamental laws are 
actually ceteris paribus laws -  for example the gravitational law is to be expressed: 
'If  there are no forces other than gravitational ones at work, then two bodies exert a 
force between each other which varies inversely as the square of the distance 
between them, and directly as the product of their masses' (Cartwright 1983, p.
58). So, for Cartwright it is wrong to say that for any two bodies the force between 
them is given by the law of gravitation. If the two bodies are charged, they will not 
behave just as the gravitational law states. '[The gravitational law] is irrelevant to 
the more complex and interesting situations' (Cartwright 1983, p. 39). To come out 
true the gravitation law m ust be reinterpreted either ceteris paribus (that is, by 
including the antecedent 'if there are no forces other...') or as describing a 
component force (that is, as one of the forces that act on the body in addition to, 
say, frictions, Coulomb law and so on). But for her to interpret a fundamental law
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ceteris paribus means to loose descriptive adequacy since ceteris paribus conditions 
never hold in reality but only in ideal situations. On the other hand, she considers 
the addition of forces as an operation we perform when we do calculations; nature 
does not add forces.
Hacking also espouses Cartwright's model of explanation. According to the 
covering law model, proposed by the American epistemologist Karl Hempel (1905- 
1997), to explain means to provide a law of nature that 'covers' the phenomenon, 
namely to show that the phenomenon had to be so given the circumstances in 
which it occurred and the existence of certain laws that always act in a certain 
way. Cartwright sets up against this model what she calls the 'simulacrum 
account': to explain means to construct models, within a theory (to which they 
may not be consistent), which are formal representations of the phenomenological 
laws. Indeed, she sees models as simulacra of things, i.e. mental pictures or even 
hold-in-your-hand models that mimic features of the world. As Cartwright says 
'[the simulacrum] account says that we lay out a model, and within the model we 
"derive" various laws which match more or less well with bits of the 
phenomenological behaviour' (Cartwright 1983, p. 161). Once a model is 
deployed, phenomenological laws describe those aspects of the phenomenon that 
are siphoned off by the model.
Hacking stresses that, as there are many models, often mutually 
inconsistent and embedded in the same theory, there can be no single explanation:
The covering-law account supposes that there is, in principle, one 
'right7 explanation for each phenomenon. The simulacrum account 
denies this (1983, p. 17).
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For the same reasons given by Cartwright, Hacking downplays the role of 
explanation:
[...] explanation may play a less central role in scientific reasoning than 
some philosophers imagine. [...] Explanations are relative to human 
interests. [...] Explaining is a feature of the historical or psychological 
circumstances of a moment (Hacking 1983b, p. 53 my emphasis).
The hypothetical construction of analogical models is, together with 
measuring and exploring relations between phenomena, part of the laboratory 
thinking and doing. According to Hacking's ideas above we should conclude that 
thinking in the laboratory SoT by propounding models of phenomenological laws 
within a given theory does not provide any valid argument for scientific realism. 
There is no auto-corrective mechanism that simplifies models and makes them 
converge on better and better descriptions of reality: we are condemned to the 
local truths of phenomenological laws.
7.2.2 Hacking's entity realism
There is an important point made by Cartwright that helps us understand 
how Hacking defends entity realism. She considers the following inference: 'if x 
explains y  and y  is true then x is true'. For her it would be invalid if x were a 
fundamental law but it would be valid in the case of causal explanation:
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Suppose we describe the concrete causal process by which a
phenomenon is brought about. That kind of explanation succeeds only
if the process described actually occurs. To the extent that we find the
causal explanation acceptable, we must believe in the causes described
(Cartwright 1983, p. 4).
To illustrate Cartwright's claim let us consider the example of a Geiger counter: a 
cylindrical capacitor with a processing electronics that is filled with gas. When a 
(X-particle passes through it, it ionizes some of the atoms of the gas and produces a 
current pulse that can be measured. In some Geiger counters the pulse produces 
audible clicks associated with the number of (X-particles. To provide a causal 
account of why a Geiger counter produces a click, a physicist would implicitly 
resort to a certain number of fundamental physical laws and eventually would 
describe the principle of operation in terms of phenomenological laws such as :' 
when the gas is so-and-so and the ions travel with such-and-such speed then they 
create an avalanche described by this equation'. In Cartwright and Hacking's 
view, Maxwell equations lie but, to the extent that we find credible the 
explanation that the cause of the clicks is a flux of particles, we m ust believe that, 
as a matter of fact, a flux of particles enters the Geiger counter. It is in this sense 
that Hacking's anecdote about what convinced him of the existence of electrons 
('if you can spray them on a niobium ball they are real' (Hacking 1983b, p. 22)) 
m ust be understood. Like in the case of the Geiger counter, if the existence of 
electrons is the only plausible cause of the effect of spraying, it must be true that 
they are real. Ultimately, causal reasoning provides good grounds for concluding 
that unobservable entities exist.
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In order to be confident about the existence of a cause of a given effect -  
stresses Hacking - causal reasoning must be integrated with experimenting. He 
distinguishes two types of experiments: experiments-with and experiments-on 
(Zeidler and Sobczynska 1995/1996) (Hacking 1995/1996). For example, when in 
1908 the physicist R.A. Millikan (1868-1953) determined the charge of the electron 
by experimenting on electrically charged oil droplets he was performing 
experiments-on. Conversely, electron diffraction, which makes it possible to infer 
the structure of a crystal by firing at it electrons and observing the interference 
pattern, is a kind of experiments-with. Experiments-on are experiments that aim to 
measure the properties of the putative entity. Experiments-with are manipulations 
of an alleged real entity in order to find out something else or create a new 
phenomenon such as the electron diffraction. Hacking directs the reader's 
attention to experiments-with and to the fact that a one-off experiment would not 
dispel our doubts about the most likely cause of a given effect. He maintains that 
when we regularly manipulate a putative entity in order to investigate other aspects 
of nature, that is when we routinely perform experiments-with, we are justified in 
thinking that the entity exists:
Experimental work provides the strongest evidence for scientific 
realism. This is not because we test hypotheses about entities. It is 
because entities that in principle cannot be 'observed' are regularly 
manipulated to produce new phenomena and to investigate other 
aspects of nature (Hacking 1983b, p. 262)
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I wish to stress two points: the first is that Hacking is claiming that the 
experimental realist knows that theoretical entities exist:
My realism about entities implies both that a satisfactory theoretical 
entity would be one that existed (and was not merely a handy 
intellectual tool). That is a claim about entities and reality. It also 
implies that we actually know, or have good reason to believe in, at 
least some such entities in present science. That is a claim about 
knowledge (Hacking 1983b, p. 28 my emphasis)
The second point is that, since experimenting-with involves the 'creation' of new 
phenomena, it must be considered part of the laboratory way of doing. So we can 
say that it is by doing in the laboratory SoT, and in particular by using causal 
reasoning and experimenting in order to elicit new phenomena, that 
experimenters find the most likely cause of a certain effect.
7.2.3 Causal Effects as Style-independent Sentences
Consistently with his theory anti-realism, for Hacking experimentation is free
from theory as far as it has the power to justify our beliefs in the existence of 
theoretical entities. He argues that an important part of experimentation is theory- 
free by making different points, which are relevant to the SoTs project, as I shall 
show here and in the next section. First of all, he points out that there is no theory 
of a theoretical entity to which all the experimenters are realistically committed 
(Hacking 1983b, p. 264). Within the same experiment different models coexist and 
each of them enables us to make calculations relevant to only one particular aspect
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of the particle. To the question 'is there not a common core of theory, the 
intersection of all the different theories?' Hacking answers: 'there is a common 
lore, not a common core' (Hacking 1983b, p. 264). Furthermore:
We design apparatus relying on a modest number of home truths 
about electrons, in order to produce some other phenomenon that we 
wish to investigate (Hacking 1983b, p. 265)
The use of colloquial terms such as 'common lore' or 'home truth ' is meant 
to downplay the theoretical analysis of experimentation: one of the aims of 
Representing and Intervening was to urge philosophers, too much concerned with 
theories, to focus on practical aspects of experiments. Hacking's point is that, 
although groups of experimenters 'm ay hold different and mutually incompatible 
accounts of electrons (Hacking 1983b, p. 264) they share a way of doing and a tacit 
knowledge of the behaviour of apparatuses, of various effects given certain 
conditions and of '[causal properties] derivative on properties like spin, mass, and 
charge [which] are the best candidates for home truths' (Morrison 1990, p. 20). 
Sentences such as 'a  beam of electrons is halted by an aluminium plate' or 
'electrons with features such-and-such spiralling in a magnetic field emit radiation 
so-and-so' are example of the shared language of experimenters not too much 
infected by theory, so to speak.
More importantly, I wish to remind the reader that in subsection 2.5.41 
have explained that for Hacking 'there have been important observations in the 
history of science which have included no theoretical assumptions at all' (Hacking 
1983b, p. 176). To illustrate this point he gives the example of Herschel's discovery
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of the infrared radiation of sunlight (Herschel 1800b) (Herschel 1800a, 1800c). As I 
have explained, Hacking is adamant that the corpuscular theory, in which the 
physicist Herschel believed, did not infect several statements of Herschel's 
research on radiant heat. For example Herschel wrote:
When I used some of them [the filters] I felt a sensation of heat, though 
I had but little light, while others gave me much light with scarce any 
sensation of heat (Herschel 1800b)
Commenting on this sentence, by which Herschel described the sensation of heat 
caused by light rays coming through different filters, Hacking wrote that '[there is 
no] better sense-datum report than this in the whole of physical science' (Hacking 
1983b, p. 176).
Herschel's sentence is to be considered style-independent. Indeed, as I have 
explained in subsection 2.5.4, Hacking contrasts it with another Herschel's 
sentence, which for him is style-dependent: 'The heat which has the refrangibility of 
the red rays is occasioned by the light of those rays'. Ultimately, the distinction 
between these two classes of sentences (style-independent and style-dependent 
sentences) mirrors the distinction theory-observation put forward at the level of 
his argument for realism: a sentence infected by theory (e.g. 'the heat has the 
refrangibility...') is supposed to be style-dependent on the laboratory SoT whereas 
a theory-free sentence 'm y skin is warmed' is supposed to be style-independent.
Notice now that the sentence 'm y skin is warmed' can be also viewed as a 
sentence that describes a causal effect of the light rays. Therefore, in the case of 
Herschel's study of radiant heat, a causal effect is described by a style-
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independent sentence. As I am going to argue, it is possible to say that this is a 
general fact: for Hacking, the causal effects of entities are described by style- 
independent (observational) sentences. For example, one can imagine that during 
the most important experiments that mark the history of the electron these style- 
independent sentences, which describe causal effects, have been pronounced:
a) 'The glass tube glows' (Thomson experiment)
b) 'The oil drops are in mechanical equilibrium' (Millikan experiment)
c) 'There is a track in the photographic plate (Wilson experiment)
Experimenters of different groups communicate by using sentences that can be 
more complex than these above and that can describe, in addiction to effects, 
causes and properties of causes. For example, one can imagine these alterations of 
the sentences a) b) c):
'Electrons emitted by the cathode make the glass glow'
'The value of the charge on the droplets in mechanical equilibrium is always a 
multiple of the charge of an electron'
'That is the track of a positron in a photographic plate'
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These sentences refer to causes (entities) and properties of causes (charge) in 
addiction to effects. For example, the first sentence states that the cause of the 
glowing is an entity called electron; the second that the droplets are dragged 
upward by the field because they are charged with particles called electrons; the 
third that the track is the effect produced by an entity that have opposite charge to 
the electrons.
Hacking is to be interpreted as maintaining that the sentences a) b) c), 
which describe causal effects, are style-independent (observational). Indeed, 
speaking of the sentence 'That is the track of a positron in a photographic plate' 
Hacking writes:
There is a tendency to infer from stories like that of the positron that 
anyone who reports, on looking at a photographic plate, 'that's a 
positron' is thereby implying or asserting a lot of theory. I do not think 
is so (Hacking 1983b, p. 179).
In this passage Hacking is implicitly expressing his disagreement with those 
philosophers, such as N.R. Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend, who put forward 
theses of theory-ladenness by claiming, for example, that observational reports 
assert theoretical presuppositions. I have already discussed in section 6.3.1 these 
differences of views between Hacking, Feyerabend and Kuhn. What interests me 
here is that the passage above clearly supports my interpretation: for Hacking 
sentences which describe causal effects are to be considered observation sentences 
and, therefore, style-independent. After all, to characterize the causal interactions 
of unobservable entities with other parts of nature in terms of observation
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sentences is crucial for Hacking's argument for realism. Indeed, only if causal 
effects can be characterized without theory can someone be antirealist about 
theories and believe in the existence of an entity only on the basis of its causal 
effects.
Hacking's point that sentences such as 'that is the track of a positron in a 
photographic plate' are observation sentences contrasts w ith what many scholars 
think. For example, this is what the historian of science Gerald Holton writes re 
the particle tracks in a photographic plate:
our naked eyes would see only an unconvincing curlicue; but the 
mind's eye sees, through the use of a Feynman diagram version of the 
same phenomenon, that a neutrino scatters an electron without any 
change of charge (Holton 1996, p. 92).
Holton's point is in fundamental conflict with Hacking's. Indeed, Holton is 
claiming that Feynman diagrams are necessary to 'see' a scattering between 
particles instead of a squiggle. Feynman diagrams are models that both help to 
visualize the relevant aspects of particle interactions (in which strong, weak and 
electromagnetic forces are involved) (see W uthrich 2012) and help to calculate 
their more interesting properties. They were introduced in the late 1940s by the 
physicist Richard Feynman for simplifying complex calculations in quantum  
electrodynamics (QED), the theory that explains the electromagnetic force at the 
quantum level. In other words, Holton is claiming that certain models are the 
presuppositions held by investigators who deal with the causal effects of
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electrons, i.e. they infect those elements of experimentation that Hacking considers 
free of theory.
To summarize the content of the last two subsections, Hacking claims that 
we know that unobservable entities exist. Regular manipulation is part of the way 
of doing of the laboratory SoT and for Hacking it is the strongest evidence for the 
existence of an unobservable entity. What the expression regular manipulation of 
an entity wants to convey is the idea that we perform experiments with that 
putative entity in order to produce macroscopic causal effects. These effects are 
described by style-independent sentences, which may be used for forming more 
complex sentences, not so much infected by theory, which include causes and 
properties of causes. Consequently, it is possible to say that an important part of 
experimentation, which in primis includes causal effects, is theory-free. By making 
this point Hacking is able to defend his realism about entities while being anti­
realist about theories. Finally, since he is antirealist about theories regular 
manipulation is also the only one justification he gives for realism about theoretical 
entities.
7.2.4 Putnam's Theory of Reference and Experimental Realism
In Representing and Intervening Hacking asks:
[...] is not the substance of the theory about positrons 
among the truth conditions or truth presuppositions for the 
type of utterance that we may represent by 'that's a 
positron'? (Hacking 1983b, p. 179)
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His answer confirms what I have explained in the previous section, i.e. that 'that's 
a positron' is an observation sentence:
Possibly, but I doubt it. The theory might be abandoned or 
superseded by a totally different theory about positrons, 
leaving intact what had, by then, become the class of 
observation sentences represented by 'that's a positron'
(Hacking 1983b, p. 179).
However, the way Hacking replies also points to another problem: how can we be 
sure that scientists holding competing or successive theories are referring to the 
same entity, the positron? This difficulty is closely related to the notorious issue of 
incommensurability between different theories debated since the 1960s: as I have 
explained, thinkers such as Kuhn and Feyerabend maintained that certain terms 
take on different meanings if used in two incommensurable theories. In order to 
overcome this difficulty Hacking wedded himself to Putnam's version of causal 
theory of reference32 because, as I am going to explain, it suggests that scientists 
having competing theories about the positron 'm ay still be talking about the same 
thing' (Hacking 1984, p. 157). In 1970s the philosophers Hilary Putnam  and Saul 
Kripke proposed causal accounts of how terms acquire referents. They attacked 
the descriptivist theory of meaning according to which meanings of names 
coincide with the descriptions associated with them, whereas their referents 
consist of the objects that satisfy these descriptions.
32 Putnam’s theory has been criticized by many scholars (see for example Dupre 1996, pp. 
17-36). Hacking is aware of these criticisms. However, he has made it clear that, although 
he does not believe Putnam’s theory literally, he is happy to employ his account (Hacking 
1984). He has extensively written on Putnam’s theory of reference in (Hacking 1983b) and 
(Hacking 2007c).
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As the descriptions of a name change (e.g. 'water is a colourless liquid' or 
'w ater is that substance made of atoms of hydrogen and oxygen') the descriptivist 
view seems to imply that its reference changes as well (as if, by the two 
descriptions of water, we did not refer to the same thing).
Since Hacking claims is that a positron is something in the world, regardless of the 
theories or descriptions we have of it, the descriptivist view does not provide the 
support he needs.
According to Putnam the meaning of a word has four components: the 
w ord's syntactic marker, the semantic marker, the stereotype and the referent. The 
syntactic marker states the grammatical role played by the word, e.g. subject or 
predicate; the semantic marker points to the category of things the word applies, 
e.g. the w ord 'horse' applies to mammals and quadruped; the stereotype is the 
conventional idea people have about a certain thing, that is the description 
commonly accepted, e.g. 'zebra' is thought of as a striped animal; the referent of a 
word is the thing or the class of things it refers to, e.g. the reference of 'water' is a 
certain kind of stuff individuated by the chemical formula H20. Only when the 
reference of a term has varied is it legitimate to state that the meaning has 
changed. For example, the concept 'natural kind all of whose members live under 
water, breath through gills, etc.' does not fit the natural kind 'fish' because some 
fish do not breath through gills. However, according to Putnam it would be wrong 
to conclude that the concept 'does not correspond to the natural kind Fish' (Putnam 
1975, p. 196). If anything, the concept of fish changes as our knowledge of the 
organisms develops. Yet Putnam maintains that it still corresponds to the same 
natural kind.
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To argue for the invariance of reference Putnam put forward the concept of 
introducing event: everyone who uses a term is connected by a certain kind of 
causal chain to a situation in which a description of that term is given, e.g. an 
event that singles out 'positron' as the entity with certain features and responsible 
for certain effects. For example someone could tell me that the positron is that 
object that makes a Geiger counter produce a click, leaves a track in a gas 
chamber, has the same mass of an electron but different charge; hence, each of my 
later uses will be connected with this event. Furthermore, even the use of any 
other person who has been told about the term 'positron1 by me will be causally 
linked to its being in my vocabulary and, therefore, to my original introducing 
event (Putnam 1975, p. 200).
Kripke argued that when the name of a referent is fixed by an act of naming 
it becomes a 'rigid designator'. By this expression he meant that, for example, the 
name George Washington refers to the same person in all the possible worlds 
whereas the expression 'the man who was the first president of the United Stated' 
could in principle refer to another person. If two rigid designators are found to 
designate the same object in the actual world it must be true -  argued Kripke - that 
they designate the same object in all possible worlds. In other terms, if it is true 
that two rigid designators are found to refer to the same object then it m ust be 
necessarily true that they designate the same object. He famously gave the 
following example: suppose that Hesperus is the name that it is given to a star 
seen in the evening and Phosphorus is the name given to the same star seen in the 
morning. Suppose also that astronomers find out that Hesperus and Phosphorus
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designate the same star, Venus. Kripke concluded that it is necessarily true, i.e. 
true in all possible worlds that Hesperus=Phosphorus (Kripke 1972, pp. 213-215).
If we return to the initial question of this section: if a theory about the 
positron is abandoned or superseded by a totally different one are we always 
referring to the same object, the positron? The causal theory of reference suggests 
that the answer is in the positive. Indeed 'positron' is a rigid designator: everyone 
who has the minimal linguistic information about 'positron' and uses the word in 
a way that is causally connected to an introducing event will refer to the positron, 
even if she advances new theories or comes to possess additional information 
about the properties of the positron. As in the case of the star Venus, if two groups 
of researchers refer to same object, the positron, at a certain point in time they will 
always refer to it in all possible worlds, for example in cases in which one of both 
of them will advance radically new theories about positrons based on new 
findings. There is no possible situation in which 'positron' designates something 
else. In conclusion, we now have a deeper sense of why Hacking considers 
Putnam 's casual theory of reference as the logical skeleton for his experimental 
realism view. He needs a notion of reference that is not defined in terms of our 
theories and conceptions.
7.3 The Incommensurability of the Styles of 
Thinking and Doing
Now that I have offered an account of the position Hacking attempts to defend, I 
return to my original question: whether there is a criterion independent of any SoT 
by which to judge the claims of knowledge made by a community that has a 
particular SoT. Until it is found an example of a claim in a particular SoT whose 
justification is relative to that very SoT, it is not possible to conclude that the SoTs 
project implies epistemic relativism. I think that the experimental argument is a 
good candidate for representing such an example: Hacking maintains that we 
know about the existence of unobservable entities, in particular we are justified in 
believing so; I shall argue that his justification is not atemporal and universal but 
relative to the laboratory SoT. Differently stated, my point will be that Hacking's 
experimental argument might justify realism about theoretical entities in the 
laboratory SoT (if one agrees with Hacking); however, outside the laboratory SoT 
realism about theoretical entities is unjustified. Before focusing on Hacking's entity 
realism and arguing for this thesis I want to point out that Hacking's theory anti­
realism makes it impossible to rank different SoTs in terms of their capacity to 
explain why certain phenomena happen.
7.3.1 Incommensurability and Theory Anti-realism
Consider the example I have given in section 4.3: the distance of the Moon from 
the Earth can be calculated by using the geometrical SoT or the laboratory SoT. As 
far as the calculation of the Moon distance is concerned, there is no much difference
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between the postulational SoT adopted by Greeks and our laboratory SoT -- one 
has no strong reasons to conclude that a SoT is 'better' than another. However, if 
we take a realist attitude, unlike Hacking, and interpret the gravitation law as a 
law that is approximately true then, as far as the study of the Moon is concerned, 
the laboratory SoT can be considered 'superior' to the geometrical SoT. Indeed, in 
that case not only does the former provide the distance to the moon but also 
explains why the value of the distance is what it is; on the contrary, the 
geometrical SoT provides no explanation of why the Moon rotates at a certain 
distance with its specific period.
In contrast to theory realists Hacking's view towards the gravitational law 
is instrumental: the law Ties' but represents a useful devise that helps to calculate 
the distance to the moon. It does not provide the explanation of the phenomenon. 
So Hacking would conclude that the laboratory SoT does not get any closer to the 
truth than the postulational SoT -  for him, as far the calculation of the distance to 
the moon is concerned, there can be no independent criterion for ranking these 
two SoTs.
The crux of the matter is that Hacking espouses Cartwright's view that 
'rendered as descriptions of facts, fundamental laws are false; amended to be true, 
they lose their fundamental explanatory force' (1980, 75). Consequently, if 
Cartwright is right, we are left with no answer as to why the distance to the moon 
is w hat it is: the gravitational law has to be amended in order to be used for the 
calculation of the distance to the moon, therefore it does not explain. Alan 
Chalmers raised a similar point when he remarked that if we deny an explanatory
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role to the fundamental laws we are at loss to say what governs the world outside 
experimental situations. His example concerns the orbit of Hailey's comet:
The first sighting of the comet, by a Voyager spacecraft, enabled the 
predicted orbit to be corrected, thereby facilitating later terrestrial 
sightings. The regularity predicted on the basis of Newton's laws lied. 
Nevertheless, Hailey's comet did return very nearly as scheduled. To 
echo Cartwright, if Hailey's comet is not governed by Newton's laws, 
then I do not know why it returned as and when it did. (Chalmers 
1999, p. 8-9)
To conclude, Hacking's theory antirealism leads to a view in which it is 
impossible to rank different SoTs in terms of their capacity to explain phenomena. 
On the other hand, Hacking's experimental realism represents an interesting 
example of a claim that might be universally and atemporally justified. I am going 
to show that this idea is fallacious.
7.3.2 The Incommensurability of Styles of Thinking and Doing: First 
Argument
As I have done in section 4.4, for the argument's sake I shall now imagine a 
situation in which a 'speaker' tries to communicate with a 'hearer' who has a 
different SoT. Speaker and hearer are to be imagined as belonging to different 
communities, which may be separated in time. Suppose that the speaker, who 
adopts the laboratory SoT, expressed the sentence: 'the muon is real'. Can a hearer 
who belongs to a community that does not adopt the laboratory SoT understand
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that sentence? One problem is how the hearer could attribute a meaning to the 
term 'm uon'. Putnam's causal account of reference can be applied to this problem. 
Although the hearer would have no knowledge of the working of experimental 
apparatuses, she could well be able to perceive the sound of a Geiger counter or 
see the effects of the track in a photographic plate; she could also acquire some 
information about other properties of the muon. On Putnam's view, this can be 
defined as an introducing event, i.e. an event in which an adherent of a different 
SoT would grasp that the term 'm uon' designates an entity responsible for certain 
effects and, for example, capable of motion and negatively charged. From that 
moment on, both the speaker and the hearer would be connected by a causal chain 
to the act of naming the muon. In sum, Putnam's account fulfils our desideratum -  
it makes the reference of the term 'm uon' independent of the SoT in which it is 
used.
Suppose now that the speaker justified the existence of the muon as 
Hacking does: she could say that the muon exists because it can be regularly 
manipulated in order to produce causal effects. Hacking assures that she would 
also be able to describe the causal effects in terms of style-independent sentences: 
for example, 'that's the track of a muon in a photographic plate'.
Ultimately, if the speaker made the claim 'the muon is real' and justified it by 
using Hacking's experimental argument, the relevant sentences that describe the 
causal effects would have a truth-value in a SoT different from the laboratory SoT.
Then, is the hearer justified to believe in the claim that the muon is real? My 
answer is in the negative. Indeed, the meaning of the term 'm uon' may not 
depend on the presuppositions of the laboratory SoT, Putnam account implies, but
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the criteria for the existence of a muon do depend on the presuppositions of the 
laboratory SoT even if the causal effects can be described in terms of style- 
independent sentences. I shall explain. What the speaker proposes is to assess the 
existence of the muon by using devices that create new phenomena and involve 
the way of doing of the laboratory SoT. Whether or not the speaker uses style- 
independent sentences to illustrate his justification, the hearer finds herself in 
rather an awkward situation that may well be likened to that described by Shapin 
and Schaffer. Indeed, a hearer coeval with Hobbes could object to the speaker that 
God has given us enough phenomena and that we should not get involved in 
dubious ones. The speaker might well describe the causal effects by using style- 
independent propositions but this would not make her argument plausible for the 
hearer — the presuppositions of the laboratory SoT would be implicit in her 
argument. Indeed, when illustrated in detail, the speaker's point would am ount to 
say that, by adopting the way of doing of the laboratory SoT and its methods for 
finding out, it is possible to perform experiments with the m uon in order to create 
new phenomena; these new phenomena, which are represented by macroscopic 
effects described in terms of observational sentences, are evidence of the existence 
of the muon. However, the speaker's way of doing and her methods for finding 
out would be no presuppositions of the hearer's SoT; nor could creating new 
phenomena represent evidence of the existence of an entity. I have already quoted 
Hacking as saying that 'the substance of the theory about positrons [is not] among 
the truth conditions or truth presuppositions for the type of utterance that we may 
represent by 'that's a positron'". This is beside the point. If anything, the crux of 
the matter is that, echoing Hacking, the 'substance of the laboratory SoT  (i.e. its
2 9 4 STYLES O F  THINKING: ASSESSIN G A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN HACKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
presuppositions) is among the truth presuppositions for the utterance 'that's a 
muon'. It is true that 'the object called "Geiger counter" made a click' is a style- 
independent sentence but it is the very practice of using the Geiger counter for 
producing new phenomena that does not belong to the presuppositions of SoTs 
different form the laboratory SoT. To use a Geiger counter in order to elicit a 
phenomenon does not count as evidence of anything for a member of a 
community that does not have the laboratory SoT. Sentences such as 'the object 
called "Geiger counter" has made a click' are not really projectable in a different 
SoT: they cannot be used as they are used in the laboratory SoT: in the laboratory 
SoT these sentences can be used to illustrate an argument for the existence of the 
muon; but that argument implicitly assumes a criterion of evidence that is not part 
of the presuppositions of different SoTs. It is as if the sentences that describe the 
causal effects of the muon can be admitted into the hearer's world but nothing 
significant can be claimed about them. They are projectable in the ordinary 
language of the hearer for describing the consequences of certain actions 
performed by others but cannot be employed to present the argument of 
experimental realism: Hacking's argument is relative to the laboratory SoT. In 
sum, if the SoTs are characterized as Hacking does, the knowledge of 
unobservable entities in the laboratory SoT has no foundations apart from the very 
presuppositions of the very laboratory SoT.
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7.3.3 Supporting the First Argument: An Historical Example
To substantiate my argument I shall provide an historical example concerning 
Galileo's discovery of Jupiter's satellites. The example will show that, although the 
'speaker' (Galileo) used style-independent sentences to deploy his argument, the 
'hearers' (Aristotelian scholars) rejected it on the basis that the speaker's kind of 
evidence and way of doing was not acceptable.
The last part of Galileo's Sidereus Nuncius (Galilei 2008 [1610], pp. 299-319) 
reports that on the seventh of January 1610 Galileo 'realised that close to Jupiter 
there were three stars, little in truth, but very bright [...] they were lying in a 
straight line and parallel to the ecliptic' (Galilei 2008 [1610], p. 299). He went on 
observing in the successive nights until early March 1610 and detailed the relative 
positions by the simple insertion of linear drawings embedded within his 
published text. These numerous observations of Jupiter did not conform to the 
principles of Aristotelian cosmology but supported the Copemican sun-centred 
hypothesis of the world system in which Galileo believed. However, although 
Galileo did have Copernicanism in mind when he discovered the four moons, he 
did not mention this theory at all in his treatise, since it was forbidden; he just 
wanted to offer to the reader a visual experience.
Three points can be noted. Firstly, even if it had turned out that Copernicus' 
model was wrong, this fact would not have called in question Galileo's detailed 
observations. From Hacking's perspective this fact could be expressed by saying 
that, even if theories change, different scientists can still refer to the same things, 
represented by the drawings in the Sidereus Nuncius. Secondly, the relative 
positions of Jupiter and its moons are described in terms of w hat Hacking would
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call observation sentences: in many cases they could be viewed as captions for his 
drawings. From Hacking's perspective this second point suggests that the claim 
for the existence of an observable entity can be substantiated by pure observation 
sentences. Finally, as Biagioli stressed,
To Galileo [...] the evidence that counted was not a snapshot of 
individual luminous dots around Jupiter, but the 'movie' of their 
motions. It was a long chronological perspective that linked his string 
of observations and turned the luminous bodies near Jupiter into 
satellites, not fixed stars (Biagioli 2006, p. 103):.
In other words, Galileo's observations presupposed a commitment to conducting 
observations over several days so as to differentiate the periodic motions of the 
moons from other visual patterns. In this sense his evidence was inherently 
historical. Anyone who had looked through a telescope for only a few minutes 
might have legitimately believed that the bright points were artefacts of the 
telescope, rather than satellites. But anyone who had observed the bright points 
for many days would have concluded that they followed over time the exact 
pattern of rotating satellites and that, therefore, they were not artefacts such as 
double images and colour fringes (which were present in early telescopes). This 
third point implies that one needs to commit oneself to a way of doing, as it happens 
in my imaginary discussion between a speaker who adopts the laboratory SoT and 
a hearer who adopts a different SoT: a one-off observation is not sufficient to 
realise and find out that four bright dots are satellites rather than artefacts; one 
needs a great incentive to take time to learn how to see through a telescope and to
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observe for a long period. Above all, one needs to accept that the telescope, an 
instrument rarely used before to observe the sky, represents a plausible way of 
finding out.
Ultimately, these three points above suggest that, the differences 
notwithstanding, there are striking analogies between my imaginary example in 
the previous subsection and the concrete case of the discovery of Jupiter's moons. 
What I want to show now is that just as the imaginary hearer could not accept the 
speaker's experimental argument on the ground that it was based on 
presuppositions that were alien to her so Galileo's opponents could not accept the 
claim that Jupiter's moons exist on the ground that they did not accept his 
presuppositions.
Few months after the publication of the Sidereus Nuncius Galileo moved to 
Florence where his discoveries were met with disbelief by the court scholars. One 
of them, the Aristotelian philosopher Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631), did not want 
to look through the telescope. At that time it was thought that the physics of sky 
was different from the terrestrial physics, in particular that the laws of light 
interaction with terrestrial objects could not be extended to the sky (see 
Feyerabend 1988 [1975], Chapter 10). Consequently, Cremonini was sceptical 
about the idea that the telescope could provide evidence for the existence of 
celestial objects. He had little incentive to invest time in Galileo's observations. As 
Biagioli explains, 'an  observation would have been a very unwise investment of 
time and resources for someone [i.e. Cremonini] of his disciplinary affiliation and 
professional identity' (Biagioli 2006, p. 113). In other words, Galileo's methods of 
finding out, the evidence he provided and his way of doing was so different from
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Cremonini's that the latter would have lost his professional identity if he had 
invested time in doing what Galileo had done.
Unlike Cremonini other scholars did look through the telescope, but only for 
a short time. The brevity of the observation was fatal for them: for example, the 
mathematician Martin Horky saw minute spots close to Jupiter on April 24 and 25 
in exactly the same configuration described by Galileo but he concluded that they 
were an optical illusion. That is not surprising. One needs to have Galileo's style of 
doing for committing oneself to refining telescopes and observing bright spots for 
months.
In Life of Galileo (Brecht 2007 [1938]), the playwright Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) 
presents a scene in which Galileo invites a philosopher and a mathematician, who 
act the part of the sceptical scholars, to observe Jupiter's satellites. The dialogue 
below is emblematic of the epistemic incommensurability between Galileo's way 
of thinking and doing and that of the two scholars. Although Galileo's arguments 
were not infected by theories, Hacking would say, the mathematician did not 
accept the kind of evidence offered by Galileo.
GALILEO If you gentlemen are agreeable, we shall begin with the 
inspection of the satellites of Jupiter, the Medicean stars.
[...]
THE PHILOSOPHER [...] before we apply ourselves to your famous 
tube, we should like to request the pleasure of a disputation: Can such 
planets exist?
GALILEO Your Highness, would you care to observe those impossible 
and unnecessary stars through the telescope?
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THE MATHEMATICIAN One might be tempted to reply that if your 
tube shows something that cannot exist it must be a rather unreliable 
tube.
GALILEO What do you mean by that?
MATHEMATICIAN It certainly would be much more to the point, Mr.
Galilei, if you were to tell us your reasons for supposing that there can 
be free-floating stars moving about in the highest sphere of the 
immutable heavens.
THE PHILOSOPHER Reasons, Mr. Galilei, reasons!
GALILEO My reasons? When a look at these stars and my calculations 
demonstrate the phenomenon? This debate is getting absurd, sir.
THE MATHEMATICIAN If it were not to be feared that you would get 
even more excited than you are, one might suggest that what is in your 
tube and what is in the sky might be two different things (Brecht 2007 
[1938]).
In the passage above Galileo insists that for accepting his reasons, that is, his 
justification for the existence of Jupiter's moons, it is sufficient to look through the 
telescope. The two scholars, though, insist in asking other reasons because they do 
not accept his kind of evidence. Even if Galileo can offer an argum ent in terms of 
observable sentences -  and, indeed, observations -  his opponents do not accept his 
claim because the kind of evidence he offers does not belong to their way of 
thinking and doing.
It took some dozen of years before Galileo's truth was accepted. Galileo's 
milieu could do little to favour the establishment of new standards of truth. Indeed, 
Biagioli wrote that Tack of consensus about style of argumentation and standards of
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evidence as well as the scant interdependence among the members of this field 
hindered closure of the debate' (Biagioli 2006, p. 97 Italic is m ine). Of course, had 
Galileo's discoveries been discussed within an intellectual milieu of astronomers, 
as Boyle's ones were discussed within an elite of people who explored nature in 
the same public place, his kind of evidence and his way of doing would not have 
been called into question.
I conclude by summing up my point. Hacking claims that we are justified in 
believing that unobservable entities exist when we regularly manipulate them. I 
counter that, if  his characterization ofSoTs is correct, then his justification is relative 
to the laboratory SoT. My argument has followed these steps: I have pointed out 
that regular manipulation is a way of doing that is not part of the presuppositions 
of another SoT. Even if causal effects obtained in experiments-with can be 
described by style-dependent statements, the experimental argument implicitly 
assumes the presuppositions of the laboratory SoT: methods of finding out, ways 
of thinking and doing and types of evidence. Therefore, the experimental 
argument is not a valid justification for the existence of a particle outside the 
laboratory SoT. To substantiate my thesis I have given an historical example in 
which it is not sufficient that a claim is justified in terms of observational 
statements in order to be accepted. Galileo's claim is dismissed a priori by 
Aristotelean scholars because it relies on a kind of evidence alien to their mental 
horizon.
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7.3.4 The Incommensurability of Styles of Thinking and Doing: 
Second Argument
Up to now, I have argued that Hacking's argument for realism is relative to the 
laboratory SoT but I have not criticized it: in my imaginary example I have 
supposed that the claim that unobservable entities exist can be defended as 
Hacking does. In this subsection, I shall use the historical account of the discovery 
of the m uon provided by the historian of science Peter Galison in How the 
Experiments End (Galison 1987) for assessing Hacking's experimental realism. My 
analysis will show that, in contrast with what Hacking maintains, theoretical style- 
dependent sentences in the laboratory SoT are necessary to justify the claim that 
unobservable entity exist. Since style-dependent sentences in the laboratory SoT 
have no truth-value for a community that adopts a different SoT I shall conclude 
that, in this case too, the justification of an observable entity is relative.
The history of the discovery of the m uon is intertwined with that of the 
research on the cosmic rays, high-energy particles of galactic and extra-galactic 
origins, most of them protons, which reach the Earth's atmosphere. It was by 
investigating the compositions of cosmic rays that muons were detected for the 
first time. Today it is an undisputed fact that, when cosmic rays enter the 
atmosphere, they collide with its molecules and produce a so-called shower of 
ionized particles, of which some decade into muons, able to reach the surface of 
our planet. A shower is a cascade of secondary particles w ith smaller quantities of 
energy than the incoming particle, each of them producing other cascades of 
billions and billions of particles. As a proton collides with an air molecule, it
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creates pions, protons and neutrons; pions decay in particles such as muons, 
which are penetrating particles, i.e. they are able to reach the surface of the Earth. 
Muons were unknown particles to physicists until the last years of the 1930s, 
when numerous experiments and theoretical considerations helped to settle the 
dispute about their existence.
The physicist Robert Millikan (1868-1953), one of the pioneers of this 
research, believed that the primary cosmic rays impinging the atmosphere were 
gamma rays, i.e. photons of high frequency penetrating the atmosphere 
isotropically from space. Gamma rays are the most penetrating of all radiations 
because they lose little energy in interactions with matter. In the 1920s Millikan, 
persuaded that in the cosmic rays there were no very penetrating charged particles, 
measured the intensity of radiation (he was convinced of measuring photons) as a 
function of penetration depth for different energies and concluded that his 
hypothesis was correct: for him the penetrating particles were gamma photons 
arriving from outside the atmosphere. However, in 1929 Walther Bothe (1891-
1957) and Werner Kolhorster (1887-1946) set up an experiment that challenged 
Millikan's conclusions. By using two Geiger tubes separated by a block of lead and 
measuring the coincidences (when the same particle crosses both the counters and 
make them produce a click) they found evidence for the passage of a single charged 
particle through the intervening lead (Galison 1997, p. 441). Indeed, by measuring 
how the coincidences decrease as the thickness of the intervening lead is modified, 
it is possible to rule out the possibility that the cause of the coincidences is the 
passage of gamma rays. This was a conclusion based on the macroscopic effects of 
the investigated entity and on the knowledge of how gamma rays are attenuated
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by plates of different thickness. However, all Bothe and Kolhorster came to know 
was that the particles were charged; they acquired no knowledge about its real 
identity.
Later on the physicist Bruno Rossi (1905-1993) improved the apparatus and 
was able to confirm with more certainty Bothe and Kolhorster's result. In the 
following years three independent experiments (see Swann 1961, p. 812) 
confirmed the existence of the so-called 'latitude effect': the variation of the 
intensity of cosmic rays with the latitude. This is the result of the Lorentz force 
generated by the terrestrial magnetic field on charged particles. This force has a 
full component when the speed of the particle is orthogonal to the Earth's 
magnetic field (at the equator) and is null when the speed is parallel to it (at the 
Poles). The latitude effect supported the idea that cosmic rays could not consist of 
gamma rays, because on photons the Lorentz force has no effect since they are not 
charged. To illustrate the point of the experiment, that it is impossible that the 
penetrating particles are not charged, it is necessary to use the Lorentz force, a 
fundamental law, or at least phenomenological laws derived from it.
The latitude effect was the reason of a long dispute between Millikan and 
Arthur Compton (1892-1962) (Bertolotti 2013, pp. 85-95), who had conducted a 
large-scale geographical survey: in the beginning the former, who had made 
experiments himself, insisted that there was no latitude effect, then he tried to 
explain it under wrong assumptions, i.e. by claiming that primary photons could 
knock off some electrons from interstellar matter. Millikan also refused to accept 
the results of Bothe and Kolhorster's experiments as well as Rossi's on the basis 
that the internal processes inside the Geiger counter were misunderstood. As
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Galison reports, in 1934 Millikan and three colleagues published a paper on 
Physics Review, in which they asserted:
[The counters' coincidences] cannot in general be due to the passage of 
one charged article through both counters and the intervening lead, but 
must rather be due to some mechanism but which a photon can release 
successively along, or in the general neighbourhood of, its path a 
number of different particles whose separate but practically 
simultaneous action on the two or more counters is responsible for the 
observed coincidence (quoted in Galison 1987, p. 95).
The way Millikan challenged the experiment is reminiscent of the criticism of 
Galileo's opponents. The analogy lies in this fact: the scholars of Galileo's time 
thought that the bright spots were not satellites but rather artefacts produced by 
the instrument, of which there was no accurate knowledge; similarly, Millikan and 
colleagues suggested that the coincidence was not the effect of a charged particle 
but that of a mechanism inside the counter produced by a gamma ray. In both 
cases, doubts about the internal processes of the instrument were a reason for not 
believing in the claim of the existence of an entity. Of course, there was an 
important difference between the two disputes: Galileo's opponents contested the 
use of the telescope as a form of evidence in principle and did not share with 
Galileo the same way of thinking and doing; on the contrary, Millikan and 
Compton shared the same SoT and the former did accept the use of the Geiger 
counter as a instrument of investigation. This difference notwithstanding, in both
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the situations it was thought that the instrument was misleading. I shall return to 
this point later.
In the light of the experiments performed in the 1930s it became clear to 
many physicists that the primary cosmic rays impinging the atmosphere were 
protons and that the coincidences at the Earth's surface were caused by charged 
particles. Millikan and others were not convinced, though. About this time or 
immediately following it, several phenomena concerning the interaction between 
protons and the molecules of atmosphere as well as the production of new 
particles became clear. In 1934 Bruno Rossi recognized the phenomenon of air 
shower: the primary cosmic rays when impinge the atmosphere produce a cascade 
of different particles (Rao and Sreekantan 1998, p. 5). However, whether or not a 
new kind of particle was the cause of the coincidence remained a mystery: it was 
thought by some that it was an electron.
The growth in complexity of theoretical physics became increasingly crucial 
for tackling the problem. New theoretical descriptions were important to find out 
the elementary processes that constituted the phenomenon of showers such as 
decays, processes of pair creations and radiation. For example, on the basis of 
these speculations the possibility that certain known particles could reach the 
surface of the Earth was ruled out. In particular, the theoretical physicists John 
Carlson and Robert Oppenheimer (1904-1967) modelled the showers by treating 
them as a diffusion process similar to the expansion of a drop of ink in a glass of 
water. In fact, they described the showers with phenomenological equations 
within the quantum theory. Their conclusion was that, either these equations were 
inapplicable in the domain of cosmic rays energies, or the actual penetration of
3 0 6 STYLES O F TH IN K IN G : ASSESSIN G A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN H A CKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
these rays had to be ascribed to the presence of a component either than electron 
(and photon) (Galison 1987, p. 95). Carl Anderson (1905-1991) and Seth 
Neddermeyer (1907-1988) made measurements of the energy loss of particles 
occurring in the cosmic ray showers that led to rejecting the first hypothesis: 
Carlson and Oppenheimer's theoretical estimates were applicable to cosmic ray 
energies; therefore the coincidences could not be caused by electrons.
In 1937, Jabez Street and Edward Stevenson provided the first quantitative 
analysis of the mass of the penetrating particle by examining the track curvature 
of the particle in a double-cloud-chamber and subjected to a magnetic field. 
Indeed, by measuring the radius of curvature and applying the formula of Lorentz 
force they concluded that the value of the muon's mass is about 130 electron 
masses.
Many experimental physicists were definitely persuaded of the existence of the 
m uon by this remarkable experiment. However, as Galison explains, 'among 
theorists, especially, the acceptance of the new particle was greatly facilitated by 
an argument from the lofty heights of quantum field theory that had been 
absolutely irrelevant to the experimentalists' (Galison 1987, p. 124). Indeed the 
m uon had approximately the same mass of a particle predicted by a theory of 
nuclear forces put forward in 1935 by the theoretical physicist Hideki Yukawa 
(1907-1981). Nevertheless theoretical physicists were wrong: later on it became 
clear that the m uon's behaviour did not conform to that predicted by Yukawa's 
particle, which actually describes the pion. It was only after the war that the muon 
and the pion were distinguished, thanks to an improved theory of quantum field, 
the discovery of new particles and the construction of new accelerators.
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The story of the muon makes it clear that is impossible to identify a 
'moment of discovery', an event that convinces everybody of the existence and the 
identity of a particle: 'we should envision the ending of the m uon experiments as a 
progressively refined articulation of a set of phenomena' (Galison 1987, p. 127). 
Furthermore, Galison draws from the story of the muon some conclusions that 
strikingly contrast with Hacking's emphasis on experimentation. Hacking is 
adamant that high-level theories are not necessary to develop an argument for the 
existence of a theoretical entity. But Galison remarks that 'theory itself played a 
complex role in ending of the cosmic ray experiment' and adds that 'if the first 
role of theory in the ending of these experiments was ostensive, demarcating a 
domain of phenomena, the second was constitutive' (Galison 1987, p. 129). For 
example, the quantum theory of electrodynamics drew the attention on the 
phenomenon of penetrating radiation; and theory helped to isolate a set of 
possible experimental techniques as important. Beside this ostensive role, there is 
a constitutive role: 'the acceptance of quantum theory of electrodynamics and its 
identification with shower particles was not separable from the acceptance of a 
new particle. These questions are complementary pieces of the same conceptual 
structure1 (Galison 1987, p. 129). Galison concludes:
Theory enters first ostensively, acting in broad, qualitatively way: look 
at penetrating particles, look at showers. [...] But theory enters a 
second time, now not to point out types of phenomena but to provide a 
quantitative analysis that plays a constitutive role in conclusion. And at 
this level theory is often mediated by a model which instantiates
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features of the more general theory without invoking the generality of 
an overarching structure. (Galison 1987, p. 131).
Bearing these thoughts in mind let us return to imagining an adherent of 
the laboratory SoT (the speaker) who has to convince a member of a community 
who adopts a different SoT (the hearer) about the existence of a muon. Among 
other things, the speaker would need to prove that the causal effects are not 
artefacts of the Geiger counter as Millikan thought. Hacking might be right that 
Galileo did not need much theory to make his point, but the example of the muon 
shows that it is not possible to isolate a group of observation sentences in order to 
characterize this particle and convince someone of its existence. Indeed, Galison 
explains that particle physicists did need fundamental theories of theoretical 
physics to become confident about the existence of the muon. Our belief in muons 
is intimately connected with our ideas about the counters, the Lorentz7 s force and 
the phenomenological laws that describe the showers. So, while observation style- 
independent sentences were all Galileo needed for arguing for the existence of 
Jupiter's moons, theoretical style-dependent sentences were necessary in order to 
argue that the Geiger counter was really counting muons. For example, in the case 
of the muon, the hearer would need to resort to theoretical sentences to express 
the phenomenological laws of Carlson and Oppenheimer or the theoretical 
interpretation of the latitude effect by Lorentz's force. These sentences would have 
no truth-value in a SoT different from the laboratory SoT although, since the 
laboratory SoT is self-authenticating, they would be true by its standards of truth. 
Carlson and Oppenheimer's model, for example, is for Hacking not the 
explanation of the phenomenon of the shower but a theoretical characterization
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that is true to the result of an experiment. In turn, the result of the experiment is 
true to the model. To sum up, the speaker would need theoretical style-dependent 
sentences in order to deploy her argument and the hearer could not attribute any 
truth-value to them. Hence, that very argument is relative to the laboratory SoT.
On the basis of the results of this section I conclude that whether or not it is 
possible to provide a justification for the existence of unobservable particle that is 
as theory-free as possible, Hacking's characterization of SoTs implies that that 
very justification is relative to the laboratory SoT. This conclusion has two 
important corollaries: the first is that Hacking's experimental realism is at odds 
with the relativistic implications of his SoTs project. Indeed, on the one hand 
Hacking's experimental realism is the claim that we know about unobservable 
entities, on the other hand, the SoTs project implies that experimental realism is 
unjustified outside the laboratory SoT. The second corollary is that by claiming 
that 'w hen the question is a live one [...] then aspects of the world determine what 
the answer is' Hacking does not really manage to distance himself from 
constructionism. Indeed, this claim amounts to saying that there is only one correct 
answer to a live question. But the answer to the question as to whether or not the 
particles posited by physicists exist cannot be considered as universally and 
atemporally 'correct': its being 'correct' -  the SoTs project implies -  is unjustified 
outside of a given SoT.
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7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I have analysed Hacking's experimental realism in the light of the 
SoTs project. Hacking's theory antirealism denies the possibility of ranking SoTs 
in terms of their capacity to explain phenomena. Furthermore, Hacking is not 
successful in showing that his entity realism is justified for a community that does 
not adopts the laboratory SoT. It follows that the SoTs project is in conflict with 
the claim that we know about unobservable. My discussion of incommensurability 
has focused on the laboratory SoT. In the next chapter I shall offer a more general 
argument that concerns any SoT.
Chapter Eight: Styles of Thinking, 
Human Forms of Life, Relativism
8.1 Introduction
In this section I want to push further my argument that the SoTs are 
incommensurable. I believe that a critical dialogue between Ian Hacking and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -1951) is beneficial to this aim: by comparing and 
contrasting the SoTs project with Wittgenstein's later works such as Philosophical 
Investigations (Wittgenstein 1997 [1953]) (henceforth PI) and On Certainty 
(Wittgenstein 1995 [1969]) (OC) it is possible to pinpoint the reasons that make the 
SoTs project relativistic in nature.
In his quest to describe the workings of hum an language W ittgenstein 
adopts different notions, of which those o f ' language game' and 'form of life' will be 
the most interesting for my aims. As he says, 'the term "language-gflme" is m eant 
to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an 
activity or a form of life' (Wittgenstein 1997 [1953], PI 23). For him language is 
composed by different games with their own rules, e.g. giving orders and obeying 
them; making up stories; guessing riddles. W hat enables all these games to work,
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and therefore the language itself to function, is a form of life, our biological, 
behavioural and sociological matrix.
The interpretation of 'form of life' has been widely debated. Wittgenstein 
says that 'w hat has to be accepted, the given, is -  one could say -form s of life' 
(Wittgenstein 1997 [1953], p. 226), suggesting that a form of life is the 'given' in 
which a language has meaning. The plural in 'forms of life' has grounded 
relativistic readings of Wittgenstein, which have insisted on the idea that forms of 
life are to be understood as contingent, historical, dependent on culture. On the 
other hand, non-relativistic readings of Wittgenstein are suggested by other 
passages such as those in which a form of life seems to be what is common of 
hum an kind and makes the language possible, e.g. 'the common behaviour of 
mankind is the system of reference by mean of which we interpret the unknown 
language'(Wittgenstein 1997 [1953], PI 205).
Ever since Peter Winch applied Wittgenstein's treatment of language as a 
series of games ('language games') to social science (Winch 1964), whether the 
later Wittgenstein should be considered an epistemic relativist has been a question 
fiercely debated. The list of the important contributions to this debate is quite long 
(see Kusch 2013, p. 37) and includes recent papers such as those of Annalisa 
Coliva (Coliva 2010) and Martin Kusch (Kusch 2013). For my purposes Coliva's 
paper is sufficiently representative of that line of argumentation that aims to show 
that Wittgenstein is not an epistemic relativist. I shall disregard the trajectories of 
his critics' different interpretations. My main objective in this chapter is to show 
that, despite of the similarities between Hacking and Wittgenstein, which I shall 
lay bare, Coliva's arguments cannot be applied to Hacking so to conclude that his
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project has no relativistic implications. Consequently, my case will be 
strengthened.
In the first section I shall point out that both the conceptions of meaning of 
the early and the later Wittgenstein can be recognized in the SoTs project and I 
shall discuss the philosophical consequences. In the second section, by relying on 
some analogies between the notion of 'form of life' and the notion of SoT, I shall 
argue that the SoTs project implies anti-foundationalism, i.e. the idea that each 
SoT is ungrounded, not epistemically justified. I shall conclude that, although in 
the case of Wittgenstein whether or not anti-foundationalism leads to epistemic 
relativism is at issue, in the case of Hacking this inference is inevitable.
8.2 Meaning, Language Games and Styles of 
Thinking
Hacking has recognized that only Foucault has exerted as much influence as 
Wittgenstein on the way he does philosophy (Hacking 2007b, p. 38). However, 
when in Leviathan and the Air Pump Shapin and Schaffer wrote that '[Boyle's] 
experimental programme was a "language game" and a "form of life'" (Shapin 
and Schaffer 1989 [1985]-a, p. 22), Hacking reacted with these words:
[Wittgenstein] certainly used 1 form of life1 when expressing the 
thought that some things are beyond or behind justification. But I
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would be more cautious than the authors in invoking it here (Hacking 
1991a, p. 240)
Hacking's reaction seems to me eloquent. As I have already highlighted by 
mentioning other passages of him, he has never wanted to leave room to 
relativistic implications of the SoTs project. In particular, he has always been 
unwilling to concede that the laboratory SoT can be likened to a form of life 
because that would have amounted to saying that there is no justification outside 
it (as he explicitly says). I shall clarify whether it is possible to draw a parallel 
between SoTs and forms of life further on in this section.
8.2.1 Meaning and Context: Comparing Wittgenstein and Hacking
I shall now select some Wittgenstein's ideas on meaning that I want to discuss vis- 
a-vis Hacking's. In the wake of the representationalist view of language put 
forward by Frege, Russell and Alfred Tarski (1901-1983), The Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1974 [1921]) had insisted that the truth of a proposition 
was determined for every possible situation. The early Wittgenstein regarded the 
meaning of a proposition as what must be the case in the world for the proposition 
to be true. In PI Wittgenstein developed an alternative view in which it is our use 
of the words, not the relation between them and the objects of the world, which 
provides meaning to what we say. He stressed that language has not only to do 
with identifying and representing but also with activities such as requesting (PI 2), 
naming colours (PI 48), inferring the intentions of an interlocutor from given 
expressions (PI 632). Each of these activities is a language-game, i.e. a 'language
STYLES O F T H IN K IN G : ASSESSING A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN H A CKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
3 1 5
and the actions into which it is woven' (PI 7). For example, in (PI 2) the builder B 
brings to the builder A the stones that the latter has called out by using the words 
'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam': B has learned that when the word is such-and-such 
she has to perform a particular action with a specific type of stone. Wittgenstein 
invites the reader to think of the 'primitive language' (PI 2) used by the two 
builders as a language-game similar to 'those games by means of which children 
learn their native language' (PI 7). Ultimately,
The meaning of a word is its use in the language (PI 43)
Only from the use that we make of the word is it possible 'to see' its meaning -  no 
ostensive definition can be sufficient for that aim. If we Took and see' (PI 66) we 
realise that there is nothing common to the different uses of the same word. It is 
for this reason that the philosopher ought to look at the different conditions 
governing the employment of a concept in different circumstances, noting 'the 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing' (PI 66) which 
he calls family-resemblances. Far from proposing theories, philosophy should avoid 
'misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by 
certain analogies between forms of expression in different regions of language' (PI 
90).
Historical epistemologists seem to follow these precepts w hen they 
consider that organizing concepts are situated. For Hacking a concept should be 
understood not by reflection on the hum an understanding but 'in  terms of the 
words that we use to express the concept, and the contexts in which we use those
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words' (Hacking 2002, p. 35). Hacking also describes his way of doing philosophy 
by echoing Wittgenstein's 'looking and seeing':
All my work has turned to real life, real knowledge, real expertise. I 
have come to call that taking a look (Hacking 2007b, p. 36).
In drawing these parallels I have deliberately been silent on an important 
difference between Hacking and Wittgenstein. The former considers necessary to 
examine concepts in relation to contexts that are determined by history: the 
structure of organizing concepts changes and develops over time. In this sense, 
SoTs represent different contexts that provide meaning to words and sentences -- 
only within a SoT does a style-dependent sentence acquire meaning. On the other 
hand, Wittgenstein generally contrasts ordinary language with metaphysical 
language. For example he says:
When philosophers use a word -  for instance 'knowledge', 'being',
'object', 'I', 'proposition', or 'name' -  and try to grasp the essence of the 
thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in 
this way in the language, which is after all its home? What we do is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 
116).
Wittgenstein's main worry is to prevent us from going astray in our arguments 
when we use a word in ordinary language, out of its context. For him concepts are 
situated because, to be properly understood, their philosophical context or, in
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general, their language-game, must be studied. A concept is a nonsense when it is 
out of any language-games we use in every day language. The language-games 
Wittgenstein considers are the language games that are ours, present, in use today. 
His concern is about how words are connected with other elements of human 
language, with their practices, and in particular with the language-games that 
provide meaning to them. For Wittgenstein even scientific language is simply a 
branch of the language we speak as human beings, whereas for Hacking it is that 
particular language that receives meaning from the presuppositions of a set of 
different SoTs that have accumulated throughout history.
In conclusion, both Wittgenstein and Hacking urge philosophers to pay 
attention to the 'contexts' that give meaning to words and sentences. However, 
Wittgenstein's emphasis is on those 'contexts' that are represented by the 
countless activities and practices of our everyday language; Hacking's emphasis is 
on those contexts that result from historical contingences such as SoTs.
8.2.2 Meaning and Understanding: Comparing Wittgenstein and 
Hacking
As I have mentioned, in the early works of Wittgenstein it is possible to find 
another conception of meaning, which was rejected later. He considered as a 
constitutive principle of meaning the memorable statement of logical positivism 
'the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification', which he discussed with 
Schlick in 1929. At that time, Wittgenstein's conception of meaning pointed to 
something external to the proposition, which provided a truth-value to it. Later 
on, when he abandoned the representationalist view and defined the m eaning of a
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word as its use in the language (PI43), he rejected the view that the meaning of a 
word is 'contained' within a particular sign or mental accompaniment of it. As 
Arif Ahmed explains, for Wittgenstein 'w hat makes a sign of this rather than that is 
how we normally respond to it' (Ahmed 2010, p. 96). Indeed Wittgenstein writes:
[...] A person goes by a signpost only in so far as there exists a regular
use of signposts, a custom (PI 198).
Even pointing at an object would not be sufficient for imparting the meaning of a 
word to a child who 'came into a strange country and did not understand the 
language' (PI 32). Ostensive definitions require a certain 'background capacity' 
(Ahmed 2010, p. 20) on the part of the child, which is not acquired by the mere 
pointing to an object. The child must be prepared to respond, say, to the definition 
of the word red 'by using the word defined as we standardly use colour-words 
(e.g. applying it to both or neither of two chromatically indistinguishable objects 
in the same light)' (Ahmed 2010, p. 20). Importantly, this pattern of usage is not 
contained within the definition or in some mental state that the definition helps to 
form in the m ind of the child. It may well be the case, as Wittgenstein admits at (PI 
39), that one forms an inner picture of a cube when one comes to understand the 
w ord 'cube'. But the point is that, as one pattern of use can fit the picture in the 
way that just one jigsaw piece fits another, so could another.
As an example Wittgenstein shows that if a picture came before one's mind 
in hearing the word 'cube', it would not be wrong to say that a triangular prism 
fits the picture. Indeed, 'one can imagine a method of projection according to 
which the picture does fit after all' (PI 139). To sum up, for Wittgenstein
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understanding is not to form an image before one's inner eye of a propositional 
expression. It means to think its sense, for example doing the 'projection', i.e. to 
think the sign and its method of application. Though, the picture alone does not 
force an application upon us (PI 140). It is use, the 'normal response' to the sign, 
which fits the picture. As Ahmed says in his comment to (PI 49):
The illegitimate idea is that the picture somehow forces an application 
upon us, so that a use fits the picture not in virtue of its being a normal 
response to the picture (i.e. a typical way of using it) but independently 
of how we normally respond to it (Ahmed 2010, p. 73).
The two conceptions of meaning, 'meaning as method of verification', as 
conceived by the early Wittgenstein, and 'meaning as use', as conceived by the 
later Wittgenstein, coexist in the SoTs project. Ever since Language, Truth and 
Reason Hacking has often used Schlick's motto to convey a central point of the 
SoTs project:
we assert that until there are methods of reasoning that bear on the 
truth or falsehood of a scientific statement, the question of its truth and 
falsehood does not arise (Hacking 2009, p. 21)
The passage expresses the claim that certain (style-dependent) sentences acquire a 
truth-value only when there is a SoT that makes them up for grabs as true or false. 
Consider this sentence (subsection 3.3.4):
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Any prism which has a triangular base is divided into three pyramids equal to one
another which have triangular bases (Heath 1908 Proposition VII book XII p. 394).
Hacking would say that this sentence came up for grabs as true or false when the 
presuppositions (methods of reasoning, criteria of evidence etc.) of the 
postulational SoT came into play. Its meaning points to something external, 
although this 'something' is not a state of affairs in the real world, rather a state of 
affairs in the universe of discourse supplied by the lettered diagram. For someone 
who adopts the postulational SoT to understand Euclid's statement can well be 
expressed by proposition 4.024 in the Tractatus: 'to understand a 
proposition means to know what is the case if it is true'(Wittgenstein 1974 [1921], 
prop. 4.024). The representationalist view held by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is 
more evident in Hacking's insistence that there exist purely observational 
sentences, which acquire their meaning from a correlation between words and 
states of affairs in the external world. In particular, for Hacking the truth of style- 
independent sentences can be assessed by relying on the evidence of senses, which 
is basic and out of history.
The conception of meaning of a proposition as its use within a language- 
game is also present in the SoTs project. Indeed, I remind the reader that a 
distinctive m ark of the postulational SoT is the interdependence between lettered 
diagram and text. Consider the sentence in Euclid's Elements XIII.4:
Let there be a straight line, AB  (Netz 1999, p. 43)
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This sentence does not assert a relation between a symbol and an object. It asserts 
an action, which is the following: take for granted of a certain line, then proceed to 
localize it in the diagram on the basis of the letters A  and B. As Netz points out 
'the identity of "the AB" as a certain line in the diagram is assumed by Euclid, 
rather than asserted by him' (Netz 1999, p. 44). To paraphrase Wittgenstein, the 
action to be performed, i.e. assuming that there is a certain line in the diagram and 
localizing it so-and-so, is not 'forced upon us' by the written sentence. It is only by 
virtue of its use that Euclid's sentence receives its meaning -  to think its sense 
means to think the written sentence and its 'normal response'.
In the light of Wittgenstein's observations it is possible to reread Hacking's 
point that certain sentences are style-dependent and have no meaning for 
someone who adopts a different SoT. Consider the example of Euclid's sentence 
'let there be a straight line, AB': the 'normal response' necessary to give meaning 
to it is a pattern of use that emerged in the ancient Greece, part of the way of 
doing of the postulational SoT. An imaginary Babylonian who had had to 
understand the meaning of that sentence would have been in the same position of 
that child who 'came into a strange country and did not understand the language', 
to echo Wittgenstein. Neither the signs that express the sentences nor the pointing 
to someone who responds to the sentence in a certain way could have revealed the 
meaning of Euclid's sentence to a Babylonian. Like the imaginary child mentioned 
by Wittgenstein, the Babylonian would have had to possess a 'background 
capacity', be prepared to respond to Euclid's sentence as the ancient Greeks 
standardly responded when they assumed the existence of a certain line and looked 
for it in the diagram. To use my terminology (section 4.4), Euclid's sentence w ould
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have been intelligible for a Babylonian, but it would have not been understandable 
for her. Indeed, a Babylonian would have needed to learn to respond to Euclid's 
sentence as an ancient Greek did. But to act and rely on the evidence of the 
postulational SoT would have meant to drop out of her community. After all, 
returning to Wittgenstein, when a child learns the meaning of the words by using 
them as the members of her community do, she becomes a member of her 
community.
By the same token, consider the sentence below in the probabilistic SoT 
(section 2.2)
The adult height for one sex in an ethnic group follows a normal distribution
One can say that to understand, for example, the meaning of 'distribution' a 
person must develop an understanding of the practice of selecting a sample, 
arranging the values that the variable of height takes in the sample, recognizing 
the different frequencies within certain intervals. As Wittgenstein says, 'the 
meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we learn when a 
word is incorporated into our language' (OC 61). The employment of the word 
'distribution' is that one which is dictated by the scientific community after the 
emergence of the statistical SoT.
Ultimately, notwithstanding the differences in terminology, Hacking makes 
a point very similar to Wittgenstein: for both of them the meaning of a sentence is 
determined by a pattern of usage that has emerged over a long period of time. In 
the case of Wittgenstein this pattern of usage is rooted on the 'background 
capacity' of a child; in the case of Hacking on the 'presuppositions' of a given SoT.
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It is important to notice, once more, that Wittgenstein discusses meaning in 
the context of language-games that inhabit our everyday language: in order to 
exemplify the case of someone that is 'out of a language-game', he gives imaginary 
examples, e.g. that of a child who has to learn the language. On the other hand, 
Hacking discusses meaning in historical contexts that emerge at different points in 
time. In this sense, it is possible to say that Hacking brings history into 
Wittgenstein's picture of meaning. In other words, Hacking presents concrete 
examples of different communities that cannot understand each other because they 
do not share the same presuppositions.
8.3 Ungroundedness, Self-Authentication and 
Epistemic Relativism
The point I want to make now is that, given certain crucial similarities between the 
notion of form of life and the notion of SoT, if the former implies anti- 
foundationalism the latter implies anti-foundationalism too. For a start, let me 
point out these similarities.
8.3.1 Forms of Life and Styles of Thinking
The expression of form of life is mentioned for example in PI where W ittgenstein 
says that 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life1 (PI 19). He does 
not mean that languages are shaped by cultures, rather that human language, 
including the use we all associate to words, is associated with certain common
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features of hum an life. Indeed, as Greg Hill suggests (Hill 1997, p. 565), (PI 19) can 
be compared to (Wittgenstein 1997 [1953], p. 174) in which Wittgenstein says:
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But 
hopeful? And why not? [...] Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who 
have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are 
modes of this complicated form of life (Wittgenstein 1997 [1953], p. 174).
In this passage, Wittgenstein speaks of a form of life to which the phenomenon of 
hope is peculiar. Therefore, the expression does not refer to a specific human 
culture but to all human beings, those beings who speak a language (and therefore 
can hope).
Another well-known passage helps to understand better what a form of life
is:
So you are saying that human agreement decides what it is true and 
what it is false?' — It is what human beings say that it is true and false; 
and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in form of life (PI 241)
Wittgenstein's point is that there is a sort of 'hum an agreement' that allows the 
working of the language itself; within the framework of this 'hum an agreement' 
hum an beings express sentences that can be true or false. And what does 'hum an 
agreement' consist in? It is an agreement in form of life, an expression by which, as 
it will apparent soon, Wittgenstein points to a common way of acting; to human
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reasoning procedures such as deduction and induction; to our taking for granted 
of certain propositions such as 'The earth has existed since long before my birth' 
or 'The earth is round' or 'Every hum an being has two parents'; and, in general, to 
what is part of our natural history such as walking, eating, drinking, playing.
The relation hypothesized by Wittgenstein between a form of life and the 
meaningful sentences is comparable to the relation between a SoT and its style- 
dependent sentences. Indeed, a form of life is the sine qua non of the existence of 
meaning, of a common 'response' -  and, all the more so, of any true-or-false 
sentence; similarly, a SoT is what makes sentences true-or-false, meaningful, 
objective. Compare, for example (OC 94)
[...] [My picture of the world] is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true or false (OC 94).
with
Propositions of that sort that necessarily require reasoning to be 
substantiated have a positivity, a being true-or-false, only in 
consequence of the styles of reasoning in which they occur (Hacking 
2002 [1982] -a, p. 175).
Often, Wittgenstein refers to our form of life as a way of acting that is part of our 
nature. For example, in (OC 144):
The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. he learns to act 
according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what it is
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believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast [...]
(OC 144)
According to this passage, there is a close connection between what we take for 
granted and our way of acting. In (OC 109) Wittgenstein asks whether an 
empirical proposition can be tested and in (OC 110) he continues:
What counts as its test? -- But is this an adequate test? And if so, must it 
not be recognizable as such in logic? -- As if giving grounds did not 
come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded 
presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting (OC 110)
Giving justifications for the truth of a proposition comes to an end -  and the end is 
a way of acting not a proposition. To understand the sense of this thought one has 
to bear in mind that a way of acting is ascribable to a way of judging, as 
Wittgenstein himself says en passant in (OC 232) ('our manner of judging and 
therefore of acting' my italics). In other terms, the human system of beliefs, the 
hum an procedures of reasoning, what we consider as irrefutable evidence, 
determine our way of judging and therefore the way of acting in order to prove, 
argue, experiment, measure etc. Therefore the passage above expresses the idea 
that there is no further justification for the hum an way of judging, e.g. our 
procedures of reasoning and our systems of evidence. Indeed, they determine our 
way of acting, which the passage defines as the end of our giving grounds.
In Hacking the concept of 'way of doing' plays a similar role as I am going to 
show.
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8.3.2 Ungroundedness
In the case of style-dependent propositions one can ask the same question posed 
by Wittgenstein regarding empirical propositions: does giving ground come to an 
end? The end is not a proposition -  the end, according to Hacking, is represented 
by the presuppositions of the SoT itself, the way of thinking and doing of that very 
SoT. Indeed, compare:
There is no higher standard to which they [SoTs] directly answer 
(Hacking 2002 [1992], p. 192)
with
At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded 
(OC 253)
In the light of the second passage, from the former passage follows that there is no 
further justification outside the presuppositions of the SoT in which a belief is 
held. So, the presuppositions of the SoTs represent, so to speak, the belief that lies 
at the foundation of all our beliefs in that SoT -  and there is no foundation for the 
presuppositions.
Notice that when Hacking says that we never call into question the 
presuppositions of a given SoT he seems to echo Wittgenstein. Compare the 
following passages:
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We do not check to see whether mathematical proof or laboratory
investigation or statistical studies are the right way to reason (Hacking
2002 [1992], p. 188).
[...] We can't just investigate everything, and for that reason we are 
forced to rest content with assumption. If we want the door to turn, the 
hinges must stay put (OC 343)
I have to stress again a substantial difference between the two pictures of 
Wittgenstein and Hacking. The former discusses meaning within the perspective 
of, nota bene, an ahistorical structure, human language, whereas Hacking discusses 
meaning within the perspective of different structures that emerge and evolve over 
time. In some sense, Wittgenstein's form of life is prior to the notion of SoT in that 
all the SoTs themselves presuppose the existence of human language, and in 
particular style-independent propositions that can be assessed by virtue of a 
universal and atemporal evidence of senses. When SoTs emerge and evolve they 
introduce new candidates for truth of falsehood leaving intact the basic structure 
of hum an language with its rules and languages games. For Hacking, as I interpret 
him, these rules include a way of judging that relies on the evidence of senses. 
SoTs do not change language games such as commanding, questioning, 
recounting, chatting, which 'are as much a part of our natural history as walking, 
eating, drinking, playing' (PI 25).
Wittgenstein's investigation reaches, in this sense, deeper levels: it is an 
investigation on what makes possible meaning at all. No wonder that, while
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Hacking simply assumes that empirical propositions are assessed by the evidence 
of senses, Wittgenstein asks what makes us certain of their truth. In the context of 
his argument against two papers of the philosopher George Edward Moore (1873-
1958), 'A  Defense of Common sense' and 'Proof of an External World' (Moore,
1959), Wittgenstein raises the doubt that common-sense certainties (expressed by 
sentences such as 'Every hum an being has two parents' or 'The earth has existed 
since long before my birth') cannot be treated as the most certain knowledge.
If Moore says that he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant 
him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says 
he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for his 
conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (OC91)
According to him 'Moore choses precisely a case in which we all seem to know the 
same as he and without being able to say how' (OC 84): good philosophy should 
show that common-sense certainties are ungrounded propositions of our 
language-games. They are neither true nor false, neither justified nor unjustified, 
or neither empirical nor normative.
Common-sense certainties and the presuppositions of SoTs have the same 
epistemological status. The former lie at the bottom of all hum an languages 
games, are constitutive of our form of life, represent 'the axis around which a body 
rotates' (OC152): if we did not believe in their truth we could not assert that we 
know all we know. The presuppositions of a SoT stand exactly in the same relation 
with all is known by using that very SoT. In this respect in doing philosophy
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Hacking has pursued similar aims as Wittgenstein in that he has identified the 
ungrounded presuppositions of the different ways of knowing. Compare:
We don't, for example, arrive at any of them [Moore's propositions] as 
a result of investigations (OC 137)
with
the propositions that are objectively found to be true are determined as 
true by styles of reasoning for which in principle there can be no 
external justification (Hacking 2002 [1982] -a, p. 175).
In Wittgenstein's passage it is said that our belief that common-sense certainties 
are true is not justified by an investigation. Similarly, in Hacking's passage it is 
said that the presuppositions of a SoT have no external justification.
To sum up, for Wittgenstein whether we consider the human way of acting 
or our procedures of reasoning or our common-sense certainties, which are all 
constitutive of our form of life, we have to conclude that they are ungrounded — in 
short, our form of life is ungrounded. The parallels I have draw n between 
Wittgenstein's and Hacking's claims have brought to the fore that SoTs are 
ungrounded too. In particular, whether we consider our ways of thinking or 
doing, or our systems of evidence, or our types of explanations, which emerge 
over history and are part of the presuppositions of our SoTs, they are all 
ungrounded.
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8.3.4 Ungroundedness and Self-authentication
The comparisons I have drawn also shed light on the concept of self­
authentication. Indeed, one can express this concept by saying: a SoT becomes a 
standard of objectivity because it gets at the truth and we believe that it gets at the 
truth because we rely on its presuppositions. Now we can say that the circuius in 
probando emerges from the fact that we cannot give any ground for the 
presuppositions of a SoT: they are neither justified nor unjustified. It is 
ungroundedness that lies at the root of the 'phenomenon of self-authentication' as 
the following parallels between Wittgenstein and Hacking show.
Consider for example the algorithmic SoT. In section 3 .21 had argued that 
the algorithmic SoT, as it is described by Hacking, does not answer to any criteria 
except its own: what has been found by using an algorithm is assessed by using 
another algorithm. For example, in the ancient Egypt the 'm ethod of false 
positions', an algorithmic method used to solve linear algebraic equations, was 
checked by the means of proportions. Let us compare this chain of reasoning 
concerning the self-authentication of the algorithmic SoT with the following chain 
of reasoning that we find in OC. Wittgenstein says:
We should ask: 'What is it like to make such a mistake as that?' -  e.g.
what's it like to discover that it was a mistake? (OC32)
and continues:
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If someone is taught to calculate, is he also taught that he can rely on a
calculation of his teacher's? But these explanations must after all
sometime come to an end. [...] (OC 34)
The answer is:
If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can't have been a 
miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a 
rule, but by learning to calculate (OC44)
And
In certain circumstances, for example, we regard a calculation as 
sufficiently checked. What gives us a right to do so? Experience? May 
that not have deceived us? Somewhere we must be finished with 
justification, and then there remains the proposition that this is how we 
calculate (OC 212).
In conclusion:
When does someone say, I know that.... x.... = ... ? When one has 
checked the calculation (OC 50)
From the perspective of the SoTs project, this conclusion amounts to stating that 
the algorithmic SoT is self-authenticating. Indeed, to check ...x...=... by another
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(or the same) method of calculation is for Wittgenstein the only way to assess the 
truth of
8.3.5 Ungroundedness and Epistemic Relativism
Notice the use of the verb 'know ' in the last passage above. Imagine a very ancient 
society who adopted a SoT different from the algorithmic one. One cannot say that 
a member of that society was able to 'know ' th a t .. .x. ..=... in that the only way to 
assess the truth of .. .x. ..=... is to use the algorithmic SoT itself, which was alien to 
her. In the case of Hacking, this circumstance leads to epistemic relativism: ... 
x. ..=... is justified within the algorithmic SoT and unjustified outside of it. No 
wonder that this was my point in the previous chapter in the case of experimental 
realism: since the laboratory SoT is self-authenticating the claim that unobservable 
entities exist is assessed by using the laboratory SoT itself.
Now, observe that the example of a hypothetical ancient society I have 
made is not so far from Wittgenstein's mind. He considered a hypothetical situation 
in which someone does not want to rely on any method of calculation:
If someone supposed that all our calculations were uncertain and that 
we could rely on none of them (justifying himself by saying that 
mistakes are always possible) perhaps we would say he was crazy. But 
can we say he is in error? Does he not just react differently? We rely on 
calculations, he doesn't; we are sure, he isn't (OC 217).
Wittgenstein is pointing to a situation in which a calculation would be justified for 
us and unjustified for someone else. However, we cannot conclude that
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Wittgenstein's passage implies epistemic relativism since he is illustrating a 
hypothetical case for the argument's sake. Conversely, Hacking does not give 
hypothetical examples -  as a matter of fact the SoTs project posits the existence of 
societies that have not thought according to certain SoTs. Consequently, whereas 
for Wittgenstein ungroundedness just implies the possibility of hypothetical cases 
of epistemic relativism for Hacking it does imply actual cases of epistemic 
relativism.
Let me illustrate this point in more general terms. Wittgenstein wrote that 
'if a lion could talk we could not understand him' (Wittgenstein 1997 [1953], p.
223) meaning that human beings could not understand a talking lion because 
there would be no 'agreement in judgments' between the lion and us. Only 
through the connection with the form of the life of the individuals of its species 
could we learn to understand the lion. But since talking lions do not share our 
form of life we cannot project 'the lion's sentences'. In other terms, the lion's 
claims of knowledge would be justified in its form of life and unjustified in ours. 
Now, just as for Wittgenstein agreement in judgments among human beings is 
constitutive of our form of life, so for Hacking agreement in a standard of 
evidence, way of thinking and doing is constitutive of a given SoT. So for similar 
reasons to those expressed by Wittgenstein by his example of the lion, a claim of 
knowledge made in a certain SoT could not be projected. Importantly, whereas the 
case of a talking lion is a mere fictitious example, the emergence of different SoTs 
is for Hacking a real historical event. Therefore, while for Wittgenstein the 
consequences of the groundlessness of our form of life concern hypothetical cases,
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for Hacking they imply that as a matter of fact a certain claim can be justified 
within a given SoT and unjustified outside it.
In order to support my thesis in this section, i.e. that the SoTs project 
implies epistemic relativism, I wish to quote and comment a passage of Annalisa 
Coliva, which I consider representative of a line of argumentation that aims to 
show that Wittgenstein was not an epistemic relativist:
[...] Wittgenstein was merely an anti-foundationalist: he believed that 
our world-picture is ungrounded and that it is not a mere reflection of 
a totally mind-independent reality. But anti-foundationalism is a long 
way short from relativism, let it be  factual -  the view according to 
which there actually are different incompatible epistemic systems that 
are all equally valid -or merely virtual -  that is, equally valid, and 
incompatible epistemic systems, all in fact conceivable from our own 
standpoint. For simply to say that our world-picture is ungrounded 
does not entail either that there are actually different ones, or -  more 
contentiously -  that there could intelligibly be other ones, at least in 
principle (Coliva 2010, p. 3).
Whether or not Coliva is right in the case of Wittgenstein, her argument cannot be 
applied to Hacking's case. In Hacking, both the elements, anti-foundationalism 
and the claim that there are different epistemic systems, are present. Indeed, 
Hacking himself once wrote: 'it never occurred to me that all knowledge needed 
foundations' (Hacking 2007b, p. 35). Moreover, the SoTs project posits 'manifold 
styles of scientific reasoning about which he [Wittgenstein] was silent' (Hacking
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2002, p. 226). Therefore, nothing prevents us from stating that the SoTs project 
implies epistemic relativism.
8.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, on the basis of some parallels between the notion of 'form of life7 
and the notion of SoT, I have argued that the SoTs project implies anti- 
foundationalism. However, although it is at issue in the case of Wittgenstein 
whether anti-foundationalism leads to epistemic relativism, this inference is 
inevitable in the case of Hacking.
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Chapter Nine: The Contingency Issue: 
Some Major Implications of the Theory 
of Styles of Thinking
9.1 Introduction
In section 1 .41 have explained that by 'contingency issue' it is meant the question 
as to whether the history of a particular branch of our science could have taken a 
different route and provided results incompatible with those of our actual science. 
I have also pointed out that, apart from Hacking's recent comments (Hacking 
2014, chapter four), the discussions on the contingency issue have not involved the 
notion of SoT. I want to fill this gap in the literature by drawing some important 
implications for the issue of contingency from the theory of the SoTs that I have 
developed in chapters three and four. As far as the contingency issue is concerned, 
I shall address four fundamental questions. First of all, in the next section I 
shall discuss to which extent the emergence of SoTs at a certain point of history is 
a contingent circumstance. In the following section I shall ask whether the 
endurance of SoTs was inevitable by tackling the connected question as to why the 
SoTs are long lasting. Afterwards, I shall focus on the growth of knowledge by 
dealing with questions such as: if a certain SoT continues to be employed and if Q
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is a 'live question', is science bound to converge on a single answer to Q? Finally, 
on the basis of my previous reflections I shall look into the question of the 
convergence of science in the long run. The answers to these questions will rely on 
some basic assumptions of the theory of SoTs and imply a picture of the evolution 
of sciences in which both contingency and inevitability play a key-role.
9.2 Why did styles of thinking emerge?
The question I shall examine in this section concerns the role played by 
contingency and inevitability in the genesis of SoTs. I think that the theory of SoTs 
can provide important insights into this question, although a comprehensive 
answer would require for each SoT a study of cognitive history. I shall start by 
arguing that the emergence of the algorithmic SoT was inevitable.
9.2.1 Inevitability and Algorithmic Style of Thinking
In section 3 .21 have maintained that the algorithmic SoT emerged in ancient 
civilizations such as the Egyptian or the Babylonian: in order to solve problems 
such as Ahmes', the Egyptian mathematicians used a standard set of rules 
involving numbers that were put down on papyri and handed down from a 
scholar to another. In subsection 3.2.5,1 have also explained that the algorithmic 
SoT is grounded in typical hum an capacities: for millennia human beings have 
unconsciously followed step-by-step procedures for fulfilling basic needs as 
animals do, e.g. spiders make silk for catching insects by following three basic
STYLES O F TH IN K IN G : ASSESSING A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN H A CKING'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
3 3 9
steps (Devlin 2005, chapter 5); furthermore, basic numerical competences are 
rooted in biological built-in resources. Importantly, I have also explained that 
when the first human societies started to make use of commodity money a concept 
of number had to come about. In this sense the emergence of the concept of 
number has been inevitable.
Although key elements such as the capacity of following step-by-step 
procedures of reasoning and the very concept of number have been a sine qua non 
for the emergence of the algorithmic SoT, other factors have played a major role in 
its genesis. The introduction of zero, in addition to the positional system, allowed 
the representation of any number without ambiguities. The concept of zero was 
represented by the Babylonians by an empty space, it developed as a num ber in 
India, it was adopted by the Arabs and finally it wended its way across Europe 
when the mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci (1170-1250) promoted the Hindu- 
Arabic numeral system, which had appeared in Europe in the eleventh century 
through the Moors (see Seife 2000). Interestingly, in around 400-300 BC also the 
Mayan people invented independently the concept of zero and a relative symbol. If 
one considers that this people did not come into contact with the earlier European 
civilizations, the emergence of zero appears an inevitable fact. However, it should 
be considered that in the ancient China zero was not used as a num ber but as an 
empty place indicator. Without the number zero there could not have been 
negative numbers and algebra would not have been possible. In other words, at 
least as compared with the inevitable invention of positive integers, that of negative 
numbers appears contingent.
The positional system made much simpler to perform calculations, as it can
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be noted by thinking of the difficulty of performing an addition by using Roman 
numbers. The Babylonians developed the sexagesimal system independently in 
about 2000 BC.; in the Classical period (250 to 900 AD), the Mayan people 
introduced a base-20 positional system. Other number bases have been developed 
by different cultures but eventually the decimal system prevailed in large parts of 
mathematics. Since all the Indo-European languages share the base-10 system it is 
likely that the peoples who spoke proto-Indo-European used it. A plausible 
hypothesis is that the decimal system derived from the use of the hands for 
counting and that it spread around the world for its convenience as a basis for 
calculation (Barrow 1992, p. 36). If this hypothesis is correct, given the basic 
features of humans, it seems inevitable that the base-10 system came to the fore 
and spread around the world. For sure, the use of positional systems in different 
ancient cultures, which did not come into contact, suggests that the emergence of a 
numeral system was an inevitable fact.
This brief account encourages the following reflections. The fact that the 
concept of number as well as the use of step-by-step procedures in mathematics 
emerged in different ancient societies suggests that, given any sufficiently 
developed civilization, it was inevitable that humans had to develop the algorithm 
SoT. However, it is a merely historical fact that the fields of mathematics to which 
we apply the algorithmic SoT are exactly what they are today: one might argue 
that even the coming to the fore of algebra is a fact contingent on the particular 
use of zero as a number in certain human civilizations. Some readers may feel that 
the extension of positive integers to negative ones was inevitable once the concept 
of zero came to the fore. I just want to point out that there is a point in time in
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which it is possible, at least in principle, to imagine an algorithmic SoT that deals 
with a very different mathematics, in this case an impoverished mathematics 
rather different from ours. One might consider that as the point in time in which 
contingency makes its way into the history of science.
9.2.2 Contingency and Postulational Style of Thinking
I shall now move on to the emergence of the postulational SoT. According to some 
cognitive scientists, just as there is an ability to grasp the numerosity of sets of 
objects inherent in the hum an mind, so there is an innate sense of the basic 
conceptual principles of geometry. For example, a team of researchers has 
provided evidence for geometrical intuitions (e.g. symmetry, parallelism, 
congruence) in an Amazonian group who had no schooling and no experience 
with artefacts that employ geometrical concepts (Dehaene and al. 2006). In the 
mind of Netz and Hacking, to acknowledge the existence of such hum an resources 
is the starting point of the particular cognitive history of Greek geometry (Netz 
1999, p. 6) (Hacking 2011) and, therefore, of the postulational SoT.
Netz points out three crucial factors for the emergence of proof. The first one 
concerns the fact that the Greek society was ready to question almost everything: 
following Lloyd, Netz claims that the Greek social environment was fertile ground 
for forms of persuasion (Lloyd 2000). The second factor concerns orality, i.e. the 
fact that in Athens 'the characteristic mode of political debate was oral' (Netz 
1999, p. 292-293). Especially in chapter 5 section 3, Netz shows how the structure 
of proofs, the use of formulae, the reference to the diagram, i.e. to an immediately 
present visual object, reflect the particular form of orality and the importance of
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persuasion in that specific context. In some sense, the demonstration was an oral 
argument written down next to a lettered diagram, argues Netz. The third factor 
concerns the existence a literate environment: the invention of a lettered diagram 
would not have been possible in a pre-literate society or a society which used 
pictograms (Netz 1999, p. 58).
Netz's theses suggest that the emergence of the postulational SoT was a fact 
contingent, especially if we compare it to the emergence of the algorithmic SoT. 
Indeed, a lettered diagram is an abstraction conceptually similar to that of 
number; nevertheless, whereas the concept of number comes about independently 
in different societies, that of lettered diagram is a specific Greek invention. Its 
coming to the fore would have been impossible without the presence of a literate 
and argumentative society, according to Netz. In brief the emergence of the 
postulational SoT has been contingent on social and historical factors. Another 
point concerns the way in which the innate intuitive comprehension of geometry 
was tapped. The postulational SoT represents one of the many possible ways, 
surely not the only possible one, of tapping human cognitive resources and logical 
deduction: other ancient societies did use diagrams, but in radical different 
modalities. Nor is the postulational SoT the only way for proving important 
geometrical truths: for example, Pythagoras theorem, which can be proven by 
using the postulational SoT (i.e. relying on the similitudes of triangles), can also be 
proven by using algebraic methods or even by rearrangement (i.e. by making 
three copies of the original triangle and arranging them in particular ways). 
Ultimately, the specificity of the postulational SoT is contingent on the features of 
the Greek society, e.g. factors such as literacy, orality and persuasion. However
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this specificity does not make the discovery of certain mathematical truths 
contingent since there might be other methods, different from the geometrical SoT, 
for arriving at them.
9.2.3 Contingency, Laboratory Style and the Evolutionary Tree of 
Styles of Thinking
Let us turn to the Laboratory SoT. Referring to the experimental reasoning in the 
early times of civilization Hacking wrote that '[it] probably ha[d] no strict 
beginning. Human beings have been curious, looking, tinkering, exploring, even 
measuring, forever' (Hacking 2009, p. 42). And, when he argued that the 
laboratory SoT is a particular way of combining experimental reasoning and 
modelling, he added that in the earlier times 'the modelling was typically of the 
movements in the heavens' (Hacking 2007a, p. 3). It seems plausible that humans 
have always reasoned by constructing models. One could well make the 
hypothesis that modelling is rooted in ancestral human ritual practices of 
representing in order to make something happen in the future, e.g. the ancient 
Egyptians believed that by writing the name of their hostile people in pottery 
vessels and smashing them they could destroy their enemies (Van De Mieroop 
2011, p. 109). However, Hacking's thesis that experimental activity had no strict 
beginning is not plausible. In order to measure something it is necessary to take 
two steps, which are not reducible to counting: firstly, to adopt a unity of 
measurement; secondly, to possess a concept of number. Indeed, the value of a 
measurement typically represents how many times a predetermined length is 
contained in the length to be measured. In many cases, integer num bers are not
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sufficient because not all the lengths in geometry can be divided into an integer 
number of pieces of the same length. Therefore, the emergence of the concept of 
number and the algorithmic SoT have been necessary for the coming to the fore of 
the earlier forms of experimental reasoning. This is to say that, as contingent as the 
emergence the laboratory SoT may be, there is no contingency in the order in 
which the two SoTs, the algorithmic and the laboratory one, came about. If one 
'replied the tape' of our cognitive history, the event of the crystallization of the 
laboratory SoT would be contingent on the emergence of the concept of number 
and, certainly, on the discovery of the irrational numbers, which was prompted, as 
far as we know, by the emergence of the postulational SoT. In this sense the 
analogy with the Darwinian evolution is striking: as, say, the emergence of 
mammals is contingent on the emergence of primitive chordates, so the laboratory 
SoT is contingent on the emergence of the algorithmic SoT. Algorithmic, 
postulational and laboratory SoT are in relation of extreme connectedness as 
different species in the same genus. However, although their order could not be 
reversed, each of them could have been different in content, e.g. it could not have 
achieved all the actual results.
To summarize it is useful to imagine a sort of evolutionary tree of the SoTs: 
the algorithmic SoT is in the tree 'trunk', as if it were an ancestor of all the other 
SoTs. Several branches grow from the trunk but are separated from it by a knot to 
indicate a sharp discontinuity: the first branch that we encounter up along the 
trunk is the postulational SoT, and in turn the laboratory SoT may be viewed as a 
branch of the postulational SoT, separated from it by a knot. Then, as I shall 
explain, the other SoTs form different branches of the trunk. The birth of the tree
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has a strong character of inevitability, since the human cognitive resources and the 
universal hum an forms of socialization predetermined the emergence of the 
algorithmic SoT. At the next stages both the postulational SoT and the laboratory 
SoT are the result of particular 'environmental pressures', e.g. the unique features 
of the Greek society. Note that trunk and branches, although separated by knots, 
are somehow connected in that they are part of one and only organism. No 
postulational SoT could have been possible without the vast mess of problems 
about lengths, areas and volumes produced by reasoning in the algorithmic SoT 
by the ancient civilizations anterior or coeval with the ancient Greeks; no 
laboratory SoT could have been possible without the possibility of using real 
numbers to measure and a prior model of demonstration (Hacking 2014, p. 140). 
There is no contingency in the order in which these SoTs have emerged because 
there is no postulational SoT without some of the achievements of the algorithmic 
SoT and there is no laboratory SoT without some of the achievements of the 
postulational and the algorithmic SoT.
9.2.4 Contingency and Other Styles of Thinking
An idea of considerable significance for Paracelsus's way of thinking was the 
Pythagorean conviction that everything in the universe is intrinsically 
mathematical. Those who adhered to Pythagoras' school believed that numbers, to 
which they attributed mystical or divine significance, was associated to all sort of 
things that exist. This body of mystic tradition survived in the way of reasoning of 
Renaissance thinkers and of many naturalist philosophers still at Galileo's time. 
Rather than thinking of the universe as a system governed by laws to be
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discovered by performing experiments, these scholars directed their attention to 
single facts of observation that they interpreted as signs. Eventually, this 
conception of the universe was substituted by one in which single events have a 
cause and an effect, more than a meaning. However, it was not until this way of 
thinking underwent a mutation, whose consequence was the emergence of the 
statistical SoT, that it became extinct. As I have explained in section 2.2, according 
to Hacking this mutation consisted in a transformation of the concept of sign into 
a new concept of 'internal evidence', i.e. of evidence other than testimony. The 
statistical style was a new way of tapping this innate sense of evidence, a kind of 
evidence that was absent in the high sciences and that only in the seventeenth 
century become a standard of truth. In the evolutionary tree the style of the 
Renaissance way of thinking could be represented as a dead branch that, at a 
certain point, has a knot, which marks a point of discontinuity with the new 
branch of the statistical SoT.
What is made clear by this brief survey is that it is contingent when, how and 
if certain hum an innate resources come to be exploited. Among these innate 
hum an resources I include not only the ability to grasp the numerosity of a 
grouping of objects or to imagine two parallel lines. I also include logic abilities 
such as deduction, which is the central method of the postulational SoT, or the 
very innate tendency to use certain facts as 'evidence of something else', the 
evidence of things, which is the standard of evidence of the statistical SoT. 
According to the theory of SoTs I have developed, all these human innate 
resources are inborn features of hum an beings that at certain points of history are 
co-opted by a given SoT. The historico-genetic SoT is another case in point.
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Abductive reasoning has always been used by human beings: it was in Aristotle's 
Prior Analytics that C. S. Peirce (1839,1914) found the notion of abduction (Psillos 
2011, p. 119). When the seventeenth century intellectuals directed their attention to 
fossils, minerals and geological layers abductive reasoning was co-opted to find 
out the best explanation of those previously unnoticed objects and its relevance for 
the study of nature became considerable.
The same considerations can be repeated in the case of the taxonomic SoT. 
When Ray, Linnaeus and other naturalists set out to establish the relations 
between the different kinds of living beings they found a way of tapping the 
hum an ability to classify -  in fact, they put the folk classifications of plants and 
animals into a scientific footing. The co-option of these hum an innate resources, 
i.e. the abductive reasoning in the case of the historico-genetic SoT and the 
common-sense view of natural relationships in the case of the taxonomic SoT, has 
been a fact contingent on the emergence of a vast amount of evidence, an entire 
portion of the world previously unnoticed.
The laboratory SoT played a role for the coming to the fore of the historico- 
genetic and the taxonomic SoT, so that their emergence can be considered 
contingent on that of experimental science. Indeed, as Peter Bowler maintains, 
what paved the way for the Darwinian revolution was the failure of the attem pt to 
harmonize the new science inspired by Galileo and Newton with the 
contemporary understanding of the Bible (Bowler 2003 p. 27). On the other hand it 
seems inevitable that the taxonomic and the historico-genetic SoT had to rely on 
one another: e.g. without an unambiguous way of expressing the relationships 
between living beings, the historico-genetic SoT would have been useless.
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In the evolutionary tree of SoTs both the taxonomic and the historico-genetic SoT 
represent two different branches. Their evolution can be explained in terms of the 
concept of exaptation in biology. The latter refers to a character of a organism that 
comes to serve a new function different from the previous one: e.g. although the 
feathers might have evolved for regulating the body temperature at a certain point 
in time they were co-opted by natural selection in order to allow the flight. 
Similarly, when the historico-genetic SoT and the taxonomic SoT evolved, the 
abductive reasoning and the natural disposition for classifying took on new 
functions, perhaps not so distinct from the previous ones, but surely different in 
purpose.
To conclude, I have argued that the emergence of the algorithmic SoT has 
been inevitable. However, the emergence of all the other SoTs has been the result 
of both contingent and inevitable factors: on the one hand, only certain historical, 
social, cultural and intellectual contexts have made it possible their emergence; on 
the other hand, there is a rationale in the order of their emergence, i.e. there is no 
contingence in the order in which they have appeared. This suggests that, once 
what it is found out by using a certain SoT is in place, there are the 
epistemological conditions for the emergence of other SoTs; but which SoTs come 
about, whether they come about, and when they come about is contingent. There 
might have been different ways of tapping human resources and, above all, we 
could not have achieved the same results we have achieved today.
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9.3 Why do SoTs endure?
In this section I shall argue that each SoT is suitable for dealing with certain 
objective structures of our world just as certain methods of lock picking are 
suitable for unlocking a given type of lock. Since Hacking is antirealist about 
theories, he has never put the accent on the ability of SoTs to represent the world. 
Consequently, the SoTs project makes no mention of what I consider an important 
fact: as I shall show, each SoT is grounded in objective features of that portion of 
the world it studies. I suggest that this fact should be taken into consideration 
when addressing the question as to why a SoT endures. Indeed, although the 
internal techniques of self-authentication are surely part of the explanation of the 
resilience of a given SoT (section 4.2.2), they cannot account for its success in 
representing the world more or less well than another possible way of thinking. 
Since success must be part of the explanation of why we do not abandon a given 
SoT, I claim that the ability of this very SoT to account for certain objective 
features of the world is relevant to the question of why SoTs are long lasting.
Ultimately, in addition to the self-authenticating character of SoTs, it is 
possible to find in the world other reasons that justify the endurance of SoTs. I 
cannot investigate here how the interplay between these two very different causes 
(which concern the internal features of SoTs and certain objective features of the 
world) can make a specific SoT long lasting. I shall only present four examples 
that illustrate how each of the six SoTs mirrors objective features of the portion of 
the world it deals with. They suggest that there is a deep connection between SoTs 
and the features of those portions of the world they study.
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9.3.1 Laboratory SoT, Historico-genetic SoT and the Time's Arrow
Many events are causally connected in time in a 'one-way direction7. In the 
example of Carol Cleland, we may happen to see the shattering of a window by a 
baseball but we never see the ball going back along the same trajectory and the 
scattered pieces of glass suddenly jumping up and converging to the empty 
window frame (Cleland 2002, p. 487-494). Ever since Arthur Eddington's 
publication of The Nature of the Physical World (Eddington 1928) this basic feature 
of our world is known as the "time's arrow'. A consequence of the time's arrow is 
the 'asymmetry of over-determination': to conclude that by throwing a ball the 
window glass gets broken one needs hypotheses on the ball, the resistance of the 
glass, the kind of throwing etc.; to conclude that the window glass got broken 
might be sufficient to find one of the many pieces of glass on the ground. Whereas 
causes are over-determined by their effects, the causal predecessors of an event 
under-determine it: there are much more traces than those needed for inferring 
that the window broke. Cleland notes that the undetermination of effects by their 
putative causes is both epistemic and causal: the shattering is epistemically and 
causally undetermined by the throwing of a baseball. On the other hand, the 
shards of glass epistemically over-determine the cause, but are not part of it. 
Cleland's point is that the patterns of reasoning of the experimental and the 
historical sciences are grounded in this pervasive time asymmetry of nature 
(Cleland 2002, p. 474). Her point can be developed: the time's arrow explains why 
the laboratory SoT and the historico-genetic SoT have just the features they have 
(e.g. their kinds of evidence, standard of truth and methods of reasoning) and why
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they succeed in, respectively, predicting phenomena and inferring causes. Indeed, 
in order to infer that an asteroid hit the earth about 65 millions of years ago 
scientists must reason in the historico-genetic SoT. That is: they cannot perform an 
experiment in laboratory but they have to look for a 'smoking gun' (e.g. granules 
of shocked quartz), proliferate tentative explanations for their presence, use 
abductive reasoning and pick out the best explanation. The crux of the matter is 
that, because of the over-determination of past events, scientists do not need to find all 
the traces of the effects of the impact (and cannot look for all of them) in order to 
succeed in finding the cause. It is a basic feature of the world that explains the success 
and the necessity of the historico-genetic SoT. Now, as the over-determination of past 
events by few  present events explains the use of the historico-genetic SoT, so the 
under-determination of future events by 'initial conditions' explains the use of the 
laboratory SoT. What the physicists need is to test a hypothesized law or an entire 
theory, rather than choosing between different explanations. They can manipulate 
the initial conditions that may trigger the phenomenon, make models under 
different hypotheses, test them, and reflect on the additional factors that may be 
relevant. In brief, they must reason in the laboratory SoT — and they m ust do so 
because of the under-determination of future events from present initial 
conditions. Again, it is a basic feature of the world that explains the success and the 
necessity of the laboratory SoT.
To conclude, the time's arrow is an objective feature of the world that 
explains why the laboratory and the historico-genetic SoTs are appropriate for 
finding out. It is reasonable to say that these two SoTs are not enduring for 
contingent reasons but because they are suited for predicting the future from
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present events and inferring the causes from past events.
9.3.2 Taxonomic SoT and the Logic of Evolution
Stephen Jay Gould made a point (Gould 2000a) that can be pushed further in order 
to claim that the endurance of the taxonomic SoT is ascribable to its capacity to 
mirror the treelike form of the interrelations between the living species, i.e. the 
causality of the evolutionary world. Linnaeus' system uses a binomial 
nomenclature: his taxonomic scheme establishes a nested hierarchy in which every 
living group is contained in a larger group, e.g. species within genera, genera 
within families and so forth. One could depict this taxonomy by drawing a sort of 
dichotomous schema in which each element bifurcates; the entire schema would 
give the impression of a progressively inclusive hierarchy. Gould notes that, 
although Linnaeus believed in the fixity of species, his nested hierarchy implies 
Darwin's branching tree, in which a main trunk ramifies into finer divisions. In 
other terms, although Linnaeus was a firm creationist, his scheme happened to 
capture an objective feature of the living world: the fact that the interrelationships 
among organisms follow a genealogical hierarchy built by evolutionary branching. 
Gould concluded that
Linnaeus has endured because he combined the best observational 
skills of his time with a theoretical conception of organic relationships 
that happens to mirror—but not by pure accident—the topology of 
evolutionary systems, even though Linnaeus himself interpreted his 
organizing principle in creationist terms (Gould 2000a, p. 4).
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Gould also reminds us that the form of logic of Linnaeus' system was not 
'invented' by him but was in use in other fields of knowledge since the daw n of 
Western story. For example, Aristotle, adopted dichotomous maps for classifying 
the categories of reasoning (Gould 2000a, p. 7).
To sum up, a particular logic of classification, among the many others (e.g. 
those proposed by Linnaeus' contemporary scholars), happens to mirror a basic 
feature of the living world. We can draw two conclusions. Firstly, it was a 
contingent fact that Linnaeus proposed his system although, arguably, the old 
dichotomous logic of classification would have made its way into the study of 
living species. Secondly, provided that we continue to have interest in the living 
world, it is inevitable the taxonomic SoT will continue to be used since it succeeds 
in mirroring the Darwinian causality, a basic feature of the world.
9.3.3 Algorithmic SoT, Geometrical SoT and the phyllotaxis
My third example concerns a very well known problem posed by the 
mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci (1170-1250) in his book Liber Abaci:
Suppose a newly-born pair of rabbits, one male, one female, are put in 
a field. Rabbits are able to mate at the age of one month so that at the 
end of its second month a female can produce another pair of rabbits.
Suppose that our rabbits never die and that the 
female always produces one new pair (one male, one female) every 
month from the second month on. How many pairs will there be in one 
year? (in Boyer 1968, p. 281)
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His solution is an algorithm for calculating the number of rabbits after each 
month: starting with one couple, after n (ft >2) months there will be a number of 
couples equals to the sum of the numbers of couples after n-2 months plus the 
num ber of couples after ft-1 months:
1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34.....
These are called Fibonacci's numbers.
On many plants, the number of petals is a Fibonacci number: for example, 
lilies and iris have 3 petals, larkspur and aquilegia 5; delphiniums 8; cineraria 13; 
some asters and chicory 21. Then there are daisies with 34,55 or even 89 petals 
and the list could go on. Furthermore, Fibonacci numbers are common in fruit's 
seeds, fruits' sprouts, flowerings, arrangements of leaves.
I shall focus on the phyllotaxis of plants, i.e. the arrangements of leaves 
along the stem. In a plant the leaves are arranged around their stems so that each 
leaf does not shadow the others. Suppose to go around the stem from leaf to leaf 
until reaching the leaf directly above the starting leaf (on the same vertical line); 
and then to go around for another number of turns in order to reach another leaf 
directly above the starting one and so on. What it is found is that both the number 
of turns necessary to reach the leaf directly above the starting leaf and the 
numbers of leaves met are Fibonacci numbers. Take the sunflower. Starting from a 
leaf, going leaf to leaf and turning clockwise we need one turn to reach the leaf 
directly above the starting leaf, meeting 3 leaves. Then 2 turns, 5 leaves; three 
turns 8 leaves; 5 turns, 8 leaves; 8 turns, 13 leaves. That is: exactly the Fibonacci 
series.
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It is possible to say that by using the algorithmic SoT we can know the 
number of leaves around the stem of a plant at certain fixed positions: the step-by- 
step procedure to follow is Fibonacci's recurrence relation. Whether the 
mechanism of phyllotaxis involves genetic factors (Pennybacker and Newell 2013) 
or natural constraints (Douady and Couder 1992) it is also possible to say that, as 
it were, some plants follow the Fibonacci recurrence relation. To conclude, by 
using the algorithmic SoT we mirror a basic feature of the living world as if we 
adopted the same procedures adopted by plants, so to speak.
Let us take a further step. In mathematics two lengths A and B with A>B 
are in the golden ratio if their ratio A /B  is equal to the ratio of their sum A+B to 
A; the value of the golden ratio is 1,61... Now, take a circle into golden 
proportions, i.e. a circle divided into two arc lengths whose ratio is the golden 
ratio. The value of the angle subtended by the minimum arc length is 137,5 
degrees. It is found that many types of plants have adjacent leaves positioned 
around the stem at 137,5 degrees. Therefore, in order to find out the relative 
position of two successive leaves in many plants it is also possible to think in the 
postulational SoT: project the points in which they grow into a plan and imagine 
them as two point in a circle, they form an arc that subtends an angle of 137,5 
degrees. Put in another way, by reasoning in terms of angles and circles in a 
diagram we happen to mirror a basic feature of the world: the way leaves are 
arranged by a plant. Incidentally, the ratio between two successive Fibonacci 
numbers tends to the golden ratio. This is not surprising since the num ber of 
leaves at each turn must grow under the constraint of being located at relative 
angles dictated by the golden ratio. This relationship between Fibonacci num bers
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and the golden ratio reminds us that there is consistency between what it is found 
independently by reasoning in the algorithmic SoT and in the postulational SoT.
9.3.4 Statistical SoT, Induction and Probabilistic World
One of the results of Hacking's historical analysis in The emergence of 
probability is that the coming to the fore of the concept of probability opened the 
way to the analytical problem of induction and to the search for stochastic laws of 
chance processes. My first point concerns the analytical problem of induction. 
Inductive reasoning is grounded in an objective feature of the world, i.e. the 
unlimitedness of the space-time: we cannot search the whole world in order to 
reach certain conclusions; we have to infer them from specific facts. When the 
concept of internal evidence emerged, it was noticed that there are different 
degrees to which inferences are supported and the concept of probability allowed 
to measure their reliability. In this sense, the statistical SoT is grounded in the 
existence of inductive reasoning, which in turn is grounded in the unlimitedness 
of space-time.
My second point concerns the existence in nature of stochastic processes. 
Ever since their discovery, many scientists have believed in the possibility of 
finding the causal mechanisms that could generate statistical laws. They conceived 
probability as an epistemic fact, i.e. a fact that simply reflects our ignorance of 
deeper mechanisms. However, the advent of quantum mechanics convinced the 
majority of scientists that statistical regularity is a brute and irreducible fact of 
nature. Indeed, the works of the physicists John Von Neumann, Simon Kochen, 
Ernst Specker and John Bell have showed that it is impossible to provide a
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'classical' reformulation of quantum  mechanics formalism. That meant the failure 
of the programme of hidden variable theorists who contended that the statistical 
laws are the manifestation of some unspecified deterministic laws.
If the world is only seemingly deterministic but at bottom intrinsically 
probabilistic, the use of the statistical SoT is necessary. In other words, if stochastic 
processes are irreducible to deterministic processes the use of the statistical SoT 
for representing this feature of our world is inevitable. That is, the statistical SoT is 
grounded in the probabilistic nature of reality. As contingent as the emergence of 
the statistical SoT may appear, if  stochastic processes are an objective feature of the 
world and we continue to be interested in them, the statistical SoT will endure.
9.4 Questions, Answers, Inevitability
In this section I shall address this question: supposed that a question is 
asked, is science bound to converge on a single answer? Hacking says:
I am not a contingentist about the content of science, once the questions 
are intelligible and are asked. But I am inclined to contingentism about 
the questions themselves (Hacking 1999b, p. 165).
Hacking maintains that, once certain questions are asked and the correct methods 
are used, the answers are free of the contingency of human history and represent a 
fingerpost for successive possible sciences (e.g. see Hacking 1999b). His 
contingentism about questions is well justified in the light of the fact that
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contingency plays a crucial role in the emergency of SoTs, which in turn bring into 
being new questions. However, as I have argued in subsection 7.3.3, Hacking's 
inevitabilism about the answers appears to me correct but quite unjustified within 
his philosophy. When he suggests that there is only a correct answer to live 
question the adjective 'correct' might be, as in the case of entity realism, relative to 
the SoT in which the answer is given. By the same token, his formulation of the 
contingency issue given in chapter one ('If the results R of a scientific investigation 
are correct, would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if 
successful, at least implicitly contain or imply the same results? ') is affected by the 
same issue: given the anti-foundationalism of the SoTs theory how could we 
establish that a result R is correct? What makes the things worse is the fact that 
Hacking believes in the possibility of an alternative physics successful and 
progressive like ours but incommensurable with ours.
Such imaginary stable sciences would not even be comparable, because 
they would be true to different and quite literally incommensurable 
classes of phenomena and instrumentation (Hacking 1992b, p. 31).
As Lena Soler has remarked, this is 'a  new and fundamental type of 
incommensurability ignored by traditional philosophers of science' (Soler 2011, p. 
9), which is different from that I have been dealing with in chapter seven. She calls 
it 'machinic incommensurability' because it concerns a scientific practice whose 
instruments, laboratory procedures, measurement processes share no common 
measure with the actual scientific practice. Since these technical differences 
translate into different standards of truths, it is difficult to establish by which
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standards an answer to a live question is correct.
I suggest that, although within the framework of SoTs theory there are 
answers about which we do not have a universal justification, but only a style- 
dependent justification, there are several important cases in which we have good 
reasons to conclude that an answer is correct. A case in point is when a scientific 
result can be achieved by reasoning independently in different SoTs. I have already 
pointed out some of these cases. For example, I have already remarked that the 
Pythagorean theorem has numerous proofs, e.g. it can be proven by adopting the 
postulational SoT, i.e. in terms of the similarity of triangles, or by rearrangement 
or, still, by using the differential calculus. Also, in the previous section I have 
shown how both the postulational SoT and the algorithmic SoT reach the same 
conclusions about the phyllotaxis of plants. Furthermore, in chapter four I have 
explained that, although Aristarchus calculated the distances of the Sun and the 
Moon from the Earth by using the postulational SoT, the same result can be 
obtained by reasoning in the laboratory SoT. Note also that, as a m atter of fact, 
instead of using demonstrations in order to achieve a geometrical result, one could 
prove a great number of particular cases by using computer programs, i.e. the 
algorithmic SoT, and concluding by induction that the demonstration is correct.
This convergence of scientific results independently obtained by adopting 
different SoTs also concerns scientific theories. In Flussi e riflussi (Russo 2003), 
Lucio Russo argued that although the theory of tides had already been developed 
in the ancient Greece later on it sank into oblivion and different parts of it were 
taken over by diverse intellectuals. After about 2000 years, Newton reunited these 
complementary parts by relying on distinct sources and reworked the theory. On
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the one hand Newton's theory of tides was not conceptually different from that 
developed in Antiquity, on the other hand the theory literally rose from its ashes 
in the shape of one of the remarkable achievements of the laboratory SoT.
It is important to note that there are other cases in science in which there are 
no strong reasons for believing in the correctness of the ontology of a given theory. 
For example, as James Cushing noted, we could today have arrived at a very 
different worldview of microphenomena if, for contingent reasons, a causal 
quantum-theory program had been pursued (Cushing 1992) (Cushing 1994).
To conclude, although there are specific cases in which we are at a loss to 
know whether or not a scientific answer is correct, in other cases the fact that 
different SoTs achieve the same results suggests that those very SoTs and their 
methods are reliable. Then, if the SoTs are reliable, at least in certain cases it is 
plausible to believe that soon or later, by a series of fallible steps, science will 
obtain the correct answer to a 'live' question. In the light of these considerations, 
there are good reasons for being inevitabilist about the convergence of science on 
correct answers to single questions; but it is contingent that those questions have 
been asked.
9.5 The Long-Term Evolution of Science
I now want to examine the implications of the theory of SoTs concerning the long­
term evolution of the sciences. I shall start by noting that, according to the SoTs 
project, over time there has been a growth of many epistemological items:
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Phenomena, [...] manipulative and technological skills [...] styles of 
thinking accumulate. (Hacking 1983b, p. 56):
Before looking into the consequences of this fact, I want to clear the ground from 
the common misconception that if science grows, in any possible sense, it means 
that it converges on truth:
The phenomenon of growth is at most a monotonic increase of 
knowledge, not convergence. [...] 'Convergence' implies somewhat 
that there is one thing being converged on, but 'increase' has not such 
implication (Hacking 1983b, pp. 55-56).
In this connection, it is useful to mention a point made by Howard Sankey: 
from no realist commitment does it follow that we will end up with a true 
complete theory of the world (Sankey 2008, p. 261). For instance, the realist claim 
that scientific progress consists in advancing towards the truth does not imply that 
science converges on a single true theory: scientific inquiry might converge on 
different truths that do not add up to one whole truth. Similarly, to say that 
science leads to knowledge does not amount to saying that scientific inquiry will 
lead to the whole truth about the world. Sankey's point suggests that for a realist it 
is not inevitable that science will reach a final, coherent, single description of the 
world. But, of course, from the realist claim that science leads to knowledge it does 
follow that it is inevitable that science will converge on at least some truths, e.g. a 
(approximately) true description of a portion of the world.
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Let us now keep realism aside. I want to investigate why one cannot expect 
that there is not one thing being converged on. Hacking says that
there can be heapings up of knowledge without there being any unity 
of science to which they all add up (Hacking 1983b, p. 55).
By spelling out this sentence it is possible to provide a picture of the evolution of 
scientific inquiry in the long run. The metaphor of 'heapings up ' of knowledge 
suggests that some of the knowledge acquired by using a given SoT is in some 
sense distinct from that acquired by using another SoT; the idea of no unity 
suggests that these supposed different parts of the our knowledge are not 
interconnected one with another. I shall clarify first what exactly accumulates and 
how; then I shall examine the question of the interconnectedness.
I recall that the discontinuous emergence of different SoTs implies that at 
different times of the history unrelated sets of questions have been considered 
important. For example, while after the emergence of the statistical SoT problems 
in social mathematics such as the distribution of age at marriage have been a 
matter of study, they were not 'live' in the ancient Greece.
The metaphor of 'heapings up of knowledge' should not invite the thought 
that knowledge is simply something that is 'out there' and needs to be picked up. 
W hat a SoT 'puts in a heap' is for example 'new objects', objects that did not exist 
before, such as the number zero in the case of the postulational SoT or the concept 
of species in the case of taxonomic SoT, or 'new phenomena', which did not exist 
before the emergence of the laboratory SoT, e.g. the laser or the Compton effect.
Furthermore, as Stephanie Ruphy points out, 'new objects' do not simply
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add further to all the objects of our knowledge but determine an 'ontological 
enrichment of the objects of science, to the extent that the use in scientific practice 
of different styles of reasoning widen and diversify the classes of propositions that 
can be true or false about them' (Ruphy 2011, p. 1220-1223). She gives the example 
of a forest fire: the statistical style adds statistical properties and the laboratory 
style adds controlled and purified versions of the natural phenomenon. The result 
is an object ontologically richer than the object 'forest fire' of the everyday life.
A first point we can make is that in as much as new questions, objects and 
phenomena are introduced by SoTs, their contingence is parasitic on that of the 
SoT they belong to. Ultimately, the contingency at the level of styles of reasoning 
implies a contingency at the level of the ontology.
The next question is whether the knowledge acquired by all the SoTs 
converges on any unity. I think that one can give a straight answer in the negative 
for several reasons. Indeed, the concept of convergence implies that w hat it is 
converged on is something that for some reason is final and completed. But the 
process by which many items of knowledge emerge is open-ended. Firstly, within 
a SoT new phenomena as well as new objects are in principle 'created' 
continuously. Secondly, new SoTs may emerge in the future, e.g. as consequence 
of the informational revolution, bringing into being new questions, instruments 
and previously unknown phenomena.
Furthermore, it might be impossible to connect all we have already found out 
by adopting the six SoTs, from the evolution of disc galaxies to how enzymes 
work (see also Hacking 1996). Firstly, even though it were possible in principle to 
connect logically different parts of sciences there would not be certain that actually,
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soon or later, they would get connected. The history of physics offers many 
examples of different accounts that ended up being considered equivalent: e.g. the 
two different formulations of the differential calculus of Newton and Leibniz or 
the wave and matrix mechanics formulations in quantum mechanics. But, as 
Hacking points out, that was a contingent fact:
[M]en like Laplace and Lagrange working around 1800, were in some 
sense obtaining consequences of Newton's laws of motion [...].They 
had to invent the language in which the conclusions could be 
expressed. [...] They were not just joining up the dots to complete a 
picture. They had to put in the dots (Hacking 2002 [1982] -a, p. 175).
In addition, the theory of SoTs opposes two 'theses of unity', which Hacking 
has discussed in 'The disunity of science' (Hacking 1999b, p. 76). The first one is a 
thesis of interconnectedness: the idea that all the phenomena are related to each 
other. This is the conception of the world that urges scientists to unify all the 
fundamental forces in terms of a single field. The second is a structural thesis: the 
idea that the truths about the world are connected with each other and form a 
structure in which some of them imply all the others. In particular, the advocates 
of this thesis might maintain that there are certain causes, necessary or 
probabilistic, which imply all the other causes of phenomena; or they might claim 
that there are logical relations between all the laws of the universe. Some scientists 
are neither reductionists nor holists but they believe that all the explanations stand 
in logical relation (Hacking 1996, p. 46,47).
If the laws of two classes of phenomena are not logically connected, it seems
STYLES O F  T H IN K IN G : ASSESSING A N D  DEVELOPING
IAN H A CK IN G 'S  HISTORICAL EPISTEM O LO G Y
3 6 5
impossible that these two classes of phenomena are interconnected. So, to deny 
the second thesis means to deny the first one too. Now, the theory of SoTs denies 
the second thesis. Indeed, for instance, the kind of explanations provided by the 
historico-genetic SoT are radically different from those provided by the laboratory 
SoT. The historical explanations have the character of a story that cannot be tested 
in a laboratory.
The points I have made in this section make it clear that the knowledge that 
we acquire by adopting different SoTs has no unity and cannot converge on any 
kind of unitary description of the world. It is for this reason that Hacking's 
metaphor is appropriate: there are 'heapings up ' of knowledge because each SoT 
accumulates new laws, phenomena, facts, and objects that cannot be connected by 
a single description of the world. The idea of convergence of science on a single 
true, coherent and complete description in the long run is at odds with the 
mechanism by which the SoTs produce knowledge: the growth of many different 
epistemological items is open-ended and never final and complete.
9.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have considered a number of connections between various ideas 
of the theory of SoTs and the issue of the inevitability of science. By addressing 
four fundamental questions I have discussed how both inevitability and 
contingency play a major role in the evolution of sciences. On the basis of my 
discussion, I advocate a position between the two extremes of contingentism and
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inevitabilism. Given the point of origin of the evolutionary tree of the SoTs, i.e. 
the birth of the algorithmic SoT, the expansion of trunk and branches is a random 
growth away from simple beginnings that produces more and more complexity.
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Chapter Ten: Concluding Remarks
10.1 Summary of the argument
In chapter two and three I have given substance to the notion of SoT by 
characterizing six modes of thinking that, although different in nature, subject 
matter and historical trajectory share a set of common features. SoTs are not only 
specific ways of reasoning but also ways of doing and finding out; they are long 
lasting, have sharp beginnings, possess techniques of self-vindication and 
introduce new objects, standards of truth and candidates for truth or falsehood. 
The internal techniques of self-vindication - 1 have argued in chapter four - make 
SoTs different from other ways of thinking, in particular those that are not in use 
in scientific research.
Despite the doubts expressed by Hacking and the close connection between 
his kind of study and what Netz has called 'cognitive history', in chapter five I 
have argued that the SoTs project fits into the area of research of historical 
epistemology. Tracing the connections between historical epistemology and a 
specific French tradition in philosophy of science has helped me to reinforce this 
thesis. I have then compared Hacking's SoTs project with Daston's study on 
objectivity and Williams's genealogy of knowledge. Thanks to these comparative 
analyses I have identified points where the three projects support one another and
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I have concluded that SoTs can be viewed both as different ways of being objective 
and as different perspectives from which to look at the world.
In chapter six I have started to draw some major implications from the SoTs 
project. First of all, in the light of a line of inquiry undertaken by the philosopher 
Edward Craig I have raised a philosophical issue, which I have called the 
incommensurability issue, and I have characterized it within the context of the 
recent discussions in philosophy of science. In brief, the issue amounts to the 
question as to whether there is an independent and atemporal justification for 
every claim made in a certain SoT. My answer has been in the negative and my 
argument can be found in chapter seven and eight. I have argued that the claim of 
entity realism made by Hacking is a case of a claim in the laboratory SoT that has 
no independent and atemporal justification outside it: whether the laboratory SoT 
is a way of finding out nearly theory-free (as Hacking claims) or not, Hacking's 
characterization of SoTs implies that entity realism is justified in the laboratory 
SoT and unjustified outside of it. This is a thesis of incommensurability: two 
different communities that at different times adopt two different SoTs may not 
have common research standards to assess the truth of a scientific claim. At a 
more general level, my point implies that Hacking's experimental realism -  the 
claim that we know about unobservable entities - is not consistent with the 
epistemic relativistic implications of his SoTs project.
In chapter eight I have offered a more general argument for the thesis of 
incommensurability that concerns all the SoTs, i.e. an argument that is not specific 
to the laboratory SoT. I have compared the notion of SoT with Wittgenstein's
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notion of form of life and concluded, as a general fact concerning all the SoTs, that 
they are ungrounded and epistemically incommensurable.
Finally, I have examined the implications of the SoTs project for the 
contingency issue. I have 1) given a picture of the evolution of sciences in terms of 
the emergence and stabilization of the SoTs 2) discussed how both inevitability and 
contingency play a major role in the emergence and endurance of SoTs 3) pointed 
out that each SoT is grounded in certain objective features of the portion of the 
world it studies 4) argued that there are good reasons for being inevitabilist about 
the convergence of science on correct answers to single questions; although, as 
Hacking maintains, it is contingent that those questions have been asked. Point 3) 
and the self-authenticating character of SoTs can explain why SoTs are long 
lasting. This relevant point can be drawn from my discussion in section 4.2 and 
9.3. To finish, on the basis of the features of the SoTs I have concluded that the 
idea of convergence of science in the long run on a single true, coherent and 
complete description does not jibe with the claim that the SoTs continually enrich 
our present ontology.
10.2 Looking ahead
I would like to conclude this dissertation by introducing some possible themes for 
future research. One of the aims of this thesis has been to draw philosophical 
implications from the SoTs project and assess them both in terms of coherence 
internal to Hacking's philosophy of science and in terms of comparative analyses 
with other authors. To this intent, in the first chapters I have developed a theory of
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SoTs by relying on Hacking's suggestions as well as on most of the sources he 
considered valuable. I now want to stress that in order to subscribe to Hacking's 
account of SoTs, or my developed version, it would be necessary to present 
independent evidence. In particular, it could be a task for further research to 
analyse Hacking's sources and compare them with other texts. Hacking's claims 
about the emergence and the stabilization of SoTs should be tested against a wider 
portion of history of science. For example, the methods of historical epistemology 
could be used in order to investigate a point that is crucial for the 
incommensurability claim: Hacking's point that SoTs have sharp beginnings, 
which mark a point of discontinuity in the history of thought.
Viewed as a study on how new concepts and sentences become possible, 
the SoTs project needs a more detailed comparative analysis of the different 
responses given by the historical epistemologists to the problem of how objectivity 
changes. The theory of SoTs would also benefit from the contribution of cognitive 
and biological sciences. Indeed, if this theory can be described as a work of 
cognitive history, first of all it is necessary to identify better the cognitive 
capacities that led to certain ways of acquiring knowledge. It might also be that by 
identifying new ways of tapping human resources, for example by investigating 
the impact of the Internet on our actual ways of knowing and doing, we can 
discover new SoTs.
I also think that the theory of SoTs has much to say in relation to the 
problem of demarcation between science and non-science. Hacking has suggested 
that only the sciences exhibit styles of reasoning that have developed self- 
authenticating techniques. However, he did not develop enough the concept of
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self-authentication, perhaps because he was not interested in a normative criterion 
for establishing what is scientific and what is not. Yet I think that the more we 
characterize the ways of thinking of the sciences the more we understand about 
what distinguishes science from non-science.
To conclude, I have conducted a philosophical analysis of Hacking's SoTs 
project. It seems to me that the most pregnant conclusion of this analysis is that, if 
we accept Hacking's characterization of SoTs, our ways of knowing are 
ungrounded - our knowledge has no foundations. Moreover, we m ust be 
prepared to accept the idea that in some cases our claims have no atemporal and 
independent justification. Having said that, I think it is important to realise that it 
is possible to assess these conclusions by carrying out a closer examination of the 
SoTs features suggested by Hacking. I do feel that it would be interesting to 
continue the investigation on this basis. My belief is that history of science and 
epistemology would have to play a decisive role, together with philosophical 
argumentation.
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